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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND THE INVENTION OF MULTINATIONAL
PEACE OPERATIONS, 1946 TO 1968

Michael Dwight Davis, Doctor Philosophy, 1998

Dissertation directed by: Professor Jon T. Sumida
Department of History

The United Nations was established in 1945 with its primary tasks to promote international peace and security. A foundational premise of the new organization was that the world's most powerful nations would cooperate to carry out these goals. Instead, the post-war international system split into three parts: the West, the East, and peripheral states. Subsequently, neither eastern nor western blocs entrusted the United Nations with the responsibility or the means to effect a system of international "collective security." As a result, one half of the UN's political mission statement was thwarted. On the other hand, the organization's efforts to promote peaceful relations within and between states were more successful, especially in the periphery—in areas beyond direct East or West control, but of great interest to both. By defusing or containing peripheral disputes, through ad hoc instrumentalities—or "peace operations"—the United Nations made its greatest contributions. In developing this capacity and conducting these missions, the United States was the organization's most staunch supporter—for both ideological and cost-benefit reasons.

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Peace operations conducted by the United Nations between 1946 and 1968—the organization's "first generation of peacekeeping"—comprised four mission types: observation, traditional peacekeeping, enforcement, and nation-building. This study documents the development of these missions and U.S. support of UN efforts in Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, the Kashmir, Korea, the Sinai and Gaza Strip, Lebanon, the Congo, West New Guinea, Yemen, and Cyprus. It also examines the actions of regional organizations in Kuwait and the Dominican Republic as "extensions" of UN peacekeeping.

Every U.S. president from Truman to Johnson proclaimed that the United Nations was a "cornerstone" of U.S. foreign policy. Although previously dismissed by diplomatic historians as mere rhetoric, Washington firmly supported UN mediation and peacekeeping efforts. The U.S. delegation sought to strengthen the organization's capacity to promote international peace. U.S. military supplies and services were critical to the success of nearly every UN peacekeeping mission. Financially, U.S. contributions consistently exceeded 40% of UN expenses. United Nations' peace operations embodied American ideological sentiments and played an important role in stabilizing the international system during the Cold War's most dangerous years.

THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE INVENTION
OF MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

1946 TO 1968

by

Michael Dwight Davis

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1998

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or the U.S. Government.

PREFACE

In 1945, fifty-one sovereign governments founded the United Nations as a world organization whose primary purpose was to promote “international peace and security.”¹ This goal, written into the opening paragraphs of the United Nations’ (UN) Charter, reflected high hopes for global cooperation in the wake of an unprecedented world war. The Charter’s idealistic founders had envisioned an international “system of collective security,” in which the victorious allied powers of the Second World War would cooperatively provide the organization with the military, political, and economic strength needed to make the world a safer place.² Instead, even before the war had

¹ United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, Preamble. For excerpts see Appendix A. The UN Charter was signed by 50 nations on 26 June and took effect on 24 October 1945. The United Nations was charged with numerous other political, economic and social goals, but the UN Charter, itself, identified “peace and security” as its primary organizational objectives in the first sentence of article 1.

² The Charter’s founders called for united great powers to provide the United Nations with significant military and police forces, while member-states disarmed and left “enforcement” to the United Nations. This plan for building a collective capacity to react against “Threats to” or “Breaches of the Peace” was outlined in articles 43 through 47. The key was article 43—calling for the Council member-states to provide units that would perform “enforcement” duties, but no units were ever provided due to disagreements over what types of forces would be provided and who control them. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Chapter One of this study. For works explaining the UN International Organization Conferences (drafting the Charter) and how the UN “security system” was envisioned by its founders, see Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949); and a twenty-years-later revision in Anne P. Simons, Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

ended, mistrust between Communist and Capitalist systems strained allied relations. As soon as the war ended, the former allies quickly drifted apart and became convinced that each was bent on the destruction of the other. As a result, rather than following through with commitments to the United Nations, the organization's most powerful members chose to guard jealously their own "national security interests." From 1949, much of the world was split into two opposing, nuclear-armed camps—"East and West." The United Nations' foundational principle—that of "great-power unanimity"—had collapsed. The Charter provisions to create "enforcement machinery" in support of an international collective-security system were early casualties of the intensifying ideological "Cold War."³ In sum, a formulaic half of the organization's "primary purpose" was compromised.

At this point, it remained to be seen whether a disunited United Nations' organization could devise alternative means and methods to meet its remaining principle objective, that of promoting international peace. From the start, this pursuit also was limited by manifestations of the Cold War. As the superpowers extended their influence and control, each side opposed UN peace initiatives within their own sphere—for by allowing the United Nations an opportunity to conduct "peace operations"⁴ in these areas, the "enemy" potentially would participate. During the

³ "Cold War:" a period of indeterminate beginning and end, (generally accepted as 1947 to 1989, but tensions existed much earlier and continued into the early 1990s). The Cold war was waged across a spectrum from ideological and economic competition to that of indirect military confrontation. The contending superpowers (the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each leading a group of allies or blocs) were clearly "enemies," but were careful to avoid risking direct military (hot) war with one another. For a synthesis history of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁴ This study employs the terms "peace operations," "operations for peace," or "field operations" to denote the most inclusive category of UN or multinational peace missions. In the analysis that follows, this study further classifies peace operations into four categories: observation, interposition, enforcement, and nation building. The term "peace operations" was adopted as "official terminology" at the highest levels of U.S. government in the 1990s. See for example, President William J. Clinton's "U.S. Policy

Cold-War era, UN peace missions were rarely authorized in areas under direct superpower influence. Some members lamented the organization's inability to take action in these cases (for example, when the United States precluded UN "meddling" in Guatemala's affairs in 1954, and the Soviet Union shut out UN investigators and mediators from Hungary in November 1956). But such attitudes reflected unrealistic assessments of the Cold-War international system and a misunderstanding of the UN's inherent limitations. From the beginning, even if it had been supplied military forces, the organization was never intended to act against great powers.⁵ The "veto power" granted to the Security Council's "permanent members" virtually ensured that this would be the case. Instead, it was in the "periphery"⁶—within or between states not under direct "East or West" control—that certain powerful UN member-states, especially the United States, were amenable to promoting UN-sponsored peace operations. It was within this limited, but nonetheless crucial realm, that the United Nations (employing innovative means and methods that were less clearly set out in the Charter⁷) was to make its most important political contributions.

on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), and William J. Clinton, "Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and Enlargement," in American Defense Policy, 7th edn., eds. Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance and Alan R. Van Tassel, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 284-97.

⁵ For contemporary sources that clearly recognized these truths, see the articles: "The Small Powers," editorial, New York Times, 9 March 1945; and "The Great Powers," editorial, New York Times, 16 March 1945 reproduced in Robert E. Summers, ed., Dumbarton Oaks (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945), 132-35, 180-81.

⁶ This term is used interchangeably with that of "the third world" to mean those states "not aligned" with either East or West, and in which both sides held interests, but did not exercise direct control.

⁷ Adam Roberts, his work representative of mainstream scholarship in this field, agreed that early on, "many of the gaps and inadequacies of the Charter system [were] filled by creative interpretation and ingenious improvisation." Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force," Survival 37/4 (Winter 1995-96): 8.

Between 1946 and 1968,⁸ the member-states of the United Nations devised certain ad hoc “instrumentalities” to help defuse or contain potentially explosive inter- or intra-state disputes. At the same time, the organization dispatched negotiators to mediate either short- or long-term political settlements. The focus of this study is on how the United Nations developed and employed this “peace machinery,” where, in what circumstances, and how multinational representatives conducted their assigned tasks; and what role the United States government played in the creation, direction, and support of these UN peace operations.

This study investigates fourteen distinct missions that were generated or sanctioned by the United Nations in the years between 1946 and 1968.⁹ This group is defined here as “first-generation peace operations”—a distinction that is based upon a timeline of missions rather than functional typology (which is further defined below).¹⁰

⁸ The year 1968 coincided with the end of what this study terms “first-generation peace operations” (described below). At the time of research for this project, 1968 also marked a delimitation as to the availability of many primary sources including the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series (of which, volumes from the early 1960s were still awaiting publication). To supplement this spotty availability of State Department records after 1960, research was conducted at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries.

⁹ Eleven of the cases addressed in this dissertation were operations sanctioned and supervised by the UN organization proper. Three others—the multinational military “peace operations” conducted in Korea, Kuwait, and the Dominican Republic—were “authorized” by the United Nations (and justified under the Charter), but were conducted by other “entities” not from UN headquarters. These three additional missions are included in this study to demonstrate how such endeavors may be defined as “multinational peace operations” conducted within the UN Charter, and as “UN peacekeeping,” broadly defined.

¹⁰ After 1968, UN member-states were disenchanted with the “failure” of peacekeeping to prevent the third Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. Three new missions were created in the 1970s, all of them on the borders of Israel. It was not until April 1988 that another UN “peacekeeping” mission was created. Thereafter, in rapid succession, at least 22 new missions were generated in the next six years and UN peace operations began what was certainly a distinctly new generation of missions. For a pictorial overview of these missions by “timeline” see Stanley Meisler, The United Nations: The First Fifty Years (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 372-73. For an alternative definition of the terms “first generation” or “second generation”

In the chapters that follow, each case is examined, primarily, in light of its “operational environment”¹¹ and with respect to the means by which UN representatives attempted to fulfill their taskings.¹² With respect to the terms “peace” and UN “peace operations,” further clarification is necessary. Peace, as a function of “peace studies” or “peace operations” has assumed a wide variety of meanings, from the most “negative,” that of “the absence of war,” to the most “positive,” associated with “tranquillity and justice for all.” Since this study is concerned with peace at the national and international levels, the term is employed here to refer to “control and limiting of structural violence”—where “structural violence” is that employed or directed by social groups, organizations, or governments.¹³ The construct “peace operations” is used in this investigation as a broad-based categorization to describe UN-sponsored field operations. Often, writers in this field of study have employed the terms “Peacekeeping” (or “Peace-keeping,” the preferred British variant) in a similar fashion. Because the UN Charter did not foresee the development of these

peacekeeping—emphasizing mission type differentiation instead of defining operations based on historical era—see John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, “Second-generation Multinational Operations,” *The Washington Quarterly* 15/3 (Summer 1992): 113-31.

¹¹ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: the Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), 17.

¹² Admittedly, there are other approaches to grouping these missions, some of which were conducted in fluid political and military environments, employing a variety of methods and seeking to carry out vague or shifting mandates. The work of Alan James, long-time professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, was seminal in suggesting such distinctions between various UN peace operations. See, for example, Alan James, *The Politics of Peace-Keeping* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969); and *idem*, “UN Action for Peace, I: “Barrier Forces,” II: “Law and Order Forces,” *The World Today*, Numbers 11 and 12 (November and December 1962). For studies that chart these missions along a “spectrum of operations,” see Hillen, *Blue Helmets*, 16-31; and William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 4-7.

¹³ These insights are based, in part, on Bert V. A. Röling, “Peace Research and Peace-Keeping,” in *United Nations Peace-Keeping: Legal Essays*, ed. A. Cassese (The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 1978), 245.

“instrumentalities,” there existed a wide variety of definitions. The International Peace Academy, an educational organization concerned with these issues, offered the following definition in its 1984 Peacekeeper's Handbook:

International peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.¹⁴

This clear definition is adopted by this study, but with a substitution of the construct “peace operations” in lieu of “peacekeeping.” The problem with the latter is that “peacekeeping” was so closely associated with a specific type of mission (that of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956 to 1967), that it held both a specific and general connotation. To avoid confusing the popular term with the more specific category, the term “traditional peacekeeping” is employed by this study (see below and Chapter Five) when required to distinguish between intended meanings.

This study references four sub-classifications of “peace operations” (although there were cases of overlap), defining these as: “observation,” “traditional peacekeeping,” “enforcement,” and “nation-building.”¹⁵ United Nations’ observation missions were broad-based in scope, but normally were conducted by fewer than 500 international representatives (most less than 100)—each primarily serving to establish a token “UN presence” in a disputed or tense region of the world. These UN observer missions (as discussed in Chapters Two through Four of this study), performed a wide variety of administrative or constabulary functions. Observer duties included: investigating complaints or “violations,” monitoring the status of negotiated agreements (such as cease-fires, truces, or armistices), and “impartially” reporting back

¹⁴ International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 22.

¹⁵ A fifth possible category of UN peace operations, not archetypical of any first-generation missions, would be that of “humanitarian operations.” The employment of UN troops to guard convoys of food and supplies in Bosnia is an example of these missions that are closely associated with “nation-building.”

to the United Nations as the organization's "eyes and ears." Analytically, this study further divides these observer missions based on their various operational environments—that is, by the type of political and military situations into which they were deployed. Chapter Two deals with UN observation missions that were involved in interstate conflicts. In these cases, observers patrolled cease-fire or armistice lines that closely followed international boundaries or demarcated static positions. Chapter Three examines first-generation observation operations that were conducted in the midst of civil wars—each of which involved actual or alleged "external" complications. The first case study in Chapter Four examines the utility of observation as an adjunct to UN "colonial" operations. As an example of the United Nations' resourcefulness in generating its first observer missions, the military personnel reporting and investigating about the situation in Indonesia (one of the organization's first colonial transition disputes) were "on loan" to the United Nations from consular offices in Batavia/Jakarta.

"Traditional peacekeeping," the subject of Chapter Five, was most closely associated with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was formed in late 1956 and early 1957 following the October 1956 "Suez War." At that time, UNEF was thought to have established a new "model" for all subsequent international peacekeeping missions that followed. This proved to be an incorrect assumption, but some of UNEF's "guiding principles" were successfully applied to the conduct of other first-generation UN peace operations. What was unique to UNEF, and what is characteristic of traditional peacekeeping as defined by this study, was that UNEF originated the practice of deploying multinational contingents as an "interpositionary" or "buffer force" stationed between contending parties or states. In this regard, few other missions were sufficiently large enough, or employed in similar circumstances to follow the "example" set by UNEF. On the other hand, UNEF's initial tasking, that of separating belligerent forces and allowing them to withdraw from a foreign state's soil, was mandated to other UN missions. Similar tasks were most successfully conducted in the case of the India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) during the 1965 Indian-

Pakistani war (also discussed in Chapter Five). In the Congo mission (ONUC, see Chapter Six), these objectives were accomplished less effectively because the Belgian forces (those to be withdrawn) did not cooperate willingly with UN efforts.

“Enforcement missions,” a third category of UN first-generation peace operations, were more difficult to conduct and, therefore, more controversial. As a general rule, the United Nations cautioned its military or police contingents against employing “deadly force” except in cases of self-defense. This heretofore “principle of peacekeeping” remained a guideline even in enforcement missions, but the concept of self-defense was “stretched” (as required) to allow UN contingents to employ significant firepower to “defend military positions” or to gain “freedom of movement.” Enforcement operations were conducted by the United Nations in locations where there was a collapse of central state authority, as in both the Congo (1960-64, covered in Chapter Six) and Cyprus (1964 - , see Chapter Seven). Other “enforcement” actions sometimes categorized as “multinational peacekeeping” were U.S.-led contingents (both “sanctioned” by the United Nations) as in Korea (see Chapter Two), and as in the Dominican Republic (Chapter Seven). In the case of the Korean “police action” (1950-1953), a full-scale international conventional war was conducted in the name of the United Nations. Although there were sixteen nations fighting under the UN flag as “the United Nations Command” all of them were politically and militarily under the control of the United States.¹⁶

“Nation-building,” a fourth categorization of UN peace operations, was associated with UN or multinational efforts assisting others to conduct functions typically performed by governments or national military forces. These missions included: “impartially” supervising the conduct of elections (as in Korea, 1948; and in the Dominican Republic in 1966), coordinating humanitarian relief efforts (Korea,

¹⁶ See, for example, National Military Establishment, “Semi-annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,” 1 January to 15 June 1951 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 12 September 1951), 56-58; and James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Volume III: the Korean War, part 1 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1979), 131-175.

1950-1953), and serving in administrative positions of government (as in West New Guinea/Irian, 1962-63). In some respects, the civilian “international police” units that participated under the UN’s “transitional administration” of West New Guinea also fit within this category.

Of course, these subjective grouping are not intended to imply that “overlap” of mission functions did not occur within cases considered. The missions that began primarily as observer missions, even though they may have performed other functions, are covered by this study in Chapters Two and Three. The situation in Korea, which began as a UN mediation and observation effort in 1947, later exhibited traits of all peace-operation categories.¹⁷ The Congo crisis, similarly, began as an attempt to use UN forces to supervise the withdrawal of Belgian military forces (a function associated with “traditional peacekeeping”), but later resorted to “enforcement” operations and also supported UN “nation-building” initiatives. Thus, it is clear that neat divisions by mission type are not always possible. In most cases, however, they can serve to help conceptualize and distinguish between the variety of missions that often are lumped together under generic classifications such as “peacekeeping” or “peace operations.”

Critical to this study, therefore, is an understanding of what UN peace operations were and were not. For example, U.S.-UN initiatives in the field of arms control, although extremely important, are not a subject of this investigation.¹⁸ Similarly, not all of the multitude of UN-sponsored mediations or “peace talks” are considered by this study. This does not mean to imply that diplomacy and peace negotiations are

¹⁷ After 1953, the multinational “buffer force” that patrolled and guarded South Korea’s side of a demilitarized zone, (though not a UN mission, *per se*) continued to perform both observation and “traditional peacekeeping” functions.

¹⁸ Although, regional arms control and peace operations are complementary. Both aim to defuse tensions or limit hostilities; and are interdependent. In 1947, President Truman wrote, “The nations can safely lay aside their arms only in so far as their security is protected by other means.” Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 5 February 1947, in Department of State, The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President of the United States on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein for the Calendar Year 1946, DOS Publication 2735, Report Series 7 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1947), v.

irrelevant. They are a separate and important dimension of conflict resolution that will be addressed in this study when they corresponded to or resulted from on-going UN-sponsored peace operations. In addition, other miscellaneous efforts directed by UN agencies, international consortiums and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the fields of economic policy, refugee programs, national development programs, humanitarian operations, and election monitoring—may have supported UN peace efforts, but unless they were integral to the conduct of UN or multinational peace operations, they also do not fall within the scope of this study.¹⁹

Chapter Seven, on the other hand, challenges one commonly narrow definition of “UN peacekeeping.” It provides historical examples that demonstrate how and why multinational operations conducted by regional organizations should be considered as proper extensions of the “UN peacekeeping system”—broadly defined. The Regional arrangements discussed in this Chapter, as defined under Charter Chapter VIII and later granted “observer status” by the United Nations, included: the Organization of American States (OAS), the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and European organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).²⁰ Each of these groups demonstrated the capacity, at one time or another, to sponsor and conduct regional peace operations. This study includes analysis of multinational peace operations conducted in Cyprus (although officially a UN effort, it was primarily a European affair), Kuwait (an LAS-sponsored buffer mission), and the Dominican Republic (initially a U.S.-unilateral intervention that sparked an OAS initiative to supplement U.S. military forces with contingents from other American countries, that generated a three-man UN political and observation mission). Taken together, these

¹⁹ Some of these functions may be tasked to peacekeepers in their original mandates—especially those engaged in “nation-building” efforts.

²⁰ NATO and OSCE were not granted observer status during the period under investigation (1946 to 1968). Other than NATO, “collective defense organizations” did not normally fit into this categorization. Most were simply treaties of guarantee for mutual defense and did not possess a central policy-making or political structure.

examples demonstrate how such regional arrangements were able to conduct peace operations in the past and may hold lessons for future alternative peacekeeping options.²¹

Historiographically, this investigation of United Nations' first-generation peace operations provides the basis for examining a number of intriguing questions. Much of the existing literature views UN peace operations in light of the Cold War and issues of national interest. To a degree, it is useful to examine UN peace operations as extensions of great-power politics—that is, as the continuation of power politics by new methods. But that is not the approach employed by this study. Instead, this analysis stipulates that first-generation UN peace operations represented a part of the international “peace and security” picture that, previously, has been ignored or dismissed as irrelevant.²² A range of possible viewpoints exists for examining the nature of the relationship between first-generation UN peace operations and U.S. involvement. From a strategic perspective, UN peace operations supported aspects of the over-riding American Cold-War policy of “containment.”²³ An unexplored point of

²¹ The European involvement in Bosnia (1995 -) is instructive in this regard. A UN mission there (UNPROFOR) was replaced by a “NATO peacekeeping force” (under various names, IFOR, SFOR, etc.). The latest in this expansion of UN-emulation was the announcement, on 14 October 1998, that the OSCE was creating a 2,000-man “inspection” team to observe disengagement of “Yugoslavian” (Serbian) forces from Kosovo. Bill Sammon, “U.S. Plans to Send Civilians to Kosovo: Inspectors Won’t Carry Weapons,” The Washington Times, 14 October 1998, A1, A20.

²² This claim is developed and substantiated further in Chapter One.

²³ Containment, as a strategy for preventing the ideological and geostrategic expansion of Communism after Second World War, was adopted by the U.S. as the main approach for dealing with the USSR, the Eastern bloc in Europe, and Communist China between 1949 and 1989. The strategy was credited to George F. Kennan, a U.S. diplomat and Russian expert who served in a number of influential policymaking positions within the State Department between 1943 and 1963. See Kennan’s first statement of this concept in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, XXV (July 1947): 566-82—signed by “Mr. X.” For further explanation of the development of containment as an American Cold-War strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy

view, is that U.S. support for UN peace operations strengthened the United Nations' legitimacy and significance in the role of international conflict resolution. It is the contention of this study that U.S. interests in and support of UN peace operations were manifestations of U.S. internationalist idealism; an ideology that was predisposed to support the United Nations and experiment with new approaches for resolving international conflicts. Thus, U.S. attitudes towards and support for multinational peace operations through UN auspices were not as one-dimensional as many Cold-War scholars would have us believe.

While the events and ideologies that shaped America's Cold-War experience define certain contextual aspects of this study, the question of U.S. support for UN peace operations goes beyond this single dimension. American policymakers supported first-generation UN peace operations for a variety of reasons. Certainly, these UN missions were employed, collectively, as an "instrument of foreign policy."²⁴ But also, U.S. commitment to improving the United Nations' capacity to promote international peace reflected more than just raw power calculations. Most of the American policymakers who were assigned as representatives to the United Nations saw a higher purpose for the world organization. These men and women were visionary leaders, like Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt, and were committed to Charter "ideals"—earnestly seeking to help the organization more effectively achieve its stated "purposes and principles."²⁵ Accordingly, this study attempts to define the history of U.S.-UN cooperative peacekeeping efforts and to demonstrate that American "international

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²⁴ See, for example, Stanley Jacob Michalak, Jr., "The Senate and the UN: A Study of Changing Perceptions About the Utility and Limitations of the United Nations as an Instrument of Peace and Security and its Role in American National Security Policy," Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1967; and Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest, rev. edn. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

²⁵ See UN Charter Chapter I, Appendix A.

idealism”²⁶ played a more significant role in the determination of U.S. foreign policy than most Cold War “realist” policymakers and historians have, heretofore, considered.²⁷

The existing secondary scholarship addressing U.S.-UN relations and UN peace operations is voluminous. Most of this work has been written by U.S. or UN public servants,²⁸ journalists,²⁹ and political scientists.³⁰ Much of this literature, especially that

²⁶ For a greater in-depth explanation and analysis of these ideologies, see Chapter One and Chapter Four of this study.

²⁷ For an example of literature dismissing much or all UN peace operations during the Cold War period as “ineffective,” see A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); David J. Whittaker, United Nations in Action (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 7th revised edn. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²⁸ For example, Harry S Truman, Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956); Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (1965) and idem, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (1965); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967); Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (NY: W. W. Norton, 1969); Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, as told to Richard Rusk and edited by Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990); Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954); Wilder Foote, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1953-1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); U Thant, View From the UN (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1978); Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972); idem, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).

²⁹ Stanley Meisler, The United Nations: The First Fifty Years (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995). Meisler was a foreign correspondent for the Los Angeles Times and was later assigned to cover the United Nations.

³⁰ Such as, Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Clarendon

published in the past few years, lacks an historical perspective and is weakened by clichés and assumptions about first-generation peace operations that do not withstand careful scrutiny. A case in point can be made with respect to the so-called “principles of peacekeeping.” Recent articles and books commonly list these imprecise generalizations as hard and fast rules. The first principle, according to a recently-published article by a former UN “undersecretary for peacekeeping operations”³¹ asserts that all of these missions were financed by UN members, “collectively.” There were important and innovative exceptions in the cases of Yemen (covered in Chapter Three), West New Guinea/Irian (Chapter Four), and Cyprus (Chapter Seven). The second principle purports that UN peace operations were fielded “with the consent of all the parties involved.” Also, not true. In the case of UNEF (1956-1967), Israel refused to allow the United Nations to operate on its side of the boundary. Had the Israeli government provided its “consent,” UNEF may not have had to withdraw in 1967 at Nasser’s insistence (see Chapter Five). In a number of disputes involving UN observers, there was consent for UN operations granted by one party, but not by others—the Greek civil war was a case in point (Chapter Three). A third widely-believed principle states that, “during the Cold-War era, there was rarely superpower or even ‘big five’ participation in these missions.” This was only true for a very limited time period (between 1957 and 1961), and only if one defines “participation” to mean contributing infantry soldiers. As will be made clear in the case-studies that follow, in every mission, the United States participated with financial, logistical, and airlift support. Even in the Congo, U.S. “advisers” and air-crew members were essential to that mission’s ambitious enforcement operations in Katanga, between 1960 and 1963. During the UN mission for West New Guinea/Irian in 1962 and 1963, a U.S. military unit was officially a participant in the UN Security Forces (UNSF) serving the UN

Press, 1993); and Toby Trister Gati, ed., The U.S., The UN, and the Management of Global Change (NY: New York University Press, 1983).

³¹ Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” International Affairs 69/3 (3 July 1993): 453-55.

Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). These are only a few examples. Therefore, it is clear that a comprehensive, historically-based survey of this subject, with reference to primary and insightful secondary historical analyses, is sorely-needed to inform the field of UN peacekeeping studies.

In addition to setting the record straight, the issue of American idealism and its influence on U.S. support of and action through the United Nations needs to be reconsidered. Recently, scholars in the field have admitted that much of the work performed by American Cold-War historians and realpolitik theorists was fixated upon the strategic aspects of the Cold War.³² If existing works consider the United Nations' as an instrument of U.S. policy at all, they have asserted myopically that UN efforts to "promote international security and peace" were rendered ineffective by Cold-War antagonisms.³³ As alluded to above, this is, at best, a half-truth. As a "collective security" organization, the United Nations was clearly inadequate. The reason was that the "great powers" abandoned the concept early on³⁴ and they failed to trust each other

³² Speaking before a round-table discussion of scholars and students, Professor John Lewis Gaddis said that "neglect of ideology was a weakness of old Cold-War studies." Author's personal notes of John Lewis Gaddis, Round Table Talk Held at the Woodrow Wilson Center For Scholars, 6 March 1996, Washington, D.C. For works that typify this "old Cold-War style," see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945 - 1996, 8th edn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997); and John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. For an insight into Cold-War ideologies, see Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition In The Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1987).

³³ For example, Stephen J. Cimbala, Collective Insecurity: U.S. Defense Policy and the New World Disorder (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1995); Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter J. Geib, The Origins of the Soviet-American Conflict over United Nations Peacekeeping: 1942 - 1948 (Emporia, KS: State Teachers' College, 1974); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1951).

³⁴ Joseph Stalin's paranoia and fear of President Truman's "nuclear saber-rattling" spurred the USSR to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe. In 1949,

enough to enact Charter articles 42-47.³⁵ Between 1946 and 1968, “security” for the major blocs was “guaranteed” by mutual defense treaties, and later, by the superpower’s reliance upon “mutually assured destruction.”³⁶ On the other hand, the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization made significant contributions—few of which were recognized by scholars, because of an irrational lament that United Nations was unable to promote peace within the spheres of the superpowers. This was never an option from the start—even the great powers realized that the system was could not be used against them. Instead, it needs to be emphasized that it was within the “periphery”—those areas of the world outside direct East or West control—that the United Nations was most successful at conducting “peacekeeping” (but not as effective securing long-term political settlements).³⁷

the West responded by working to erect a ring of defensive arrangements that could “contain” the Soviet bloc and Communist China. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 71-88; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 15-19, 30-94, 495-520.

³⁵ For a scholarly analysis of the decisions made by the Truman administration to abandon the United Nations’ “security machinery,” see Thomas M. Campbell, Masquerade Peace: America’s UN Policy, 1944-1945 (Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University Press, 1973), especially 194-205.

³⁶ See for example, David Alan Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); and John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988): 55-79; and Idem, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989, 90).

³⁷ As a result of the strategic stalemate, events outside the East and West spheres assumed importance beyond their intrinsic value. During the Cold War, nearly every state of “elevated nuclear alert” was in response to crises at the periphery. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1992), 510.

The United Nations' conduct of first-generation peace operations in the peripheral regions helped defuse local disputes and limited the superpowers' perceived stake in every crisis. And it was "national pride," more than anything else that drew great powers into the vortex of peripheral-state politics. In these cases where both East and West majorities at the United Nations agreed that "multinational peacekeeping" was the "most appropriate means" to take action, this allowed the great powers to take a more disinterested approach to the multitude of crises that developed outside their direct spheres of control. As a result of this schism between tightly-controlled security policies and looser alternatives to peacekeeping (depending upon the location of the international dispute relative to spheres of power), there emerged a de facto division of responsibility for promoting international "security and peace" during the Cold War. America's realists, with their defensive coalitions and strategic calculations, monitored and closely guarded the strategic aspects of international security. At the same time, and in a complementary fashion, the United Nations was supported by U.S. idealists who touted the United Nations as a "first option" for promoting peace in the potentially-explosive periphery. To this point, such assertions have been neglected, but they should not be discounted. Consider former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg's³⁸ reflections regarding these issues:

The real test of the UN is political—what it can do in political terms to assure peace and security. Its accomplishments in these areas is a mixed bag. However, if the UN were junked, we'd have to recreate it tomorrow.³⁹

That so experienced an American public servant concluded the United Nations was necessary emphasizes the need to readdress the role of the United Nations in the

³⁸ Arthur J. Goldberg served between 1965 and 1968 as the seventh U.S. Ambassador (Permanent Representative) to the United Nations. He was a U.S. Supreme Court Justice between 1962 and 1965. For a brief analytical account of Goldberg's tenure, see Victor Laskey, Arthur Goldberg: The Old and the New (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1970), 51-98.

³⁹ Arthur J. Goldberg quoted in Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 168.

conduct of U.S. foreign policy between 1946 and 1968. Thirty years later, in 1994, Rosalyn Higgins (an expert in the field of UN peace studies) wrote: “all the lessons of the necessary conditions for UN peace-keeping seem to have been forgotten.”⁴⁰ The case studies and analysis presented in this study bring these lessons together and offer scholars a foundation to build upon.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the United States Air Force for providing me a tuition scholarship and for allowing me to pursue this degree while serving on active duty. The staffs of the United Nations Archives, the National Archives, (College Park), the Library of Congress, and the U.S. Presidential Libraries in Abilene, Boston, and Austin, were all friendly and helpful.

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I am indebted also to my extended family, friends and local Solid Rock Church members for all their hours of prayers and encouraging words. Finally, I dedicate this project to the love of my life, Karen Sue and our two sons Andrew and Roger. Without their patience and understanding I would still be typing long into the night.

As ever, all unintentional misstatements and mistakes are my own.

⁴⁰ Rosalyn Higgins, excerpts from Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), chapter in United Nations Peace Operations: A Collection of Primary Documents and Readings Governing the Conduct of Multilateral Peace Operations, ed. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr. (New York: American Heritage, 1995), 22.

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Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms

[Including effective dates for U.N. Missions/establishment dates for organizations]

ADL	Armistice Demarcation Line
ANC	Congolese National Army (Léopoldville government)
BSC	Balkan Sub-Commission (of the U.N. General Assembly's Peace Observation Commission) [December 1951 to 1954]
CFL	Cease-Fire Line
CMO	Chief Military Observer (associated with U.N. Observer Missions such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP)
COAS	Council of the Organization of American States
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DDEL	The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (source for documents cited, part of the U.S. NA system, Abilene, KS)
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic [May 1965-October 1966]
DOD	The U.S. Department of Defense (Defense Department, established 1947, HQ at Pentagon, near D.C.)
DOS	The U.S. Department of State (State Department, an executive policy agency, established 1947, HQ Foggy Bottom, D.C.)
DPRK	Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (alternatively referenced as North Korea)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville government) the country's name was later changed to Zaïre, then back again

ECA/ERP	European Cooperation Administration/European [economic] Recovery Program—adjuncts to the “Marshall Plan” for the economic recovery of post W.W.II Europe—a U.S. government initiative that began in 1947
ELAS	Military arm of the Greek KKE Communist party, 1946-1951
ESS	Emergency Special Session(s) of the General Assembly—authorized under the 1950 UFP resolution (see below) and designated with the shorthand ESS-# —there were five ESS of the GA between 1956 and 1967
<u>FRUS</u>	<u>Foreign Relations of the United States</u> (volumes of selected diplomatic documents, compiled by the U.S. State Department)
GA	General Assembly [GA# for resolutions; A/# for documents] (Also a Division under SPA/UNA/IO for Assembly concerns)
GMT	Greenwich Mean Time (zero longitude, universal reference)
GOC	UN “Good Offices Committee” (Mission to NEI) [November 1947-January 1949] (UNCI after January 1949)
GRAND SLAM	ONUC’s military operations against Katangan forces; [December 1962-January 1963]
HQ	Headquarters, location of primary office of responsibility
IAPF	Inter-American Peace Force (used in Dominican Republic) [May 1965-September 1966]
ICJ	International Court of Justice (World Court)
IDF	Israel Defense Force, military forces of Israel, after 1949
IO	U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Organization Affairs [title for UNA after 1954] Also the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
IRC	The International Red Cross (and its affiliates)
JFKL	The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (source for documents cited, part of the U.S. NA system, Boston, MA)

KKE	A Greek Communist Party, active in the 1946-1951 civil war
LAS	The League of Arab States (established 22 March 1945)
LBJL	The Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (source for documents cited, part of the U.S. NA system, Austin, TX)
LON	League of Nations (1920-1946)
MAC	Mixed Armistice Commission (associated with UNTSO and the Korean armistice agreements) (plural, MACs)
MNF	Multinational Force (plural, MNFs)
MORTHOR	ONUC's second "mercenary round-up" operation in Katanga, September 1960 (the term "morthor" means "smash" in Hindi)
MSC	The Military Staff Committee—advising body of the UN SC
NA	U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C. and Adelphi, MD
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (established 4 April 1949)
NEI	The Netherlands' East Indies—Dutch colonial holdings that became the United States of Indonesia in December 1949
NGO	Non-governmental Organization (plural, NGOs)
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (non-UN body established to help supervise terms of Korean armistice, 1953)
OAS	Organization of American States (established 30 April 1948)
OAU	Organization of African Unity (established 25 May 1963)
ONUC	UN Congo Operation (<u>Opération des Nations Unies au Congo</u>) [July 1960-June 1964]
OSS	U.S. Office of Strategic Services (precursor to U.S. DOS)
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization (founded in 1964)

POC	Peace Observation Commission (General Assembly Body) (Created by the 1950 "Uniting for Peace Resolution"—rarely called into active use after 1954)
PKI	Communist Party in Indonesia
<u>PPP</u>	<u>Public Papers of the Presidents</u> (collections of U.S. presidential speeches and policy statements)
PRC	The Peoples' Republic of China (alternatively "mainland China" or "Communist China")
RG	Record Group (classification of U.S. archival documents)
ROC	The Republic of China (alternatively Formosa or Taiwan)
ROK	Republic of Korea (alternatively South Korea)
SC	UN Security Council [SC# for resolutions; S/# for documents]
SCP	Special Committee on Palestine (also UNSCOP)
SCUA	Suez Canal Users Association (established September 1956)
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement (plural, SOFAs)
SPA	U.S. Department of State Office of Special Political Affairs: renamed the Office of UN Affairs in 1948; after October 1949 renamed Bureau of UN Affairs (both abbreviated as UNA); in August 1954 renamed again as Bureau of International Affairs (abbreviated as IO)
SS	A Special Session of the General Assembly; distinct from the ESS (see above), Special Sessions could be convoked any time a majority of GA members voted to do so. There were five special sessions between 1947 and 1967 (annotated SS-#)
UAR	The United Arab Republic: a political union of Syria and Egypt: February 1958 to September 1961. Egypt (now the Arab Republic of Egypt) retained the title UAR until 1970
UC/UNC	Unified/UN Command: coalition of 16 UN member-states that intervened on behalf of South Korea [June 1950-July 1953]

UFP	“Uniting For Peace”—the title of a resolution sponsored by the U.S. delegation, approved on 3 November 1950 (GA#377)
UN	United Nations—normally “UN” is employed as an adjective or possessive noun, in lieu of the construct the United Nations’
UNA	Office/Bureau of UN Affairs: U.S. Department of State designations between 1948 and 1954. Previous designation for this office was SPA. After 1954 it became IO
UNC	The “United Nations Command” (Korean war, 1950-1953)
UNCIP	UN Commission for India and Pakistan (January-July 1949; its observers became UNMOGIP)
UNCIVPOL	UN Civilian Police contingents (Cyprus, elsewhere)
UNCOK	UN Commission on Korea (revised UNTCOK) [General Assembly, January 1949-October 1950]
UNDP	UN Development Program [after 1965]
UNEF	UN Emergency Force I (Sinai) [November 1956-June 1967]
UNFICYP	UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus [March 1964-present]
UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission [September 1965-March 1966]
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan [January 1949-present]
UNO	The United Nations Organization (established 1945)
UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in Lebanon [June 1958-December 1958]
UNOKAT	UN military operation in Katanga (December 1961)
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCOB	UN Special Committee on the Balkans (replaced by BSC) [October 1947-December 1951]
UNSCOP	UN Special Committee on Palestine [General Assembly body, 13 May 1947-15 May 1948]
UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea/Irian [September 1962- April 1963] (supported UNTEA)
UNTCOK	UN Temporary Commission on Korea [General Assembly, November 1947-December 1948]
UNTEA	UN Temporary Executive Agency, West New Guinea/Irian [October 1962-May 1963] (Supported by UNSF)
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) [June 1948-present]
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission [July 1963-September 1964]
U.S./USA	United States/United States of America: normally "U.S." is employed as an adjective or possessive noun, in lieu of the construct the United States' or the States's
USGPO	U.S. Government Printing Office
<u>USPUN</u>	Annual Reports of <u>United States Participation in the United Nations</u> . Compiled by the U.S. Department of State (signed by presidents) and submitted in the name of the U.S. presidents to Congress each year since 1946
USUN	U.S. Mission to the United Nations (UNM in some documents)
YAR	The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) (Yemen after 1990)

UN* “Peace Operations” Quick Reference

UNSCOB/BSC United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans [in northern Greece]. October 1947 to December 1951. Thereafter UNSCOB’s mandate was continued to January 1954 as the “Balkan Subcommission” (BSC) under the Peace Observation Commission.

GOC/UNCI The United Nations “Good Offices Committee.” November 1947 - January 1949. The GOC was renamed (and its mandate was enhanced) as the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI). UNCI was terminated in April 1951.

UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization [in Palestine/Israeli borders]. June 1948 - to present.

UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan [in the Kashmir]. January 1949 - to present.

UNEF I First United Nations Emergency Force [Sinai and Gaza Strip—on UAR soil]. November 1956 - June 1967.

UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. June - December 1958.

ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo July 1960 - June 1964.

UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian). September 1962 - April 1963. [Note: UNSF was the “Security Force attached to UNTEA—the UN Temporary Executive Authority that managed a transition of West New Guinea’s government from Dutch to Indonesian control.]

UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission. July 1963 - September 1964.

UNFICYP United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. March 1964 - To present.

DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General to the Dominican Republic. May 1965 - October 1966. [Note: the major “peacekeeping force” in the Dominican Republic during this “crisis” was the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF).]

UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission [UNIPOM supplemented UNMOGIP’s coverage of Indian-West Pakistani borders]. September 1965 - March 1966.

* UN publications do not consider UNSCOB/BSC or GOC/UNCI as “peace-keeping” operations simply because the observers that were employed represented their own countries not the UN. This is unnecessarily pedantic, since of these missions were authorized by UN resolutions and reported to the UN. There were exceptions to the organization’s “peacekeeping rules” in almost every case, as this study reveals.

Key Persons Quick Reference

USUN Mission Chiefs ("U.S. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations")
(their period of tenure) and their primary deputies¹

1. Edward R. (Reilly) Stettinius, Jr. (January 1946-June 1946)
Deputy: Hershel V. Johnson (January 1946-June 1946)
2. Hershel V. Johnson (Interim Ambassador, June 1946-December 1946)
3. Warren R. Austin (January 1947-January 1953) (Officially a U.S. Senator through 1946, but by October 1946 Austin was directing USUN staff meetings)
Deputies: Johnson (through May 1948), John C. Ross (1947-1949), Philip C. Jessup (June 1948 to 1952), Ernest A. Gross (January 1949-1953)
4. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (January 1953-September 1960)
Deputies: James J. Wadsworth (1953-1960), James W. Barco (1956-1961)
5. James J. Wadsworth (Interim Ambassador, September 1960-January 1961)
6. Adlai E. (Ewing) Stevenson, III (January 1961-July 1965)
Deputies: Francis T. P. Plimpton (1961-1965), Charles W. Yost (1961-1965)
7. Arthur J. Goldberg (July 1965-June 1968)
Deputies: Yost (1965-1966), James M. Nabrit, Jr., (September 1965-1967)
William B. Buffum (1967), Richard F. Pederson (1967-December 1968)
8. George W. Ball (Interim Ambassador, June 1968-September 1968)
9. James Russell Wiggins (Interim Ambassador, October 1968-December 1968)

U.N. Secretaries-General (nationality) (dates as secretary-general)

1. Trygve [Halvdan] Lie (Norwegian) (1 February 1946-April 1953)
2. Dag [Hjalmar Agné Carl] Hammarskjöld (Swedish) (10 April 1953-17 September 1961)
3. [Sithu] U Thant (Burmese)
Acting Secretary-General: (3 November 1961-1 January 1962)
Secretary-General (1 January 1962-31 December 1971)

¹ Initially, just the U.S. "permanent representative" carried the title "Ambassador." This was extended to his one or two deputies when the position of permanent representative was elevated to "Cabinet rank" under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. Source for all information (as compiled by author) was: DOS, USPUN series, 1945-1968.

CHAPTER ONE

THE IDEOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS OF MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Over a period of years, the authority of the United Nations as a [peace and security] agency must be established step by step. By passing successfully each milestone, the United Nations will increase its capability to meet future tests and take new steps toward the extension of the benefits and of the restraints of the rule of the Charter to all peoples and to all governments. Only thus can the cause of peace move forward.

Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson¹
[U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1946]

In the first decades of the twentieth century, U.S. statesmen often expressed a desire “to promote peaceful relations between states” as a fundamental goal of American foreign policy.² After the First World War, American President Woodrow

¹ Department of State, The United States and the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947: Second Annual Report on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3024, International and Conference Series III, 1 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1948), 290. (Henceforth abbreviated as USPUN 1947.)

² For example, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions mediating a settlement of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Of course, these sentiments were not wholly altruistic. The concepts of “international peace” and “national economic prosperity” were closely linked. President Franklin Roosevelt, Theodore’s distant cousin, emphasized this interrelationship when he spoke to Congress on 12 February 1945, saying: “We shall need prosperous markets in the world to insure our own prosperity, and we shall need the goods the world can sell us. For all these purposes, as well as for a peace that will endure, we need the partnership of the United Nations.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message to Congress on the Bretton Woods Proposals,” Department of State

Wilson³ inspired the founding of a “League of Nations” (LON) organization as an integral component of the post-war diplomatic settlements. The League’s Covenant (its articles of organization and operations) were largely based upon Wilson’s idealism that emphasized primacy of the “rule of law” for guiding state-to-state relations and endorsed “international cooperation” as the best means of achieving international peace and security.⁴

Despite its weaknesses and failures, the League of Nations was a pioneering attempt to establish a “world community of nations” and it made some progress toward redefining international relations. The League of Nations was intended to be an inclusive or “universal” world deliberative body, but the organization suffered a major blow when the U.S. Congress failed to ratify the 1919 “Treaty of Versailles.” By this action, the United States turned away from its ideological progeny. Thereafter, the League and its associated “World Court” made modest advances in the areas of mediating and arbitrating interstate disputes.⁵ But, organizationally, the LON was

Bulletin, 12 (18 February 1945): 220-22. For a provocative treatise emphasizing the economic aspects of American idealism, see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 3rd edn. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1972), especially 58-89.

³ Works on Woodrow Wilson’s ideology, much of which was embodied in his famous “Fourteen Points” (suggestions for how the First World War should be equitably settled—about half of which were incorporated into the Versailles treaty), include: Arthur S. Link and others, Wilson’s Diplomacy: An International Symposium, (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1973); Idem, Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace [Based in part on Link’s Wilson the Diplomatist, first published in 1957] (Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishers, 1979); and Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

⁴ LON Covenant, Preamble. Cited in F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 317.

⁵ For a thorough and scholarly analysis of the League’s and the World Court’s contributions to resolving interstate disputes, see David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 7-85; and Amos Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1989), 8-25; 116-19.

handicapped by its rules requiring unanimous endorsement of proposed actions and also by a lack of unity among its member-states. Hard feelings left over from the First World War caused League members to delay granting membership to Germany (1926) and Russia (1929). These were influential countries that many studies have concluded they should have been admitted much earlier into a “universal” organization. Even as the League’s membership increased, political and economic forces outside of the organization’s control frustrated the League’s aspirations during the 1930s. The world-wide economic depression of that decade was exacerbated by political crises resulting from LON members resorting to imperial conquests as an outlet for their national frustrations and as attempts to secure “spheres of economic prosperity.”⁶ Finally, League authority was undermined further by the membership withdrawals⁷ and expulsions⁸ that preceded the breakdown of international peace.

As early as 1941, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) directed his policymakers to plan for an improved League of Nations that should be established after the Second World War.⁹ With memories of President Wilson’s failure to generate

⁶ In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria. Four years later, Italy did likewise in Ethiopia. In 1938, Germany expanded into Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia. For a scholarly discussion of the economic motivations behind these conquests, see Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).

⁷ Japan withdrew its League membership in 1931 after the Japanese were condemned for their invasion into Manchuria. Hitler’s government withdrew two years later when the League’s disarmament conference refused to grant Germany “equality in arms” with other states. Italy followed suit in 1937 to protest LON economic sanctions that were being applied against Mussolini’s regime for its invasion of Ethiopia. Robert E. Summers, ed., Dumbarton Oaks (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1945), 87. A prescient analysis of why the League “failed” (and including the counterfactual exploration of “was this inevitable?”) is in Northedge, The League of Nations, 255-92.

⁸ As one of its last official acts, the League Assembly voted to expel the Russian member for that country’s 1939 “aggression” against Finland. Ibid.

⁹ See, for example, Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1949).

sufficient public and congressional backing for the LON, President Roosevelt's staff generated increased public support for U.S. membership in a new world organization and secured Congress' patronage in advance.¹⁰ As a result, when the Charter of the United Nations was signed by fifty-one nations in 1945, the United States was the organization's leading champion.

The Charter, similar to the League's covenant, called upon all member-states to "unite" their strength and to strive together to "maintain international peace and security."¹¹ President Roosevelt argued that the organization was to be created for just that "primary purpose."¹² The basis for the organization's capacity to fulfill this charge would be the political and military cooperation of the world's five "Great Powers"—China, France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States (U.S.), and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The combined strengths of these "Big Five" were to provide the United Nations with the credibility and capacity that it would need to promote international peace and security, to include "enforcing" organizational decisions, if required. In return for these services, the UN Charter granted these five nations status as "Permanent Members" (the P-5) of the organization's "Security Council." Significantly, the P-5 were granted controversial "veto" powers—the ability to deny majority initiatives, even in the case where 10 of the 11 Council members voted in favor of a given proposal. As discussed below, this "deal" with the P-5 governments (agreed upon by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet

¹⁰ According to a December 1942 Gallup poll, U.S. public support for American membership in the new world organization increased from 33% in 1937 to 73% by 1942. Cited in "The Public Looks at World Organization," report no. 19, (Denver: National Research Center, April 1944), 5-6. For an in-depth study of efforts to keep American interests in the League concept high between the wars, see Warren F. Kuehl and Lynne K. Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939, (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997).

¹¹ UN Charter, Preamble. For excerpts, see Appendix A.

¹² Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Washington Conversations on International Organization," 9 October 1944, reprinted in Department of State, Bulletin 11 (8 October 1944): 265.

Premier Joseph Stalin at Yalta¹³) sparked considerable controversy then, and afterwards. But, by working these voting privileges into the Charter, the UNO framers actually had dovetailed the “realities” of traditional power calculations with the visions of an improved system of international relations. In this respect, the United Nations represented an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary attempt to encourage new approaches to and methods of international cooperation.

Early expectations that the United Nations might be able to fulfill its lofty goals, especially those regarding international security and peace, met with disappointment. In fact, the measure of U.S. public opinion that expressed “satisfaction” with the United Nations’ performance was at 40% in early 1946 and then dipped to 22% by mid-1948.¹⁴ This disenchantment was largely the result of the organization’s perceived “inability” to deal with three consecutive “threats to international peace.” First, in February 1948, the USSR orchestrated a coup in Czechoslovakia.¹⁵ Next, in May, full-

¹³ The Yalta Conference, held in the southern Crimea (now belonging to the Ukraine) between 4 and 11 February 1945, has long been a subject of scholarly controversy. The secret “handshake” agreements and what were considered to be “undue concessions” to the Soviet Union, have been debated and criticized. Among the other decisions agreed upon by the “Big Three” were these: (1) a four-power occupation of Germany (with France being the fourth power); (2) the Soviet Union's agreement to enter the war against Japan after Germany's defeat; receiving occupation areas in the East in return; and (3) a guarantee of representative government in Poland. For a French diplomat’s investigation of the Yalta “controversies,” see Jean Laloy, Yalta: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, trans. by William R. Tyler (New York: Harper and Row, 1988). The book’s appendices include “Text of the Communiqué of the Yalta Conference” and “Exchanges of Letters between Roosevelt and Stalin, March and April 1945.”

¹⁴ William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey, The United States and the United Nations: The Public View, 1945-1955 (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958), 42-43.

¹⁵ Professor Leffler’s magisterial study on U.S. national security policy during these years noted that “The Czech crisis surprised U.S. officials precisely because it came against a backdrop of uncertainty about Soviet intentions.” Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 205; Thomas T. Hammond, ed.,

scale war involving multiple parties broke out in Palestine.¹⁶ Finally, and most disconcerting to Washington and the American public, in July, Moscow cut off all ground routes through East Germany to West Berlin and established a virtual blockade that required a tense, herculean airlift to keep the city supplied with essentials for another nine months.¹⁷ By this time, too, the ideological division between East and West had thwarted Charter provisions for creating a world security system and had limited the organization's effectiveness to promote international peace. Use of the veto, which threatened the organization's viability, was a subject of numerous debates in the General Assembly and added to public dissatisfaction with the United Nations.¹⁸ The cause of these UN "security failures" was, more than any other factor, the ideological "Cold War"¹⁹ that divided East and West and undermined one of the organization's most important foundational principles, that of great-power cooperation.

The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1975), 398-432.

¹⁶ See Chapter Two of this study.

¹⁷ Department of State, The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948, DOS publication 3298; DOS, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3437, International and Conference Series III, 29 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, April 1949), 67-77.

¹⁸ Through 1948, for example, the USSR representative to the UN Security Council had cast 31 vetoes to block proposed Council initiatives—no other permanent member had cast a single "veto" (although they had voted against many Soviet proposals that failed to otherwise gain the minimum required votes—hence not technically considered "vetoes"). Thomas Hovet, Jr., and Erica Hovet, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs: A Chronology and Fact Book of the United Nations 1941-1985, 7th edn. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1986), 317.

¹⁹ The term "Cold War" was adapted from the French construct *la froid guerre* by America's premier twentieth-century journalist, Walter Lippmann. As a period of indeterminate beginning and end (generally accepted as "active" between 1947 and 1989), the Cold War was characterized by intense ideological, economic and military posturing, but both the "Eastern" Communist-bloc states and their ideological Western enemies were careful to avoid engaging the opposition in direct military ("hot")

In the midst of these troubles for the United Nations, the United States was faced with a decision. Either the organization could have been written off as a useless political forum (as “realists” advised), or alternative means for employing the United Nations had to be devised. Between 1946 and 1968, the second of these options prevailed. Had Washington policymakers abandoned the United Nations, especially in its early years, the organization may have gone the way of the League of Nations. Instead, for the United Nations’ first twenty three years, the United States was the organization’s most important political, logistical, and financial supporter.

Even with strong U.S. backing, the organization was unable to overcome many handicaps and obstacles. Charter provisions that would have provided the United Nations with an “enforcement” capacity (article 43, discussed below), for instance, were scuttled by the end of 1947. In that year, after two years of negotiations, P-5 military commanders announced that it was not possible for them to agree on equitable arrangements for providing “article 43 contingents” to serve as the organization’s “UN armed forces.”²⁰ Similarly, from the earliest debates in January 1946, “Cold-War issues” brought before the Security Council routinely were defeated by either a Soviet veto or by the western coalition voting *en masse* against Communist-sponsored proposals. These early “failures” of the United Nations created the impression (commonly held by scholars even now²¹) that the Cold War gutted the organization of

confrontations. See, for example, Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy [based on a series of press articles that appeared in the New York Herald Tribune] (New York: Harper, 1947).

²⁰ See UN report MS/265 (S/336), “General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces to be Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations,” UN Military Staff Committee, 30 April 1947; and information concerning these discussions in DOS, USPUN 1947, 104-08.

²¹ For an example of literature that dismisses much or all U.N. peace operations during the Cold War period as “ineffective,” see A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 19; and David J. Whittaker, United Nations in Action (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 27-29. For a generalization that the veto rule created an ineffective UNO, see Stephen

its capacity to make positive contributions in the field of international peace and security. This is a misleading generalization that fails to consider the organization's successes in a number of areas. The case studies analyzed in this dissertation provide examples of how the United Nations was able to act effectively as a "peacekeeping organization," conducting a variety of complaint-investigating, dispute-mediating, boundary-observing, truce-supervising, or "peace-keeping" missions, even in cases where Council veto votes were cast.

The success or failure of UN efforts to promote international peace was determined by two main factors: cooperation and great-power spheres of control. Aspects of cooperation were multidimensional. Of utmost importance to the outcome of UN peace operations was the willingness of the parties in dispute to extend good will and assistance to UN mediators and field representatives. As a corollary, the support of the more influential or capable UN member-states (which could vary with circumstances) was also important. Positive or negative "incentives" or "pressures" when exerted upon recalcitrant parties often determined the outcome of UN missions. The second factor that determined how and where UN peace operations were conducted was based upon the location of the dispute in relation to great power areas of control. Between 1946 and 1968, when disputes or hostilities involved states that lay within the "spheres" dominated by either the eastern or western superpowers (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the United States of America), often the United Nations was powerless to sponsor any direct intervention on behalf of the international community. This "weakness" of the organization, according to some analysts, was a "fact" that was recognized from the beginning. The UN organization (UNO) framers realized this would be the case when they retained aspects of traditional *realpolitik* in their evolutionary construction of a new international relations system. A New York Times editorial, written in 1945, addressed the United Nations' obvious limitations in this regard by noting that "if a point is ever reached when one of the five great powers

E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 7th revised edn. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 102.

must be coerced by force, then peace will have been lost anyway . . . and a new world war will be in the making.”²²

As the case studies addressed in the chapters that follow demonstrate, the United Nations rarely was able to rally sufficient international support for actions contrary to P-5 interests. On the other hand, in the areas outside of well-defined eastern or western influence, especially in what came to be called “the third world” or the “peripheral regions,” the United Nations often was able to make positive contributions by defusing hostilities and negotiating peaceful settlements. The significance of these contributions should not be underestimated, especially in an era when such peripheral skirmishes often attracted “external intervention.” The means by which the United Nations overcame these obstacles and the ways in which U.S. support helped to transform the UNO into an effective, albeit limited, “peacekeeping” agency are a major concern of this study.

In the years between 1946 and 1968, every U.S. president publicly stated that American support for the United Nations was a “central tenet” of U.S. foreign policy. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, wrote an open letter to Congress in which he asserted that “the American people are right in regarding the principles of the United Nations Charter as a cornerstone of their foreign policy.” “In pursuing our national goals,” the U.S. president added, “the United Nations is—both for our country and for the community of nations—a proven asset of incalculable value.”²³ Yet, standard historical accounts of American foreign relations routinely dismiss these

²² “The Great Powers,” editorial, *The New York Times* 16 March 1945, reprinted in *Dumbarton Oaks*, ed., Robert E. Summers (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1945), 133.

²³ Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Congress, Letter of Transmittal, 20 July 1959 in Department of State, *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958*, DOS Publication 6852, International Organization and Conference Series 4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1959), ix. Further examples are cited in later chapters of this study and can be found in annual editions of the *USPUN* series, each of which includes between two and seven pages of summaries addressed to the U.S. Congress and signed by the presidents.

pronouncements as mere rhetoric (if they address the issue at all) and have disparaged the organization as unimportant or ineffective during these years that marked the height of the Cold War. Stephen Ambrose, author of presidential biographies and diplomatic histories, and John Lewis Gaddis, a well-known "Cold War historian" are two prominent examples. Ambrose's "magnum opus," Rise to Globalism, provides only passing references to the organization's debates, and at no time, does Ambrose mention that the United Nations was a significant factor of U.S. foreign policy or an embodiment of America's "globalism."²⁴ Gaddis, in his best-selling Strategies of Containment, mentions "the United Nations" just eight times in 357 pages of text. In a section on the development of America's "Cold-War mentality," Gaddis dismissed the United Nations' significance by quoting George F. Kennan, an influential "realist" who shaped America's post-war foreign policy (especially, the theory of "containment")²⁵. According to Gaddis, "Kennan attached little significance to the United Nations; it was an illusion . . . parliamentary shadow boxing, . . . [and its] only effect was to distract the American people from the real issues."²⁶

Part of the problem with these Cold-War diplomatic histories is that they have focused on just half of ideological underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. By

²⁴ Ambrose stated that FDR "felt that postwar collaboration could be achieved through the United Nations." This statement was left hanging. Ambrose referred to a UN plan for partition in Palestine, but did not analyze the U.S. role in failing to support the plan (see this study Chapter Two). Finally, in the context of the U.S. effort to rebuild and defend postwar Europe, Ambrose superficially dismissed a group of Senators' question as to "why the United States did not rely upon the United Nations" by stating "one reason was the Russian veto; another was that the Europeans required some sort of special guarantee [for defense]." This dissertation dispels the "Russian veto" misperceptions and explains why NATO was necessary and how it fit into the broader UN system. Ambrose's work does not. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 57, 100-102.

²⁵ See Kennan's first statement of this concept in Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July 1947): 566-82.

²⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 29.

concentrating on “realist” fixations—those of power-calculations and realpolitik—they have discounted or failed to recognize the importance of “idealist” ideologies such as “internationalism” and “liberalism” that explain Washington’s continued support of the United Nations during these Cold-War years. On the other hand, a few scholarly studies have traced the development and importance of these ideologies. Akira Iriye’s monograph, From Nationalism to Internationalism established the importance of “internationalism”²⁷ as an aspect of America’s foreign relations from the time of the founding fathers until the point at which the ideology gained preeminence as an aspect of “Wilsonianism” in the early twentieth century. Complementary arguments were carried forward by Tony Smith, in his work, America’s Mission. The emphasis of Smith’s study is America’s attempts to create a world “safe for democracy” as a goal of U.S. foreign policy—an endeavor Smith characterized as “liberal democratic internationalism.” Building tangentially upon the works of Iriye and Smith, this dissertation supplements traditional Cold-War historical analysis by demonstrating that “internationalism” or “idealism” survived the era of Cold-War power posturing and manifest itself most clearly in Washington’s support for the United Nations—especially in the way America’s policymakers supported UN peace operations “as the most appropriate means” to resolve disputes occurring within the peripheral regions, outside the spheres of superpower suzerainty. Prior to exploring case studies that validate these assertions, a discussion of the United Nations “system,” its charter and some of the key statesmen that were involved in U.S., UN, or multinational peacekeeping or peace-making are covered in the remaining sections of this chapter.

²⁷ Akira Iriye’s From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 11-20, 231-37, 327-53; and Tony Smith’s America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially pp. xiii-xv, 3-34.

A UN "System" Overview²⁸

The United Nations system, as defined by its Charter of nineteen chapters, extended far beyond its ostensible high-rise buildings in Manhattan (New York City). As an international organization comprising most of the world's countries (51 members in 1945 and 126 by 1968), it strove to coordinate international cooperation on issues ranging from maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations to searching for means to resolve international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems.

The principal organs of the UN "proper," as specified in the Charter, were the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.²⁹ [See diagram of UN System at Appendix C.] The General Assembly fielded delegations (teams of representatives and their staff members) from every member nation. Each country wielded a single vote.³⁰ The General Assembly met in regular annual sessions and in special sessions when necessary. Special sessions were convoked by the Secretary General at the request of the Security Council or that of a majority of the members of the Assembly. On important questions a two-thirds

²⁸ For a more extensive introduction to the United Nations organization, see United Nations Department of Public Information, Everyone's United Nations, 10th edn. [Previous editions entitled Everyman's United Nations] (New York: UNDPI, 1986); Yoder, The Evolution of the United Nations System; and Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 2nd edn. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), 17-42.

²⁹ This paper will employ accepted shorthand references to the Security Council as the "Council" (or SC) and the General Assembly as the "Assembly" (or GA). For documents, those associated with the Security Council are normally indicated by S/# and those of the Assembly as A/#. When resolutions are subsequently referenced, the shorthands SC# and GA# are used.

³⁰ Although the USSR was essentially granted three votes when the allied heads of state agreed at Yalta to include Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia as separate states.

majority of members present and voting was required; on other questions a simple majority was sufficient (article 18, more on voting below). The General Assembly was given the power to approve the budget and to apportion expenses among its members. A member in arrears was to have no vote in the Assembly if the amount of arrears equaled or exceeded the amount of the contributions due for the preceding two full years (article 19). The General Assembly was the organization's chief deliberative body. Assembly members studied political, social, economic issues and made recommendations (that were not compulsory) on all issues except those already under Security Council consideration. The Assembly annually considered and passed the organizational budgets and set assessment percentages for members. Work was conducted in part through seven main committees (on specified issues, such as political, economic, budgetary, etc.) and others, designated as standing, procedural or ad hoc committees. [See diagram of USUN/GA Chart at Appendix C.]

The Security Council was the United Nations' full-time organ most responsible for promoting international peace and security. It originally comprised 11 members (6 elected for two-year terms, and another 5 with permanent seats), but was expanded to 15 seats (10 temporary and the same 5 permanent) after 31 August 1965. The temporary members were elected (half of the group each year) by the General Assembly. Member-states that had just served on the Council were not eligible for immediate reelection. The Council was charged with investigating any dispute that threatened or breached international peace. Parties to a dispute, even if not UN members were allowed to participate in Council discussions, but only Council members cast votes. Theoretically, (under article 27.3) "procedural questions" were to be approved by an affirmative vote of seven (nine after 1965) members. On all other matters the majority of seven (or nine) affirmative votes had to include the concurring votes of all permanent members. This stipulation (also article 27.3) established the P-5

“veto power.” Votes cast as “abstentions” did not count as vetoes, nor did they count toward the seven (or nine) minimum required.³¹

Other UN organs included the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Trusteeship Council. The Economic and Social Council originally comprised 18 members. This was raised to 27 members on 31 August 1965.³² Members were elected by the General Assembly for 3-year terms. The council was responsible under the General Assembly for carrying out the functions of the United Nations with regard to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters. The Trusteeship Council was established to serve as the organization’s body entrusted with supervising the status of “Trusteeships”—non-self-governing territories that took the place of League of Nations’ Mandates. The Trusteeship Council included “administering powers” and the permanent Security Council members.

The Secretariat was responsible for coordinating all UN administrative functions, which included servicing all meetings (over 3,000 meetings in 1947); translating documents and preparing meeting minutes (in all official languages). Over the years, these Secretariat personnel served as representatives of the secretary-general and of the organization as mediators (for example, the undersecretary for trusteeship issues, later undersecretary for special political affairs, Ralph J. Bunche who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his negotiations in Palestine during 1949). Responsible for

³¹ By way of explanation: anytime a vote is documented in this study there will be three numbers listed as: For-Against-Abstaining. In addition, a partial or full listing of those member-states falling into these categories will be annotated parenthetically. Given a hypothetical Security Council vote: 7(U.S.)-3-1(USSR) this would mean that seven members, including the U.S. representative voted FOR the issue; 3 representatives voted AGAINST it (but no one of importance to this case) and the 1(USSR) means that the Soviet representative voted to ABSTAIN—that vote does not count for or against the proposal, but it changes the approval percentage to that of 7 out of 10 (not 11). If this was an actual vote it would have been approved unless one of the 3 negative votes was cast by a “permanent member”—which will be annotated in any such case. For more on these issues, see Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 198-210.

³² Later, on 24 September 1973, ECOSOC membership was raised to 54.

directing the Secretariat (and later, by tradition, UN peacekeeping operations) was the secretary-general. This position was defined as the “chief executive,” who customarily served a five-year, renewable term. The role of the UN secretary-general developed into an important position, between 1946 and 1968, especially with respect to the conduct of peace operations. According to article 99, the secretary general was authorized to bring to the Security Council’s “attention,” any matter, “which in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” The secretary-general reported to the General Assembly annually, in the manner of the U.S. president’s “state of the union” address.

Outside of UN headquarters in New York, there existed a number of associated organs and “specialized agencies.” The International Court of Justice (also called the World Court) was designated the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The Court met annually in The Hague, Netherlands. All UN members were considered to be parties to the statute of the Court—although individual countries interpreted the degree to which Court decisions would be honored. Other “specialized agencies” associated with the broader “UN system” include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, established in 1945) or World Bank; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 1945); the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1957); the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 1947); the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1946); the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 1948); the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 1946); the World Health Organization (WHO, 1948); and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA, created in 1948 as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war).

Under Charter Chapter VIII, “regional arrangements” (or regional alliances) were characterized as extensions of the UN system. These organizations, included: the Organization of American States (OAS, founded in 1948 and granted UN “observer status” later that same year), the League of Arab States (LAS, established in 1945, UN “observer status” in 1950) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU, 1963, 1965).

During the period under investigation by this study, two of these organizations assisted the United Nations in its efforts to maintain regional peace. In the “Kuwait Incident” of 1961 (see Chapter Seven, this study), the League of Arab States was instrumental in creating a buffer “peacekeeping force” in response to Iraq’s threats to invade Kuwait. Four years later, after a unilateral military “intervention” conducted by U.S. military forces in the Dominican Republic, the Organization of American States organized an “Inter-American Peace Force” (IAPF). The IAPF (see Chapter Seven) conducted both peacekeeping and nation-building tasks in the Dominican Republic that culminated with peaceful national elections for the Dominicans in 1966 and the force’s withdrawal shortly thereafter. In each case, the “sanction” of these regional arrangement peace operations was justified under articles of the UN Charter.

The interface between the United Nations and the United States government came to be called USUN—short for the United States Mission to the United Nations. USUN’s structure changed often in the first few years, but later stabilized as depicted in the two charts in Appendix C. Legally, the department was guided as an executive body under terms of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (as amended). Structured similar to a large United States’ Embassy, USUN was headed by the United States’ Representative to the United Nations, who held the rank of Ambassador. This “Permanent Representative” also was the primary U.S. delegate to the Security Council.³³ The president designated his appointees for these top USUN positions and these personnel were officially confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

USUN served as the channel of communication between the Department of State and the United Nations’ organs, agencies, and commissions at the headquarters and the delegations of other nations to the United Nations located in New York. It also was the “base of operations” for the U.S. Assembly delegation-members when they were in

³³ Department of State, The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President of the United States on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein for the Calendar Year 1946, DOS Publication 2735, Report Series 7 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1947), 81.

New York City.³⁴ In its early years, USUN faced the challenge of finding its proper role in the American bureaucratic machine. In fact, early organizational matters dominate the U.S. government official records of USUN's activities throughout its first few years in operation.³⁵ USUN eventually found itself reporting through the U.S. Department of State—after some discussion of treating the delegation as a “separate” executive agency. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and President Harry S Truman justified this decision as “establishing a more streamlined” foreign policy system” (and one that did not challenge the secretary of state’s control over UN issues). [See diagram of USUN Organization Chart at Appendix C.]

By 1954, USUN was placed within the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Organizations Affairs (IO)—an entity that had a number of different names during USUN’s first years. Between 1945 and 1948 it was called the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA). For the year after that, it was called the Office of United Nations Affairs and, thereafter, changed again to the Bureau of United Nations Affairs (both UNA). The SPA was initially headed by Alger Hiss,³⁶ who was assisted by Robert McClintock.³⁷ This office (as UNA) was later headed by Dean Rusk, and Donald Blaisdell.

³⁴ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951 [Including information of up to May 1952], DOS Publication 4583, International Organization and Conference Series III, 80 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1952), 316.

³⁵ USUN’s first organizational meetings held in the U.S. were in New York City’s Hotel Pennsylvania in the Autumn of 1946.

³⁶ Alger Hiss was run out government service in 1950 when convicted of “perjury.” In fact, there is much evidence to prove the original charges that he was an ardent American Communist. See, for example, Christopher Matthews, “When Evil is Cloaked in Secrecy,” The Washington Times, 12 September 1998, C8.

³⁷ U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 Volume I General: The United Nations (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 16-18.

USUN members were in a unique position within the State Department. Unlike other offices, USUN members both recommended policy and executed it.³⁸ Sometimes they failed to keep their priorities in line with the chief executive's final decisions. Losing sight of these fundamental principles caused confusion at USUN and in the Department of State. For example, when Senator Warren R. Austin was appointed to replace Ambassador Stettinius (mid-1946), Austin made it a point to start his tour by reminding his staff of these "statutory" guidelines.³⁹ Later, however, when Cabot Lodge replaced Austin, the position of Permanent Ambassador to the UN was elevated to that of a cabinet position. This was more symbolic than actual, since the Ambassador was too busy with duties in New York and not always available for cabinet meetings in Washington D.C. On the other hand, this elevation of status caused occasional friction between the American secretaries of state and USUN chiefs, both of which had "direct access" to the president. As these concerns affected U.S. policies and support of peacekeeping, this study will address them.

To help clarify other issues that broadly apply across the spectrum of UN operations for peace, the following section offers a short analysis of applicable articles of the United Nations' Charter.⁴⁰

³⁸ "Memo by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)" Memorandum #501, 31 December 1946. DOS, FRUS 1946, I: 49, 50. Quotes from p 50.

³⁹ "Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States Delegations, Held at New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, October 17, 1946, 11 a.m." Senator Warren R. Austin (U.S. Representative to the U.N. "Designate"—not to officially take over the post until January 1947 due to his status as a Senator until that time). DOS, FRUS 1946, I: 45.

⁴⁰ For an in-depth discussion of all UN Charter articles, and how they were debated by during the founding conferences see Summers, ed., Dumbarton Oaks; and Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949).

Multinational Peace Operations and the UN Charter

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the United Nations Charter set out lofty goals, many of which were unfulfilled. The Charter "Preamble" began with the following: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." It continued by adding fundamental goals that set the tone for subsequent articles:

. . . to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. . . . and for these ends . . . to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. . . .

The next section, which began with Chapter I, outlined the organization's stated "purposes and principles." Article 1 was a listing of organizational "purposes" that, in general, restated what was already outlined in the preamble. Of interest to this study are articles 2.4 and 2.7. The first of these urged that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United Nations." This article was often cited by disputing parties who were alleging that others had "violated" the Charter by employing violence, often military force. The second article that was raised quite frequently, especially with respect to "colonial disputes" (the topic of this study's Chapter Four) was article 2.7. The text read:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

In cases involving disputes between peoples fighting against a colonial or "administering" power, the latter would cite this article as justification that the United Nations possessed no authority to interfere in a member-state's "domestic affairs."

These arguments were raised in cases of French (Indochina, North Africa), British (Cyprus, southern Africa), Dutch (Indonesia and West New Guinea), Belgian (the Congo), Portuguese (Angola and Mozambique), and even South African (Southwest Africa or Namibia) colonialism. This article was also cited by the superpowers to defend against “intrusion” by the international community into their affairs being conducted within spheres of control, such as the USSR’s invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the United States’ hemispheric claims that justified intervention in Guatemala during 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965-66. In the organization’s first years, even until 1960, the United States supported its allies’ claims that this article should prevent UN “meddling.” Thereafter, as a result of a dramatic change in the organization’s membership (which was a consequence of rapid international decolonization), legal defenses citing article 2.7 were rejected by the majority of newly-independent member-states (most former colonies) as not applicable to “colonial” situations.

The next Charter section relevant to the central focus of this study is Chapter IV, articles 9-22, which describes the functions and limitations of the UN General Assembly. Articles 10-14 each noted issues upon which the Assembly may consider and make “recommendations.” The Assembly was created as the organization’s most “inclusive” deliberative body. But, the fact that the Assembly wielded no compulsory power over UN member-states weakened its authority as an alternative to the Security Council (which was granted specific powers). These articles also established the primacy of the Security Council’s jurisdiction over the General Assembly. In situations where the Council was currently “exercising” its duties, the Assembly was forbidden “to make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests” (article 12.1). These “conflict of interest” issues, as it will become clear later, are relevant to this study. During the early years, 1945-1950, the United States delegation sought the means to “work around” these restrictions—with the ultimate goal of removing issues that had been (or were sure to be) vetoed by the USSR from the Council and allowing the Assembly to take action. In the case of

Greece (Chapter Three), the U.S. delegation “tricked” the USSR representative by having the issue “procedurally removed” from the Council’s list of items considered under review. In September 1950, after the Soviet member “deadlocked” further Council actions in Korea (Chapter Two), the U.S. delegation essentially revised these restrictions under a resolution entitled “Uniting For Peace” (GA resolution 377, 3 November 1950). This initiative authorized the Assembly to debate and take actions, including authorizing peace operations (as it turned out in November 1956 during the Suez War) when a majority of Council members voted to “pass authority” to the Assembly. In such cases, a permanent Council member could not cast a veto. The purpose of uniting-for-peace was to move items “deadlocked” in the Security Council to the Assembly where further actions could be taken with a two-thirds majority. This last rule was derived from article 18, which stated that “decisions of the Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.” The article then specifically listed “recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security” as one such “important question” (article 18.2). Nonetheless, the question of what was to be considered “important” was a controversial issue. In most cases, a determination was made by the Assembly’s “president” (a different representative each year), or by a majority—not two-thirds—of the Assembly. This last catch was employed by the United States delegation (and others) to keep the membership of “China” from being transferred to the Peoples Republic of China long after a majority of UN member-states favored doing so.⁴¹

The Security Council’s responsibilities and rules were the subject of the next Charter chapter (Chapter V). Article 24 conferred on the Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Article 25 (along with references in articles 48 and 49) established the Council’s authority as

⁴¹ For more on this, see Chapter Four. See also the discussions in John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia and America, 3rd edn. (New York: Random House, 1973).

“compulsory.” Next, article 27 set out a series of rules for Council voting procedures. It deserves citing in full:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [7 of 11 through 1965, then 9 of 15, effective 1 January 1966] members. [Note, no Veto of procedural issues.]
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [seven/nine] members including the concurring votes of the Permanent Members [this established the P-5 power of veto]; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting [which is not considered a veto].

Article 27.2 addressed the issue of “procedural matters,” but similar to the Assembly’s quandary with article 18’s use of the term “important matters” this was open to interpretation. From the Soviet perspective, no topic should have been considered “procedural” if it related to issues of peace and security. The liberal use of the veto by the Soviet representatives (even against “procedural issues”—in violation of this provision) significantly impaired the Council’s capacity to carry out its primary responsibilities. For example, in August 1947, the Soviet representative vetoed a proposal for the Security Council to send a (second) committee to Greece and to observe the northern border (see Chapter Three, this study). The U.S. representative argued that creating an investigative committee was a procedural issue and should not have been “subject” to a veto. But a majority of Council members refused to challenge the Soviet interpretation.⁴² In February 1948, in the wake of a Communist coup d’état

⁴² In this case, the U.S. resorted to “trickery.” It convinced the Council to “drop” the Greek issue from its formal list of items under active consideration. With this established, the way was cleared for the U.S. delegation to resort to the GA (and the restrictions, as described above under articles 10, 11, 12, 14). Once burned, Moscow opposed all similar U.S.-initiatives to move issues to the General Assembly, including the November 1950 “uniting-for-peace resolution” which it declared to be “illegal.” Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. II, Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 164-65; Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 346-48; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (NY: W. W. Norton, 1969), 448-51.

in Czechoslovakia, the U.S. delegation sponsored a “procedural proposal” that the Security Council should appoint a committee to “investigate” the situation in Czechoslovakia. This too was “vetoed” by the Soviet Union and allowed to let stand.⁴³ These actions led to a discussion of the so-called “double veto” and further debates as to what the Charter meant by “procedural” and non-procedural issues. The U.S. point of view did not support the jealously-guarded right to veto held by other permanent members. This expanded veto privilege, however, stood unchallenged until 1954 when all Council members agreed to “disregard” a negative vote that was cast by China (Taiwan) regarding a UN investigation of the Taiwan Straits crisis. It was not until 1959 that a Soviet objection regarding a proposal to send a representative of the secretary-general into Laos was rejected by all other members. In this case, the Italian and United States’ representatives colluded to call for another vote that would determine whether the action was in fact “procedural.” A majority determined that it was. After this precedent was established, the “double veto” was less frequently employed.⁴⁴

The heart of article 27.3 was the controversial “permanent member veto” that was to have applied to all non-procedural votes. From the time these rules were agreed upon, in secret, by the “Big Three” at Yalta in February 1945, the “lesser powers” complained that the Council’s voting rules were a scheme whereby the great powers were trying to “dictate terms” to the rest of the world. It is true that these voting provisions allowed the Council’s permanent members to jealously guard their perceived national interests. In each case, whenever a veto was cast the Council (but not always the Assembly, especially after the adoption of the uniting-for-peace resolution) was prevented from taking further actions—or in UN legalese, the Council became “seized” or “deadlocked” with these issues. From the organization’s earliest years, the U.S. delegation expressed its views that these voting privileges should be resorted to

⁴³ DOS, USPUN 1948, 9-10.

⁴⁴ Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 165.

sparingly. Although they reflected geopolitical realities, they concurrently conferred a special responsibility upon the P-5 states. As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin (January 1947 to January 1953) stated, the Charter “recognize[d] that power and place[d] obligations upon these nations to use that power in accordance with the law.”⁴⁵

Also of interest to this study were the final words of article 27.3, which stated that “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” Only in a few cases was this proscription strictly applied. Instead, it was violated on a regular basis by all delegation members, including the U.S.—which voted against (instead of abstaining from) Council initiatives to condemn U.S. actions in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. The case of the Berlin blockade (1948-1949) further demonstrated the complicated workings of this aspect of article 27.3. A “complaint” about Soviet actions against Berlin was brought to the Council by three permanent members—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later, when the six temporary members of the Council proposed a solution, all permanent members voted and the Soviet representative cast a veto. In strict compliance with article 27.3, the U.S., U.K., French, and Soviet representatives should have abstained—all were clearly “parties to the dispute.” Nonetheless, this voting was allowed to stand, including the Soviet veto—since the United Nations had neither the will nor the capacity to “enforce” great power compliance with rules or majority opinions.⁴⁶

One final note on voting procedures. Article 27 required (until 1966) that seven of eleven members concur for a vote to carry—assuming no P-5 negative votes. What was interesting was that P-5 votes to “abstain” were considered to be neither a yes or no. But like all other abstentions, these actions reduced the total pool from which a possible seven positive votes could be attained. Had article 27.3 been observed in the voting on Berlin, the resolution would have had to pass 7-0. In other words, a single

⁴⁵ Warren R. Austin, “Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” 30 October 1946, in DOS, USPUN 1946, 151.

⁴⁶ DOS, USPUN 1948, 68-74.

negative vote or even a vote to abstain by the remaining Council members (six of them temporary) would have defeated the proposal. Theoretically, in any case involving five member-states sitting on the Council, no resolution could have obtained the minimum number required for any proposals to carry.⁴⁷

The next Charter paragraph of interest to this study was article 29. Although it was just a single short sentence—"The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions"—this became an important legal basis for the organization's ad hoc approach to generating peace operations (in the wake of other means, discussed below, failing to be implemented). The vagueness of the terms "such subsidiary organs" and "performance of its functions" allowed for wide interpretations and innovative approaches. Examples where this article was specifically cited included the Greek Council of Investigation mission that established a "majority opinion" that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were providing assistance to Communist forces in northern Greece during 1947. This body's findings influenced the Assembly's decision to organize an observer mission for Greece (see Chapter Three). In 1948, the Council created two similar bodies: the Palestine Truce Commission—which evolved into the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO); and the "Good Offices Committee" (later as the UN Commission for Indonesia, or UNCI) which was created to mediate and observe a dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands between 1947 and 1949 (see Chapter Four).⁴⁸

Article 30, also a single sentence, allowed the Security Council to select its "president" by methods of its own choosing. The Council's rules of procedure established a method whereby this important position (because the president

⁴⁷ In General Assembly voting, abstentions reduced the total number of votes cast for calculations of "majority" and "two-thirds." There was no absolute minimum number specified. Theoretically, with a vote of 2-1-100, a resolution would carry as having both a simple and a two-thirds majority because the 100 abstentions did not count.

⁴⁸ DOS, USPUN 1948, 11.

determined the daily agenda of issues that came up for votes) rotated on a monthly basis between member-state representatives. The monthly shifts were assigned by alphabetical order of the countries serving on the Council. To demonstrate how petty the debates were in these cases, members even sparred over whether French or English spellings should be used. The significance of this provision, as the position of president gained greater responsibilities, was that the Council member sitting as monthly president was partisan—with the power to advance his own agenda and potentially obstruct others. A most blatant example of this, mentioned earlier, was when the Soviet member held up proposals for action in Korea during August 1950 (the war had begun on 25 June, and the July Council had acted without Soviet vetoes being cast since the USSR had “walked-out” to protest the Chinese membership/seating issue in January 1950, see Chapter Two).

The next two sections of the UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII were critically important with respect to the organization’s conduct of operations for peace. It has been noted that UN peace operations were inconsistent and ad hoc “instrumentalities.” This was as much a function of the Council’s failure to implement the “enforcement” sections of Chapter VII (articles 42-47) as it was due to the “flexibility” built into the Charter. Within Chapter VI, two articles were of key importance to the organization’s efforts to promote international peace, articles 33 and 37. Together, these articles established progressive guidelines for how contending parties could attempt to peacefully resolve their differences. Article 33.1 set initial guidelines:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

As disputes were raised before the Council, the U.S. delegation argued for the interpretation that this article prescribed a linear progression for parties to follow. That is, before the United Nations could move on to other options, the parties involved should attempt to resolve their disputes “quietly” in the form of bilateral negotiations.

If these efforts failed, then the Council could debate the merits of “other peaceful means.” This argument ostensibly was substantiated by article 37.1 which read: “Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.” Then, under article 37.2, “If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.” This general wording, similar to that of article 29 was an additional “basis” that the Council cited to justify a variety of methods and means that it used to limit hostilities and seek peaceful resolutions of disputes.

Much has been made of the “legal” distinctions for categorizing disputes and UN responses under Chapter VI: “Peaceful Settlement” or under Chapter VII: “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Although Chapter VII was generally called the “enforcement” chapter of the Charter, the first three articles did not authorize “measures of force.” Articles 39 and 40 authorized the Council to “make recommendations” and to defuse these dangerous disputes by means of “provisional measures” to “prevent an aggravation of the situation.” Some commentators have called these articles the Council’s “elastic provisions.” Former secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, grouped them with articles 33 and 37 under the rubric of “Chapter Six and One Half.”⁴⁹ Certainly, this set of four articles: 33, 37, 39, and 40 are the foundations upon which UN peace operations clearly rested. Of course, as most histories are quick to point out, the terms “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” were never mentioned in the entire Charter. Instead, the military and other field operations conducted by the United Nations were innovated in response to the organization’s desire to do “something” and having been denied the formal means when the rest of Chapter VII was scuttled. In one respect or

⁴⁹ Dag Hammarskjöld, cited in United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, 2nd edn. (New York: UNDPI, 1985), 3.

another, each of the fourteen cases addressed in this study involved a UN response based on one or all of these articles included in Chapters VI and VII. From this perspective, Chapter "Six and One-Half" provided the legal basis for UN peace operations.

With regard to the other articles in Chapter VII, articles 42-47 were never put into effect. They fell victim to the great powers' failure to agree upon how to equitably provide military forces to the organization as envisioned under these guidelines. As a quick overview, article 42 authorized the Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." These forces, under article 43, would be provided by the Council permanent members "in accordance with a special agreement" that would have set out "the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." These agreements were to be negotiated "as soon as possible." This task was delegated to senior military commanders and executive representatives. Articles 46 and 47 provided for the creation of a "Military Staff Committee" (MSC) that was to convene meetings at the United Nations and was responsible for organizing and commanding these projected United Nations military and police forces. During 1946 and 1947, the MSC considered proposals and counteroffers in vain attempts to conclude these agreements. Reasons for lack of progress in these talks were stated as differences over which country should supply which types of forces—the western states offered air and naval force contingents and expected the Soviets to contribute the bulk of ground forces. Moscow rejected the West's "balanced force" proposals and argued that all powers should contribute equally in each category. On face value, it does not seem that this was an unreasonable request. Actually, these justifications merely reflected the broader political differences that divided East and West. By 1947, neither side was willing to commit to a scheme for international collective security. Instead, each side feared the

other's intentions and reacted by valuing "national security" over international security.⁵⁰

In the face of the MSC's failure to agree upon how to provide the Council with military forces, the 1947 U.S. deputy of mission, Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson summarized the ramifications:

Until these agreements have been concluded and put into force, the Security Council will be unable to fulfill its responsibilities as the enforcement agency of the United Nations. Chapter VII of the Charter, in so far as it relates to military enforcement measures, will remain inoperative."⁵¹

Estimates of what would have been made available to the Security Council, "on call" also differed. The U.S. proposed 20 divisions [later revised to 15—each division roughly equal to 10,000 soldiers], 3 carrier task groups (each consisting of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers, and 16 destroyers); 3 groups of assault ships and naval transport-craft capable of lifting a total of 6 troop divisions; 90 submarines [later revised to 60]; an air force (not including air transport) of 1,250 bombers, 2,250 fighters, and 300 other aircraft—a total of 3,800 aircraft [later revised to 2,800].⁵² The contrast between these proposals and the most ambitious of all first-generation peace operations, that of the Congo operation (ONUC), is revealing. At its peak size, ONUC comprised 19,828 personnel (approximate equivalent of two infantry divisions), but without air cover, these forces were attacked for two months in 1961 by a single Katangan aircraft.⁵³ Needless to say, peacekeeping operations, as *ad hoc* multinational contingents of very few forces were nearly insignificant compared to what was on the table in 1947. As the organization evolved bereft of its own military forces, UN member-states were left responsible for guaranteeing their own "security." The last article of Chapter VII (article 51) and those of Chapter VIII, in this light became even more important.

⁵⁰ DOS, USPUN 1946, 43.

⁵¹ DOS, USPUN 1947, 106.

⁵² Ibid., 107-08.

⁵³ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 709.

Article 51 guaranteed “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” and Chapter VIII described how “regional arrangements,” fit into the broader “UN system,” if meeting certain stipulations. Article 52.1 sanctioned these regional alliances if “their activities [were] consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations.” Articles 52.2 and 52.3 encouraged members to seek a solution to disputes through these agencies prior to seeking redress before the UN Security Council. Thus, “regional arrangements” were not only a viable alternative to UN peace operations, they were encouraged to take action before the United Nations became involved. Important caveats to Article 52 however, were outlined in articles 53 and 54. Article 53 stated that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.” Article 54 directed the regional arrangements to keep the Council “fully informed” of the activities that were being taken by these regional bodies.

In practice, the United States justified its resort to building Cold War “defense alliances”—which were necessary because of the failed United Nations collective security scheme—under the terms of articles 51 through 54. In 1948, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained that Washington’s growing reliance upon “regional security arrangements” was “permitted by the Charter and consistent with its purposes.” This convenient rationalization was incorporated into a U.S. congressional resolution (Senate resolution 239, 80th Congress) that “reaffirm[ed] the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security [as redefined] through the United Nations.” This resolution was cited as having paved the way for U.S. membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949; U.S. bilateral assistance provided to Greece, Turkey, and China; and the European Recovery Program (the Marshall plan). In light of all these “supplemental” U.S. efforts to make up for failings of the UN organization, Acheson summarized, “Nevertheless, there is no sound reason for Americans to lose confidence in the United Nations.

Responsible collective judgment on matters of international concern is better than the interested and sometime irresponsible judgments of individual nations.”⁵⁴

Ambassador Austin explained Washington’s reliance upon collective defensive arrangements was a result of “aggressively reactionary Soviet policies, both inside and outside of the United Nations.” Thus, the perceived Communist challenge “forced the free world to accelerate the building of adequate defenses.”⁵⁵ Ambassador Austin listed the Inter-American Treaty of 1947, the North Atlantic Treaty (signed 4 April, effective 24 August 1949), the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (passed in September 1949) as “part of this common effort to assure security” and all “formed to fit within the framework of the Charter.” At the Third Regular General Assembly sessions (1948) a resolution was adopted that granted “observer status” to the secretary-general of the Organization of American States. The Legal Committee endorsed this action and suggested that “a similar status for the highest officers of other regional organizations would be favorably considered by the Assembly.”⁵⁶ In 1950, the League of Arab States (LAS); and in 1965 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also were granted “official” regional organization status and “observer” status in UN organs.⁵⁷

Finally, three other Charter chapters are relevant to the case studies investigated in the following pages. Chapter XIV outlined general responsibilities of UN member-states to seek redress of justiciable disputes before the “International Court of Justice” (ICJ). Article 96.1, specifically, encouraged the General Assembly or the Security Council to request that the ICJ provide an “advisory opinion on any legal question.” The next four articles, 97-101, outlined the functions and responsibilities of the organization’s “chief administrative officer,” the secretary-general. Article 98

⁵⁴ Dean Acheson, Letter of Transmittal to the President, 17 March 1949 in DOS, USPUN 1948, vi-vii.

⁵⁵ DOS, USPUN 1951, 3, 24.

⁵⁶ DOS, USPUN 1948, 163.

⁵⁷ Of note, NATO was not granted this status between 1946 and 1968. Hovet and Hovet, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 309.

authorized the other UN organs to task the secretary-general and his "Secretariat" staff to perform "tasks as are entrusted to him." This broad mandate allowed for a significant increase in the secretary-general's importance as an international negotiator, fact-finder, and later, as chief of all UN "field operations." Similarly, article 99 authorized the secretary-general to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." In this capacity, the secretary-general gained greater prominence as an initiator of debates and one who recommended courses of action to settle disputes.⁵⁸

Ironically, Charter Chapter XVII was entitled "Transitional Security Arrangements." This chapter, comprising two articles, noted that until such a time that the forces outlined in article 43 came into being, the individual states would retain responsibility for international security. Article 106 referenced the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 as the great powers' mutual agreement that these nations (those that became the P-5) should "consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Whereas article 107 gave the P-5 exclusive rights to settle their affairs with their former W.W.II "enemy states" (primarily Germany and Japan—including all territories that they had conquered). The delay in discharging this responsibility, like the specific questions at issue in the settlements themselves, had far-reaching effects upon international political, economic, and security relations. The continued failure of the powers to agree upon how to settle issues of Germany and Austria, were unresolved for many years. Only in late 1947 was the treaty with Italy concluded (and Trieste remained an area of contention between U.S./British and Yugoslavian armed forces). At that time, an official Department of State report stated that "the essential bases of postwar world order necessarily must continue incomplete

⁵⁸ A number of studies have been published dealing with how the secretary-general's position gained greater responsibility for UN peace operations. See, for example, Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967)

until these settlements are effected.”⁵⁹ It can be argued, fifty years later, the “post-war order” was never effected.

Key UN and U.S. Officials:

This study of UN peace operations between 1946 and 1968, emphasizing the United States role in these missions, necessarily deals with the actions taken by senior UN and U.S. diplomats and government officials. In most cases when these actors are quoted or mentioned in the pages that follow, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide in-depth biographical information. For the sake of convenience, some of the actors that appear often in this study are briefly discussed here and references are provided for where to find more detailed biographical information.

In these years, the position of United Nations secretary-general was filled by three distinguished statesmen: Norway’s Trygve Halvdan Lie (in office 1 February 1946 to 10 April 1953), Sweden’s Dag Hjalmar Agné Carl Hammarskjöld (10 April 1953 to 17 September 1961), and Burma’s U [Sithu] Thant (Acting Secretary-General 3 November 1961 to 1 January 1962; thereafter Secretary-General from 1 January 1962 to 31 December 1971). Trygve Lie (1896-1968) was a Norwegian statesman who, prior to his election as secretary-general, had served in ministerial posts and as Norway’s foreign minister (both of his government in exile during World War II, and after October 1945 in Norway). Lie was elected as secretary-general on 1 February 1946 to serve a 5 year term. In 1951 his renomination was opposed by the Soviet bloc because of his support of UN action during the Korean War (1950-53, see Chapter Two). Ironically, Lie had been the Soviet bloc’s nominee to serve as the first General Assembly “president” (a one-year position). In November 1950, the Security Council voted to reelect Lie for an additional term as secretary-general. The count was 9-1(USSR)-1. The Soviet Union considered this a “veto;” the others argued that the

⁵⁹ DOS, USPUN 1947, 5-6.

Council's "great "majority" was sufficient mandate for the secretary-general to continue in office. Later, the U.S. delegation sponsored an initiative before the Sixth General Assembly to force a vote in support of the Council's "majority opinion." The Soviet bloc considered this move to be "illegal, arbitrary, and inconsistent with the Charter." During the Assembly debates, the Soviet representative announced that "if Trygve Lie were appointed for any supplementary period the Soviet Union would have no dealings with him and would refuse to regard him as the secretary-general after the expiration of his initial term [as of 1 February 1951]." The Assembly debated the merits of different Charter interpretations, and, in the end, voted "by a show of hands" 46-5-8, to allow the secretary-general to continue his duties for an additional three years.⁶⁰ He did so, but was embittered by the Soviet Union's decision. He left office in 1953, having served a full term plus two years into another. Thereafter, Lie resumed an active role in Norwegian politics.⁶¹

The second secretary-general was Sweden's lawyer, economist and diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961). Elected in 1953 as a compromise candidate between East and West, Hammarskjöld earned initial praise after a year-long diplomatic effort (1954-55) led to Communist China's decision to release a number of American airmen who had been captured during the Korean war.⁶² Hammarskjöld's next important diplomatic feat was the creation of the United Nations' first "traditional peacekeeping" mission that took up duties in the Sinai and Gaza Strip after the October-November 1956 Suez War (see Chapter Five). Hammarskjöld advocated that the organization's potential to conduct successful peace operations in the periphery—outside the

⁶⁰ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950, DOS Publication 4178, International and Conference Series III, 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1951), 120.

⁶¹ The most comprehensive source on the first secretary-general is that of his memoirs, Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954).

⁶² Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 96-127.

superpower-controlled areas—should be exploited.⁶³ His “principles of peacekeeping,” although later demonstrated to be less than universal, were hailed as guidelines that the organization should adopt when creating and executing all subsequent peace operations.⁶⁴ It was upon Hammarskjöld’s recommendation (under Charter article 99) that the Security Council responded to events in the Congo during 1960 (see Chapter Six). That mission became the organization’s most ambitious peace operation—in terms of both personnel and costs. In September 1961, the secretary-general was in the Congo. He embarked on a flight for the purpose of negotiating a cease-fire agreement with a rebel leader when, short of its intended airfield (in the middle of the night), his plane mysteriously crashed. He and his personal staff-members were all killed. For his efforts in the Congo and for his contributions as secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld posthumously earned the 1961 Nobel peace prize.⁶⁵

The third secretary-general was a quiet statesman from Burma, U Thant. Thant stepped into a maelstrom as secretary-general and yet managed to hold the organization together. Initially, the Soviet bloc was opposed to appointing a third secretary-general after losing “control” over the two previous, activist secretaries-general. This led to a three-month delay between Hammarskjöld’s death and the appointment of U Thant as the “acting secretary-general.” To make matters worse, the organization was in the midst of a growing “financial crisis.” As a result of France’s and the Soviet bloc’s refusal to pay assessments for “peacekeeping costs,” organizational debts mounted. At

⁶³ For a collection of Dag Hammarskjöld’s public statements and writings, see Wilder Foote, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1953-1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

⁶⁴ For works on Hammarskjöld and his strategies for peacekeeping, see Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana, 1961); and Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

⁶⁵ The most comprehensive biography of Dag Hammarskjöld was written by one of his undersecretaries who later became the undersecretary for UN peacekeeping operations: Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972).

the same time, the General Assembly was facing political collapse as the United States pressed to deny the USSR its vote in that body (for not paying its arrears, per article 19). In the midst of all of this controversy, Thant earned international respect by escalating UN operations in the Congo (terminating an 18-month-long Katangan succession, see Chapter Six), and for supervising “successful” operations in West New Guinea (Chapter Four), Yemen (Chapter Three), and Cyprus (Chapter Seven). Approaching the end of his first term in late 1966, U Thant expressed little desire to continue as secretary-general (he especially was frustrated by his inability to mediate an end to the war in Vietnam).⁶⁶ Nonetheless, on 2 December 1966, after the Security Council had already agreed, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution to reappoint U Thant for another term (that ended 31 December 1971).⁶⁷ Despite his peacekeeping successes and ability to straddle East and West, U Thant’s greatest political disaster came in May 1967 when he (perhaps, too-quickly) acceded to Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s demands that UNEF be withdrawn (see Chapter Five). This “unilateral decision” was criticized when the third Arab-Israeli war broke out soon thereafter. Thant’s decision was immortalized as the “Sinai Blunder,” although, in retrospect, other than stalling for more time and generating an organizational consensus for an inevitable acquiescence, Secretary-General Thant had few options.⁶⁸

During the years under consideration in this study, 1946 to 1968, Washington saw four different presidential administrations under Presidents Harry S Truman (1945-

⁶⁶ U Thant, View From the UN (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1978), 57-84; Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 49-55.

⁶⁷ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966, DOS Publication 8276, International Organization and Conference Series 77 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1967), 75.

⁶⁸ See analysis in Chapter Five of this study. Also see, Indarjit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980). For the secretary-general’s views, see Thant, View From the UN, 220-53.

1953), Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961), John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). In these years, the leadership of the U.S. mission to the United Nations was under the official control of at least seven successive U.S. secretaries of state and eight "Permanent Ambassadors" to the United Nations.

In the Truman years, secretaries of state George C. Marshall and Dean G. Acheson made important decisions that established the methods and extent to which the United States would support the United Nations.⁶⁹ During their tenure, three men served as the United States' "permanent ambassador" to the UN (and chief of USUN): Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (formerly secretary of state under Franklin D. Roosevelt), Hershel V. Johnson, and Warren R. Austin. The first two of these were USUN chiefs for approximately six months each. Long-term leadership was provided with the appointment of former Senator Austin (January 1947 to January 1953). Austin was a soft-spoken diplomat who took his orders from Marshall and Acheson—even if he did not always agree with them.⁷⁰ He was ably assisted by several talented U.S.-delegation members (most of whom went on to hold high offices in U.S. government) including: deputy representatives Philip C. Jessup and Ernest A. Gross; and delegates: H. Merle Cochran, Gerald A. Drew, John Foster Dulles, Mark F. Etheridge, Frank P. Graham, W. Averell Harriman, Alan G. Kirk, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Eleanor Roosevelt, Dean Rusk, Francis B. Sayre, and Adlai E. Stevenson, III.⁷¹

⁶⁹ The two most important biographical sources for these years are Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956); and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation.

⁷⁰ See George T. Mazuzan, Warren R. Austin at the UN, 1946-1953 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977), and Seymour Maxwell Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 41-71.

⁷¹ For articles on the contributions of Jessup and Gross, see Linda M. Fasulo, Representing America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the UN (New York: Praeger Scientific, 1984), 21-45. See also Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Ernest A. Gross, The United Nations: Structure For Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

When Eisenhower was elected in 1953, he chose for his top foreign policy and USUN positions two men with previous experience with the U.S. delegation: John Foster Dulles (as his secretary of state) and Henry Cabot Lodge (as his UN ambassador).⁷² This team served together for over six years (when Foster Dulles retired due to ill health, and was replaced by Christian A. Herter⁷³). Both Dulles and Lodge were fiery orators who envisioned the United Nations as important as both a supplemental foreign-policy agency and as a rostrum from which to expose and denounce the “evils” of communism. Lodge was very close to President Eisenhower and his status as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations was elevated to that of a “Cabinet position.” At times Lodge’s “direct access” to the president frustrated the proper policy-making channels, but normally, Dulles understood that such liberties were rare exceptions.⁷⁴ Lodge was assisted by his deputy ambassador James J. Wadsworth (who assumed the top position when Lodge left to campaign for vice-president in 1960); James W. Barco, Ellsworth Bunker, Benjamin Gerig, Paul G. Hoffmann, Harry N. Howard, Walter M. Kotschnig, Mary P. Lord (also listed as Mrs.

⁷² For Eisenhower’s memoirs see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years. Vol. I: Mandate for Change 1953-1956; Vol. II: Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1963, 1965). For Dulles, who left no memoirs, see Anthony Clark Arend, Pursuing a Just and Durable Peace: John Foster Dulles and International Organization (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); and Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). On Cabot Lodge, see: Henry Cabot Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973); and Idem, As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the ‘50s and ‘60s (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976).

⁷³ On Herter, see G. Bernard Noble, Christian A. Herter (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1970).

⁷⁴ For more on Lodge and his “special relationship” with President Eisenhower, see Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN, 72-106; and Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 366-68.

Oswald B. Lord), Harold E. Stassen, and Francis O. Wilcox (who also served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, IO).⁷⁵

The Kennedy administration brought in nearly an entirely new staff in January 1961—in the midst of the United Nations' Congo crisis.⁷⁶ The new U.S. secretary of state was former army officer and UN General Assembly delegate, Dean Rusk. For the next eight years, Rusk was the anchor of U.S. government in Washington. This was ironic because President Kennedy had surprised even Rusk by asking him to become secretary of state and because from the time Johnson assumed the presidency, it was a recurring rumor that LBJ was planning to replace Rusk.⁷⁷ The other man thought to have been high on Kennedy's list for that position was appointed as UN ambassador, former UN delegate, Governor of Illinois, and twice Democratic candidate for president, Adlai E. Stevenson.⁷⁸ Stevenson's staff included his deputies: Francis T. P. Plimpton and Charles W. Yost; and delegates: George W. Ball, Jonathan B. Bingham, Chester Bowles, C. Douglas Dillon, Charles P. Noyes, Charles H. Popper, Marietta P.

⁷⁵ For information on Wilcox and Klutznick, see Linda M. Fasulo, Representing America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the UN (New York: Praeger Scientific, 1984), 46-61.

⁷⁶ On Kennedy, see Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).

⁷⁷ Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, as told to Richard Rusk and edited by Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 193-205.

⁷⁸ For biographies of Stevenson, see Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN, 109-159; Walter Johnson, Carol Evans, C. Eric Sears, eds., The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson, vol. VIII: Ambassador to the United Nations, 1961-1965 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979); Robert L. and Selma Schiffer, eds., Looking Outward: Years of Crisis at the United Nations (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); and Richard J. Walton, The Remnants of Power: The Tragic Last Years of Adlai Stevenson (New York: Coward-McCann, 1968).

Tree, and Sidney R. Yates.⁷⁹ Stevenson's relationship with the Kennedy administration was not nearly as close or "privileged" as that of Lodge's was with Eisenhower. There was a tension between Kennedy and Stevenson that was rooted in Kennedy's resentment that Stevenson did not fully endorse the Kennedy campaign in 1960 and also in Stevenson's hopes for an appointment as Kennedy's secretary of state. Notwithstanding these frictions, Stevenson's skills as an orator and his stature as one of the original members of the UN founder's conference inspired great confidence in the Kennedy administration's UN mission.⁸⁰

When Johnson assumed the presidency after Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, most of the top foreign-policy and USUN personnel remained in place through mid-1965.⁸¹ Rusk retained the top post at the Department of State as did Stevenson at USUN. At this point, Yost was moved up to deputy ambassador with Plimpton. Unexpectedly, on 14 July 1965, Ambassador Stevenson died. America lost a great patriot and a liberal icon. President Johnson wanted to select an honorable replacement. He chose Arthur J. Goldberg, a former Labor Secretary and most-recently, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.⁸² Under Goldberg, Yost was moved up to

⁷⁹ For biographies of Finger, Plimpton, and Tree, see Linda M. Fasulo, Representing America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the UN (New York: Praeger Scientific, 1984), 62-90. See also, George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, Memoirs (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1982); and Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Conscience of a Liberal: Selected Writings and Speeches, Chester Bowles; (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

⁸⁰ Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN, 109-154.

⁸¹ For Johnson's memoirs, see Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971). On his presidency, see Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), and Paul Y. Hammond, LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992). For a look at both Kennedy's and Johnson's foreign policy, see Diane B. Kunz, The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁸² On Goldberg, see Victor Laskey, Arthur Goldberg: The Old and the New (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1970); and Linda M. Fasulo, Representing

second-in-command (Plimpton resigned) and James M. Nabrit, Jr. became the second deputy ambassador. Other U.S. delegates after mid-1965 included: Eugenie M. Anderson, Harding F. Bancroft, Colonel James M. Boyd, William B. Buffum, Seymour M. Finger, William C. Foster, Henry H. Fowler, Arthur E. Goldschmidt, Walter Kotschnig, Thomas C. Mann, Richard F. Pederson, William P. Rogers, James Roosevelt, Eugene V. Rostow, Joseph J. Sisco (also IO) and Francis E. Willis. Arthur Goldberg took the position as USUN chief with reassurances from President Johnson that he would have "direct access" to the White House and that only a man of his stature could replace Adlai Stevenson. Goldberg was intrigued by the offer, but he proved to be a less than inspirational speaker and was frustrated by the Johnson administration's war in Vietnam.⁸³ In June 1968, Goldberg resigned and was replaced by Ball (for two months), then James Russell Wiggins.

Finally, in addition to these "partisan" American diplomats and government representatives, the United States was represented at the top levels of the UN Secretariat during these years. The most important of these persons was Dr. Ralph J. Bunche (1904-1971; UN Secretariat 1946-1971). Bunche served as director of the UN Trusteeship division in the late 1940s and was subsequently utilized as a political undersecretary without portfolio (so he could work on a variety of peacekeeping operations, including those in Palestine, the Sinai, and the Congo). In 1954, Bunche was made the secretary-general's "undersecretary for special political affairs" and he held that position until he died in 1971. More than any other man, Ralph Bunche provided continuity at the top levels of the UN Secretariat and was instrumental in building the organization's "peace machinery."⁸⁴ Another U.S. national who worked

America: Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the UN (New York: Praeger, 1984), 98-106.

⁸³ Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN, 160-92.

⁸⁴ The most comprehensive work on Bunche detailing his contributions as the architect of UN peace operations is Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993). Urquhart worked side-by-side with Bunche and later became the UN "undersecretary-general for special political affairs" (1974-1986).

long-term at the UN Secretariat was Andrew W. Cordier. Cordier served as the secretary-general's "Executive Assistant" and later compiled all the papers of the secretaries-general in a project for Columbia University.⁸⁵ A few other Americans also were employed for many years in the Secretariat, including: David Vaughn (as Chief, Office of General Services), Paul G. Hoffmann (Administrator of the UN "Special Fund") and Laurence H. Michelmore (Director, United Nations Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees, UNRWA).

With the provision of ideological, charter, and personnel backgrounds, it is now possible to move on to the case studies that examine the United Nations' development of peace operations and the role played by the United States in these endeavors. The next two chapters of this study deal with UN "observer missions"—those in Chapter Two as examples of interstate disputes; whereas those in outlined in Chapter Three as intra-state disputes that attracted or were threatened to draw-in "external" parties. The middle three chapters focus on missions that dealt with "colonial issues" (as in Indonesia) and those that went beyond simple "observation," to include "traditional peacekeeping," and situations entailing military "enforcement" or "nation-building." Finally, Chapter Seven demonstrates the capacity demonstrated by regional arrangements to conduct peace operations under the Charter, as extensions of the UN system. In each of these studies, an understanding of specific U.S. ideological motivations and UN organizational provisions will make the individual case studies more comprehensible and cast them within their proper context.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vols. I-V; and Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, vols. VI-VII (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972-1976).

CHAPTER TWO

UNITED NATIONS' PEACE OBSERVATION AND THE "PACIFIC PERPETUATION" OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES¹

Progress toward the solution of problems of peaceful settlement is necessarily slow. It involves the adjustment of conflicting interests and the reconciliation of hostile emotions and in the final analysis depends upon the parties themselves, since the United Nations cannot impose solutions. The United Nations can, however, assist by recommending procedures and methods of adjustment, by making available its good offices, and by establishing [certain] instrumentalities. . . .

[U.S. Department of State, 1953]²

In the organization's first decade, United Nations' (UN) peace operations had modest beginnings. During these years, the United Nations employed "international representatives" as impartial commission-members, investigators, observers and diplomats. These UN "servants in the cause of peace"³ represented the international

¹ I have borrowed the phrase "pacific perpetuation of disputes" from Canadian professor Alastair Taylor to convey the notion that these UN field missions were relatively successful at "keeping the peace," but the political disputes were never sufficiently "resolved." See Talyor's article "Peacekeeping: The International Context," in Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response, The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 39 (Ontario: John Deyell Limited, 1968), 4.

² Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953, DOS Publication 5459, International Organization and Conference Series III, 100 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, August 1954), 3.

³ This was the first UN secretary-general's characterization of these employees and of himself. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954).

community's interests in troubled locations that included Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, the Indian subcontinent (Kashmir) and Korea. In each case, the organization generated an ad hoc response—creating and employing “machinery” unique to each set of circumstances and commensurate with the organization's capacity to act. Inevitably, the United Nations' response and its effectiveness was determined by the nature of each conflict and by the amount of support that contending parties and influential member-states rendered to the United Nations. That the organization was able to perform at all was a reflection of the flexibility built into the United Nations' Charter and of the international community's desire to promote a peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Although these early missions do not compare in terms of manpower or financial costs with later UN “peacekeeping” missions, they did serve to inform public debates and contributed in small ways to help defuse certain dangerous international disputes. In addition, they established precedents and provided lessons for similarly-conducted UN “field operations” and the more ambitious UN peace operations that followed.⁴

This chapter concentrates on the mutual concerns of and actions taken by the United Nations and the United States government regarding “interstate” conflicts in Palestine, the Kashmir and Korea.⁵ A study of UN observations operations in Greece, Lebanon and Yemen is covered in the next chapter under the rubric of UN observation missions that operated in the midst of “internationalized civil wars.” Later, in chapter four of this study, the case of Indonesia will be examined as a “colonial issue”—as

⁴ This study alternatively references UN “field operations” as “field missions” or as “peace operations.” UN missions staffed primarily by observers are referenced as “observer missions” or “observer operations.” For distinctions between observer missions and “traditional peacekeeping” see Chapter Five of this study.

⁵ With respect to Korea, the dispute which led to war between 1950 and 1953 (and which resulted in a long-term division of the country) can properly be considered either a “civil war” or a de facto interstate conflict. Even though the Korean peninsula was artificially divided at the 38th parallel in 1945, the ideological and geographical differences that were “sponsored” by the Communist states in the North and Western states in the South transformed the nature of the conflict into something resembling an interstate war. In any case, the United Nations treated North and South Korea as two sovereign nations. Accordingly, aspects of the conflict are addressed in this chapter.

representative of the numerous colonial disputes that involved the United Nations and the United States during these years. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of early UN observer operations and mediation efforts that contributed toward stabilizing (but not resolving) certain interstate disputes. In each case, this study will focus on the political, military and financial aspects of U.S. contributions to these UN efforts and on U.S. maneuvers that sought to overcome the organization's handicaps and to strengthen its capacity to meet its ambitious Charter goals.⁶

Palestine and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

On 14 May 1948, Jewish settlers (formerly under British administration in Palestine) proclaimed their national independence and created modern Israel. That same day, having anticipated this declaration, four Arab states declared war and launched a multi-front offensive against the Jewish military forces (later, the "Israel Defense Forces" or IDF).⁷ Prior to the outbreak of this regional cataclysm, the United

⁶ The United Nations was "handicapped" during these years because certain articles of the Charter were circumscribed by the advent of the East-West "Cold War." Charter articles relating to the organization's capacity to "maintain international peace and security," especially those enumerated in Charter Chapter VII, were not realized. Instead, "great power" ideological differences and national decisions led the world to rely upon one's own national military strengths rather than support an international "peace force." As a result of the "article 43 failure," UN member-states "creatively" responded to international disputes—these were the first steps toward what became known as UN "operations for peace" or "peacekeeping." (For more information on these Charter issues, see Chapter One of this study).

⁷ Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon deployed significant portions of their national military forces against Israel in May 1948. Other Arab states (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, etc.) also "declared war" but contributed only funds or "token" units. For sources on this "first Arab-Israeli war" see, Ritchie Ovendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars* (London: Longman, 1984), 112-25; and Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 2nd edn. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1976), 68-101.

Nations had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a peaceful transition in Palestine.⁸ All suggestions for equitably dividing the disputed territory, however, were rejected by one or both sides. Once war started, both the Security Council and the General Assembly simultaneously called (repeatedly) for belligerents to conclude a peace settlement, agree to a truce or sign a cease-fire.⁹

In the wake of Arab-Israeli hostilities, the United Nations appointed Sweden's Count Folke Bernadotte as the "General Assembly's Special Representative" to Palestine. Bernadotte was instructed to mediate a cease-fire agreement and then seek a broader peaceful solution. He shuttled between representatives of both Arab and Jewish military forces and attempted to forge a compromise based upon earlier UN recommendations for a "Partition Plan" [See map at Appendix B]. All factions, however, rejected Bernadotte's proposals. By this point, the belligerents were confident of gaining "total victory" over the other. In September 1948, Bernadotte was assassinated.¹⁰ This tragic event spurred the UN "Truce Commission" (created by

⁸ The UN General Assembly was "handed" the problems in Palestine by the British in early 1947. At that time the British announced their intentions to "terminate" their mandate arrangement (established in 1920 under the League of Nations) with Palestine. In response, the General Assembly met in its first Special Session between 28 April and 13 May 1947. This session adopted a resolution to create a Palestine commission. The end result of the commission's work was the adoption, by the Second Regular General Assembly, on 29 November 1947, of a plan to "partition" Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state, with an economic "union." For a concise British history of Palestine (in a broad context of British interests) see Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), especially 163-170. For a more American perspective of the situation, see Seth P. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), especially 12-18.

⁹ The distinction between these terms is debated by lawyers and diplomats. Essentially, a truce or "armistice" is a mutually agreed-upon, conditional termination of hostilities. A "cease-fire" is the most temporary and conditional of agreements that aims to pause local fighting while other, more lasting arrangements are sought.

¹⁰ Count Folke Bernadotte was killed on 18 September 1948 in Jerusalem by a Jewish extremist group that opposed the mediator's suggestions for a compromise solution based on the Assembly's plans for "partition" of Palestine.

the Security Council in April 1948) to enhance the security of UN personnel in Palestine. This resulted in an increased use of military “observers” as security details and as local investigators. After Bernadotte’s death, American Ralph J. Bunche was appointed as “acting mediator” to carry on his former supervisor’s taskings.¹¹ Between May 1948 and June 1949, Bunche had worked under Bernadotte as the UN official responsible for organizing the United Nations’ military observer mission. After September 1948, Bunche successfully negotiated separate armistice agreements between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on the other.¹² Notably, each of the armistice agreements negotiated by Bunche incorporated a continuing UN observer presence. These military observers, designated as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),¹³ gained an enduring mandate tied

¹¹ Ralph J. Bunche had served in the U.S. State Department before the Second World War, was an original member of the U.S. mission to draft the Charter in San Francisco, and had served on the UN Secretariat since 1946. A number of works chronicle Bunche’s role on the UN Secretariat and his contributions to international peacekeeping in the Middle East and the Congo. See Sir Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); Benjamin Rivlin, ed., Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990); and Charles P. Henry, ed., Ralph J. Bunche: Selected Speeches and Writings (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

¹² For his efforts, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche (Ph.D. from UCLA) was awarded the 1950 Nobel peace prize. He was the first American who was not a president or secretary of state to earn that award—the sixth American to win the award since 1905, and the first African-American.

¹³ Although, under the armistice agreements negotiated in 1949, UNTSO’s tasking was actually “armistice” supervision, since there was no “truce” to supervise. UNTSO’s original mandate indirectly evolved out of Security-Council resolution 48, of 23 April 1948, which had created a “Truce Commission for Palestine.” On 14 May, the General Assembly created the position of “Mediator for Palestine” and directed this official (Count Bernadotte until September 1948, then Dr. Ralph Bunche) to cooperate with the Security Council’s Commission. Five days later, the Security Council passed an additional resolution that called for a cease fire and instructed the Mediator, “in concert with the Truce Commission” to pursue a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Notably, this resolution authorized the appointment of a “sufficient number of military observers” to help the mediator and commission to implement these taskings. Within six months, UNTSO observers from France, Belgium and the United States totaled 572

flexibly to the armistice agreements negotiated in 1949. [See map of Israel and 1949 armistice boundaries at Appendix B.]

As approved by the Security Council,¹⁴ UNTSO was to patrol along the armistice demarcation lines (or ADLs), observe compliance with the armistice agreements, report violations, and mediate complaints employing a series of bilateral Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs).¹⁵ Separate MACs were established between Israel and each of its contiguous Arab neighbors. The Israel-Lebanon MAC functioned the smoothest; whereas the MACs between Israel and Jordan, Syria, and Egypt functioned erratically (listed in order from less to more troublesome). Despite the volatility of many of these cases, UNTSO personnel were able to provide service as impartial investigators. Their reports also contributed by informing those debates that were elevated to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, after 1949.¹⁶

Despite these agreements, sporadic violence and international disputes flared between Israel and its Arab neighbors—the root cause of which was that a permanent political solution for Palestine was not reached. Especially divisive were issues related to the promised “repatriation and compensation” due refugees displaced by the 1948 war. Nonetheless, UNTSO proved its utility and was renewed annually and funded by the United Nations regular budget. The operational manning was significantly cut back

men. For copies of these source documents see Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, I The Middle East (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), 13-16; 25. See also, United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDPI, 1996), 15-32; 691-92.

¹⁴ Security Council resolution 73, 11 August 1949, UN document S/1376 (II).

¹⁵ The MACs were another enduring aspect of the “international machinery” created by Dr. Bunche—as incorporated into each of the armistice agreements. Canadian General E. L. M. Burns provided an insight into the daily operations of the MACs, from his perspective as UNTSO chief of staff, see E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: Harrap, 1962), 182-183.

¹⁶ In 1967, Israel officially denounced the 1949 armistice agreements. Curiously, by then, UNTSO’s mandate was continued by the United Nations without those agreements legally “in effect.” See UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 24.

from a high of 572 observers in 1948 to a total varying between 30 and 178 observers thereafter. Although it was discouraging to note the continued tensions in the area, UNTSO's long-term arrangement proved advantageous to the United Nations. Having observers continuously on duty provided the organization with a regional fact-finding and mediating body as disputes arose each year. N. D. White wrote of this arrangement: "UNTSO's longevity [arose] out of the political necessity for the United Nations to have a constant presence in the most volatile area of the world."¹⁷ In addition, the experience gained by UNTSO-assigned observers was passed both academically and personally to future UN peace operations.¹⁸

U.S. support for UNTSO began slowly, but proved to be critical. During the "first truce" (11 June to 5 July), the U.S. supplied approximately 41 men and officers to support the UN "Truce Commission" and its mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. With a "second truce" called (15 July), Bernadotte and Ralph Bunche set about to expand the role of UN military observers. By 15 August, the U.S. had deployed 187 persons to Palestine, half of whom were officers. By the end of 1948, the U.S. was contributing 327 military personnel, a majority of UNTSO's total 572-man strength. These numbers rapidly decreased in 1950. By April of that year, only 16 U.S. military personnel remained assigned to UNTSO (out of 32); and by February 1953, the U.S. assigned 15 personnel to UNTSO (out of 30 total)¹⁹ With respect to transport and

¹⁷ N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993), 217.

¹⁸ Forces with experience in UNTSO, especially their top leaders, were called upon to assume future foundational and leadership roles in other UN-generated peace operations.

¹⁹ Thus, in the first five years, U.S. personnel accounted for at least half of UNTSO's total strength; thereafter the U.S. percentage of total assigned dropped as other UN member-states added contingents to UNTSO after 1953. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. III, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 34-35, 71.

logistics, American contributions were even more important. In this category, the United States donated, loaned, and operated: aircraft (4 C-47s), naval destroyers (3, for coastal patrols in 1948), jeeps (about 150 supplied in 1948 alone), communications equipment, rations, and medical supplies. Most all of these items were either loaned or donated by the U.S. military services.

Although Count Bernadotte complained that U.S. responses to his requests for support were “distinguished by slowness,” America proved to be UNTSO’s greatest supplier. It was not until after 1950 that the United States began to charge the United Nations for providing American equipment and special services.²⁰ Even then, many items were provided gratis, notably the expensive, critically-important initial “emergency airlift.”²¹ UNTSO’s annual expenditures averaged around \$500,000 between 1948 and 1956 (with costs about \$1 million in 1948 and 1956).²² These expenses were assessed under the UN’s “regular budget,” to which the United States contributed approximately between 32 and 38 percent during these years.²³

²⁰ It was not until after the 1956 Suez war (with the creation of the organization’s first “peacekeeping force”—UNEF, as discussed in Chapter Five of this study) that an “assist letter” system was devised to track UN requests for U.S. equipment and services. David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 529.

²¹ The importance of airlift provided by the United States Air Force to these efforts—especially in the initial or build-up stages of large-scale UN peace operations in the Sinai and the Congo—cannot be overstated. These services, in many cases, could not have been provided comparably by any other means by any other nation’s air resources. National Support of International Peacekeeping, III: 34-43, 75.

²² The total costs for initial UN observer missions were comparatively low when you consider that the 1956-57 costs for “peacekeeping” in the Sinai were \$30 million and costs for the first year of UN operations in the Congo (1960-61) were over \$100 million.

²³ The U.S. was assessed its “fair share” (based on capacity to pay) at a percentage that began at 38.89% in 1946 and decreased (slowly) to near 30% twenty years later. Each year the U.S. argued to have this share decreased, while at the same time U.S. voluntary payments and other costs to the UN “system” for the first 15 years averaged over 40% of all contributions made to the United Nations. See Calvin J.

The significance of UNTSO was that it served the United Nations in so many different ways. First, a constant “presence” was maintained in the midst of a tense situation that could resort to hostilities at any time. Observers “on the spot” were able to document impartially how events transpired. Observers were familiar with the terrain and the local customs. This helped in conducting fair investigations and offering impartial mediation services. Second, the experience gained by UNTSO observers and their staff was transferable to other UN missions. UN peacekeeping conducted in the Sinai after 1956 relied heavily upon UNTSO staff for filling initial leadership and cadre positions. These same observers were the first to deploy to Lebanon in 1958 and to the Congo in 1960. Thus, in addition to conducting its mandated functions, UNTSO became an organizational proving ground that yielded experienced personnel that could be called upon to form the nucleus of subsequent missions. The fact that the “Palestine problem” persisted was not a critique that should fall upon UNTSO. That mission conducted every-day operations separately from the myriad of mediation attempts that were sent to resolve the greater political issues. These discontinuities, at bottom, demonstrated the organization’s inability to supplement its modestly-effective “field operations” with similarly-successful “peace-making.” In these respects, the United Nations’ second observer mission—generated to help defuse an interstate conflict between India and Pakistan—faced similar obstacles and yielded comparable results.

Kashmir and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

In August 1947, after 347 years of informal and formal control, Britain’s economic and political domination of the Indian “subcontinent” ended.²⁴ As

Nichols, Financing the United Nations: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1961), 3-20.

²⁴ The British East India Company gained its first concessions from the Mogul rulers in 1600. It was not until after the “Indian Mutiny” of 1857 that London formally supplanted “company” administrative operations in India. See Penderel Moon, The

negotiated, all but three “princely kingdoms”²⁵ were assimilated into either a Hindu-dominated India or the split Islamic state of East and West Pakistan.²⁶ One of the smaller regions that remained “autonomous” was that of Jammu and Kashmir (both were commonly called “the Kashmir”). To its misfortune, the Kashmir was situated between India and West Pakistan—and its territory, especially the fertile “Vale of Kashmir,” was coveted by both regional powers (see map at Appendix B). Almost as soon as the British formally relinquished control, skirmishes ensued between Pakistani and Indian soldiers (or their proxies) for control of the Kashmir.²⁷

Under terms written into the Indian Independence Act, Kashmir was granted the

British Conquest and Dominion of India (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Proudest Day: India's Long Road to Independence (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); and Nath Das, Manmath, Partition and Independence of India: Inside Story of the Mountbatten Days (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1982).

²⁵ On 15 August 1947, the day of India and Pakistan’s independence, only three of some 584 “princely states” had not yet announced their intentions to join with either India or Pakistan. The others had acquiesced to Lord Mountbatten’s (former “Viceroy” of the Indian subcontinent) recommendation to choose one side or the other. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. II, Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 315-16.

²⁶ Unless otherwise stated, the use of “Pakistan” or “Pakistani” in this paper, refers to that of the former “West Pakistan.” In 1947, under terms of the Indian Independence Act, a divided Muslim state of Pakistan (West and East, divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory in between them) was created. Over the next two decades, a political movement for an independent East Pakistan gained momentum. In 1971 East Pakistan broke from West Pakistan, the former renaming itself Bangladesh and the latter retaining the title Pakistan. A clear discussion of this dispute’s historical background is presented in Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 14-23.

²⁷ Actually, disputes over the Kashmir came in the wake of the devastating 1947 “war of independence” that had left more than 1 million dead and millions homeless. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 315-20; David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 357-59.

“right” to remain autonomous under the Maharaja—who at that time, was a professed Hindu, even though most of his subjects were Muslims.²⁸ Nonetheless, both India and Pakistan pressured the Kashmiri ruler to join with them. After enduring two months of “Azadi” rebel demonstrations (a group closely aligned with Pakistan), the Maharajah gave in to India’s beseeching. On 24 October 1947, he signed an “Instrument of Accession” with New Delhi in return for India’s military aid. Pakistan protested the Maharajah’s “arbitrary decision” and vowed to escalate military support for the Azadi resistance movement. Prior to responding in kind, potentially inciting a major regional war, the Indian government brought the Kashmir problem to the United Nations’ Security Council.²⁹

In January 1948, the Security Council considered testimony from both Indian and Pakistani representatives. After hours of heated debates, on 20 January, the Council adopted a resolution (SC 39) to establish a three-member fact-finding “UN Commission For India and Pakistan (UNCIP).³⁰ UNCIP was directed to both investigate and mediate the political dispute in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Although the employment of UN military observers was authorized under SC 47³¹ in April 1948, it was not until January 1949 that observers were sent to monitor the status of an agreed-upon cease-fire. The first group of seven UN observers arrived in late

²⁸ A 1941 census showed the region to be 77% Muslim. Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir, 16. The Islamic movement gained widespread acceptance since the 14th century. However, in 1846, the British mandated that the Maharajah should be a Hindu. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 358.

²⁹ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 65.

³⁰ SC Resolution 39, S/654, 20 January 1948. The vote was 9-0-2 (Ukraine and USSR abstained). UNCIP’s membership was increased to five members (Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, and the United States) in April 1948 under resolution 47. See Security Council document S/654 in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 330-31.

³¹ For a full text of Security Council resolution 47 (UN document S/762) that established the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), see Ibid., 331-34.

January and began their work in February. Their first commander was Belgium's General Maurice Delvoie. A more formal cease-fire line (about 500 miles long, half of which was inaccessible in high mountains) was established five months later when, on 27 July, India and Pakistan signed the important "Karachi agreement."³² This bilateral treaty specified that UNCIP observers (later called the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, or UNMOGIP) would be granted unimpeded access to both sides of the administrative boundary in order to "verify compliance" and "report infractions." By the end of 1949, secretary-general Trygve Lie established the number of observers assigned to UNMOGIP at twenty. The Security Council authorized the secretary-general to double this force to forty members in 1950. It remained near that manning level for the next fifteen years.³³

Concurrently, yet separate from these observer "field operations," the United Nations sponsored a number of diplomatic initiatives with the goal of finding a more enduring solution to the dispute over Kashmir. To lead these efforts, the Security Council or the Secretariat enlisted the services of a series of distinguished statesmen. In March 1949, the UN secretary-general appointed U.S. Fleet Admiral (five stars, retired) Chester W. Nimitz to arrange for a plebiscite as called for in the April 1948

³² The Karachi Agreement set the basis for further negotiations and established the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. A copy of this agreement also is in *Ibid.*, 334-37.

³³ Pauline Dawson wrote an extensive Ph.D. dissertation about UNMOGIP, which she submitted to Keele University in 1987. Her book, "the revised and shortened version" (still 330 pages) was published seven years later, and is the best single volume study on the subject. See Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir. A number of other "case studies" of UN operations in the Kashmir exist in the myriad of compendium studies listed in this study's bibliography; perhaps the most comprehensive of these, regarding the Kashmir, is Sidney D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-1964, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 59-150; and David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 357-73. The "official" UN version is summarized in: UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 133-137; 703-04. (For information on UN operations in the Kashmir during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, see Chapter Five of this study.)

Security Council resolution.³⁴ Nimitz failed to make any progress, mainly because an anticipated “truce,” had not yet been put into effect.³⁵ In January 1950, the Security Council president, General McNaughton (the representative from Canada) pursued a second UN “peace-making” initiative. A month later, McNaughton reported that his mediation efforts had also failed. In the wake of these two diplomatic setbacks, the Security Council decommissioned the UNCIP and replaced that body with a single diplomatic point of contact—entitled the “UN Representative to India and Pakistan.” To fill this role, the Council appointed Australian Sir Owen Dixon. Dixon spent approximately four months negotiating with both parties. His proposals also were not accepted, although he made a number of positive and thoughtful recommendations.³⁶ The Council, in this case, was persistent. Dixon was replaced by Frank P. Graham, a former American university president. Between 1951 and 1958, almost annually, Graham approached India and Pakistan with a number of proposals. In the end, he too was unsuccessful. The reason for all of these failures was that the contending parties never moved past their initial, incompatible demands. India insisted upon a Pakistani and Azadi withdrawal prior to any concessions. Pakistan refused to withdraw its military forces (or pressure the Azadis to stop their raids) until the Indian government first conduct a fair (UN-supervised) plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. India refused to allow the Kashmiris to express their political aspirations—which most experts agreed, overwhelmingly would have favored assimilation with Pakistan. Neither party was willing to make the first move toward a peaceful resolution. From New Delhi’s perspective, a continued stand-off favored India because its forces had taken early control of approximately two-thirds of the Kashmir, including most of the Vale. Pakistan was not willing to mount a full counter-offensive, but instead supported the

³⁴ SC Resolution 47, S/726, 21 April 1948, part B, paragraphs 6-15.

³⁵ DOS, USPUN 1949, 46.

³⁶ DOS, USPUN 1950, 13; 91-2.

low-level harassment operations of the Azadi rebels against Indian positions.³⁷

Similar to U.S. participation in UNTSO, Washington contributed manpower and supplies in support of UNMOGIP. Between 1949 and 1954, a number of U.S. soldiers served as observers. This number reached a high of twenty-eight (in an average force of forty) and stood at eighteen U.S. observers in March 1954. U.S. "authority" to contribute observers to UNMOGIP ended that month, however, when India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (a native of Kashmir) asked that U.S. personnel be removed. Nehru's request was made because the United States had signed a bilateral military agreement with Pakistan during 1954.³⁸ Nehru claimed that, as a result of Washington's actions, India could no longer consider U.S. observers to be "neutral."³⁹

This incident demonstrated the organization's developing commitment to what has become known as "principles of peacekeeping." The second UN secretary-general, Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld emphasized the importance of reconciling the conduct of UN field operations with member-states' rights and national sovereignty. Hammarskjöld agreed with India's right to request that U.S. observers be removed from UNMOGIP on three bases. First, it was important to maintain India's cooperation with the continuing mission. Since New Delhi suspected U.S. loyalties, it had the right to withdraw its "consent"—a principle that was applied to both determining which national contingents should participate and to what extent UN forces were granted permission to conduct or continue their assigned duties.⁴⁰ Second,

³⁷ Bailey, How Wars End, II: 59-121.

³⁸ This agreement led to Pakistan's formally joining with the American-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) alliance.

³⁹ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, III: 139-40.

⁴⁰ In 1967, the third secretary-general, U Thant, was criticized for acquiescing to Egypt's demands that the United Nations withdraw a long-standing peacekeeping mission (UNEF) from Egyptian territory. U Thant justified his actions on this principle of host nation consent. See, for example, Indarjit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980); and Chapter Five of this study.

the secretary-general was dedicated to fielding representatives that were “impartial” in thought and deed. In this case, the very accusation of “partiality” was enough to convince Hammarskjöld that the United States should no longer contribute observers to that UN mission. This realignment of UNMOGIP’s manning, therefore, exemplified the enshrinement of “host nation consent” and “impartiality” as having become fundamental principles of UN field operations. U.S. personnel assigned to the Kashmir mission soon departed and were replaced by observers of more politically-“neutral” nations. This trend was adopted as a third foundation of UN peace operations, at least during Hammarskjöld’s tenure (1953-1961). Hammarskjöld strove to limit the direct participation by great powers—while, at the same time having no alternative but to rely upon them (especially the United States) for logistical and financial support.⁴¹ Regarding UNMOGIP, even after 1954, the United States continued to provide equipment and paid more than one-third of all UN assessments. In this respect, the U.S. relationship with UNMOGIP was similar to that of UNTSO.

A unique development in the United Nations’ conduct of peace operations in the Kashmir dispute was the amount of responsibility granted to the Secretary-General and his staff (compared to the missions in Greece and Palestine). Rosalyn Higgins, a lawyer and historian of UN peace operations, discussed this evolutionary development of the secretary-general’s growing responsibilities with respect to UNMOGIP. Higgins traced how the UN Council accepted decisions made by the secretary-general as having been “already approved” under previous (non-specific) resolutions. The Soviet representative argued against granting too much authority to the secretary-general, but no other Security Council member seemed to object to the secretary-general assuming carte blanche over the daily operations of these observer missions.⁴² As will become

⁴¹ For the development of Dag Hammarskjöld’s principles of peacekeeping, see Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 133-97; and Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 187-230.

⁴² Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, II: 334.

clear in the analysis of the case studies treated by this study, it can be said here that this trend continued, despite Soviet objections in nearly every instance.⁴³

Another remarkable feature of UNMOGIP's operations, between 1950 and 1965, was the degree to which Kashmiris and local Pakistani and Indian commanders cooperated with the UN mission. As a result of the political deadlock, Kashmir was essentially (*de facto*) partitioned between the two countries along the cease fire lines (CFLs) established in July 1949. Occasionally, one side or the other (usually out of frustration with the lack of diplomatic progress) would spark local hostilities. But, for the most part, only minor incidents were reported during UNMOGIP's first five years. Between 1955 and 1964, reported "incidents" increased ten-fold. Even so, it was not until after 1964 that "serious organized disorders" broke out along the 500-mile-long CFL. During the first, relatively peaceful decade of its operations, UNMOGIP observers were granted equal access (or "freedom of movement") along both sides of the demarcated boundary. This was not always true of the situation in Palestine. In a number of instances, UNTSO observers were not allowed access or were detained by local military commanders. Another novelty of UNMOGIP operations was that local military commanders routinely briefed UN observers on the status of national military encampments and their "order of battle." Normally such information would be closely-guarded as "secret." By sharing these details, Indian and Pakistani officers provided UNMOGIP with the advantage of knowing when something was out of place without having to go and find out first. The contrast between the friendly relations between "contending" military units (many of whom were comrades before India and Pakistan split in 1947) and that of the hostility and distrust between their respective political capitals was striking.⁴⁴ From a broader perspective, UNMOGIP operations were

⁴³ An exception to the general rule that the Soviet representative would protest the UN secretary-general exercising too much direct control, ironically, was the case of West New Guinea (see Chapter Four) where the United Nations Secretariat assumed near-total control of a transition government for seven months, between October 1962 and April 1963.

⁴⁴ Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 371-2.

conducted by a small cadre in a theater that remained a relative international backwater. These quiet operations relegated the Kashmir dispute to a lesser priority than other developing crises. In fact, the very year that UNMOGIP observers were settling into their routine, the United Nations' attention was diverted almost completely to a much more serious "threat to international peace" in East Asia.

Korea, the United Nations and "Uniting For Peace"

The political division of modern Korea has its roots in failed wartime diplomacy. Similar to Austria, as a region caught between East and West, Korea was a strategic region that neither side wanted to see lost to the other. Putting this more diplomatically, David Wainhouse's study concluded that, U.S. and USSR leaders simply "never got around to agreeing on a specific program for Korea."⁴⁵ The issue was raised at the 1943 Cairo Conference and 1945 Moscow Minister's Meeting, but these forums adjourned without a consensus being reached for Korea's ultimate status. When the Japanese forces occupying Korea (having held it as an "imperial possession" since 1910) surrendered in August 1945, Soviet ground forces began to displace positions vacated by withdrawing Japanese units. As a geographic "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) was concerned that the entire peninsula would fall under Russian control. As a result, DOD was quick to suggest a division of "mop-up" responsibilities between the Soviets in the north and U.S. forces in the south. According to Dean Acheson's memoirs, it was "a young officer recently returned to the Pentagon from the Chinese theater, Colonel Dean Rusk,

⁴⁵ Ibid., 323.

[who] found a convenient administrative dividing line along the 38th parallel.”⁴⁶ [See map at Appendix B.] North of this line, the Soviets backed their protégé Kim Il-Sung (a Moscow-trained Communist). In the south, the United States came to support Dr. Syngman Rhee (an American-educated autocrat). As things turned out, the “administrative line” persisted.

Between 1945 and 1947, the U.S. government attempted to reach an agreement regarding Korea with the Soviet government, but was unsuccessful.⁴⁷ As a result of these stalled bilateral efforts, the Harry S Truman administration decided to “present the Korean dispute” to the Second Regular General Assembly.⁴⁸ It is interesting to note that the U.S. delegation to the United Nations (USUN) avoided raising the issue of Korea in the Security Council. Washington realized that this would only lead to obstruction by the USSR representative and would create a possible “legal” precedent for Council “control” of the issue.⁴⁹ Accordingly, USUN raised the issue before the

⁴⁶ Rusk later became a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, served as the chief of the state department’s UN division (the office changed its designation over the years from SPA, to UNA, then IO), and was one of America’s longest-serving secretaries of state from 1961 to 1969. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), 449; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, as told to Richard Rusk and edited by Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 124.

⁴⁷ John Foster Dulles, a member of the USUN delegation in 1947 (later secretary of state from 1953 to 1959) summarized the efforts of the “Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union for Korea” as “two years of bickering and dispute.” Speech by John Foster Dulles, before the General Assembly, 13 November 1947 on “Korea” in Department of State, The United States and the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947: Second Annual Report on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3024, International and Conference Series III, 1 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1948), pp. 303-07.

⁴⁸ DOS, USPUN 1947, 263-64.

⁴⁹ The concern here was that once the Council was “seized” with an issue, under Charter articles 11 and 12, the General Assembly would then be unable to consider the matter.

General Assembly.⁵⁰ As will be discussed below, the Korean dispute and Washington's efforts to strengthen the General Assembly's authority as an organizational "alternative" to the Security Council touched off a battle for control of "UN peacekeeping"—a legal dispute that lasted well into the 1960s.⁵¹

On 14 November 1947, by a vote of 43-0-6, the General Assembly approved its first resolution dealing with Korea (GA 112).⁵² This resolution created a nine-member UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK, which did not include representatives of the U.S. or USSR) that was charged with "observing" and "consulting throughout Korea" with the aim of holding national elections (in the entire peninsula) no later than March 31, 1948.⁵³ The resolution envisioned the formation of a national Korean government, followed by the creation of Korean "national security forces" which were to allow the U.S. and USSR forces to withdraw. UNTCOK representatives arrived in Korea in early 1948 to carry out their duties. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not recognize the General Assembly's authority to create such a

⁵⁰ Under the Charter, the U.S. delegation argued for the General Assembly's authority to take action on this issue based on principles outlined in UN Charter articles 10, 11.1, 14 and 35.1—more on this below. See Appendix A for Charter excerpts.

⁵¹ This legal dispute regarding the role of the General Assembly versus that of the Security Council was not divided along East-West ideological or "Cold War" lines. After the General Assembly encroached upon "colonial issues" (see Chapter Four of this study), France (and sometimes the United Kingdom) often sided with the USSR in arguing for the Security Council's "precedence" or "sole authority" over UN peacekeeping. Ironically, by the 1970s, when the USUN chief dubbed the General Assembly an ideologically "dangerous place," Washington moved closer to the Soviet and French positions. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1978).

⁵² A copy of GA resolution 112 is reproduced in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 156. The states abstaining from this vote were Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.

⁵³ GA Resolution 112, 14 November 1947, Part I, paragraphs 1, 2; Part II, paragraphs 1-5.

commission and refused to grant UNTCOK “access” north of the 38th parallel.⁵⁴ This Soviet refusal to cooperate with the United Nations set a negative precedent that would handicap all subsequent efforts by the organization to mediate peace or even to supervise agreed-upon truces. Nonetheless, UN member-states persisted in their efforts to find ways to break the peninsula’s political impasse.

The Second Regular General Assembly was also an important session with respect to the United States’ resolve to strengthen the Assembly’s authority vis-à-vis that of the Security Council. In August of 1947, the Council had deadlocked (East vs. West) regarding what to do about the Greek Civil war (see Chapter Three). At that time, the U.S. delegation arranged to have the Greek dispute dropped from the Council agenda and placed before the upcoming Second General Assembly (to meet in September).⁵⁵ With the addition of the Palestine and Korean problems also before the Assembly, the Soviet Union inspired other member-states to question how the Assembly could be responsible for such full-time issues as a part-time deliberative body—referring to the fact that the General Assembly met annually in one or two sessions (first sessions traditionally ran from mid-September to mid-December; and as required, second sessions were held in the spring). By contrast, the Security Council was continuously on call. The U.S. delegation defended the Assembly’s capacity to meet these demands and referenced General Assembly procedural rules (specifically article 20) that provided for “Special Sessions” to be called anytime a majority of members voted in favor of doing so.⁵⁶ Yet, some UN member-states were influenced by the Soviet arguments. In response, the U.S. delegation introduced a proposal to establish a minimum-staffed Assembly that would remain “experimentally” in session

⁵⁴ DOS, USPUN 1947, 157-59.

⁵⁵ This “administrative trick,” that of removing the issue from the Council’s list of “seized items,” was henceforward opposed by the USSR.

⁵⁶ In fact, a General Assembly “Special Session” had already convened in the spring of 1947 (and would do so again, in spring 1948), in response to crises in Palestine (as discussed earlier in this chapter).

year-round. The General Assembly adopted the U.S.-sponsored proposal on 13 November 1947, by a vote of 41-6(Soviet bloc)-6. This resolution created what became known as the "Interim Committee of the Whole [General Assembly]," or the "Little Assembly."⁵⁷ Of significance to the Korean dispute, the General Assembly resolution that created UNTCOK was approved the next day. By U.S.-insistence, that resolution contained a statement directing UNTCOK to report, as required, to the new Interim committee.⁵⁸ The Soviet bloc boycotted the Interim Committee and stated that its creation was an illegal "violation of the Charter" (it was not) and "an attempt to bypass the Security Council" (which it was). Despite these protestations, a majority of the General Assembly seemed content with the efforts of the Interim Committee and they extended its mandate for another year on 3 December 1948.⁵⁹

The Interim Committee met for the first time on 5 January 1948. During that year, it held 29 "plenary meetings" (with a representative from every UN member-state present) and conducted another 50 meetings of its subcommittees and working groups. In February 1948, UNTCOK consulted the Interim Committee with respect to the Soviet Union's refusal to allow UN field representatives to conduct operations in North Korea. On 26 February, the Interim Committee ruled that the Commission should conduct its business in the southern sector—and proceed with arranging elections in there. This action, both symbolically and politically, contributed toward substantiating

⁵⁷ The Interim Committee resolution adopted in 1947 was the result of a U.S.-sponsored effort that began with Secretary of State Marshall's speech before the Second Regular General Assembly. Apparently, the concept had been borrowed from an earlier Dutch proposal. In a separate speech, John Foster Dulles credited the Netherlands government with initiating a similar proposal in 1945—when the Dutch had suggested creating a "standing committee of the General Assembly on peace and security." DOS, USPUN 1947, 303.

⁵⁸ GA Resolution 112, 14 November 1947, Part II, paragraph 5.

⁵⁹ Department of State, The United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3437, International and Conference Series III, 29 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, April 1949), 8, 63-64.

the heretofore administrative split of Korea along the 38th parallel. UNTCOK, armed with the Interim Committee's decision, set 9 May as the date for elections in southern Korea. A Department of State (DOS) summary noted that these elections were held as scheduled, with approximately 75 percent of the eligible voters participating, that 198 representatives were elected, and that "a great plurality of parties [were] represented." UNTCOK observers ruled that "a valid expression of the free will" had taken place. They regretted being denied admission to North Korea, but took satisfaction in the fact that two-thirds of the Korean people lived in the area where they were provided access. Thereafter, the South Korea National Assembly met on 31 May and elected Syngman Rhee as Chairman. This body drafted a national Constitution and approved it on 12 July. On 20 July, Syngman Rhee was elected (by secret ballot) as "President of the National Government." Subsequently, the government of the "Republic of Korea" (ROK, or South Korea) was inaugurated on 15 August and the U.S. military government in southern Korea was officially "terminated" at midnight the same date. North of the 38th parallel, the Soviet Union responded in kind. On 9 September, it announced in the establishment of a "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (DROK, or North Korea) which claimed jurisdiction "over the entire country."⁶⁰

On 6 December 1948, the First Committee of the General Assembly debated "the problem of the independence of Korea." A Czechoslovakian resolution to invite a representative of North Korea was rejected 34-6-8. To justify its opposition to such a move, the U.S. representative claimed that only the representatives in South Korea were "lawfully" elected—as confirmed by UNTCOK. He then noted that it was the "only such government in Korea." Thereafter, the U.S. delegation (and others) sponsored a resolution to strengthen UNTCOK, replacing it with a permanent UN Commission (The UN Commission on Korea, UNCOK). The General Assembly adopted this resolution on 12 December 1948, by a vote of 48-6-1, and charged UNCOK to seek a peaceful "unification" of Korea that would enable external forces to

⁶⁰ DOS, USPUN 1948, 64.

withdraw as soon as possible.⁶¹ The membership of the new UNCOK was decreased from nine to seven. The new members included: Australia, China (soon to be Taiwan), El Salvador, France, India, the Philippine Republic, and Syria. Canada and the Ukrainian S.S.R. were dropped from earlier membership in UNTCOK.⁶²

During 1949, UNCOK continued its restricted activity. No progress was achieved on the issue of the commission's access north of the 38th parallel and neither side was willing to recognize the other's claim as the "rightful" government of the Korean people. UNCOK continued to report on the situation and was commended by the UN as a "stabilizing factor in the situation."⁶³ UNCOK noted that "the division of Korea had caused bitterness and frustration among its people" and that the isolation of the agrarian south from the industrial Korean north resulted in adverse economic consequences for both.⁶⁴ Also during 1949, South Korea applied for membership in the United Nations, but this was vetoed by the USSR delegation.

In the summer of 1950, the previous year's "bitterness and frustration" erupted into full-scale conventional warfare. Early in the morning of 25 June (0400 local time⁶⁵) North Korean forces drove south across the 38th parallel.⁶⁶ The 100,000-man

⁶¹ GA resolution 195, 12 December 1948. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 158-9.

⁶² DOS, USPUN 1948, 65-67.

⁶³ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3765, International and Conference Series III, 48 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, May 1950), 36.

⁶⁴ A/936 and Add. 1, "Report of the UN Commission on Korea for the period 30 January to 28 July 1949."

⁶⁵ The time was 2:00 p.m. on the 24th of June in Washington D.C.

lightly armed South Korean militia was no match for the Soviet and Chinese-trained 135,000 North Koreans equipped with tanks and heavy artillery.⁶⁷ As soon as the United States government was informed of the North Korean attack, the Truman administration directed USUN to call for “an emergency meeting” of the Security Council. The Council met on that Sunday afternoon (still 25 June in New York). The USSR representative was absent—having “walked-out” in January 1950 to protest the West’s refusal to recognize the Communist Chinese (Peoples’ Republic of China, PRC) regime as the true representative government of that country.⁶⁸ Without a Soviet veto to prevent it from taking action, the Council determined that the North Korean action against South Korea was “a breach of the peace,” called for an “immediate cessation of hostilities,” and “requested all UN members to lend every assistance” in implementing its resolution.⁶⁹ President Truman cited this resolution (SC 82, 25 June 1950) as justification for repositioning the Seventh Fleet from the Philippines to the Formosa Straits (he assumed that escalation of the Chinese civil war was a real possibility with

⁶⁶ As documented by UN “impartial observers” assigned to UNCOK. See report of the United Nations Commission on Korea, 15 December 1949 to 4 September 1950, General Assembly Official Records [henceforth, GAOR], Fifth Session, Supplement, no. 16, 2-3; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 104.

⁶⁷ William W. Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 112-38; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 107. Another source (Tae-Ho Yoo) noted that South Korean intelligence put the North Korean forces at 175,000; but others agree upon estimates closer to 135,000. See Tae-Ho Yoo, The Korean War and the United Nations: A Legal and Diplomatic Historical Study (Louvain, Librairie Desbarax, 1965), 24-25.

⁶⁸ An extended Chinese civil war ended in the “Communist” Maoist forces defeating the U.S.-backed “nationalists” during 1949. The nationalist leaders and some of their supporting military forces took refuge on the island of Formosa/Taiwan. The U.S. government insisted that the “true” Chinese government—the one holding UN membership and a veto in the Security Council—was the faction in Taiwan, not the mainland “Peoples Republic of China.”

⁶⁹ SC Resolution 82 (S/1501), 25 June 1950. The vote was 9-0-1 (Yugoslavia abstained). The USSR did not vote.

Korean Communists on the attack at the same time) and for authorizing U.S. military forces (most of these in Japan under General Douglas MacArthur's command) to "assist and protect the evacuation of American civilians from South Korea." At the same time, President Truman directed the DOD to prepare contingency war plans and to begin providing South Korea (ROK) with military equipment.⁷⁰

The Security Council met again on 27 June to discuss a second report received from UNCOK. The report noted that Korean hostilities continued unabated, despite the Security Council's call for a cease fire on 25 June. The U.S. representative, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, declared that North Korea's refusal to obey a Security Council resolution's order to cease hostilities was "an attack on the United Nations itself."⁷¹ The U.S. delegation then introduced a draft resolution requesting that all UN members "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."⁷² This resolution passed with the minimum number of votes, 7-1 (Yugoslavia). The Soviet member was absent and both Egypt and India did not vote for "lack of government instructions."⁷³ This resolution (SC 83) was supplemented by another resolution passed on 7 July (SC 84) which was approved by the same minimum number

⁷⁰ The decision, according to Truman, was made on the evening of 25 June, after the Security Council had approved SC resolution 82. Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 334.

⁷¹ George T. Mazuzan, Warren R. Austin at the UN, 1946-1953, (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977), 147.

⁷² Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950, DOS Publication 4178, International and Conference Series III, 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1951), 34.

⁷³ Until 1965, the minimum majority for a resolution to pass in the Security Council was 7 votes (and no permanent member negative votes—the veto rule). See article 27 of the Charter, Appendix A. Higgins pointed out that India's no-vote later provided that country with a certain "impartiality" in the issue and made that member-state valuable as a mediator. See Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 162-63.

of votes, 7-0-3 (Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India abstained). SC 84 recommended that member-states “provide military forces and other assistance” and make such support “available to a unified command under the United States.”⁷⁴ It was SC 84 that formally commissioned the United States government to serve “as the United Nations Command.” Together, these Security Council resolutions set into motion the largest multinational coalition of armed forces to take the field in battle since the Second World War. U.S. government records indicate that 41 UN member-states offered “assistance” to the UN effort in Korea and 16 states contributed military forces to UNC—although the bulk of the financial and military load was carried by the United States and South Korea. In December 1951 (at the war’s mid-point), U.S. military forces, all services, accounted for 64.19 percent of the contingent totals. The ROK and U.S. forces combined were 90.42% of all ground forces, 93.34% of the naval/marine units, and 98.98% of the air forces.⁷⁵

At this point, it is relevant to note the common misconception that the operation conducted by the “United Nations Unified Command” (UNC) against North Korea was a “UN peacekeeping mission.” Despite the fact that the coalition of sixteen UN-member-states carried a United Nations flag into battle (along with their own), their effort was directed by the United States, not the United Nations. It is true that UN resolutions provided a moral justification for coalition actions against North Korea,

⁷⁴ As a result of seven votes, those of China (Nationalist), Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, UN “actions” against North Korea were set into motion. The change in one of these votes would have either left the U.S. to act “alone” or perhaps resulted in a U.S. resort to support through the General Assembly (as it did in October after the USSR returned to thwart Council action with its P-5 veto). Throughout the 1940s and most of the 1950s the U.S. delegation was able to generate widespread support for U.S.-sponsored proposals. This “control” of the Assembly gradually decreased after 1955 with the admission of new member-states and rising disaffection with U.S. identification with its NATO “Colonial” allies. See Chapter Four for more on “colonial” and “membership issues.”

⁷⁵ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951 [Including information of up to May 1952], DOS Publication 4583, International Organization and Conference Series III, 80 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1952), 288 (appendix 1).

however, the Unified Command merely “informed” the UN Secretariat of its military decisions, after the fact.⁷⁶ Consequently, a military analysis of the Korean war (June 1950 to July 1953) is outside the scope of this investigation and will not be covered here. Nonetheless, aspects of the Korean dispute pertain directly to this study—including lessons that can be learned from UN efforts to mediate a political solution, from America’s desire to strengthen the General Assembly’s role as an alternative to the Security Council, and from the international community’s decision to try and resolve post-war Korean problems outside the auspices of the UN organization.

On 27 July, the USSR announced that it would assume its scheduled “turn” as president of the Security Council in August.⁷⁷ By doing so, the Soviet president was able to prevent the Council from considering any further Korean proposals for an entire month. In September, the United Kingdom assumed Council presidency. On 6 September, the USSR vetoed a U.S. resolution that had been postponed since early August. The vote on the U.S.-sponsored proposal to “localize” the Korean conflict—calling on all non-UN sanctioned forces and states to stay out of the war—received nine favorable votes (out of eleven), but was defeated by the Soviet veto.⁷⁸ A week later, MacArthur and two Marine amphibious divisions (Tenth Corps) were wading ashore at Inchon (just southwest of Seoul)—executing a bold movement deep behind

⁷⁶ In fact, compared to what has come to be called “traditional UN peacekeeping” (as outlined in Chapter Five of this study), the UN role in Korea exceeded or “violated” nearly every principle—control of the mission by the UN Secretariat, consent granted by all parties involved, and impartial operations that limited the use of force to self-defense or maintaining freedom of movement. UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 8.

⁷⁷ That position rotated by alphabetical order of UN member-states elected as members. The P-5’s order changed based on the shuffling of non-permanent members in and out of the Council each year; and based on whether French or English alphabetically spellings were ruled as determinant for the year. Stueck speculated that had it not been for the Korean war, perhaps the Soviet walkout would have endured and the UN organization would have lost its value as an “inclusive” world body. See Stueck, The Korean War, 369.

⁷⁸ DOS, USPUN 1950, 36.

enemy positions that cut off supplies to the over-extended North Korean forces and allowed U.S. Eighth Army/ROK forces pinned down in southeast Korea (inside the “Pusan Perimeter”) to break free and begin driving northward.

On 7 October, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (GA resolution 376, by a vote of 45-7-7) that recommended steps be taken to establish “a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.”⁷⁹ With this broadly-interpreted “sanction” in hand, MacArthur was given permission to drive his UNC forces north of the 38th parallel—with the aim of unifying all of Korea. This same resolution, GA 376, had also created a seven-member UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to replace UNCOK. The new Commission’s mandate emphasized its role coordinating relief and economic support for the Korean people. This UN-coordinated effort was to be funded by “voluntary” contributions—which was asking a great deal, since humanitarian relief for war-ravaged Korea proved to be extremely expensive. In fact, UNCURK’s annual budget of \$250 million per year cost \$50 million per annum more than the United Nations’ most ambitious first-generation “peacekeeping” effort—the fielding of a 20,000 man multinational army in the Congo, a decade later.⁸⁰

November 1950 was also the month that witnessed a dramatic transformation in the scope and significance of the Korean War. Whether because of an intelligence failure or arrogance, Washington had ignored Beijing’s warnings that if UN forces approached the Manchurian border the PRC would intervene on behalf of North Korea. As late as 4 November, the UN army was confident of a quick, decisive victory, promising that the boys would be “home for Christmas.”⁸¹ Despite signs that Beijing would not sit idly by while UNC forces advanced further northward, on 10 November, the UNC announced its decision to consider the Chinese frontier with Korea

⁷⁹ GA Resolution 376, 7 October 1950, paragraph 1(b).

⁸⁰ DOS, USPUN 1950, 37, 49. For more on the Congo, see Chapter Six of this study.

⁸¹ Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 106.

“inviolable.” In other words, there would be no UN reversal of the UNC’s aims to reunite the entire Korean peninsula (which bordered China’s Manchurian province).⁸² Within two months, however, the northernmost boundaries of North Korea were no longer a realistic military objective. Instead, UNC soldiers were in full retreat and fighting for survival. This turn of events was the direct result of a dramatic change in the balance of opposing forces. In the last two weeks of November, the 500,000-man North Korean forces had regrouped along the Manchurian frontier and were reinforced by at least 200,000 fresh Chinese soldiers. By the end of the year, the “Chinese People’s Volunteers” contingent was reinforced by another 500,000 troops.⁸³ The UN “drive to unify Korea” had been reversed.

On 28 November, speaking before the Security Council, Ambassador Austin charged the PRC representative with taking military action on behalf of the Soviet Union, saying that the Chinese invasion, “could not have been dictated by any genuinely Chinese interest but must be assumed to have been undertaken on behalf of the USSR.”⁸⁴ Such accusations were without foundation, but they exemplified the U.S. obsession with pervasive “international communism.” Just as important as the Chinese military victory was the resulting strain the UNC’s reversal placed upon U.S. military-civilian relations and the allied commitment to “re-unite the Korea peninsula.” General MacArthur’s response to his army’s “intelligence failure” was to press for bombing the bridges between Manchuria and North Korea (over the Yalu River). After these targets were characterized as “too sensitive” (and attacks were prohibited) the general

⁸² DOS, USPUN 1950, 41.

⁸³ Stueck, The Korean War, 112-17. For motivations behind China’s intervention, its ramifications and listing of “Chinese People’s Volunteers” units involved see Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995), especially 55-85, 247-262, and 263-270; and *idem*, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 106-110.

⁸⁴ Professor Zhang argued that the United States consistently underestimated the Chinese military capabilities. U.S. intelligence estimates were biased by cultural misunderstandings and a lack of western interest in Chinese motivations. Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism, 260-61. DOS, USPUN 1950, 41.

called for escalating the war against mainland China and for considering “unleashing” the Taiwanese to hit the PRC along two fronts. President Truman responded by rejecting what the U.S. president regarded as “Mr. Prima-Donna, Brass Hat” MacArthur’s inappropriate “attempts to make policy.” A reprimand was sent to the general in December 1950. In April 1951, after MacArthur discussed policy recommendations in a letter to a U.S. senator, one of America’s most revered and popular army commanders since George Washington was informed ignominiously (not by official orders, but by a press broadcast) of his involuntary retirement. MacArthur’s position as “Supreme Commander” was transferred to General Matthew B. Ridgway.⁸⁵ The main issue of contention between Truman and his general (in addition to the officer’s overbearing attitude) was MacArthur’s unwillingness to abandon a strategy of “no substitute for victory.” Truman and America’s “allies,” however, rejected the general’s ideas in favor of politically-“limited warfare.” This decision resulted in the UNC’s second policy reversal since September 1950, that of establishing a status quo ante—limiting the UNC military response as required to stabilize fighting near the 38th parallel.

Allied government leaders helped to persuade the Truman administration against escalating the Korean war in response to the Chinese intervention. On 4 December, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee arrived in Washington for consultations. In essence, Attlee passed along the message that his government feared that an escalation (and certainly any resort to nuclear weapons) would over-extend the West’s military forces and prove too tempting for Moscow to resist an attack against Western Europe. On 12 December 1950, the U.S. administration made public America’s decision to accept “less than victory” in Korea. The president announced that the United States was “prepared . . . to accept a cease fire in Korea with a view to a peaceful settlement

⁸⁵ President Truman provided his account of these events in Truman, Memoirs, II: 442-49. MacArthur recalled that he was surprised by the president’s decision, and hurt by the way the message was “leaked” to the press. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 403-09.

there.”⁸⁶ Unfortunately, the Communist authorities were not yet convinced that agreeing to a peace in Korea was in their best interests. Moscow, in particular, enjoyed watching the United States endure another two years of bloody trench warfare in Korea—as the Korean and PRC “negotiators” rejected every reasonable offer.

With the UNC ready to call it quits, the Western alliance supported efforts by the United Nations to help mediate an end to hostilities in Korea. On 14 December, the General Assembly echoed President Truman’s “new policy” and adopted a resolution (by a vote of 52-5-1) that called for all parties involved in the Korean conflict to cease fire and engage in diplomatic talks. This resolution also established a “cease fire Group” to promote a diplomatic solution.⁸⁷ Unfortunately, having previously “endorsed” the war to halt North Korean “aggression” and then becoming “actively” involved as a “participant,” the UN organization had lost all credibility as a potential “impartial” mediator. Not surprisingly, North Korean and PRC leaders rejected all UN resolutions as “illegal.”⁸⁸ In addition, Moscow advised the North Koreans and PRC governments to oppose the proposed cease fire as a “trap”—claiming that the UN forces would simply regroup and re-attack. The Chinese government was soon repeating similar accusations. Within a few weeks, the PRC government issued its “terms” over official Chinese radio. The only way to settle the “Korean question,” according to Beijing, was for 1) all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Korea; 2) American “aggression forces” to be removed from Formosa; and 3) the representatives of Beijing should be seated in the United Nations as the true representatives of the Chinese people.⁸⁹ The U.S.-led Western coalition rejected items 1 and 3 and denied the validity of the PRC’s second point. After another six months of haggling, the talks

⁸⁶ DOS, USPUN 1950, 42, 45.

⁸⁷ GA resolution 348, 14 December 1950, paragraph 2.

⁸⁸ The PRC argument for legality was that, since Communist China was not represented at the UN, no body created by or representing the UN could be legally formed until the seat of China belonged to the PRC.

⁸⁹ DOS, USPUN 1950, 45-46.

stalled over the issue of how each side should “repatriate” its prisoners of war.

In retrospect,⁹⁰ the Korean conflict demonstrated America’s resolve when confronted by a clear act of military aggression—even if this was against a region that was not overtly designated as “vital” to U.S. national interests.⁹¹ Although not a classic UN peace operation, U.S. support for the UN “collective action”⁹² was extensive. The Korean war cost the U.S. approximately \$18 billion and 34,000 military personnel killed in action.⁹³ In South Korea, an estimated one million civilians were

⁹⁰ The conclusions offered here are by no means conclusive. There are a myriad of lessons that are provided by in-depth analyses of the Korean War. These are offered as a limited set of conclusions relevant to this study of the United Nations as a “peacekeeping agency” and how these aspects are applicable to other peacekeeping cases addressed by this study.

⁹¹ Dean Acheson’s 12 January 1950 “Defensive Perimeter” speech failed to designate Korea as within a region vital to U.S. interests. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia,” Department of State Bulletin 22 (23 January 1950): 111-18. The significance of Korea was reevaluated in early hours of the North Korean invasion—the “consequences” of failing to counter “the forces of communism” and the “wider Cold-War significance” were overriding considerations. “Summaries of NSC Discussion, 29 and 30 June 1950, Harry S Truman Papers, cited in Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1992), 361.

⁹² Actually, the UNC action was a “coalition” effort to which fifteen other nations contributed military units and a total of forty-one countries contributed supplies or funding). As a “UN operational type,” such an effort was not repeated until the 1991 Gulf War (Desert Storm).

⁹³ Caleb Carr and James Chace, “The United States, the UN, and Korea,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History Vol. 5 #1 (Autumn 1992), 23. These figures vary widely with sources. Doug Bandow of the Cato institute (a conservative “think-tank” with an agenda) claimed that “the war had cost America some 54,246 lives (including non-battle deaths), 103,284 non-fatal casualties, and \$75 billion—a significant 5.6 percent of the aggregate U.S. gross national product between 1950 and 1953.” Bandow doesn’t state how he reached the \$75 million figure, (or if this was 1953 dollars or if the figure was corrected to some other index). In another passage, he stated that the Korean war cost \$360 billion (1996 dollars) “in both direct and indirect expenses.” To put these amounts into perspective, in a third passage, Bandow asserted that U.S. “Cold-War defense expenditures” exceeded \$13 trillion. Assuming these numbers are not apples and oranges, Korean war costs (even his high estimates)

killed and over two million were rendered homeless. North Korean losses were estimated to have been twice those suffered by its southern neighbor (out of a total of 30 million persons)—thus, one out of ten Koreans were killed and one of five made homeless.⁹⁴ As Bruce Cumings and other scholars have concluded, the Korean peninsula was left a “smoldering ruin” and the Koreans were the ones who suffered most severely.⁹⁵

Despite tremendous costs and destruction, both Secretary-General Lie and President Truman stood firm in justifying their decisions for action in Korea. Both statesmen agreed that such an effort was required to defend the Korean people and protect the reputation of the United Nations.⁹⁶ A USUN draft for the president’s 1951 state of the union address highlighted these interconnections:

The assault upon the Republic of Korea which occurred last June was an assault upon the United Nations as well. . . . For the United Nations to have shut its eyes to that attack, to have ignored the findings of its own commission in Korea and the appeal of the government of the Republic of Korea for help would have fatally undermined the confidence of the people in the United Nations.⁹⁷

amounted to approximately 2.8% of all Cold-War expenses. Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute Press, 1996), 22, 37, 181.

⁹⁴ David Rees, The Limited War (London, 1964), 460-61; Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London: Longman, 1986), 218; and Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1960, cited in William D. Halsey and Bernard Johnston, eds., Collier’s Encyclopedia (NY: P. F. Collier, Inc., 1990), s.v. “Korean War,” by Gerald Kanner, 14: 172.

⁹⁵ Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, vol. I, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), xix; and Stueck, The Korean War, 360-61.

⁹⁶ Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 323-348.

⁹⁷ “UNA Section of Department Contribution to President’s 1951 State of the Union Message,” U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 “General Records of the Department of State,” Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01) Bureau of United Nations Affairs Subject File Relating to Palestine, Political, Security, and Trusteeship Matters, 1946-1951”

The fact that sixteen UN member-states provided military units and a total of forty-two states contributed supplies or funds to support the UNC effort in Korea reveals an indication of the widespread international agreement with this line of reasoning.

The Korean experience provided at least four lessons relevant to the United Nations' capacity to more effectively promote a peaceful resolution in similar situations. First, pre-war UN mediation efforts were frustrated by North Korea's (and its allies') refusal to cooperate with the United Nations. Ironically, the UN decision to proceed with supervised elections in South Korea during 1948 were intended to decrease U.S. and USSR "external involvement" and make the problem more manageable. Instead, the elections inspired a response in kind by North Korea and served to formalize the political division of Korea. The United Nations' failure to resolve the Korean dispute reinforced lessons that should have been learned from the organization's earlier attempts to mediate with communism-controlled governments (for example in the case of Greece, covered in Chapter Three). The influential capacity of the United Nations depended upon international opinion or moral "suasion." These "powers" consistently proved ineffective against authoritarian regimes, especially those within the Soviet or Chinese sphere of influence. Non-democratic regimes are primarily influenced by realpolitik—and by carrots or sticks wielded by allies or regional powers. The Truman administration failed to appreciate the significance of this inherent UN organizational limitation. Had the Soviet Union or the PRC been treated respectfully by the United Nations (or by the West) they may have proven more amenable to using political, military, or economic leverage against their client states. As it was, the United States insisted on excluding Beijing from the United Nations and blamed UN failures in Korea on Soviet vetoes that blocked Security Council resolutions. This was not a formula for success.

Second, because of Washington's inability to find common ground with Moscow, the United States continued to seek measures that would strengthen the role of the UN General Assembly in order to circumvent the Soviet's veto power in the Security Council. Toward this end, the Korean dispute gave rise to the United States' most

enduring organizational restructuring of the United Nations—a “Uniting For Peace” resolution (GA 377 or UFP) that was approved on 3 November 1950. By an overwhelming majority (52-5-2), this landmark resolution provided that:

... if the Security Council, because of its lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁹⁸

Of great significance to future UN “peacekeeping,” UFP also stipulated that, “if not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in an Emergency Special Session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor.” The only requirement to invoke such emergency sessions would be a “procedural approval” in the Security Council.⁹⁹ This U.S.-sponsored resolution was introduced to the General Assembly by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Originally, the proposal was intended to prevent USSR “interference” in the conduct of the Korean war effort (as exemplified by the month of delays and subsequent Soviet vetoes that began in August 1950 when the USSR resumed its participation).¹⁰⁰ But the uniting-for-peace resolution had broader ramifications. In the provision that the General Assembly could meet to make recommendations to “maintain or restore international peace and security,” the General Assembly’s authority to conduct future “peacekeeping” operations was greatly enhanced. In fact, the organization’s two largest and most ambitious operations for peace subsequently were authorized or affected by resolutions that were the result of

⁹⁸ GA Resolution 377, 3 November 1950, Paragraph A:1 cited in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 165.

⁹⁹ GA Resolution 377, 3 November 1950, Paragraph A:1. Of significance, the “procedural vote” was NOT subject to the veto. It required only seven supporting votes (nine votes after the Council membership was increased in 1965).

¹⁰⁰ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 450.

UFP "Emergency Special Sessions."¹⁰¹ Other sections of the uniting-for-peace proposal were less important, in the long run. They created new "mechanisms" for enhancing the General Assembly's role in the realm of international conflict resolution. A "Peace Observation Commission" was established to act as the Assembly's body that would "dispatch observers to watch and report on developments at points of international tension." It was used in Greece's peace operation and, thereafter, fell into disuse. In addition, UFP created a "Collective Measures Committee." This committee was directed to "study what measures can be taken to strengthen international peace and security and report to the General Assembly and Security Council" with its recommendations. As a corollary to this effort to enhance UN collective actions, the uniting-for-peace resolution recommended that member-states "maintain within their armed forces elements which could be made available to the United Nations pursuant to recommendations of the Security Council or the General Assembly."¹⁰² This was one of many resolutions that the organization approved to motivate member-states to designate or "ear-mark" units for UN peacekeeping or collective action. Had this been widely adhered to (only a few states reported to the organization that units were designated) it would have made the ad hoc generation of peacekeeping missions less difficult. As it would turn out, similar measures to create a "standing peace force" were less widely accepted than resolutions that endorsed a mere "designation" of units to be made available to the United Nations. As will be discussed throughout this study, the problem of creating peacekeeping missions, usually at a moment's notice, has

¹⁰¹ The first UN "traditional peacekeeping" mission to the Sinai (UNEF) was authorized by the GA's first emergency session (ESS-I). (See Chapter Five.) Important GA resolutions dealing with UN peace operations in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and the Congo (ONUC) were also considered under UFP during emergency sessions. (See Chapter's Three and Six, respectively).

¹⁰² DOS, USPUN 1950, 7,8. The next year's DOS annual report noted that "The United States exercised positive leadership in this work because of our belief that the more effectively the United Nations members are organized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged." DOS, USPUN 1951, 7.

complicated the organization's capacity to respond quickly to international disputes.

Third, the experience of the Korean peace talks and armistice "machinery" also holds lessons for multinational peacekeeping and mediation. A DOS report to congress concluded that the Korean armistice was "unquestionably the most important UN development during 1953."¹⁰³ That statement reflected Washington's relief that the war was ended, not because the armistice was the result of effective mediation or reconciliation between the divided Koreas. One of many conditions agreed-upon in the Korean armistice called for the creation of a "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission" (NNSC) that was to report on North and South Korean compliance with armistice stipulations (such as military deployments, imports, and so forth). Of note, the NNSC was not a "UN body" nor was it to be associated with the "partial" United Nations. The NNSC was composed of representatives from Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. This "two West, two East" formula was both illogical and ineffective. Rather than relying on "impartiality," this commission squared off into two opposing camps. As a group, it was trusted by neither party—North or South Korean. As expected, North Korea refused to cooperate with the commission and South Korea accused the Polish and Czechoslovakian NNSC members of conducting "espionage" against the ROK. Within weeks, the local U.S. commander recommended that a "complete dissolution of the NNSC" would be prudent.¹⁰⁴ The committee's failure demonstrated the absolutely critical requirement for mediation and inspection—that they be conducted by "impartial" parties, preferably in a oddly-numbered committee.

Similarly, the United Nations had lost all credibility with North Korea and

¹⁰³ DOS, USPUN 1953, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1955, DOS Publication 6318, International Organization and Conference Series III, 115 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1956), 50-51.

Communist China due to its “sponsorship” of the UNC military effort.¹⁰⁵ Nonetheless, the organization continued to debate Korean issues each year in the Security Council and General Assembly. No resolutions seemed to make much impact, but the Herculean efforts of a single UN representative could lead to limited diplomatic progress. A case in point is how the second UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld was able to serve as an “impartial” mediator. Hammarskjöld was elected in 1953 partly because the Soviet-bloc members had declared that they could no longer work with Trygve Lie on account of his having supported the Korean war. During 1955, Hammarskjöld was able to resolve a complex diplomatic impasse left over from the Korean war. After approximately eight months of patient efforts, Hammarskjöld successfully negotiated with China (PRC) for the release of eleven U.S. air-crew members that were still being detained as prisoners of war.¹⁰⁶

In certain respects, the allied coalition forces that remained in South Korea after the armistice to help patrol the southern demilitarized zone (DMZ), presaged other, less-ambitious United Nations “peacekeeping” missions that would follow. These

¹⁰⁵ For example, in 1959, the North Korean government and its supporters, Communist China and the Soviet Union, continued to assert that the United Nations had lost all impartiality with regard to its annual drive to “unify” the Korean peninsula. In a memorandum passed to the UN via the British charge d’Affaires in Beijing, North Korea maintained, “As everybody knows, under the domination of the United States, the United Nations has been reduced to a belligerent in the Korean war and lost all competence and moral authority to deal fairly and responsibly with the Korean question. Therefore, any resolution on the Korean question adopted by the United Nations is unilateral and null and void.” Quoted in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1959, DOS Publication 7016, International Organization and Conference Series 12 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1960), 37.

¹⁰⁶ These 11 USAF air-crew members of a B-29 (four-engine) bomber were shot down over North Korea while, supposedly, conducting “leaf-dropping operations.” Dag Hammarskjöld dedicated a better part of 8 months negotiating with Beijing to release these airmen. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 96-131. President Eisenhower commended the secretary-general for accomplishing what no other forum or mediator seemed able to do. Letter of Transmittal, President Eisenhower to the Congress, in DOS USPUN 1955, v.

forces in South Korea served to preserve the political status quo (a divided Korea). Their removal, in the estimation of the West, would be tantamount to inviting the outbreak of a second Korean war.¹⁰⁷ As a “plate glass” or buffer force, the UN General Assembly sanctioned this “peacekeeping” mission in South Korea, “pending the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea through free elections held in accordance with the principles set forth by the United Nations.”¹⁰⁸ In these respects, the DMZ mission in South Korea performed a similar role (albeit by different methods) as that of United Nations’ traditional or “interpositional” peacekeeping” that the United Nations conducted in the Sinai between Egypt and Israel after the 1956 Suez War (See Chapter Five of this study).¹⁰⁹ Also in a similar fashion to the United Nations “peacekeeping machinery” that was constructed in Palestine as part of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements, Korean peace negotiators established a Mixed Armistice Commission system to investigate complaints of armistice violations. As in the Palestine case, this type of body proved to help defuse low-level tensions and prepared reports that informed subsequent investigations or debates before the United Nations. The Korean Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) was established in 1953. It averaged holding approximately 20 meetings each year and provided continued utility.¹¹⁰ Similar to the situation in Greece (Chapter Three, this study), these

¹⁰⁷ Although a number of agenda-oriented articles and books called upon the United States to remove its “tripwire” forces because they equate to a virtual guarantee of reengagement in the case of another North Korean invasion. See, for example, Bandow, *Tripwire*, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958, DOS Publication 6852, International Organization and Conference Series 4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1959, 60.

¹⁰⁹ After 1949 (until 1991), NATO forces in western Europe, especially the commitment of United States armed forces, served a similar deterrent or “trip-wire” function against enemy hostilities. The lessons inherent to “interpositional peacekeeping” would not be revealed clearly until 1967 following the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai. (See Chapter Five of this study.)

investigators in South Korea were forced to operate from just one side of a hostile boundary and this limited their potentially-more-significant contributions.

Fourth, and much to Moscow's chagrin, the Korean war had the effect of spurring the United States and its regional allies to build up an ambitious "collective defense network" that was to make up for the United Nations' incapacity to take military action against "aggressor" states. This resort to collective defense, although cited by some as proof that the United Nations had "failed," clearly can be viewed as an augmentation of a developing, broader "UN system." Under article 51 of the Charter, UN member-states are guaranteed the "inherent right to self-defense." Chapter VIII of the Charter outlines the role of "regional arrangements" and endorses them, provided they conduct business in a manner "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."¹¹¹ During the Korean action, President Truman justified U.S. adherence to such regional arrangements by writing that:

We are working to strengthen the United Nations by building up a security system in accordance with the purposes of the Charter that will protect the community of nations against aggression from any source. We are working, in important regions of the world, to build the pillars of this collective strength through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Rio treaty [for American Hemispheric defense], and the security treaties in the Pacific [later ANZUS and SEATO]. All this is being done under the Charter as a means of fulfilling the United Nations purpose of maintaining world peace. The progress we have made since the Korean aggression started has now begun to tip the scales toward real security for ourselves and all other peace-loving peoples.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966, DOS Publication 8276, International Organization and Conference Series 77 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1967), 34.

¹¹¹ UN Charter article 52.1. See excerpts provided at Appendix A.

¹¹² Harry S Truman, Letter of transmittal, "The President to the Congress," 3 July 1952 in DOS, USPUN 1951, vi.

Chapter Summary and Analysis

With respect to interstate disputes, the degree to which the United Nations was able to generate effective peace missions was dependent upon the cooperation provided by the parties involved. In the first two cases discussed in this chapter, one in Palestine and the other in Kashmir, the contending parties welcomed UN investigating and observing missions. The result was the creation of small, but effective observation missions—UNTSO, in the first case, and UNMOGIP in the second. Each contributed to defusing local situations by conducting local investigations, mediating disputes, and sending reports to the United Nations that “impartially” informed Council or Assembly debates. The positive contributions of these early UN observer operations and the lessons learned from them provided the foundation upon which later, more ambitious “peacekeeping” operations would be attempted by the United Nations. In the case of Korea, the organization’s inability to gain North Korea’s trust and “access” severely limited the early mediation efforts and post-armistice machinery (which, technically, was not representative of the United Nations since North Korea considered the organization untrustworthy).

In the first two cases, Moscow acquiesced to the creation of UN observer missions and mediation efforts. As a result, the Security Council remained the primary controlling agency of UN field efforts in Palestine and the Kashmir. In the case of Korea, however, Moscow’s veto (after August 1950) rendered the Security Council ineffective. In this case, Washington attempted to strengthen the General Assembly’s authority to help “maintain international peace and security.” Despite deep divisions associated with the Cold War, the organization was able to take action in all three scenarios, albeit limited action. In no case, however, was the organization’s influence great enough to promote the contending parties to accept a more enduring peace settlement. This was considered a great failure, but the fact that no other individuals, states, or group of states were able to mediate lasting solutions reaffirmed the difficulty of obstacles involved.

Despite the United Nations' inability to broker solutions to major political disputes (in these cases), UN members supported keeping international observers in place even after mediation efforts had failed. Accordingly, in all three cases, a UN or coalition observer mission proved useful as the international community's impartial "eyes and ears." Additionally, the secretary-general's direct responsibility for peace operations increased and his position gained greater international respect. This trend was reinforced by the increased number of resolutions passed by the United Nations "tasking" the secretary-general to carry out broad mandates. On the other hand, the United Nations displayed little consistency in its early approach to international conflict resolution. This was especially true when one looks at how each of these missions was created. The administrative origins of each mission varied considerably and the ad hoc nature of UN operations, unfortunately, became another legacy of these early missions. The military observers in Palestine were the mutual creation of the General Assembly and the Security Council, working in tandem. The Security Council's role in Palestine increased with the outbreak of full-scale war in May 1948. Through the secretary-general, the Security Council retained responsibility for directing UNTSO's operations after the General Assembly's "Acting Mediator" (Ralph Bunche) incorporated UN observers into the 1949 armistice "machinery." The example of observers under Security Council control was carried over to the Kashmir dispute. In that case, the Security Council maintained primary responsibility and the General Assembly was hardly involved. Additionally, although the UN observer mission that became UNMOGIP was authorized by a Council resolution in April 1948, it was not until India and Pakistan were able to conclude a bilateral cease fire (mediated by UNCIP in January) and later, an armistice (signed in July 1949) that UNMOGIP developed as an international observer force. In the case of Korea, the uniting-for-peace resolution allowed the United States to pass UN "control" out of the Council into the General Assembly. Although, due to North Korea's and China's refusal to recognize UN resolutions or its attempts at mediation, the UFP legacy lay more in its legal and organizational ramifications—especially that of moving disputes out of the Council into

the Assembly (or emergency sessions, if the Assembly was not already in session).

The analysis of the three conflicts addressed in this chapter documents the United Nations' early approach to international conflict resolution and the United States' contributions toward making UN advances possible. In Palestine and Kashmir, although neither struggle was viewed (at least initially) as part of the greater East-West contest, the roots of both these crises lay in divisions drawn along lines of incompatible religious ideologies and nationalism. In this respect, the United Nations gained its first experience dealing with forces that would transform the international system after the Second World War.¹¹³

Strong United States' support was common to all three of these early UN "international war" observer and mediation missions. Most notably in the case of Korea, especially after 1950. The U.S. commitment to peace in Palestine and the Kashmir was more diplomatic and less ostensible. As proof of these assertions, consider the United Nations' desperate plea in early 1948 for the United States to "enforce" the plan for "Partition" of Palestine (adopted on 29 November 1947 by the General Assembly). Both the United Kingdom and the United States refused to do so. As President Truman recorded in his Memoirs:

The American view on Palestine is that . . . the matter will have to be worked out diplomatically with the British and the Arabs, so that if a state can be set up there they may be able to set it up on a peaceful basis. I have no desire to send 500,000 American soldiers there to make peace in Palestine.¹¹⁴

Contrast this with the U.S. commitment of \$18 billion and 600,000 soldiers (34,000 of which lost their lives) to maintain South Korea's political and territorial integrity (and billions of U.S. dollars in defense commitments for Korea since that time).

Despite its lack of commitment to "enforce" the international community's will in Palestine and the Kashmir, the United States was the United Nations' single-most generous supporter of international peace operations. American assistance went far

¹¹³ See Chapter Four, "International Conflict Resolution and the "Colonial Issue," for more on this international systemic transition.

¹¹⁴ Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman, II: 136.

beyond any UN member-state's "fair share," (just as U.S. economic support for the UN budget in these years). The United States' generosity, however, was not purely ideological. American policymakers argued that UN operations promoted long-term American foreign policy goals. If they had not, Washington would not have supported them—consequently, the United Nations would have been hard-pressed to conduct any of its early missions. In a detailed study of U.S. contributions to UN peace operations during these years, David Wainhouse summarized:

In the small UN peace observation missions established . . . in the immediate postwar years, U.S. financial and material assistance was crucial. The U.S. share of the regular UN budget from which they were all financed was almost 40 per cent of the total at that time and the U.S. provided most of the aircraft, communications, vehicles and other necessities. U.S. military personnel also participated in each case, reaching a peak at one point of 452 men.¹¹⁵

Washington's returns on these investments, however, were more intangible. United Nations' efforts in Palestine served to help defuse tensions and censured the Arab nations for their unwillingness to resolve the political division of Palestine without resorting to military operations. Later, when Israel adopted the practice of "retaliatory" military strikes against its Arab neighbors, this too was condemned by the United Nations (even by the U.S. delegation). In the Kashmir, as in Palestine, a fragile armistice was mediated under UN auspices and international observers were deployed to observe and report on the situation along the armistice demarcation lines. When subsequent disputes were brought before the United Nations (and when wars resumed in each of these theaters) "impartial" reports from the field helped the international community determine culpability and recommend actions for redress. In Korea, three year's of hard-fought battles, and years of patrolling a dangerous DMZ since that time, did not result in the oft-stated U.S. desire for a free, democratic, unified Korea.

¹¹⁵ This last figure represented well over half of all UN personnel deployed at that time. (The case of Indonesia will be covered in Chapter Four.) Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. I, Summary Report, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 6.

In certain respects, however, each of these three UN "sanctioned" missions, helped to rationalize U.S. positions and actions. Although the world community (including Washington) was disappointed that long-term political solutions proved elusive, the employment of international observers and MACs (in the case of Palestine and Korea) may have curtailed existing disputes or discouraged subsequent hostilities. In all cases, these missions helped provide diplomats an opportunity to mediate political solutions. The fact that such agreements were not forthcoming proved the intractable nature of these international problems (each of which had persisted, in various guises, for centuries).¹¹⁶ From this perspective, the United Nations' "failure" to resolve these three disputes was disappointing, but understandable. Certainly, the innovation of UN observer and investigating missions during the United Nations' first decade stands as a commendable example of the UN member-states' interest in mediating international conflicts. At bottom, the United States' leading role in creating and implementing such "instrumentalities," although often self-serving and limited, was the critical support that made these UN field missions possible.

¹¹⁶ A number of diplomats have noted that many of the political dilemmas facing the United Nations made their way to that forum for the very reason that no one else had been able to solve them. See for example, George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State's letter of transmittal to the President, 28 January 1948, in DOS, USPUN 1947, v-vi.

CHAPTER THREE

UNITED NATIONS' OBSERVATION AND THE LOCALIZATION OF CIVIL WARS

A limited UN involvement, one entailing debate, resolution, and perhaps some form of investigation and observation, is the most significant precedent to emerge from the organization's responses to contemporary internal conflicts involving charges of external aggression or subversion and proxy wars.

Professor Linda B. Miller¹

This chapter concentrates on the mutual concerns of and actions taken by the United Nations organization and the United States government with respect to the Greek civil war (1946 to 1949), the Middle East crisis of 1958, and a third "internationalized civil war"² in Yemen that began during 1963. In each of these cases,

¹ Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 200.

² This term, attributable to Small and Singer, most succinctly describes the subject of these case studies—namely civil wars or domestic hostilities that were complicated by the influence or intervention of regional or "external" actors. The intervention of outside powers in the domestic political and military affairs of states is not a new phenomenon. The use of force or threat of force in this manner was documented as a "natural thing" by Thucydides' histories in 411 BC and it was a common phenomenon of twentieth-century international relations—even if such practice was considered against various precepts of international law, including article 2.4 of the UN Charter. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translation by R. Warner (Hammondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1954), 208; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishers, 1982), 219; and Bruce W. Jentleson and Ariel E. Levite, "The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military Intervention," in Foreign Military Intervention: The

internal or domestic strife was exacerbated by external political or military assistance on behalf of one or more contending factions. In the Greek civil war, Communist-supported guerrillas took refuge and received assistance from Greece's northern neighbors: Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In the case of Lebanon, domestic political instabilities were fomented by external propaganda and concerns of a potential infiltration of men and weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border. In the Yemeni civil war, each of the two contending factions received direct political, military, and financial succor from an outside sponsor—Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The United Nations and the United States pursued the same objectives in each of these complex civil wars—to limit (or localize) the hostilities, then to resolve the disputes through diplomacy. In the first two cases (Greece and Lebanon), the U.S. government wanted to preserve the stability of “pro-West” governments and justified American support (military intervention in Lebanon) in the name of thwarting the advance of “international communism.” In the third case study, that of Yemen, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were concerned with broader complications—fearing that the external sponsors, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would escalate their war beyond hostile words. If these two Arab states went to war, the involvement of other regional states and the concomitant dangers to oil-production facilities would be disastrous. Even a limited spill-over of the Yemen civil war would threaten the strategic shipping lanes through southwest Arabia's Bab el-Mandeb, through the Red Sea, or points north such as Aqaba, Eilat, and the Suez Canal. Hence, Washington had a keen interest in keeping the Yemeni civil war “localized,” if not resolved. In-depth analysis of each of these case studies confirms these assertions and supports the more general conclusions that follow.

Greece and the UN Special Committee for the Balkans (UNSCOB)

Greece is situated at the crossroads of the Europe and Asia. Its national history is the story of continual international strife. Putting the Greek experience in perspective, C. M. Woodhouse, wrote that "it would be hard to identify a span of fifty years in the last sixteen centuries in which the boundaries of the Greek world remained unaltered."³ It should come as no surprise, therefore, that threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece were among the first concerns addressed by the Councils of both the League of Nations (1921, 1923, 1925)⁴ and the United Nations (1946-1954). During the Second World War, Greece's political, economic, and social institutions (already weakened by political instability and the Great Depression) nearly collapsed. In addition, after the war, relations between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other, remained unfriendly. They grew significantly worse during the ensuing Greek civil war.⁵

³ C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 12.

⁴ For a scholarly analysis of these cases in one single volume see David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 29-32; 35-39; 48-52. Of note, two of these cases (1921 and 1923, as complaints before the LON) were between Greece and Albania; the other (1925) was between Greece and Bulgaria. These are two of the three "northern neighbors" involved in the 1946-54 case before the UN.

⁵ The Greek civil war has been divided into as many as three phases, one or two before 1945 and the last major phase, most scholars agree, took place between 1946 and 1950. A number of books or case-studies have been written about the Greek civil war. A broad historical perspective is presented by Woodhouse, in his Modern Greece: A Short History. Woodhouse also wrote The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Faber and Faber, 1976). A similar treatment is offered by Edgar O'Ballance's The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949 (London, 1966). Western "first-hand" accounts are offered by Reginald Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek (London, 1950) and Harry N. Howard [a U.S. participant of UNSCOB] "Greece and Its Balkan Neighbors (1948-1949)," Balkan Studies 7 (1966): 1-26. The International aspects, (specifically UN involvement) are covered in Amikam Nachmani, International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947-1952 (Westport, Ct: Praeger, 1990). Works on UN peace operations

Post-Second World War Greece was politically fragmented and economically weak. In 1946, Greek society was factionalized into three groups, each of which was further divided. First, there was a fading, but large party of constitutional monarchists. They had held political control in Greece between 1832 and 1924. Next, there were the "Republicans," those who favored reviving a system similar to the Greek Federal Republic that was declared in 1924, (and later suspended in 1935, by an authoritarian ruler who also revived the Greek monarchy). Finally, there was the growing Greek Communist movement that opposed any return of the monarchy and sought to align Greece politically with the international community of Communist states.⁶ Like many "national wars" of the twentieth century, however, the indigenous peoples were not the only ones who held a keen interest in the outcome of Greece's political battles. In fact, all three main political factions gained significant foreign support for their political aspirations—these complications gave the Greek civil war an international dimension, and persuaded the United Nations to consider the conflict a "danger to international peace and security."

During the twentieth century, the ideological struggle between communism ("East") and democratic capitalism ("West") sharply divided Greece. Greek communism gained momentum in the early 1920s. During these years, the political "Comintern" (the Communist International movement) sponsored an active Communist movement in Greece. These efforts were realized in the form of the Greek Communist

that include case studies of the Greek civil war are innumerable. Some of the most important of these include compilations by: William J. Durch; Leland M. Goodrich; Rosalyn Higgins; Alan James; Evan Luard; Indarjit Rikhye; Anne P. Simons; David W. Wainhouse; Lawrence D. Weiler; N. D. White, and Henry Wiseman. (For full citations, refer to the Bibliography.)

⁶ The Communist party organized a "Comintern" (Communist International) in 1919 to encourage unity of Communist movements in various countries. The Comintern was "disbanded" in 1943 as a gesture of support for the allied war effort. It was revived in 1947 as the "Cominform" (the Communist Information Bureau) which was disbanded "officially" in 1956.

Party (the KKE) and its military arm the ELAS.⁷ The British and the Americans opposed the rise of communism in Greece, especially after the Second World War. Traditionally, the British had supported the traditional Greek monarchists and had contributed military forces and economic assistance in the Greek struggles against the Ottoman Turks, the German Nazis and indigenous Communists after the Second World War. The United States government tacitly supported British actions in Greece and demonstrated a growing interest in the Greek domestic political and economic situation during the 1940s. In 1946, the activity of the Greek Communist military arm (ELAS) alarmed American foreign-policy analysts. As the conflict between Greece's three political factions intensified, the United States openly favored any Greek government that would oppose a victory for communism in the "strategic" eastern Mediterranean region. When the economically drained United Kingdom declared its inability to project adequate military and economic power into the eastern Mediterranean region in 1947, American policymakers encouraged President Harry S Truman to take-up Britain's former role in Greece.⁸

When conflict in Greece threatened to escalate as a contest between East and West, other UN member-states increasingly became concerned. On 21 January 1946, the Soviet (USSR) representative complained before the United Nations Security Council that an unreasonable number of British forces had remained in Greece after the Second World War. The Soviets argued that the presence of these British troops in Greece were "interfering in that country's internal affairs" and contributed to "tension fraught with grave consequences to the maintenance of international peace."⁹ The

⁷ Scholars refer to Greece's Communist Party as the KKE, which is short for its Greek equivalent: Kommounistiko Komma Ellados. During the Greek civil war, the KKE controlled Greece's political National Liberation Front (the EAM: Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon Metopon). The EAM's military arm, also controlled by the KKE, was called the National Popular Liberation Army: Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos, or the ELAS.

⁸ Woodhouse, Modern Greece, 125-258.

⁹ Department of State, The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President of the United States on the Activities of the United Nations and the

USSR representative demanded that the British immediately withdraw their forces—a move that the Truman administration considered tantamount to paving the way for a successful Communist revolution in Greece. Another motive behind the Soviet complaint was diplomatic retaliation. Earlier in January 1946, before the Council, representatives of the United States, Britain and France had publicly criticized the Moscow for its hesitancy to remove Soviet troops from northern Iran. Both East and West delegations, therefore, in this the United Nations' first month of operations, had decided to employ the new international body as an ideological battleground. These debates reflected the broader emergence of and heating up of the global political struggle that would dominate the next 40 years of international relations: the "Cold War."¹⁰ The manifestations of "Cold-War politics" in the chambers of the United Nations undermined "the principle of unanimity" that was to have served as one of the organization's foundations. Just as this East-West struggle transformed the broader international system of nations, it served to stymie actions of the United Nations Security Council in a number of subsequent crises—especially those where both superpowers determined that they had a primary interest.¹¹

Participation of the United States Therein for the Calendar Year 1946, DOS Publication 2735, Report Series 7 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1947), 35-36.

¹⁰ The "Cold War:" is generally accepted as having existed between 1947 and 1989—although East-West tensions existed before 1947 and continued into the early 1990s. The term "Cold War" was adapted from the French *la froide guerre* and first employed in the U.S. press by journalist Walter Lippmann. His use of the term characterized the desire of both sides to avoid direct (hot) military confrontations between forces of the U.S. and USSR, as the ideological and economic competition between East and West (or between the Communist world and the "free world") extended across the globe. Although this study is not primarily concerned with the Cold War (and it should not be classified as "Cold War history," *per se*), its influence on international politics between 1946 and 1968 was pervasive. Accordingly, its effects upon UN peace operations (both positive and negative) will be addressed.

¹¹ For a good monograph on this topic see John G. Stoessinger, "General Assembly: Problem of Membership and Representation of China," chapter in The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia and America, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1973). Stoessinger wrote, "The conflict between the superpowers has dominated international politics since World War II and, naturally, has cast its shadow

From the western perspective, much of this great power disunity had its roots in Russia's imperialist aims and Premier Joseph Stalin's diplomatic "broken promises."¹² During allied wartime conferences at Moscow (1943) and Yalta (1945), Prime Minister Winston L. S. Churchill perceived that Premier Stalin had promised the British a "free hand" in Greece in return for western "concessions" in Eastern Europe.¹³ In 1946, these allied "gentlemen's agreements" fell by the wayside. As a result, the East-West "battle" for Greece mirrored the widening fault line that was dividing former allies. In

over the United Nations;" in *ibid.*, 187.

¹² U.S. analysts, after 1946 came to regard the USSR as expansionist and willing to spread communism by force. This outlook, and the resulting decision to meet the perceived threat along "a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points" was spurred by two influential documents produced by the U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan. He recommended a policy of "firmness" be adopted by the Truman administration to restrain Soviet adventurism. The U.S. Cold War strategy of "containment" was founded (although not strictly) upon Kennan's famous "Long Telegram" of 22 February 1946 [see George F. Kennan Memoirs, 1925-1950, (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), 583-98; Thomas G. Patterson and Dennis Merrill, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, vol. II, Since 1914, Documents and Essays, 4th ed., (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 244-47]; and later his "Mr. X" article [see X (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-82]. See also John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 18-53. The Soviets, for their part, accused U.S. diplomats of brandishing their "nuclear pistols" and adopting an aggressive attitude toward Moscow during these years that spawned the early Cold War (until, in 1949, when the USSR evened the standoff with nuclear weapons of their own—by then, differences over issues such as Berlin and Eastern Europe had set East-West antagonism in stone). See, for example, Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Atomic Monopoly," in A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1992), 94-96.

¹³ See Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter, FRUS] The Conferences of Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1955); Woodhouse, Modern Greece, 257; and Jean Laloy, Yalta: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, trans. William R. Tyler (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), especially Appendix A "Text of the Communiqué of the Yalta Conference," 119-132; and "Exchange of Letters between Churchill and Stalin (April-May 1945)," 141, 144.

May 1946, open hostilities erupted in northern Greece. By November, the fighting had spread to all provinces. It was during this escalation of the Greek civil war that the UN Security Council decided to become more directly involved.

In August 1946, the representative to the Security Council from Ukraine charged that Greece's military actions (taken against Communist forces) were "constituting a threat to the region's peace." In response, the representative from Greece counter-charged that Albania (Greece's northwest, adjacent state [see map at Appendix B]) had been intentionally "provoking border incidents." During the course of this debate, the U.S. delegation proposed creating a UN commission that would proceed to northern Greece and report back to the Council on the nature of the conflicting claims concerning Europe's southeast regional hostilities. In addition, the U.S. representative (Ambassador Warren R. Austin) proposed expanding the scope of a UN investigation beyond the Greek-Albanian border to an inquiry along the length of Greece's northern border. This proposal, when put to a vote, was supported by eight Council members, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Despite the Security Council's rejection of the U.S. proposal, the Greek civil war had gained the attention of the international community. Exposure, however, did not deter the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (Greece's Communist northern neighbors) from increasing their support for the KKE. As a result, on 3 December 1946, the Security Council was again addressed by Greece's Representative who charged that all three of its northern neighbor states were "interfering in Greece's internal affairs" by providing military and other aid to Greek Communist guerrilla

¹⁴ According to UN Charter, article 27, all "non-procedural" votes cast in the Security Council must gain a minimum of seven out of eleven (through the year 1965, nine out of fifteen, beginning in 1966) positive votes and secure a positive vote by all five "permanent members" (the P-5) to gain passage. The issue of the "veto" power of the P-5 is discussed in Chapter One under issues related to the UN Charter. In this case, the U.S. suggestion failed to be adopted, despite gaining more than the seven minimum votes required because of the negative Soviet vote—which was considered a veto. Note, a negative P-5 vote is classified as a "veto" only if the measure would have passed otherwise.

forces. Greece requested that the Council reconsider the earlier U.S. suggestion to conduct an "impartial, on-the-spot investigation." Heated debates followed. On 19 December, the USSR abstained, conditionally.¹⁵ This allowed the passage of UN Security Council resolution SC15,¹⁶ which established a "United Nations Commission of Investigation" for northern Greece. The "price" to be paid for the Soviet abstention, however, was that the representatives of Poland (a non-Permanent Member of the Council in 1946 and 1947) and the USSR were to be included as members of the investigating commission.¹⁷ In the end, every one of the 11 member-states serving on the Council during 1947 appointed a representative to the investigating commission for Greece.¹⁸

The UN commission conducted its investigation during the first three months of 1947. It submitted its first report to the Security Council on 27 May. In this report, the majority opinion of the Council Commission (8 of 11 members) concluded that "Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria, have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece."¹⁹ Based on these conclusions, and with support of the majority of

¹⁵ Note, early on, the Security Council established the precedent that a P-5 vote to "abstain" was not to be counted as a veto. (See Chapter One, discussion of article 27, Council voting procedures.)

¹⁶ Different numbering systems exist regarding UN resolutions. For this study I will refer to resolutions passed by the Security Council as SC resolution # and those of the General Assembly as GA resolution #. UN documents generated in the Council are annotated S/# and those of the General Assembly are marked A/#.

¹⁷ Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954), 103. Trygve Lie, the United Nations' first secretary-general (a diplomat from Finland) noted that Article 34 of the Charter provided legal justification for the Security Council to establish this commission of investigation. Later, the General Assembly would justify (without Soviet bloc concurrence) creating similar field operations under article 22. See Appendix A for excerpts from the Charter.

¹⁸ The U.S. designated Mr. Mark F. Etheridge as its representative to the Security Council Commission of Investigation. Department of State, "The United States and the United Nations: DOS, USPUN 1946, 36.

¹⁹ The Commission accumulated over 20,000 pages of evidence and compiled

states in the Security Council, the U.S. delegation submitted a mild resolution that proposed calling upon all belligerents involved in the Greek civil war to work toward "re-establishing good relations." The U.S. also suggested that these states to allow a similarly-constituted UN commission to "investigate frontier violations and to use its good offices for the settlement of controversies and complaints having to do with the frontier." On 29 July, despite the support of 9 of 11 Council member-states, however, the Soviet Union vetoed the U.S. delegation's proposal.²⁰

As the Council was considering the Commission's report, representatives remaining in Greece were recalled to testify in New York. Prior to departing, these members requested that a "Balkan Subcommission"²¹ be established to remain behind and to continue investigations in the region. This suggestion was approved by the Security Council on 18 April 1947 (as a procedural vote). This subsidiary group attempted to continue the work of the Council Commission, but its mediation efforts were frustrated when political cooperation from the governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia abruptly ceased. From this point, UN requests for its representatives to cross into their territories were denied. This decision to rebuff the UN Group by the Communist states set a pattern that handicapped nearly all future UN regional observations, investigations and mediations in northern Greece. Nonetheless, the United Nations' field mission persevered. Its members conducted interviews with

a 767 page report. In the view of the U.S. delegation, these reports substantiated beyond a doubt the majority conclusions of the commission and of the Security Council that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have supported guerrilla warfare in Greece. See "Report by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents to the Security Council," 3 vols., UN Document S/360.27, May 1947.

²⁰ Poland and the USSR disagreed with Council Commission's findings and vowed to oppose any further UN "interference." Department of State, The United States and the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947: Second Annual Report on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3024, International and Conference Series III, 1 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1948), 281-82.

²¹ The Balkan Subcommission was also referenced as the "Subsidiary Group of the Balkan Investigating Commission."

locals and former guerrillas and performed on-the-spot observation and to compile information that was sent back to the United Nations. Their reports convinced the international community that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were actively supporting the Greek Communist guerrillas.²² Contrary to what some studies have asserted,²³ UN operations in northern Greece were able to conduct effective observation, patrols and investigations despite these limitations. In support of these conclusions, David Wainhouse's detailed study of the United Nations in northern Greece (1946-1954) noted that "considerable peace observation [was] effected even though access [was] granted only on one side of a boundary line."²⁴

In August 1947, the Security Council's prospects for taking further, effective action in Greece were derailed. Two proposals, one from the U.S. representative, another sponsored by Australia gained majority support, but were defeated by the veto-wielding USSR.²⁵ At this juncture, the Truman administration was frustrated that the Security Council's inability to sanction these resolutions, in light of "clear evidence." In President Truman's view, the USSR's obdurate posture posed an "unacceptable" impasse that the United States was determined to circumvent.²⁶ As a result of the

²² DOS, USPUN 1947, 282.

²³ Henry Wiseman's study, for example, claimed that the UN effort proved to be "very limited in effectiveness because it had the support of only one of the parties." Henry Wiseman, "United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview," chapter in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals (New York: Pergamon Press and the International Peace Academy, 1983), 25.

²⁴ David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 236.

²⁵ These defeated suggestions were intended to officially characterize the situation in northern Greece as representing a "threat to international peace" (as described in chapter VII of the UN Charter).

²⁶ DOS, USPUN 1947, 283. To this point, the Council's debates regarding the Greek civil war had been frustrated by four consecutive Soviet vetoes. In fact, during the Security Council's first two years, the USSR was the only Council "permanent member" that had employed the veto. In 1946, Soviet negative votes frustrated a total of 11 resolutions (all gaining 7 or more positive votes). In 1947, another 14 proposed resolutions fell to the Soviet veto. In this respect, the United

Security Council's "failure to act," the Truman administration reached an important decision point regarding U.S. relations with and commitment to the United Nations. The U.S. delegation could have let the issue stand. Washington was quite capable of pursuing its own interests completely outside of the United Nations—in 1947 the United States held a nuclear monopoly and was, unquestionably, the strongest nation in the world. In addition, as other UN members (and its secretary-general, as discussed below) were well-aware, by mid-1947, U.S. political and economic initiatives had committed American resources and prestige to the political independence of Greece. Unilateral action by Washington, however, would have compromised the United Nations and perhaps led to the UN's early demise. The fact that the U.S. delegation was directed to pursue an alternative tack—that of strengthening the General Assembly's role (whenever the Security Council failed to act)—demonstrated that the Truman administration sought to make the United Nations a more effective international political organization. Backed by America's allies, President Truman directed the U.S. delegation to pursue an innovative maneuver that would "transfer" UN responsibility for the Greek issue from the deadlocked Security Council to the General Assembly—where the U.S. normally commanded overwhelming support. To set this diplomatic effort into motion, the Truman administration dispatched U.S. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall to the opening session of the Second Regular General Assembly.²⁷ This action, however, had potentially serious drawbacks as well

Nations' primary objective "to maintain international peace and security" was considered by many to be in serious jeopardy. See Preamble of the Charter and article 1.1: where the first purpose of the United Nations is listed as "to maintain peace and security . . . and to bring about by peaceful means . . . adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." (See Charter excerpts at Appendix A.)

²⁷ U.S. Secretary of State Marshall, speaking before the Second General Assembly, urged the General Assembly to assume greater responsibilities:

This Assembly cannot stand by as a mere spectator while a Member of the United Nations is endangered by attacks from abroad. If the United Nations should fail to protect the integrity of one small state, the security of all small states would be placed in jeopardy. The inability of the Security Council to take effective

as benefits.

Ideally, the U.S. would have preferred to maintain debates of international issues within the Security Council for at least three reasons. First, the U.S. held veto control in the Council (as a “permanent member” or “P-5” state). Second, debates before the Security Council were limited to 11 states (15 after 1965)—and to others, as parties to a dispute, or as invited. These participation limits served to simplify debates and kept the atmosphere more “controlled.” Third, and important from a legal perspective, the Council held “primary responsibility” for issues of international peace (under the Charter, article 24). The Council’s decisions were to have the “full force of law” and were applicable to all UN member-states (because they had signed the Charter).²⁸ This last point, of course, as in all international law, was “selectively respected,” either voluntarily, or due to incentives or coercion.²⁹ Theoretically, the role of “enforcement”—as defined in various articles of the UN Charter, especially chapter VII—was to fall to the Security Council and its “forces.” As discussed earlier in this

action in this case passes a grave responsibility to the General Assembly . . . It must [act] if the Organization is to carry out its fundamental purposes.”

For a full text of Secretary Marshall’s speech see George C. Marshall, “A Program for a More Effective United Nations,” speech before the General Assembly, 17 September 1947, appendix III in DOS, USPUN 1947, 261-67. The quoted section is on page 262.

²⁸ See Henry Cabot Lodge, As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the ‘50s and ‘60s (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), 96. Lodge served as the U.S. top Ambassador at USUN from 1953 to 1960. He earlier served as a Senator (with one year on the U.S. delegation to the UN General Assembly), and later as the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.

²⁹ From a legalist’s perspective, regarding the Greek case, Yugoslavia’s refusal to cooperate with resolutions of the Security Council defied its “binding” contracts under the Charter (see articles 25, 34, and 48). Albania and Bulgaria, although they were both applying for UN membership, were not UN member-states during the years of the Greek civil war; and therefore, did not break any “legal” obligations to the United Nations. Albania and Bulgaria were admitted as members of the United Nations in 1955. See also “The Test of International Law” section in chapter one of Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 1993), 9-10.

study, however, the Charter provisions for making armed forces available to the Security Council fell victim to early P-5 disunity. In this respect, the Security Council commanded coercive power indirectly, and then, only when an issue gained unopposed great-power support.³⁰

The U.S. decision to shift responsibility to the General Assembly held similar positive and negative considerations regarding that organ's legal capacity. The appeal of the Assembly to the United States was that the "plenary Assembly" (all members voting) offered predictable international support for U.S.-sponsored resolutions (especially in the organization's first 15 years)³¹—and conducted voting in the absence

³⁰ The "enforcement" aspects of the Charter (chapter VII—articles 39-51) were significantly undermined by the early failure of the P-5 to agree upon the composition of national armed forces that were to be made available for these purposes under article 43. (See Chapter One for a discussion of article 43.) By the end of 1947, the type of "enforcement" envisioned by the Charter, other than the occasional approval of economic sanctions (under article 41) was also "deadlocked"—a casualty of the Cold War. Certain aspects of "Peacekeeping," in its broadest sense, represented an organizational attempt by the UN members to make up for the P-5 disagreement over article 43 provisions.

³¹ As UN membership increased over the years (with large increases in 1955 and 1960) the percentage of "Afro-Asian" or "neutral" bloc membership increased in the General Assembly. Proportionally, U.S. "control" of the General Assembly declined. Evidence to support this claim can be seen in the U.S. annual battle (after 1949) to prevent the replacement of Nationalist China (Formosa, Taiwan, the ROC) by Communist China (Mainland China, the PRC) as the "true" representative of the Chinese people. A number of studies have analyzed this topic by detailing changes in the percentage of votes cast in support of the U.S. policy (although it should be kept in mind that the issue was affected by international political events such as the PRC's entry in the Korean war in 1950, China's controversial relations with Tibet, and the Chinese "invasion" of India in 1962). The total percentage of UN General Assembly members "supporting" the U.S. policy dropped 10 points (from 70 to 60) in 1956 and another 8 points in 1960 (from 54 to 42). The steady trend (due also to the United States siding with its "colonial" European allies on sensitive issues) pointed to a U.S. loss of clout in the Assembly. In 1971 the General Assembly defeated the U.S. position and voted to unseat the representative of the ROC in favor of the PRC. For a concise treatment of this argument see Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Superpowers, 25-44. See also chapter 4 of this dissertation on the "rise of neutralism" in the UN General Assembly and its effects on the "colonial issue."

of veto privileges. Along with these advantages, there were two serious disadvantages inherent in resolutions passed by the General Assembly (vice those of the Security Council). First, under the Charter, the General Assembly did not possess “compulsory” authority. In other words, resolutions passed by the Assembly were no more than “recommendations.” In practical application, without the United Nations wielding the means (and normally, the will) to “enforce” its resolutions, these legal distinctions were more theoretical than actual. Second, and more troublesome to U.S. efforts, the Soviet Union (and its allies, which usually voted as a “bloc”) challenged the “legality” of the General Assembly’s capacity to act on issues previously “rejected” by the Security Council. The U.S. delegation (supported by its allies³²) argued against Moscow’s Charter “interpretations.” The American representative asserted that the Charter’s founders (those who had debated the new international organization’s roles at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences) intended that the General Assembly should routinely act on behalf of international peace and security.³³ U.S. representatives argued (repeatedly, as it would turn out) that articles 10, 12, 14 and 35 of the UN Charter empowered the General Assembly to discuss issues and recommend measures related to the “peaceful adjustment of any situation” or those that threatened the “friendly relations among nations.” Limitations to the Assembly’s authority, however, were documented (not so clearly) in article 12.1. It stated: “While the Security Council is exercising [a term subject to interpretation] in respect of any dispute . . . the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation

³² Most of them, anyway. The French later stood more closely with the Soviet Union’s questioning how much “responsibility” could be granted to the General Assembly. France’s hostility against the Assembly also lay in the bitter “colonial” debates of that body in which Paris became disaffected. See the expanded discussion of the “colonial issue” in chapter 4.

³³ A number of scholarly works expound upon the “true intent” of the Charter’s founders as they met at both Dumbarton Oaks (in 1944) and in San Francisco (in 1945). See Robert E. Summers, ed., Dumbarton Oaks (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945); and Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949).

unless the Security Council so requests.” The U.S. delegation worked within the ambiguity of article 12 to strengthen the Assembly’s role by arguing that items “removed from the Security Council agenda” or those “deadlocked” were no longer being “exercised” by the Council. The Soviet bloc, did not agree.³⁴ This battle interpreting when, and to what extent, the General Assembly could “act for peace” dominated UN organizational debates for the next two decades.³⁵

After successfully moving the Greek dispute to the General Assembly, the Truman administration launched a second, related initiative. During the Second Regular Assembly, the U.S. delegation submitted a proposal that was intended to address the concerns of certain UN members regarding the Assembly’s role vis-à-vis the Security Council. The end-result of this effort was the creation of a General Assembly “Interim Committee of the Whole.”³⁶ Certain UN representatives pointed to the Security Council’s “full-time” tasking and the General Assembly’s “part-time” operations as evidence that the General Assembly would likely not even be in session at the time future international crises arose. The American representatives argued that certain mechanisms were already in place (under article 20 and the Assembly’s rules of

³⁴ Although it disagreed with the U.S. arguments, the Soviet bloc also resorted to employing this U.S. logic when it suited their “collective” national interest to do so. See for example chapter 5, Suez—in that case Yugoslavia invoked the U.S.-sponsored “uniting-for-peace resolution” to pass initiative out of a deadlocked Security Council (foiled by U.K. and French vetoes). This action led directly to establishing the UN’s first major peacekeeping effort (the United Nations Emergency Force).

³⁵ This topic will be re-addressed, as it arises, since the U.S.-sponsored effort to keep the United Nations “effectively engaged” as an international mediator is a central theme of this dissertation.

³⁶ As discussed in Chapter Two of this study, the Interim Committee resolution adopted in 1947 was the result of a U.S.-sponsored effort that began with Secretary of State Marshall’s speech before the Second Regular General Assembly. Apparently, the concept had been borrowed from an earlier Dutch proposal. In a separate speech, John Foster Dulles credited the Netherlands government with initiating a similar proposal in 1945—when the Dutch had suggested creating a “standing committee of the General Assembly on peace and security.” DOS, USPUN 1947, 303.

procedure) that permitted convoking UN “special sessions” in such cases.³⁷

Notwithstanding, certain member-states remained unconvinced. In response, the U.S. delegation proposed to “fix” this perceived Assembly short-coming by creating an Interim Committee of the General Assembly that would remain “experimentally” in session year-round. This U.S.-delegation initiative was adopted on 13 November 1947³⁸, by a vote of 41-6(Soviet bloc)-6. The Interim Committee held its first meeting on 8 January 1948 and was quickly engaged with events in Korea (as discussed in Chapter Two of this study).³⁹ As a result of these U.S. efforts, 1947 was a momentous year in United Nations’ organizational history.

The year 1947 also proved to be critical with respect to U.S. relations with Greece. In February, following Britain’s announcement that it could no longer “carry the burden of continued military and economic aid” to Greece (and elsewhere),⁴⁰ the Truman administration concluded that Greece would “fall” to international communism if the United States did not step in with economic and military assistance.⁴¹ At the

³⁷ In fact, a General Assembly “Special Session” had already convened in the spring of 1947 (and would do so again, in spring 1948), in response to crises in Palestine (as discussed later in this chapter).

³⁸ General Assembly resolution 111, GAOR, 1947.

³⁹ For a scholarly discussion of the Interim Committee and its role as part of the U.S. plan to improve the General Assembly, see “Changes in the United Nations System” as part of chapter 7 in Lawrence D. Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons, The United States and the United Nations: The Search for International Peace and Security (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), 152; 170-171; for more on the Interim committee’s decisions that influenced UN actions in Korea, see Chapter Three of this study.

⁴⁰ The British memorandum was issued on 21 February 1947 and it stated that British forces in Greece would need to be significantly reduced by 30 March. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 5: 17-44; Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope, (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 100-108; and Lie, In the Cause of Peace, 103.

⁴¹ American diplomatic historians disagree as the true nature of the “threat” to Greece from international communism during 1947. Bruce R. Kuniholm argued the former in “Containing the Soviets at the Northern Tier” and Melvyn P. Leffler

same time, Greece's eastern neighbor, Turkey, was also considered by U.S. analysts to be facing great Soviet "pressures." American policymakers championed the critical need to support both of these two "northern-tier states" to prevent communism from gaining a foothold in the strategic eastern Mediterranean region. These arguments were a major factor in the Truman administration's decision to propose to the U.S. Congress (on 12 March 1947) a \$400 million program of military and economic assistance for both Greece and Turkey. President Truman's proposal (with Congress' subsequent approval) came to be called "The Truman Doctrine."⁴² This bold policy initiative symbolically launched America's post-war general policy of "internationalism" and, in particular, represented the United States' first steps toward supplanting the United Kingdom as the western power most responsible for security in the eastern Mediterranean.

Five months later, after the Security Council failed to provide a "moral sanction" for U.S. policy initiatives in Greece, the U.S. delegation forced a vote of the Security Council to remove the Greek case from the Council's official agenda.⁴³ The Soviet Union protested, but the Security Council president (a position that rotated among members monthly—not held by Poland or the USSR in August 1947) declared the vote to be "procedural"—which, under article 27.2, was not a matter subject to the veto. The 9-2(USSR, Poland) vote, therefore, was allowed to stand.⁴⁴ Immediately after the

countered that the Truman administration "distorted regional realities" by depicting the Greek civil war as a "struggle between the forces of light and evil, monolithic communism" in his "The Truman Doctrine: A Critique." Both articles are in Thomas G. Paterson and Robert J. McMahon, eds., The Origins of the Cold War, 3d ed. (Lexington, Ma: D. C. Heath and Company, 1991), 189-97; 197-203.

⁴² For a full text of President Truman's 12 March 1947 speech before Congress, see Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman (1947), 176-80.

⁴³ Point 9 of "Principal Points UN Handling of Greek Complaint," U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 "General Records of the Department of State," Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01), File "Greek Case."

⁴⁴ Having been caught by surprise, the Soviets would oppose any such procedural votes in the future. (See Charter review, Chapter One on the issue of a

vote was recorded, Ambassador Austin confirmed that the Soviets had been outmaneuvered. At that time, the U.S. representative recommended (and gained approval) that all documents relating to the Greek case be sent to the General Assembly for consideration in that forum (which was about to convene for its Second Regular Assembly).

After a month of debate before the Assembly, on 21 October 1947, by a vote of 40(U.S.)-6(Soviet bloc)-11; the United Nations adopted a proposal entitled "Threats to the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of Greece." This resolution (GA109)⁴⁵ officially endorsed the April 1947 majority decision of the Council's Commission of Investigation (which had found that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia "had given assistance and support to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek government"). The Assembly resolution called upon Greece's neighbors to stop supplying arms and providing training and refuge to these guerrillas and to "cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful means." In its operative paragraph, the resolution created a UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) comprising nine members.⁴⁶ This Special Committee was mandated (under paragraph 6 of GA109)

second or "double" veto.)

⁴⁵ A full text of this resolution, as with any UN resolution quoted in this dissertation, is available in the applicable volume of UN official records (i.e.: Security Council Official Records, henceforth SCOR and General Assembly Official Records, henceforth GAOR). A copy of this specific resolution is also in Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, vol. IV, Europe, 1946-1979 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981), 19-20.

⁴⁶ The Security Council's Commission of Investigation was officially disbanded when the Greek issue was removed from the Council's agenda. The new Assembly Special Committee's nine "active members" were: Australia, Brazil, China (Formosa), France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These were the same nine member-states that had participated as members of the Council Commission. The other two Security Council states, Poland and the USSR, both declined to participate—asserting that the General Assembly did not have the "legal capacity" to create a "Special Committee for the Balkans." Nonetheless, the General Assembly resolution (and subsequent UNSCOB actions) "reserved" membership for Poland and the USSR, should they change their positions and decide to participate. They did not. The first chief U.S. representative to

to “observe compliance” with specific recommendations (as outlined in GA109’s paragraphs 4 and 5) and to assist the four governments involved (Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) to “implement” the General Assembly’s recommendations. Resolution GA109 also provided that UNSCOB should be able to suggest the convening of a General Assembly “special session,” if UNSCOB’s members considered such an action “necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In any event, the new Special Committee also was called upon to report on the Greek dispute no later than the next regular Assembly session. Finally, and of relevance to the growing role of the secretary-general and his Secretariat, GA109 tasked the secretary-general to supply the Special Committee with a “staff adequate to enable it to perform its duties.”⁴⁷

In retrospect, the General Assembly’s resolution of 21 October 1947 established a number of precedents—most of these were embodied in the mandate and operations of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans. UNSCOB was established as an investigating, observing, and mediating body. In each of these taskings, the Balkan field mission demonstrated the United Nations’ efforts to compensate for its inherent limitations as an organization responsible for promoting international peace. As a deliberative body, the United Nations was handicapped because it did not possess an independent intelligence-gathering capacity. UNSCOB investigations and reports from the field provided the United Nations with “impartial” information.⁴⁸ These reports,

UNSCOB was Alan G. Kirk, the American Ambassador to Belgium. He was replaced, in March 1948, by Gerald A. Drew (a career U.S. foreign service officer).

⁴⁷ DOS, USPUN 1947, 155-7. The role of the secretary-general as the organization’s chief executive, later as international mediator and director of peace operations, began modestly with this resolution. This development was supported, in almost every case, by the U.S. presidential administrations between 1946 and 1968 and will be noted as a sub-theme of this study.

⁴⁸ Without access to “impartial” information, as each case was brought before the United Nations, its members were hard-pressed to rule even-handedly on international complaints. For the period under review, the United Nations never adequately resolved this weakness. In many cases an ad hoc fact-finding body (or resort to some other innovative means) was employed to gain information as a step

like that of the Security Council's investigating committee in April 1947, were not always unanimous. Notwithstanding, the "majority" opinions forwarded to UN headquarters served to inform debates conducted in New York—far removed from events taking place in northern Greece.

Another innovation of UNSCOB's operations was the use of "international [assumed to be impartial] observers" to investigate complaints and monitor the status of international agreements or relations. In early 1948, the UN Special Committee on the Balkans organized itself into six observation zone groups, (see map at Appendix B). These observers desired to operate along both sides of Greece's northern borders, but Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to allow UNSCOB access inside their respective nations. In fact, they echoed Soviet charges that the mere creation of such a committee was "a violation of their sovereignty."⁴⁹ Thwarted, but not discouraged, UNSCOB set about investigating incidents within northern Greece. UNSCOB officials erected a number of observation posts (with Greece's permission) and staffed these positions with rotating teams of UN military and foreign service officers⁵⁰ (provided by seven of the nine governments participating in the Committee⁵¹). These international

toward settling important disputes. Later, the Council and Assembly even relied upon reports submitted by other international agencies such as the International Red Cross or the International Jurists to provide "impartial" information.

⁴⁹ UNSCOB's operations were contingent upon the consent of all parties. Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had the right to deny access to the UN Special Committee. UNSCOB adhered to their wishes. At no time did UNSCOB attempt to "force" itself upon Albania, Bulgaria or Yugoslavia. Thus, the committee did not "violate" their sovereignty—despite Soviet protests to the contrary.

⁵⁰ A few of the initial observers were military, but most were foreign service civilians. Later, in most other UN "observer forces" the UN representatives were primarily military personnel. The lesson learned from UNSCOB was that even UN "observation" could be dangerous work and observers needed to know how to defend themselves and deal with battlefield obstacles such as land-mines. In fact, one of UNSCOB's first "grave injuries" was the result of a land-mine. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 38.

⁵¹ As of November 1948, the U.S. furnished UNSCOB with 13 observers. Mark Etheridge, Harding Bancroft, Cyril Black and Harry N. Howard were among the

observers conducted operations in a dangerous environment. Two were killed in the line of duty and others were injured. Their reports, however, were valued highly by the West. During 1948, UNSCOB submitted five reports to the General Assembly, the most comprehensive dated on 30 June.⁵² In general, these reports documented that large-scale aid continued to be furnished to Greek guerrillas. As a result, UNSCOB's reports convinced the majority of UN member-states that Communist forces were supporting attacks from north of Greece's borders and were allowing Communist guerrillas to take refuge from pursuit behind international lines (where they were being resupplied and reinforced).⁵³

The reports and experiences of UNSCOB also provided a valuable legacy to subsequent UN field operations. The creation of a UN "Observers' Handbook"⁵⁴ is one such example. In its first year of operations, the experiences of UN observers in Greece were organized by the Special Committee into a series of general instructions "to clarify and define" the scope of UN field-observer duties. The goal of this first UN handbook was stated: "so that this new form of international machinery could function

high-quality diplomats selected by the Truman administration to serve on UNSCOB. David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 241.

⁵² See UN documents A/521 (9 January 1948, interim report), A/522 (19 January 1948, interim report), A/574 (30 June 1948), A/644 (10 September 1948, supplementary report), and A/692 (22 October 1948, interim report) in GAOR, 3d Session, supplement 8.

⁵³ In 1949, and thereafter, UNSCOB reports were submitted to the General Assembly annually (some with one or two supplementary reports). Department of State, Department of State, The United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3437, International and Conference Series III, 29 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, April 1949), 59.

⁵⁴ Alternately called the "Provisional Observation Service Manual." This publication was for internal use, however the idea spread to "think tanks" a few decades later. See, for example, the International Peace Academy's Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).

in the most impartial and objective manner possible.”⁵⁵ This first edition was subsequently amended by Special Committee members in February 1950, but the main guidelines, emphasizing impartiality and confidentiality, remained intact.

The United Nations’ overall failure to mediate a political settlement of the Greek dispute, on the other hand, detracted from the significant contributions made by UNSCOB’s field operations.⁵⁶ When the Third General Assembly (meeting in Paris) convened between 25 October and 11 November 1948, the controversial “Greek issue” was assigned for discussion in the Assembly’s standing First Committee (also called the “Political and Security Committee”). These debates in First Committee were arduous and mostly inconclusive. A U.S. Department of State report noted that, during this Third Session, “more time was spent by the First Committee of the General Assembly on the Greek problem than on any other question.” As expected, arguments concerning the Greek civil war produced a sharp cleavage between the views of the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations and those of the minority comprising the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. This Soviet bloc contended that UNSCOB was “an illegal, incompetent, and even dangerous body.” The U.S. delegation disagreed and argued, as it turned out, for the majority. John Foster Dulles (future U.S. secretary of state under President Dwight D. Eisenhower) represented the United States delegation in the First Committee debates. Foster Dulles claimed that the Soviet-supported guerrilla war in northern Greece was “but part of a general effort to extend the power of Soviet communism throughout the world.”⁵⁷ He endorsed continuing the work of UNSCOB

⁵⁵ “Third Report of UNSCOB, annexes, section 3,” A/1307, 31 July 1950 in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 39-41.

⁵⁶ Critics would claim that UNSCOB’s political failures also foreshadowed the UN’s inability to solve intractable political disputes. As this study will show, the UN’s record on this account is mixed with examples of both political failures and successes.

⁵⁷ Thus, by autumn 1948, the United States had begun to espouse (for international consumption) the notion that communism was a “monolithic” evil. This perception gained faithful adherents in the late 1940s, and after April 1950 (with NSC 68) it became official U.S. policy. This misconceived generalization remained the basis

as an “indispensable factor” for helping to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Greece.⁵⁸ The Soviet Union countered Dulles’ accusations by offering a draft proposal for the “immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Greece” and requested the immediate termination of UNSCOB. These debates concluded, on 27 November 1948, as the General Assembly adopted the U.S. point of view and overwhelmingly agreed to continue UNSCOB by a vote of 47-6(Soviet bloc)-0.⁵⁹

During 1949, the military situation in Greece improved to favor the Greek-government forces. On 16 October, the Communist guerrillas conceded failure of their conventional armed campaign and announced the “cessation of its military activities.”⁶⁰ Contrary to these claims, however, the Communist effort did not end. Instead, the struggle transitioned to “insurgency warfare”—an approach that became the trademark style of future Communist wars.⁶¹ Accordingly, despite the fact that Greek forces were

of U.S. Cold-War rhetoric for another 23 years. Only in 1972, when President Richard M. Nixon opened U.S. relations with Communist China (the PRC), did American officials admit (as Kennan insisted in 1946) that political differences existed between Communist states. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 83-92.

⁵⁸ The record fails to support Foster Dulles’ claims. UNSCOB did not overtly preserve Greece’s territorial integrity or its sovereignty. The Greek military forces, as supported by the people of Greece (with significant material aid supplied by the West, primarily the United States) determined the outcome of the Greek civil war. The fact that the Truman administration considered UNSCOB’s work “indispensable” lies in the less tangible realm of international moral support for the U.S. agenda—in effect, the United Nations morally sanctioned the West’s actions and countered perceptions that the U.S. was overtly “interfering” in Greece’s internal affairs (as the Soviet bloc often charged).

⁵⁹ DOS, *USPUN* 1948, 60-63.

⁶⁰ Department of State, *United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein*, DOS Publication 3765, International and Conference Series III, 48 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, May 1950), 63.

⁶¹ In this respect, the first three years of the Greek civil war was one of the few cases (outside of the Korean War and the Warsaw Pact’s “police actions” in

able to establish "effective control" in the northern border regions, the Communist forces continued to employ hit-and-run attacks and were able to safely withdraw into the territories of Greece's northern neighbors.⁶²

Coincident with the transition of Greece's civil war to that of a long-term struggle against a Communist insurgency, the General Assembly was becoming more impatient with the lack of political progress between Greece and its neighbors. Recall that UNSCOB's original mandate tasked the Special Committee to "observe compliance" from all belligerents and also to help establish "friendly relations" between Greece and its northern neighbors.⁶³ The second part of UNSCOB's tasking, unlike the first, met with very little success. On 29 September 1949, the Assembly's First Committee renewed a 1948 suggestion to create a political "Conciliation Committee." This committee was directed to reattempt mediating a political settlement for improving relations between the belligerents fighting in northern Greece. Although it was headed by the General Assembly's president,⁶⁴ the 1948-49 Conciliation Committee was no more successful than was UNSCOB in mediating a political solution. Meanwhile, the military situation was improving for the Greek government forces. UNSCOB's 1949 annual report, while it remained critical of Albania and Bulgaria, noted that Yugoslavia's aid to regional Communist guerrillas had

Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968; and in Hungary in 1956) that Communist forces engaged in open conventional warfare. The "insurgency" or "infiltration" across international boundaries was the more common Communist style of warfare that the United States failed to comprehend while "losing" its war in Vietnam. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, inc., 1986); and Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), especially "And How Do You Know If You're Winning?" 440-67.

⁶² DOS, USPUN 1949, 63.

⁶³ General Assembly resolution 109, 21 October 1947, in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 19.

⁶⁴ The General Assembly president between September 1949 and September 1950 was the Filipino statesman (former general) Carlos P. Romulo.

diminished.⁶⁵ This trend continued, and in 1950, UNSCOB reported that Yugoslavia's aid may have ceased, altogether.

In late 1949, as a result of the continued Albanian, Bulgarian belligerence, the General Assembly resolved to stiffen its third (annual, to this point) resolution concerning the situation in northern Greece. On 18 November 1949, by a vote of 50-6-2, the Assembly continued UNSCOB and recommended a series of partial "sanctions" against Albania and Bulgaria. This resolution (GA288) requested that UN member-states avoid providing arms or war materials to Albania and Bulgaria, either "directly or indirectly" until the proper United Nations agency "had determined that the unlawful assistance of these states to the Greek guerrillas has ceased." This was a landmark resolution, in that it was the General Assembly's first recommendation for "sanctions" against sovereign states (neither of which were members). The Communist bloc, as expected, denounced the resolution and, again, called for the immediate dissolution of UNSCOB.⁶⁶

During 1950, UNSCOB reported that no significant guerrilla military action took place along the northern frontier of Greece. The military and political situation was improved greatly by the resumption of full diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. Relations between Greece and both Albania and Bulgaria, however, remained hostile. UNSCOB continued its observation of the conditions along the frontier and concentrated its efforts toward repatriating Greek children and captured soldiers⁶⁷ On 31 July 1950, UNSCOB submitted its third annual report. The UN

⁶⁵ In fact, Belgrade implemented a policy of "closing" its frontier with Greece. This reversed Yugoslavia's previous policy of sheltering guerrilla forces and allowing raids across its borders. This decision had more to do with Marshall Josip Broz Tito's 28 June 1948 "split" with Moscow than any warm feelings for Greece. The UNSCOB reports containing these statements were dated 2 August (UN document A/935) and 16 September 1949 (A/981). DOS USPUN 1949, 65-66.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 68-69.

⁶⁷ Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were improving quickly. In November 1950, a number of captured Greek soldiers and the first group of Greek children were returned from Yugoslavia to Greece. Shortly afterward, the Yugoslav

observers concluded that guerrilla activity persisted and that Albania and Bulgaria continued to provide shelter and assistance to guerrilla forces.⁶⁸ On 10 November 1950, in support of another annual renewal for the UNSCOB mission, the U.S. representative to the General Assembly spoke favorably of UN and other Western efforts to support the Greek government. Benjamin V. Cohen (a member of the U.S. delegation since 1946), stated that the general improvement in northern Greece could be attributed to "the efforts of the Greek people," to the "increased respect shown by Yugoslavia for the General Assembly's recommendations on this question," to the "affirmative assistance given to Greece by the United States and other member nations," and to the "active and persistent work of the Special Committee on the Balkans." Cohen recommended that the General Assembly should consider placing UNSCOB under the newly created Peace Observation Commission.⁶⁹ Regarding this last suggestion, the UN member-states adopted the U.S. suggestion after a year's delay. With respect to renewing UNSCOB, based on the Special Committee's annual report (and supplemental letters), with Greece's support, the General Assembly renewed UNSCOB's mandate for another year (resolution GA382, 1 December

and Greek governments established full diplomatic relations, and appointed ministers to Athens and Belgrade, respectively. Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950, DOS Publication 4178, International and Conference Series III, 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1951), 14.

⁶⁸ UN Report A/1307; supplements were dated 9, 12, and 13 October 1950.

⁶⁹ In 1950, looking back to the development of the Greek case, and forward to a need for General Assembly support in Korea, the Truman administration sponsored a resolution called "Uniting for Peace." This resolution was intended to further strengthen the General Assembly's responsibility for maintaining international peace (especially in the case of Security Council deadlock). The Peace Observation Commission was established by the General Assembly on 3 November 1950 as a result of the uniting-for-peace resolution. (See Chapter Two for more on "Uniting for Peace" as the source resolution that created both the Peace Observation Commission and the Collective Measures Committee).

1950).⁷⁰

In 1951, the situation in northern Greece was improved, but remained unsettled. In UNSCOB's final report to the Sixth General Assembly, covering the period August 1950 to August 1951, the Special Committee noted a "steady improvement in relations between Greece and Yugoslavia . . . exemplified by the restoration of full diplomatic relations in late 1950 [and] by the repatriation of a significant number of Greek children."⁷¹ On the other hand, Greece's relations with both Albania and Bulgaria remained as difficult as ever. Rumania also indirectly assisted its Communist neighbors by broadcasting radio propaganda programs criticizing the government of Greece.⁷² The continuance of these "unconventional warfare tactics" were documented by the 1951 UNSCOB report.⁷³ The Special Committee report concluded that "since the military defeat of the Greek guerrillas in 1949, the guerrilla movement had merely changed its tactics, reverting to underground agitation and organization without abandoning its ultimate objective—the eventual overthrow of the Greek government." The report also noted that aid to the Greek guerrillas continued to flow, not only from Albania and Bulgaria, but also from other central and eastern European states. Accordingly, the report recommended "continuing vigilance on the part of the United

⁷⁰ DOS, USPUN 1950, 67.

⁷¹ During the Greek civil war a large number of children (and some adult refugees) were either allowed to cross or were forcibly taken across the borders of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia out of Greece. Between 1949 and 1954 the UN attempted a number of political initiatives to have these refugees and children "returned" to Greece. The U.S. DOS noted that the Soviet bloc did not deny "harboring" close to 10,000 children. As of February 1952, only Yugoslavia had taken steps to enable some of these children to return to Greece. Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951, [Including information of up to May 1952], DOS Publication 4583, International Organization and Conference Series III, 80 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1952), 91-92.

⁷² DOS, USPUN 1951, 88.

⁷³ The final UNSCOB report was dated 15 August 1951. See GAOR, 6th Session, Supplement 11, document A/1857.

Nations.”⁷⁴

On 7 December 1951, as suggested a year earlier by the U.S. delegation, the Sixth General Assembly’s ad hoc Political Committee administratively transferred UNSCOB’s “functions and mandate” to the new Peace Observation Commission (POC).⁷⁵ By this time, the Greek civil war had ended. Formal peace notwithstanding, the Greek government continued to distrust Albania and Bulgaria. As a result, the Greek representative to the United Nations requested that the POC dispatch a team of observers to northern Greece to continue UN observation and investigations. The Peace Observation Commission granted Greece’s request and, in January 1952, formed a five-member “Balkan Subcommittee” (BSC) to replace the disbanded UNSCOB. The BSC then dispatched six observers to northern Greece—one from each of the five members of the subcommittee⁷⁶ and another from the United Kingdom (which was tasked to provide a sixth “principal observer”).⁷⁷ Since the western and central frontiers were found to be quiet, the BSC concentrated its attention upon the Bulgarian-Greek border.⁷⁸ During the next two years, the situation remained mostly quiet, with only one violent incident documented. As a result, the BSC was scaled

⁷⁴ DOS, USPUN 1951, 88.

⁷⁵ Technically, UNSCOB was disbanded, but its mandate was assumed by the POC subcommittee. The Peace Observation Commission was created by the 3 November 1950 U.S.-sponsored “uniting-for-peace resolution.” Mary Allsebrook noted that by the General Assembly’s decision to transfer UNSCOB’s mandate to the POC, was the only instance when the Peace Observation Commission was used. Mary Allsebrook, Prototypes of Peacemaking: The First Forty Years of the United Nations (London: Longman Group, 1986), 8. (For more on the Peace Observation Commission and the uniting-for-peace resolution, see Korea, Chapter Two.)

⁷⁶ The five member-states of the Balkan subcommittee were: Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden and the United States. These five states were selected from the members of the 14-nation Peace Observation Commission.

⁷⁷ USPUN 1951, 89-90.

⁷⁸ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1952, DOS Publication 5034, International Organization and Conference Series III, 90 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1953), 60.

down to a total of 4 observers in late 1953. In early 1954, Greece was satisfied that the northern border region had stabilized and the leadership in Athens allowed the General Assembly to withdraw the remaining UN observers.⁷⁹

Despite the United Nations' failure to resolve the international political aspects of the Greek civil war, American policy makers avidly supported the work performed by the United Nations (specifically, the debates in and field missions created by the General Assembly) concerning the situation in Greece between 1946 and 1954. During these years, the Truman administration pushed to keep the Greek issue alive in the United Nations and was satisfied with the subsequent "moral mandate" the United States secured in support of its policy decisions supporting the Greek government. John W. Halderman's draft proposal, submitted for inclusion in President Truman's 1950 state of the union address, demonstrated the administration's positive assessment of United Nations' limited successes in Greece:

During the past year [1949] there has been marked progress towards eliminating the threats to the independence of Greece arising from the support rendered the Greek guerrilla by the northern neighbors of Greece. The UN has contributed greatly to this happy result through the activities of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans. . . . We remain convinced that the UN function of observation of broader [border?] relations between Greece and [its] northern [neighbors has been] an important factor in promoting a peaceful settlement.⁸⁰

In addition, the United States demonstrated its resolve to keep the Greece case at the top of the United Nations' agenda—backed by veiled threats of direct U.S. intervention if these measures proved inadequate. Repeatedly, the U.S. Ambassador, Warren Austin, proclaimed in the UN Assembly:

⁷⁹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954, DOS Publication 5769, International Organization and Conference Series III, 104 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1955), 3.

⁸⁰ J. W. Halderman, "State of the Union Message for 1950," 11 October 1949, U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 "General Records of the Department of State," Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01) "Bureau of United Nations Affairs Subject File Relating to Palestine, Political, Security, and Trusteeship Matters, 1946-1951," UNP File "Notes on Greece and UNSCOB," pp. 2-3.

If it should become necessary to call a special session of the General Assembly to consider threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, the government of the United States would be prepared to cooperate with other members of the United Nations in putting into effect whatever measures are recommended by the General Assembly for the protection of Greece.⁸¹

If there was one flaw in the Truman administration's multilateral handling of the Greek case, however, it stemmed from poor communications between the American president and his New York USUN office. Trygve Lie (the UN Secretary-General between 1946 and 1953) from his perspective in New York, criticized the Truman administration's cavalier approach to the Greek situation. Secretary-General Lie was especially disappointed by the announcement of the Truman Doctrine without prior consultation. Trygve Lie claimed that the U.S. president's declaration "burst like a bombshell upon the world with no advance notice whatever." Lie claimed in his memoirs that this "shock" was shared at the highest levels of USUN as well. Pointing to Truman's public announcements touting the United Nations as "the cornerstone" of American foreign policy, for example, Trygve Lie wrote that he would have preferred Truman's initiative for Greece to have been announced at the United Nations. Had the American president done so, the program still would have belonged to the United States, and the United States would have strengthened the United Nations as the focal point of international policy coordination.⁸² President Truman's memoirs provide certain insights into this debate. He wrote that his administration considered the 12 March 1947 "declaration" to be a "turning point in America's foreign policy." Looking back, the president's statement that the Truman doctrine was "America's answer to the surge of expansion by Communist tyranny" seems to indicate that, rather than thinking about strengthening multilateralism, President Truman was focused on the intensification of the developing one-on-one rivalry between the United States and the

⁸¹ Point 12 of "Principal Points UN Handling of Greek Complaint," U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 "General Records of the Department of State," Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01), File "Greek Case." This U.S. "resolve" was not forthcoming in Palestine and the Kashmir (as noted below).

⁸² Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, 104.

Soviet Union.⁸³ These critiques aside, the Truman administration's efforts did revive the Greek debates after Security Council action was blocked by the Soviet veto. As a result, the U.S. move to pass the initiative for action to the General Assembly enhanced the United Nations' credibility and strengthened international operations for peace.

The engagement of the Greek case by General Assembly Members in 1947, after the Soviet Union had effectively stymied the Security Council with repeated vetoes, kept the initiative for action within the United Nations alive. This U.S.-led approach strengthened the United Nations' capacity to act as an impartial investigator and mediator of international disputes. The creation of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) and that Special Committee's successful observation and investigation role evolved just ahead of two other early important UN-sanctioned observer missions: one in Palestine (the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) and the other in Kashmir (the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan). In these respects, the UN field operation in the Balkans set other changes into motion that improved the United Nations' effectiveness as a "peacekeeping" organization. During the United Nations' first five years, the General Assembly's role was strengthened. The UN secretary-general's role as both an independent international civil servant and the supervisor of "field operations" also expanded. Field handbooks, logistics lessons, and experience was documented for future missions to learn from. UNSCOB, (together with UNTSO, UNMOGIP, and operations in Indonesia) as an early multinational peace effort salvaged the United Nations' credibility as an organization designed to promote international conflict resolution, after East-West ideological conflicts threatened to render the United Nations ineffective.

At this point, an overview of two other UN observer operations that were conducted in the midst of "internationalized civil wars" will demonstrate the limitations of UN peace operations to "localize" and resolve similarly divisive and complex disputes.

⁸³ Truman, Memoirs, II: 105-06.

The 1958 Middle East Crisis: UN Observers in Lebanon (UNOGIL)

After the 1956 Suez war, Egypt's President Gamal Abd al-Nasser emerged as the Arab world's most popular leader.⁸⁴ Despite Egypt's military defeat at the hands of a joint Israeli, British, and French expeditionary force, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez canal company was effectively sanctioned when the United Nations, backed by the United States, insisted that all three invading armies withdraw. As a result, the Arab people admired Nasser for having "stood up to the West"—for having pulled the Lion's tail. From his elevated status, Nasser endeavored to unite all Arabs under his leadership—reviving regional aspirations of a political reunification of all Arab peoples. By early 1958, Nasser's charisma and his ideological message of "pan-Arabism"⁸⁵ (disseminated by means of "radio Cairo" and Arabic newspapers) had inspired a following throughout the region.⁸⁶ Consequently, President Nasser was quite pleased in February when Syrian political leaders decided to "unite" their country with Egypt. This federation, under Nasser's leadership, was designated as the United Arab Republic (UAR).⁸⁷ Thereafter, Nasser's pan-Arabism (what Washington referred to as "Nasserism") continued to reach across national boundaries. To many Arabs, Nasser was seen as a hero. But to Arab governments that were experiencing difficulties

⁸⁴ Professor Brands admirably traced Nasser's emergence as a regional leader in H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 263-81.

⁸⁵ Elie Chalal's "Arab Nationalism, A Bibliographic Essay," chapter in Tawfic E. Farah, ed., Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 1-17; is an excellent study explains the rise of and definitions of "Arab nationalism" and "pan-Arabism."

⁸⁶ David C. Gordon, The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 26.

⁸⁷ The UAR later included North Yemen, under the expanded title of the United Arab States—but this term was rarely used. Nasser's control of Syria lost its luster in 1961 and the UAR broke apart in October of that year—although Nasser continued to refer to his Egypt as the UAR. The adjectives Syrian and Egyptian remained in usage and will be employed in this paper as required to clarify analysis.

maintaining popular support, Nasser's allure was a political threat. In mid-1958, Nasser's regional agitations played an important role in national crises that developed in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. A background paragraph describing each of these countries follows.

Lebanon gained its independence from France during the Second World War. France had gained influence in the Ottoman province of "Mount Lebanon" during the sixteenth century and had been granted "Mandate" authority over the country under the League of Nations (LON) in 1920.⁸⁸ During France's years of influence, one of Lebanon's many religious sects gained precedence over the others—the "Christian Maronites." The Maronites were only one of many religious communities that, centuries before, had taken refuge in the Lebanese mountains. Other religious factions that concomitantly vied for political power in Lebanon included the Druze, Shi'a, and Sunni Muslims.⁸⁹ In August 1860, a civil war was waged between the Maronites and the Druze—the two largest groups (at that time). The French intervened and imposed what was called a "confessional" system for local power sharing. The legacy of this "solution" was carried into the modern era when Lebanon gained independence. In November 1943, the Lebanese established a "National Pact" that mandated a system for "representational" government that was similar to the French confessional arrangement. Based upon a 1940 census, Maronites were guaranteed the position of

⁸⁸ F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 64.

⁸⁹ The differences in these Lebanese factions were as much political as they were doctrinal. The Druze and Shiites (each distinct groups) were persecuted by the Ottoman Sunni ("orthodox") Muslims. Among other things, each sect held different beliefs concerning the proper line of Caliphate succession (the line of religious and political leadership passed on from their common prophet Muhammad). The Maronites were a Uniat Catholic sect (using Syriac liturgy) that was prosecuted by both the Eastern Orthodox church (under Byzantium/Constantinople) and the Sunni Ottoman Muslims. For more information, see John B. Noss, Man's Religions 6th edn. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1980), 527-32; and Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1964), 35-39.

national president. The prime minister was to be a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament was to be a Shiite (or Druze) Muslim. The problem with this "sharing of power" was that once the Maronites had gained the uppermost position in government, they refused to authorize any subsequent census that would have challenged their "majority" status.⁹⁰ The first Maronite president, Bishara Khoury, established a second unfortunate "tradition." By law, he was limited to serve a single six-year term. When time came for him to step down, however, he arranged to have himself elected for a "second term." His extended presidency was interrupted in 1952 when three years of protests forced Khoury to step down. At that point, the cabinet appointed (there were no direct elections for the president) Camille Chamoun as the new Lebanese president. In 1957, anticipating the expiration of his presidential term the following summer, Chamoun orchestrated a questionable election of ministers to ensure that an 80% loyal cabinet would be in place.⁹¹ As expected, in 1958, Chamoun announced that he expected the new cabinet to "insist" that he remain as Lebanese president for another six-year term. Needless to say, the other factions were enraged.

Similarly, Jordan's king was tottering on the edge of popular support in mid-1958. King Hussein Ibn Talal al-Hashemi (grandson of Abdullah), had ruled his destitute country since his eighteenth birthday in March 1953. His grandfather had been assassinated in Jerusalem (with Hussein at his side) in 1951. For the next two

⁹⁰ The 1940 census established a six to five Maronite majority. It was clear that demographic changes (due to birth rates per family) dictated a reassessment of this census, but the Maronites refused to allow any such talk. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 105-08, 135-53; and Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), especially 182-87. See also David C. Gordon, The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (Oxford: Martin Robertson and Company, 1983); and Philip L. Gabriel, In the Ashes: A Story of Lebanon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

⁹¹ The U.S. role in this dismal display of "cabinet packing" was documented by an ex-CIA member who disclosed that he was tasked to deliver suitcases full of cash to buy off Chamoun's rivals. In the end, 53 of 66 ministers elected were counted as "pro-U.S." Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York: W. W. Norton and Company), 248-50.

years, Hussein's father, Talal was in and out as King when medical doctors determined that Talal was mentally incompetent to rule. The Jordanian government held together under loyal administrators until Hussein came of age and slowly solidified his reign. Hussein's close association with the West, especially with the British (who officered his Arab Legion army until 1956) had its roots in the British Mandate of "Transjordan" and support received from London after Jordan was granted independence in 1946. The political fallout from the British "invasion" of Egypt in October 1956, however, nearly precipitated the young king's overthrow. Since that time, Hussein survived a handful of coup attempts and continued to lose the support of Jordan's intellectuals. If it were not for his popularity among the Bedouins and the strength of the Arab Legion (mostly recruited from Bedouins), Hussein would not have survived.⁹²

A third Arab country that was on the verge of revolution by mid-1958 was Iraq. Another state that fell under British tutelage as a LON Mandate, Iraq was established under the popular leader of the First World War's "Arab revolt," Faisal (Abdullah's brother—both were sons of the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein al-Hashemi). Faisal was killed in a car accident in 1933, and his grandson, Faisal II took over as King in 1938. The point of continuity between these two reigns was a minister named Nuri al-Said. Similar to Jordan, however, Iraq's alignment with Britain (through the Baghdad Pact signed in April 1955) cost the regime great credibility during the October 1956 Suez war. Between 1956 and 1958, Nasser urged both the Jordanians and Iraqis to overthrow their governments and join with the United Arab Republic. In March 1958, as a counter to these pressures, Jordan and Iraq joined together in a loose political federation called the "Arab Union."⁹³ Four months later, on 15 July, this alliance unexpectedly was terminated by Iraqi General Abdul Karim Qasim when he seized

⁹² Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 1955-1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 78-95.

⁹³ For more on the relations between the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Jordan, and on their schemes for political unification, see Reeve S. Simon, "The Hashemite 'Conspiracy': Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958," International Journal of Middle East Studies 5/3 (1974): 314-327.

control in Baghdad. Qasim and his army cohorts allowed the murders of King Faisal and Prime Minister Nuri by an angry mob.⁹⁴ In Washington, Iraq's bloody coup was blamed on "Nasserites" and regional Communists.⁹⁵ In Beirut and Amman, Chamoun and Hussein feared for their lives and sent desperate pleas to Washington and London for immediate military assistance.

During these events, the United Nations had authorized and was conducting a 100-man observer mission in Lebanon. On 22 May 1958, the government of Lebanon had brought a complaint before the UN Security Council regarding Nasser's propaganda that was "interfering" in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Lebanon's Ambassador Charles Malik claimed that if this meddling continued, it was "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." In a separate memorandum, Malik complained of guerrilla and rebel "bands" filtering across the UAR (Syrian) border into Lebanon. These forces, he asserted, were causing destruction of "life and property." Concurrently, as if to cover its tracks, the Lebanon delegation also submitted similar claims to the League of Arab States (which was dominated by the UAR and headquartered in Cairo). In order to allow the League of Arab States to consider the case, the Security Council took no further action for the next two weeks. After the Arab League was unable to satisfy the Lebanese government—Chamoun refused a proposal that was recommended as "acceptable" by his own delegation⁹⁶—the issue was again raised before the UN Security Council. At this time, Malik argued for Lebanon's situation as a "test case" representative of "every small country in the world." If the UN did not take action to save Lebanon, he argued, "No small country could feel secure." The U.S. representative, ambassador Henry

⁹⁴ Both Faisal and Nuri were violently killed and dismembered by the crowds. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 412.

⁹⁵ Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis," Diplomatic History Vol. 20 No. 1 (Winter 1996): 43.

⁹⁶ Wainhouse, International Peace Observation, 374.

Cabot Lodge, seconded Malik's line of reasoning. Lodge stressed the need for the United Nations to be "particularly alert in protecting small states from interference by those whose resources and power are larger." "There should be no doubt," he declared, "of the firm determination of the United States to continue to support the independence and integrity of Lebanon."⁹⁷

On behalf of the UAR, Representative Omar Loutfi argued that the "heart of the trouble" was to be found in the desire of Lebanon's President Chamoun to "unconstitutionally succeed himself" in the impending Lebanese national elections (to be held 31 July). In an answer to this charge, Ambassador Lodge argued that "while political opposition was a natural and essential attribute of democracy, it did not justify external attacks or external subversion." Following this debate, a proposal offered by Sweden was adopted in the Security Council, on 11 June 1958, by a vote of 10-0-1 (USSR abstained).⁹⁸ This resolution (SC 128)⁹⁹ proposed the urgent dispatch of an observation group "to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders." It also proposed that the secretary-general "take the necessary steps to that end." Although short and vague, SC 128 provided the basic mandate for what became the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).¹⁰⁰ [See map of UNOGIL deployment at Appendix B.]

⁹⁷ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958, DOS Publication 6852, International Organization and Conference Series 4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1959), 74-75.

⁹⁸ The USSR abstained—it allowed the resolution to pass "because neither Lebanon nor the United Arab Republic objected to it." DOS, USPUN 1958, 74-76.

⁹⁹ S/4022, 11 June 1958, SCOR, 13th year, 825th meeting, 17; Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, vol. I, The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 546-47.

¹⁰⁰ Later, the General Assembly, during ESS-III, reconfirmed the validity of this mandate for UNOGIL with Resolution 1237, on 21 August 1958. *Ibid.*, 545. For detailed studies of UNOGIL, see Gerald Curtis, "The UN Observer Group in Lebanon, International Organization, Autumn 1964; Wainhouse, International Peace Observation, 373-90; and *idem*, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press,

Following the 11 June resolution, the secretary-general immediately took steps to make UNOGIL a reality. In doing so, Hammarskjöld relied heavily upon existing UN facilities and previously established missions in the region—those attached to UNTSO and UNEF—as sources of men and equipment to be borrowed “on an emergency basis.” On 12 and 13 June, the first 10 Military Observers, (borrowed from UNTSO), arrived in Lebanon. The secretary-general also designated UN personnel assigned to the United Nations Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the UN staffs in New York and Geneva to supplement UNOGIL. By 13 June, “initial reconnaissance” was being conducted by UN military observers in white UN jeeps (supplied by the United States). To support these operations, Hammarskjöld appointed Dr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador as Chairman of UNOGIL and put Norway’s Major Germany Odd Bull in command as “Executive Member in charge of Military Observers.”¹⁰¹ As of 25 June, there were 94 UN observers in place. UNOGIL’s force was later augmented (after a U.S. military intervention), reaching a maximum strength of 591 military personnel on 14 November. At peak strength, UNOGIL deployed 469 military observers—22 classified as “supporting troops” and another 90 assigned to the air section. By November 1958, 49 observer outposts had been established. These fixed sites were supplemented by mobile patrols in 290 vehicles, 12 fixed-wing aircraft and 6 helicopters. There were also 118 military and civilian personnel assigned for administrative support.¹⁰²

As usual, the United States contributed the lion’s share in financing and supplies. On 13 June, the United Nations inquired whether equipment for UNOGIL could be provided from U.S. sources, similar to that being provided the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).¹⁰³ The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration agreed. The

1973), 102-36.

¹⁰¹ Galo Plaza had been serving as the executive in charge of the United Nations’ Geneva Office, General Odd Bull had been serving as chief of staff, UNTSO.

¹⁰² DOS, USPUN 1958, 76-77.

¹⁰³ Under U.S. law, specifically, the “U.S. Participation Act” (Public Law 264,

U.S. government, thereafter, arranged the transfer of jeeps, planes, helicopters, and automotive, signal and field equipment, in addition to other supplies. The total cost of this equipment was valued over \$500,000. This contribution was valued at nearly one-eighth the total of all UNOGIL costs.¹⁰⁴

Despite the timely U.S. financial and logistics support provided to the United Nations, the rate at which the observer force came to be effectively employed was criticized by Lebanon (and others). From an examination of the monthly reports that UNOGIL submitted to the Security Council, via the secretary-general, it seems clear that at least 60 days passed from the time UNOGIL was established, until it was considered to be carrying out its mandate.¹⁰⁵ UNOGIL's first report, submitted 3 July, was mostly administrative. In its second report, dated 30 July, UNOGIL claimed to have discovered evidence of "infiltration on a limited scale"—limited to that of "small arms and ammunitions." By mid-August, it reported that even these cases had "diminished markedly." By 29 September, UNOGIL noted "with the establishment of its extended network of posts, the group is confident that any infiltration which may still be occurring is on a very small scale indeed." In its last report, covering the dates 21 September to 14 November 1958, UNOGIL found "no cases of established or

20 December 1945; amended by PL 341, 10 October 1949 and Executive Order 10206, 19 January 1951) Congress had directed the U.S. Department of Defense to devise an "assist letter" system to track U.S. service contracts with the United Nations. The USUN office coordinated requests with the DOD and military supplies were subsequently billed to the United Nations. For UNOGIL, the DOD received 38 assist letters. Total charges paid to the U.S. government for equipment provided was approximately \$360,000. See Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 119-36, 519-34.

¹⁰⁴ UNOGIL's total mission costs came in under \$4 million. DOS, USPUN 1958, 77.

¹⁰⁵ In UNOGIL's defense, it was an international ad hoc force (formed from disparate units of forces representing UN member-states from across the globe). UNEF also faced similar organizational difficulties. Unlike UNEF's operations in the Sinai and Gaza desert areas, however, UNOGIL had to establish operations in mountainous, remote terrain, along boundaries that were not well-established between Lebanon and the UAR (Syria).

suspected infiltration.” In the same report, UNOGIL staff members recommended that the UN mission be disbanded.¹⁰⁶

In the midst of this UN effort to settle Lebanon’s fears of outside interference into its internal affairs, the government of Iraq was ousted in Qasim’s bloody coup. The subsequent Lebanese and Jordanian cries for immediate military assistance spurred a quick response from Washington and London. On 15 July, President Eisenhower initiated “Operation BlueBat.” Over 10,000 U.S. marines (already on “standby” off the coast of Lebanon), were sent ashore to “protect American lives” and to shore up national confidence in the Lebanese government—officially justified as thwarting threats to “Lebanese sovereignty and integrity.”¹⁰⁷ The president’s authority to deploy these forces in support of Lebanon had been granted a year earlier by means of a deal worked out between Eisenhower and the U.S. Congress.¹⁰⁸

Between January and March 1957, fearing that the Suez fiasco would invite future Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, President Eisenhower convinced a skeptical Congress to grant authority to the president for employment of U.S. military forces, “to assist any nation requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.”¹⁰⁹ The revolution in Iraq was misconstrued to fit this stipulation. Accordingly, the president exercised his “Eisenhower Doctrine”¹¹⁰ authority to deploy a division of Marines and elements of the

¹⁰⁶ S/4040, 3 July 1958; S/4051, 15 July 1958; S/4085, 14 August 1958; S/4100, 29 September 1958; S/4114, 14 November 1958; DOS, USPUN 1958, 77.

¹⁰⁷ Jack Shulimson, The Marines in Lebanon 1958 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1966), 8-10.

¹⁰⁸ For development of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Brands, Specter of Neutralism, 282-89.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, seventh rev. edn. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 158. Full text of “Eisenhower Doctrine” was approved by Congress (Senate 72-19, House 350-60) as U.S. Public Law 85-7, 85th Congress, H. J. Resolution 117.

¹¹⁰ Public Law 85-7, 85th Congress, H. J. Res. 117, 9 March 1957. Secretary of State’s copy with notes in Dulles Files, Subject Series, Box #5, DDEL. For

U.S. Army into Beirut, Lebanon. In an effort to head-off international criticism of this U.S. unilateral intervention, Eisenhower immediately directed Ambassador Lodge to "report U.S. actions" to an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Before the Council, Lodge asserted that the U.S. forces would be withdrawn "as soon as the United Nations was able to take adequate measures to meet the new situation in Lebanon." The task of convincing the United Nations that the Iraqi revolution was masterminded by the forces of international communism, however, left Cabot Lodge "more perplexed" than he had ever been as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.¹¹¹ Rather than attempting to explain U.S. actions based on Eisenhower Doctrine intangibles, Ambassador Lodge decided to argue that the U.S. legally responded to Lebanon's direct appeal for help. "We are the first to admit" he defensively pointed out, "the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems." By sending troops to Lebanon, he said, "the United States was acting pursuant to what the UN Charter regarded as an inherent right, the right of all nations to work together to preserve their independence." Lodge completed his briefing by stating that U.S. forces were "under instructions to cooperate with UNOGIL and to establish liaison immediately upon arrival."¹¹² At the same time Lodge was defending U.S. actions in the Security Council, President Eisenhower was doing the same before Congress. In addition to justifying his actions on tenuous connections to the "Eisenhower Doctrine," the president also cited external influences that were acting to "overthrow the legally constituted government of Lebanon." He also mentioned that such measures were necessary to safeguard the 2,500 U.S. citizens

diplomatic historian's analysis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see John A. DeNovo, "The Eisenhower Doctrine," in Alexander DeConde, ed. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), 1:292-301.

¹¹¹ Henry Cabot Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative (NY: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973), 139.

¹¹² DOS, USPUN 1958, 78.

in Beirut.¹¹³

Meanwhile in Jordan, a similar situation unfolded. The British and King Hussein feared a repetition of events in neighboring Iraq, which claimed the lives of the Jordanian King's cousins. On 17 July, with support of the U.S. Air Force, the United Kingdom dispatched approximately 3,000 "Tommies" to Jordan from nearby bases on Cyprus.¹¹⁴ These troops pitched camp just outside Amman and guarded against any further rebellions against the young pro-West king. The underlying reasons for the U.S. and U.K. reactions to the revolution in Iraq, in addition to losing the "Baghdad Pact's linchpin," was a real fear of losing "stable" (autocratic) Arab rulers who claimed to be staunchly anti-Communist. The Eisenhower administration's fear of falling dominos and notions of "zero-sum" gains and losses in the Cold War, led Washington to view the "loss" of pro-West Arab governments as a gain for the Soviet union. The fact that communism was quite unpopular in the Arab world (for religious reasons, if for no other) did not calm U.S. and U.K. fears. Economic considerations were also important. Iraq was a major oil-producing state and Lebanon controlled terminals for overland pipelines at Sidon and Tripoli. Both countries represented millions of Western dollars in investments. If Nasser's example of "nationalizing" the Suez Canal was followed by Iraq and Lebanon (there was nothing to nationalize in Jordan), then the U.S. and the British would have contemplated a full-scale military invasion.¹¹⁵

United Nations' considerations of events in Jordan began on 17 July. On that day, the Security Council was informed of British unilateral actions taken in support of King Hussein. In defense of Britain's intervention, Jordan submitted a complaint to the

¹¹³ M. S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965), 228-31.

¹¹⁴ For a British account of these events, see Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958," International History Review 16 (May 1994): 285-90.

¹¹⁵ "Conversation between the President and Prime Minister," 10:30 p.m., 14 July 1958, OF 371, 134159; cited in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60, 11:231-34; and in Little, "His Finest Hour?" 46.

UN against the United Arab Republic charging external “interference in its domestic affairs.” Jordan’s complaint echoed Lebanon’s: concerns of smuggling, agents, plots and saboteurs. Jordan had appealed to the United Kingdom for immediate military support, the United Nations was informed, to deter a “threat beyond [Jordan’s] capacity to meet.” The British representative in the UN Security Council also argued to justify his government’s actions. Like the U.S. defense, he concluded, “If arrangements can be made by the Security Council to protect the lawful Government of Jordan from external threat and so maintain peace and security, the action which we have felt obligated to take will be brought to an end.”¹¹⁶ Despite strong protests by the Soviet representative, U.S. and U.K. unilateral actions in support of Arab “allies” were not formally condemned as violations of the UN Charter—both actions were requested by internationally-recognized governments.¹¹⁷ Oddly, when the Security Council voted to dispatch additional international observers (to allow more rapid Western force withdrawals), the Soviet Union vetoed all proposals. Thereafter, both the U.S. and USSR [for very different reasons] immediately called for convening the General Assembly under provisions of the 1950 uniting-for-peace resolution. In deference to the up-coming Lebanese general elections (to be held 31 July), however, the Security Council members resolved to wait and see if things would settle down without further UN debates. On 31 July, General Fuad Chehab—the army commander who had

¹¹⁶ Jordan’s ties with Britain had weakened a great deal after the Suez fiasco in October 1956. Only a tremendous fear of suffering a similar fate to that of his cousin in Iraq motivated King Hussein to authorize a return of British forces. (The British had trained Jordan’s Arab Legion between 1920 and 1946—with select advisers, to include General John B. “Pasha” Glubb, remaining in Jordan until 1956.) For Glubb’s insights, see (Sir) John Bagot Glubb, *The Changing Scenes of Life: An Autobiography* (London: Quartet Books, 1983) and *idem*, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, (New York: Harper, 1957).

¹¹⁷ These actions were not legally comparable to the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. Also, in contrast to the Soviet refusal to allow UN entry in Hungary, the American and British governments welcomed replacement of their forces by the United Nations. Nonetheless, these distinctions did not stop the USSR from vehemently denouncing U.S. and British actions as “gross interventions” in “violation of the Charter.”

refused Chamoun's requests to use the national military against rebels—was elected as Lebanon's new president.¹¹⁸ With Chehab's election (with the exception of a Christian militia's protest in late September over political cabinet appointments) tensions immediately eased and Lebanon backed away from civil war.¹¹⁹ This was another indication that Beirut's troubles were primarily a domestic squabble, brought on by Chamoun tampering with elections in 1957 and announcing his intention to be re-elected in 1958. At this point, the situation seemed to have been settled. The U.S. was content, but the continued presence of Western military forces in Lebanon and Jordan persuaded a majority of UN member-states that the General Assembly should meet in its third Emergency Special Session (ESS-III).

On 13 August, President Eisenhower personally defended U.S. military actions before the General Assembly emergency session.¹²⁰ This appearance by the U.S. president before the Assembly, his first speech there since his inaugural year in office in 1953, demonstrated the importance Eisenhower ascribed to generating multilateral support. In his speech, Eisenhower emphasized that the U.S. had responded to an appeal from the "lawful Government of Lebanon, which felt itself endangered by civil strife fomented from without." He argued, "if it is made an international crime to help a small nation maintain its independence, then indeed the possibilities of conquest are unlimited. We will have nullified the provision of our Charter which recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense."¹²¹ In addition, the U.S. president offered a

¹¹⁸ Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 79-81.

¹¹⁹ Robert Murphy gave himself a great deal of credit for convincing Chamoun to step down and for coordinating with all factions to discover that General Chehab was the most acceptable candidate to replace Chamoun. *Ibid.*, 405-08.

¹²⁰ This was Eisenhower's first speech before the United Nations since his famous "Atoms for Peace" initiative in December 1953. Secretary of State Dulles headed the U.S. delegations to ESS-I and ESS-II. See *GAOR*, Third Emergency Special Session, 733rd plenary meeting, 13 August 1958, paragraphs 7-14.

¹²¹ Ironically, the year before, the president emphasized the Communist threat when justifying his proposals before the U.S. Congress. According to Douglas Little, "It was far simpler Eisenhower and his advisers believed, to exaggerate the Communist

“six-point plan” that would provide security for Lebanon and Jordan; deal with outside interference in domestic affairs of Lebanon and Jordan, consider the creation of a standby “United Nations Peace Force;” establish a “regional economic development plan” for the Arab states; and take measures to stop the escalation of the “arms race spiral in the area.” For their part, the Soviets insisted upon immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. and British troops from the region.¹²² After much haggling and consideration of a number of proposals, on 21 August an “Arab States” draft that called upon the secretary-general to make “practical arrangements” to “facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops” from Lebanon and Jordan was unanimously adopted.¹²³ This resolution incorporated most of Eisenhower’s first three points. Another section of the resolution welcomed the creation of a “development” agency for the Middle East; which was the U.S. president’s fifth point.

The UN secretary-general proceeded to carry out the tasks that fell to him as a result of the unanimous resolution. In Jordan, Dag Hammarskjöld appointed a single “special representative” to report on coordination efforts between the United Nations, the British and that country.¹²⁴ By the end of September 1958, Hammarskjöld received a “withdrawal schedule” from both the British and Americans. The U.S. military exit was made contingent upon improvements in Lebanon’s “international security situation.” As the governments of Lebanon and Jordan felt reassured, Washington and London approved force withdrawals in October. By 25 October, all U.S. forces had

threat in Lebanon and to stretch the logic of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the breaking point than to risk defeat on Capitol Hill by seeking congressional approval for the use of U.S. troops to combat anti-western Arab nationalists.” Little, “His Finest Hour? 52.

¹²² DOS, USPUN 1958, 84-85.

¹²³ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, I: 545.

¹²⁴ Mr. Pier P. Spinelli was designated to fill this role. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 389; United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDPI, 1996), 120.

departed Lebanon. By 2 November, British forces had similarly withdrawn from Jordan.¹²⁵

Soon after the U.S. and British withdrawals, UNOGIL was also terminated. In its 17 November report, the UNOGIL report stated that “organized opposition forces have now . . . ceased to exist and the government is in [the] process of extending its authority over the whole country.” In the same report, the UNOGIL commander considered the force’s task “completed” and recommended the mission’s termination and withdrawal. The secretary-general agreed. By 10 December 1958, most all UN observers were removed.¹²⁶ Expenditures for UNOGIL during 1958 were \$3.7 million. The General Assembly voted a supplementary increase in the regular UN budget for 1958 to cover this amount.¹²⁷ At its 1958 assessment level of 32.5%, the United States paid \$1.2 million. U.S. “reimbursable” support for UNOGIL totaled near \$750,000. The Department of Defense supplied 20 of the 24 aircraft used by UNOGIL. Fifty of UNOGIL’s white jeeps and a number of its other vehicles were provided by U.S. stock supplies in Europe. Approximately \$350,000 U.S. army miscellaneous supply items and an additional \$10,000 in airlift support was provided to UNOGIL. No U.S. personnel were assigned directly to the UN mission, although U.S. Army helicopter crews provided some in-country training to Norwegian personnel upon initial delivery. In sum, although UNOGIL was a small-scale UN peace operation, especially compared to UNEF or a few later missions (especially in the Congo), U.S. support financially and logistically remained critical to the mission’s success.¹²⁸ By contrast, the 102-day U.S.

¹²⁵ DOS, USPUN 1958, 87-88.

¹²⁶ S/4114, 14 November 1958.

¹²⁷ DOS, USPUN 1958, 88, 240.

¹²⁸ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. II, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 88-89.

unilateral action, "operation BlueBat," cost between \$120 and \$200 million.¹²⁹ Assuming the higher figure to be correct, \$200 million was a significant amount of money. But relative to the \$37.68 billion defense budget for 1958 (and \$39.06 billion actually spent), \$200 million was approximately one-half of one percent of U.S. military expenditures for 1958.¹³⁰ As for human losses, amazingly, only one U.S. soldier was killed by sniper fire.¹³¹ UNOGIL reported no fatalities. Considering the potential for hostilities (for example, 75 persons had been killed in one day of riots in May 1958 in Beirut), this was fortunate. In fact, U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock and special envoy Robert Murphy each detailed how narrowly the U.S. forces averted disaster with a faction of the Lebanese army that was waiting to ambush them on the road to the Beirut airport.¹³² According to an official Marine Corps history, the

¹²⁹ President Eisenhower's special envoy (officially the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) to Lebanon during this crisis, Robert Murphy cited the cost as \$200 million. Murphy recalled a conversation with the Turkish ambassador to Lebanon who told Murphy that "the United States should have bought off the Lebanese—it would have been much cheaper." Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 409. According to a 1963 Congressional Hearing, the "total cost of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon" was approximately \$120 million. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Affairs, Hearing in Review of United States Participation in the United Nations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 13 March 1963, p. 31.

¹³⁰ The raw data is taken from Tables 2 and 3 of Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements, 1957-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975), 281. In addition to these amounts, U.S. bilateral assistance to Lebanon was at least \$25 million in 1955-56, and another \$12.6 million in the five months immediately following the U.S. intervention. See Chargé John Emmerson (Beirut) to DOS, 11 October 1955, and DOS to Emmerson, 28 October 1955, FRUS, 1955-57 13:177-78; and Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute Press, 1961), 162.

¹³¹ Most accounts say that the U.S. mission suffered no fatalities, but Murphy recorded that one Army sergeant was killed by a sniper's bullet. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 408.

¹³² McClintock to DOS, 15 July 1958 and McClintock to CINCNELM, 15 July 1958, FRUS, 1958-60 11:231-34; Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 108-110; Murphy, Diplomat Among

“opposition forces” numbered some 10,000 “irregulars,” and were “dispersed in bands of 400 to 2,000” with each group reporting only to its individual leader.¹³³

With respect to UNOGIL, the mission has been criticized for a number of shortcomings. First, the mission took approximately one month before the approximately 165 miles of borders with the Syrian UAR were adequately covered.¹³⁴ Even then, only major roads and intersections were “observed.” Second, the mission employed no covert means of investigation—observers were plainly visible in their white jeeps or UN outposts—and these were manned only during daylight hours. Third, the employment of aircraft for patrols—later claimed to have been operational 24 hours a day (after July)—was innovative, but less than efficient. Patrols were not coordinated with ground observation and no capability for night photography was developed, despite certain letters of inquiry made to U.S. military suppliers. The Lebanese and United States’ governments expressed great disappointment and little confidence in UNOGIL’s capacity to fulfill its original mandate—that of “ensuring” that there was “no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms . . . across the Lebanese borders.”¹³⁵

A broader analysis of the United Nations’ and United States’ involvement in Lebanon during 1958 reveals a number of significant points. First, UNOGIL, as a UN peace operation, fit more into the mold of earlier investigative missions such as the one conducted in northern Greece (UNSCOB) than that of the inter-positional peacekeeping force created in 1956 (UNEF).¹³⁶ Second, the deployment of hundreds

Warriors, 401.

¹³³ Shulimson, The Marines in Lebanon 1958, 11.

¹³⁴ Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 385.

¹³⁵ S/4022, 11 June 1958, paragraph 1. See also Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 124-36.

¹³⁶ Although, strangely enough, the Lebanese army fulfilled a buffer role by occupying positions between the rebel stronghold in Beirut (the Basta) and U.S. forces. In addition, U.S. military forces “hit the beach” with orders to fire only in self-defense. Thus, the U.S. mission was more like a peacekeeping operation than an invasion.

of UN observers from 21 different countries, using aircraft and radio-equipped jeeps, demonstrated the growing sophistication of UN observation operations. UNOGIL's peak strength of 591 observers in November 1958, marked UNOGIL as the most ambitious of all such UN missions to date.¹³⁷ Third, the reliance of the UN member-states upon the secretary-general and his appointees (a "special representative" in Jordan and the UNOGIL chief of staff in Lebanon) to arrange UNOGIL's details and supervise daily operations demonstrated the growing responsibilities of the UN secretary-general, as chief executive. Fourth, the U.S. unilateral intervention in Lebanon (and the British actions in Jordan) may have "complicated"¹³⁸ the conduct and evaluation of the UN's role during the 1958 Middle East crisis, but the two missions rarely crossed paths.¹³⁹

During 1958, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration, Lebanon experienced two distinct threats. Each required a separate response. The initial complaints lodged by Lebanon against the UAR concerning international subversion constituted a real, but low-level threat that the United States entrusted to first, the League of Arab States, then the United Nations. In these cases, the U.S. observed, and where able, closely guided multilateral actions to ensure that a "stable, non-Communist" state received

¹³⁷ In 1948 UNTSO strength peaked at 572, but rapidly decreased thereafter (averaging a strength of 200 observers). UNOGIL peaked at 591 members on 14 November 1958 and employed more sophisticated and complex patrols than those of any other observer mission. In the first month of its operations, UNOGIL fielded approximately 100 observers. On 10 August the force was 190; on 20 September it was 287. UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 691, 701; and Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 384.

¹³⁸ The UNOGIL reports characterized the U.S. intervention as a "set-back" and claimed it "resulted in a sharp reaction in the opposition-held areas." Later, the report claimed that "ground lost" was "steadily regained through the tact, patience and perseverance of the military observers." S/4805, 14 August 1958, 14.

¹³⁹ Some scholars point to these unilateral actions as proof that the United Nations was inadequate and that the Eisenhower administration, specifically, did not place any faith in the United Nations as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. This analysis is superficial and fails to distinguish between the nature of the two simultaneous operations.

international support against perceived threats to its national integrity. On 14 July, with the violent overthrow of a pro-West monarchy in Iraq by “radical elements,” the Eisenhower administration saw U.S. interests in the Middle East to be more directly threatened. The Eisenhower Doctrine provided the administration with “authority” to employ military forces—provided that the forces of international communism were behind the regional crisis. Proof of this stipulation was never provided. At best the Communist linkage could only be “justified” by the argument that the Iraqi revolution both resulted from and caused major “instability” in the Middle East—a situation that “opened the door to Soviet adventurism.” Under the Charter, specifically under article 51, the administration legally rationalized its military actions under the guise of bilateral “self defense.”¹⁴⁰ Whether the action was necessary or beneficial to American national interests has been debated ever since.¹⁴¹

The Yemeni Civil War and a UN Observation Mission (UNYOM, 1963-4)

Yemen¹⁴² is an Islamic, Arab country located in roughly the southwest one-sixth

¹⁴⁰ Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” See Charter excerpts at Appendix A.

¹⁴¹ It is beyond the scope of this study to get into the 30-year historical argument other than to reference an excellent summary of historiography and discussion on this question by Douglas Little, “His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 20 No. 1 (Winter 1996): 27-54. Little concluded that the intervention was “more risky in the short run and more costly in the long run than the Eisenhower administration realized.” *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁴² After 1967, Yemen was known as “North Yemen” to differentiate it from

of the Saudi Arabian peninsula. Yemen became independent in 1918. It was ruled for a number of generations by a succession of Zaidi Shiite Imams.¹⁴³ On 26 September 1962, elements of the Yemeni Army overthrew the Imam of Yemen. This “republican” movement established a new government and renamed the country the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The new regime extended its control over most major population centers and principal routes of supply, but the ousted Imam regrouped his forces and counter-attacked in the country’s northern-most regions (near the border with Saudi Arabia). This “civil war” took on external complications when the republican government called upon Egypt (the UAR¹⁴⁴) for military assistance against royalist guerrillas.¹⁴⁵ In response, the royalist Imam turned to the Saudi government for

the former British colony of Aden, which assumed the title of “South Yemen.” Unless otherwise stated, all references to Yemen in this study refer to the northern territory, with its capital at San’a. Between 1958 and 1961, Yemen was politically aligned with Egypt and Syria (as part of the “United Arab Republic” or the “United Arab States”). Egypt retained close ties with the faction that executed the 1962 Yemeni coup. Saudi Arabia and Jordan supported the deposed royalist faction. The Yemeni civil war continued, intermittently, until 1970; thereafter, hostilities ensued between North and South Yemen—until their merger in May 1990. San’a was retained as Yemen’s political capital; although the south’s port city of Aden was larger and more commercially prosperous.

¹⁴³ The Arabic title “Imam” is normally reserved for a spiritual leader, but in this case, like the Ottoman Caliphate, it reflected a political leadership title, as well. The Zaidi Shiites are a small sect of Muslims who differ from the orthodox “Sunni” Muslims in certain beliefs and practices, most notably (as with other Shi’a or Shiite Muslims) they trace the divine right of leadership through Mohammed’s son-in-law Ali—the term Shiite is derived from the Arabic terms “Shi’a Ali” meaning the “party of Ali.” For a scholarly analysis of Yemeni politics and influences of Islam, see Robert W. Stookey, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978).

¹⁴⁴ Egypt, under President Nasser, retained the official national title of the United Arab Republic; despite the fact that Syria and North Yemen had ended their short-lived political union with Egypt in 1961.

¹⁴⁵ For a study of Egypt’s ties to the Yemen Arab Republic, see Ali Abdel Rahman Rahmy, *The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1967: Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983).

advisers, financial assistance, weapons, and military supplies.¹⁴⁶ As a result of this external “sponsorship,” two of the most influential Arab states—both already locked in an ideological struggle to claim the title of “Arab leader”—overtly supported opposing sides in the Yemeni civil war. As the battles grew more intense, both regional Arab powers attached greater significance to their proxy’s success.¹⁴⁷

After four months of fighting in Yemen, during December 1962, tensions seemed to be decreasing. First, the YAR government announced its intentions to “live at peace with its neighbors.” Second, UAR officials stated, conditionally, that their government would withdraw its forces (estimated between 20,000 and 30,000) if Saudi Arabia would “cease its support to the royalist forces.”¹⁴⁸ As a result of these announcements, the Kennedy administration extended diplomatic recognition to the YAR, on 19 December. Hopes for regional de-escalation, however, were premature.

As 1963 began, the UAR forces renewed attacks against royalist positions in northwest Yemen and in southwest Saudi Arabia. In March, the Kennedy administration informed the new UN secretary-general, Burma’s U Thant, that Washington was dispatching Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to mediate on behalf of the United States.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, U Thant sent Ralph J. Bunche, his undersecretary

¹⁴⁶ For relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Royalists, see F. Gregory Gause, Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

¹⁴⁷ The Egyptians and Saudis had fought in both the nineteenth century and early twentieth century for control over the Western “Hejaz” regions of the Arabian peninsula (location of Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina), to claim the title of “Keeper of the Holy Places.” For a good summary of these events see Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), 170-173; and William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 116-17. The regional Arab conflict over Yemen is the focus of Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

¹⁴⁸ DOS, USPUN 1963, 132; 137.

¹⁴⁹ For an Arab perspective of U.S. initiatives in Yemen during this civil war, see Ahmed N. K. Almadhagi, Yemen and the United States: A Study of a Small Power

for special political affairs, on a fact-finding mission to Yemen.¹⁵⁰ The efforts of Bunker and Bunche provided the international bases for pursuing further UN actions to resolve the UAR-Saudi conflict.

On 29 April, the secretary-general briefed the Security Council on the Yemeni civil war. He thanked the U.S. administration for the initiatives offered by Ambassador Bunker and noted the acceptance, by all parties, of Bunker's "terms of disengagement." These terms included a Saudi promise to "terminate all support and aid to the royalists;" a simultaneous UAR "withdrawal from Yemen . . . as soon as possible;" and the establishment of a demilitarized zone [DMZ]—a distance of twenty-kilometers on each side of the demarcated Saudi Arabia-Yemen border. The Bunker plan also proposed employing United Nations' observers in the DMZ to monitor observance of the terms of disengagement. Compliance with these agreements would not be easy to confirm, however, since observers would be tasked with "certifying the suspension of activities in support of the royalists from Saudi Arabian territory" and documenting the "outward movement of the UAR forces and equipment from the airports and seaports of Yemen."¹⁵¹

In light of these suggestions and considerations, Secretary-General Thant made plans to launch a new UN peacekeeping mission in Yemen. After the groundwork had been laid, Thant was requested to explain his intentions to the Security Council. The Council had called the secretary-general to report because its members had expressed

and Super-State Relationship, 1962-1994 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996).

¹⁵⁰ Bunche had served on the UN Secretariat as an Undersecretary since the late 1940s. He was responsible for negotiating the "General Armistice Agreements" that ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli war; organizing the first large-scale UN peacekeeping effort (UNEF) in 1956; and had spent months in the Congo organizing the UN's largest military effort (ONUC). Prior to serving on the UN Secretariat, Bunche was the first African-American to hold a U.S. Department of State regional desk position (Bureau of Near East and African Affairs).

¹⁵¹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963, DOS Publication 7675, International Organization and Conference Series 51 (Washington D.C.: GPO, August 1964), 133-34.

two major concerns about launching a new mission. First, the United Nations was facing an extreme financial crisis that was caused primarily by French and the Soviet-bloc nonpayment of assessments that were needed to support expensive peacekeeping operations that were concurrently operating in the Sinai (UNEF) and the African Congo (ONUC). As a result, the Security Council was not willing to launch another mission in the absence of arranging up-front financial support. Second, the Soviet representative noted that, to this point, the secretary-general had assumed total responsibility for generating a new mission without an official Council resolution asking him to do so. This was viewed by Moscow as infringing upon its “controlling” rights as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Regarding the first area of concern, the secretary-general attempted to assuage these fiscal anxieties by proposing the creation of a very limited observation force—in the end, this allowed the creation of a new mission, but also severely handicapped the UN effort. U Thant optimistically proclaimed that the force would require less than 200 men, could be recruited from UNEF and UNTSO forces stationed nearby, would cost less than \$1 million, and would not be required for more than 4 months.¹⁵² Furthermore, the secretary-general promised to negotiate with Saudi Arabia and Egypt for reimbursement.¹⁵³ Some of his optimistic estimates proved to be accurate, others did not.

With some of the UN’s financial reservations addressed, the secretary-general next faced opposition from Moscow. On 8 June, the Soviet representative called for a Council meeting claiming that there was a “need to ensure control of international peace and security remained with the Security Council.” The USSR argued that Secretary-General Thant was over-stepping his authority. The Soviets based their logic on the historical precedent: that never before had the UN secretary-general generated a

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 134.

¹⁵³ This precedent of belligerents “footing the UN bill” can be traced to an innovative Dutch idea when they requested UN assistance in their colonial struggle with Indonesia regarding West New Guinea (Irian); as discussed in Chapter Four.

UN peace operation without a Security Council or General Assembly resolution directing him to do so. U Thant responded to these charges by describing his desire to go forward with a UN mission in Yemen. He stated that such an operation would be "difficult, but feasible." He also promised that there would be "no financial implications" for the organization. After asserting its opinions, the Soviet representative announced that he would not object to a decision by the Security Council to "establish" the operation."¹⁵⁴ On 11 June, the Council adopted resolution 179 (S/5331), which authorized the creation of a United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), by a vote of 10-0-1 (USSR).¹⁵⁵

On 13 June 1963, the first UN observers arrived in Yemen. A regional UN headquarters was established in San'a (the Yemeni capital). A liaison office for coordinating UN operations with Saudi Arabia was set up in the Saudi Red-Sea-port city of Jeddah. As of 4 July, UNYOM was officially considered underway, with six ground observers, a Yugoslav reconnaissance unit (114 men) and a Canadian air unit (50 men).¹⁵⁶ [See map of UNYOM's deployment at Appendix B.] UNYOM's mandate included "observing, certifying, and reporting on compliance with the terms of the disengagement agreement by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic." To this point, the UAR and Saudi governments had agreed to pay for only a two-month UN operation. On 4 September, as the first two month-term of UNYOM expired, the mission reported that Saudi support for the royalists had been reduced, but not eliminated. In addition, UAR air and ground operations continued, despite reports that "considerable" UAR withdrawals had been observed. The secretary-general was convinced that UNYOM should continue. He was able to get the supporting

¹⁵⁴ DOS, USPUN 1963, 135-36.

¹⁵⁵ A full text transcript of S/5331 and commentary can be found in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, I: 620.

¹⁵⁶ The observers were detached from UNTSO, the reconnaissance and air units were "temporarily" reassigned from UNEF. See the official UN record of UNYOM in UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 121-27.

belligerents to authorize a two-month extension as, again, they agreed to defray the mission's costs. Despite pleas for a longer mandate, the UAR and Saudi governments insisted on limiting UNYOM's mandate for just another two months.¹⁵⁷

Sporadic hostilities continued in north Yemen through October 1963. Until the last week of October, the Saudi government would not agree to extend UNYOM beyond the mission's second term (to end 4 November). With the deadline approaching, the local UN commander made plans to withdraw his observers. At the same time, the UN secretary-general and the United States wanted to keep the mission going. Independently, the Secretariat engaged the Saudis while Washington applied diplomatic pressure on Riyadh to reconsider. Just five days before the mission would have ended, on 31 October, the Saudis announced their willingness to fund UNYOM for an additional two months.¹⁵⁸

With a number of units set to depart Yemen, the secretary-general took this opportunity to "reorganize" the mission. U Thant appointed Pier P. Spinelli,¹⁵⁹ under-secretary and director to the United Nations European office in Geneva, to serve as the secretary-general's "special representative for Yemen." U Thant calculated that this appointment would add a political presence to UNYOM's mission and he intended it to play "a more positive role in encouraging the implementation of the disengagement agreement." Still, by year's end, the UN observer mission was operating "on a shoe-string" waiting to see if its mandate would be approved for an additional two-month extension. During this third term, UNYOM consisted of the secretary-general's "special representative" (with a limited civilian staff); a small military headquarters

¹⁵⁷ The DOS report quoted the secretary-general's report which claimed some 13,000 UAR troops had departed Yemen, but another 1,500 were sent as replacement forces. DOS, USPUN 1963, 137.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 139.

¹⁵⁹ Spinelli had served in 1958 as Dag Hammarskjöld's "special representative" to Jordan during the "Middle East crisis." In between these assignments, Spinelli was the chief administrative officer of the United Nations' European offices in Geneva, Switzerland.

staff; a liaison officer at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; a small air transport unit contributed by Canada; and about 25 military observers drawn from Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Throughout the remaining months of its mandate, UNYOM remained in roughly that form. During 1964, additional two-month mission extensions were secured between January and July.¹⁶⁰

Overall, as 1964 began, U.S. policymakers were not satisfied with UN efforts in Yemen. UNYOM was too small to be either an effective deterrent or a competent observer force given that it was operating in mountainous terrain and in a country with a poorly-developed infrastructure.¹⁶¹ Washington policymakers realized that, at most, UNYOM provided limited “impartial” information that confirmed the continuing external involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAR in the Yemeni civil war. Since the United Nations was failing to sustain a complementary “peace-making” effort, Washington exerted greater pressures on both Saudi Arabia and the UAR, encouraging these governments to abide by the Bunker agreements. At the same time, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration also continued to support the UN secretary-general and his efforts to end, or at least contain, the Yemeni civil war. Together, U.S. and UN efforts failed to adequately convince either belligerent coalition to seek peace; although direct contact between sponsor-state military units was limited. In this respect, the limited U.S.-UN effort may have prevented a regional escalation of hostilities as representatives of the Saudi and UAR government were prodded to negotiate mutual disengagements.

During the first months of 1964, there was a notable lessening of tensions in the area that provided hope for a future reconciliation of the Yemeni situation. In March 1964, the secretary-general noted the “resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic,” but also reported that the “progress toward disengagement [in Yemen] continued to be disappointing.” After securing a

¹⁶⁰ DOS, USPUN 1963, 140.

¹⁶¹ Even the official UN history admits these mission shortcomings. See UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 127.

final 2-month extension in early July, U Thant reported that “if this new period of two months were to register no substantial progress toward fulfillment or the firm prospect of imminent fulfillment [of the terms of disengagement], [he] would find it difficult to envisage a further extension of the Mission in its present form, and with its present [limited] terms of reference and purpose.”¹⁶²

All sides agreed to UNYOM’s withdrawal on 4 September 1964. The situation remained unresolved, but stabilized. As UAR troops were being withdrawn, a number of fresh Yemeni “republican” troops were arriving from training in the UAR to take their place. High-level discussions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia—as hoped for—had not yet taken place. Thus, the secretary-general’s final report noted that UNYOM was withdrawn as “a matter of regret.”¹⁶³ In retrospect, the secretary-general noted that the mission’s mandate was too limited to do much beyond simple observation—a function that could do little to stop a civil war (which gained external support from competing regional powers). On the positive side, U Thant noted: “the true measure of the Mission, of course, is to be found in how it has discharged the limited responsibility and authority entrusted to it.” In this respect, the secretary-general asserted that the mission accomplished much more than could have been expected of it; and that UNYOM could have been much more useful had the definition of its functions been broader and stronger. U Thant summarized that the mission’s fourteen months of operations had served an “important restraining influence on hostile activities in that area.”¹⁶⁴

UNYOM’s total costs were shared by the UAR and Saudi Arabian governments. The bill came to approximately \$2 million—about one-tenth the annual cost of UNEF’s

¹⁶² Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964, DOS Publication 7943, International Organization and Conference Series 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1966), 26-27.

¹⁶³ U Thant, “Report by the United Nations secretary-general to the Security Council on functioning on UNYOM and the implementation of the terms of its disengagement,” 11 September 1964, UN document S/5959.

¹⁶⁴ DOS, USPUN 1964, 28.

operations in the Sinai and one-fiftieth the annual cost of the Congo mission. In support of this UN effort, Washington provided airlift of personnel, and contributed supplies, and equipment. With respect to services provided, since much UNYOM materials were "borrowed" from UNEF, U.S. support amounted to approximately 18.5% of total costs.¹⁶⁵ As a return on this investment, the mission may have provided just enough stability and international interest to spur the UAR and Saudi governments to serious negotiations. Just as UNYOM was disbanding, representatives of the belligerent governments met at an "Arab Summit meeting" in Alexandria, UAR. On 14 September, President Nasser (UAR) and Crown Prince Faisal (Saudi Arabia) announced their mutual agreement to "cooperate fully in solving the existing differences between the various parties in Yemen and their determination to prevent [further] armed clashes." Shortly thereafter, another cease-fire was agreed upon and talks led to a steady improvement in relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.¹⁶⁶ Viewed in retrospect, UNYOM held the "status quo" and kept the Yemen dispute from escalating to a full-scale war between two major Arab states. Saudi Arabia and the UAR allowed the UN mission to lapse when both governments had become more receptive to solving their differences through diplomacy. Even with the United Nations crippled, at the height of a financial crisis, a U.S.-UN multinational operation had contained a potentially dangerous war and advanced the cause of peace.

Chapter Summary and Analysis

The United Nations' involvement in each of the three scenarios studied in this chapter (Greece, Lebanon/Jordan, and Yemen) resulted in the organization creating and improving upon its unique "machinery" for promoting international peace. Listed from

¹⁶⁵ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, II: 94-95.

¹⁶⁶ DOS, USPUN 1964, 28.

most successful to least, advances were realized in the conduct of observation, investigation, and mediation. UN observer reports and investigations provided the organization with “impartial facts” that informed subsequent debates and organizational responses. The employment of civilian and military observers in Greece led to the early standardization of UN international observer procedures. In Lebanon, both the scope and methods of impartial observation were greatly expanded—including the deployment of over 500 persons supplemented by use of photographic reconnaissance aircraft (daytime only). A similar commitment would have improved UNYOM’s operations, but due to funding and piece-meal mandate limitations this was not done.

On the other hand, in all three missions, UN efforts to mediate political solutions largely were ineffective. The nature of these disputes, as much as any other factor, limited the United Nations’ overall operational and diplomatic effectiveness.¹⁶⁷ These “internationalized civil war” hostilities have proven to be more resistant to diplomatic initiatives than those of “traditional” or “classic” interstate wars. In Greece, Lebanon, and Yemen, the meddling of regional or international powers into others’ domestic disputes seriously complicated the United Nations’ efforts to defuse tensions and to mediate a more lasting peace.

In every case, the United States government instituted measures to guard its own national interests—which it attempted to justify as in support of specific UN objectives or, generally, in accordance with the “purposes and principles” of the UN Charter. In reality, Washington viewed each of these UN efforts insufficient without additional U.S. support or intervention.¹⁶⁸ Even with this American “help,” the United Nations

¹⁶⁷ Jentleson, Levite, and Berman make this point clear when they describe the characteristics of these types of conflicts as the potentially most dynamic, uncertain, complex, and destructive of all non-nuclear warfare. Bruce W. Jentleson, Ariel E. Levite and Larry Berman, eds. “Foreign Military Intervention in Perspective,” chapter in Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 303-07.

¹⁶⁸ In the case of Lebanon, for example, President Eisenhower justified America’s military intervention by saying: “I have concluded that, given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the United Nations Security

found these disputes beyond its capacity to resolve. To its credit, the organization's early ad hoc peace machinery often had substantiated disputant's claims and informed the public debates in New York. By exposing and documenting the extent of international involvement in these cases, public pressure forced intervening actors to justify their actions. Often, however, UN efforts did not "resolve" the complex disputes that were being debated in New York. In the case of Greece, Yugoslavia's decision to improve its relations with its southern neighbor was primarily a result of Tito's dissatisfaction with Stalin's overbearing attitude, more than due to any pressures exerted by international censure. In Lebanon, Syria and Egypt argued that the decision by President Chamoun to seek a second, unconstitutional term was the primary cause for Lebanon's domestic unrest. If men and supplies were being transported across the Syrian border into Lebanon, the establishment of UNOGIL either deterred the continuation of such activities or, possibly, forced infiltrators and smugglers to operate at night, along less-traveled routes. The mission's size and daylight-only operations precluded the United Nations from determining such questions conclusively. In Yemen, similar restrictions and financial limitations handicapped the operation's effectiveness. In addition, the unwillingness of the Yemeni belligerents and their sponsor-states to seek a diplomatic solution contributed to the organization's failure to mediate a political solution. Accordingly, that war continued for years after the United Nations mission was terminated.

From the United States' perspective, these UN missions represented modest but incomplete responses to the crises in Greece, Lebanon, and Yemen. In the first case, President Truman's announcement of an extensive bilateral assistance "program" for Greece (the Truman Doctrine) supplied the financial and military equipment that Washington considered "necessary" to ensure the Greek government's victory over its "Communist" enemy forces. During the Middle East crisis of 1958, again a presidential statement of America's willingness to provide bilateral assistance to countries

Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon." Quoted in Department of State Bulletin, 39 (4 August 1958), 182-83.

“threatened by international communism” (the Eisenhower Doctrine) paved the way for U.S. actions. In Lebanon and Jordan, American and British “supplemental” assistance was brashly introduced into situations where UN peace operations were already serving a minor role. Finally, in Yemen, the diplomatic initiatives of Ellsworth Bunker and other political pressures applied against Saudi and UAR officials demonstrated Washington’s resolve to supplement a modest, mostly ineffective United Nations’ observer and mediator mission.

Linda Miller, as quoted in this chapter’s epigraph, asserted that the functions of investigation and mediation were “the most significant precedents to emerge from the organization’s response” to these internationalized civil wars.¹⁶⁹ This study concludes less enthusiastically that the historical record of the United Nations’ first 23 years of dealing with these complex conflicts was not impressive. Lacking the full support of the international community and a clear desire by all parties involved to willingly work with UN personnel, the only clear contribution of these operations was their reports and investigations which subsequently informed the international community and public discussions at the United Nations. Overall, UN Observer missions dispatched to civil war zones proved to be of limited utility. The degree to which they successfully observed, investigated, or patrolled was dependent upon the cooperation or obstruction exhibited by the parties involved. If any contending party or external sponsor resisted UN efforts, the peaceful mediation of these complex disputes was beyond the United Nations’ organizational capacity to resolve without “external help” of its own.

¹⁶⁹ Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, 200.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEDIATION OF COLONIAL CONFLICTS, 1946-1968

No problem has occupied more of the attention of the General Assembly than the movement of dependent territories toward self-government or independence.

[U.S. Department of State, 1960]¹

Between 1946 and 1968, the ramifications of world-wide decolonization transformed the United Nations organization and challenged U.S. policymakers. Tasked with "managing peaceful change," the United Nations responded in various ways to contain or mediate numerous colonial disputes.² As a result of former colonial holdings emerging as independent states, UN membership swelled from its original number of 51 (in 1946) to 126 (by 1968).³ Systemically, the turbulence of these years

¹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1960, DOS Publication 7341, International Organization and Conference Series 27 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, March 1962), 39.

² See, for example, Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 36-64.

³ Thomas Hovet, Jr., and Erica Hovet, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs: A Chronology and Fact Book of the United Nations 1941-1985, 7th edn. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1986), 308.

reflected a radical international transformation. Ideologically, U.S. policymakers were forced to walk a narrow line. The examination of U.S.-UN relations with the Netherlands and Indonesia, which follows, serves to illustrate the complexities of the issues involved.

In the midst of colonialism's demise, U.S. decision-makers often were forced to choose between supporting emerging nationalist movements or holding true to "America's traditional allies"—who were, in most cases, imperial overlords. The desire to remain "neutral" in such issues (thereby avoiding difficult decisions) was natural. Unfortunately, as a "model nation" for constitutional liberalism, and as the greatest economic and military power in the world (after the Second World War), even a U.S. decision to declare "disinterest" in these affairs could make a difference. Consequently, America's international prestige was closely associated with the stance assumed by USUN representatives regarding UN debates of "colonial issues."⁴

During these years, a dichotomy of ideological foundations affected how American statesmen viewed colonial disputes. Some U.S. policymakers were "idealists"—endorsing universal freedoms and rights for peoples to choose their own form of government; whereas others were "realists"—placing strategic and "national security" issues above any consideration for indigenous peoples' political aspirations.⁵

⁴ Regarding U.S. involvement in the Indonesian dispute (discussed below), the former State Department counselor, and later a USUN official, wrote that "As a permanent member of the Security Council, it was difficult or impossible for the United States to treat the threat to peace in this area as a matter with which it had no concern." He speculated, "If there had been no United Nations, it might have been expected that the State Department following traditional practice would have acted with considerably greater circumspection and caution than it did." Benjamin V. Cohen, "The Impact of the United Nations on United States Foreign Policy," International Organization 5:2 (2 May 1951): 277.

⁵ The notion of "realism" is identified with "power politics"—as categorized by diplomatic historians, "realists" dwelled on issues of "global balances, contending alliances, and competing national interests." Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 3. The notion of "liberal democratic internationalism" is defined as an ideology that "endorses the Wilsonian view." These

The roots of these contending points of view date back, at least, to the early twentieth century. During and after the First World War, certain American policymakers publicly declared that the United States supported the universal right of peoples to political “self-determination”—a term commonly ascribed to U.S. president Woodrow Wilson and his famous Fourteen Points speech of January 1918.⁶ After the conservatives in Congress rejected Wilson’s idealism, the subsequent Republican leadership insisted such notions were irrelevant to the conduct of American foreign affairs. Nonetheless, a number of influential politicians maintained a certain attachment to Wilsonian ideals.⁷ One of these men, although he avoided repeating many of President Wilson’s “mistakes,” was Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁸ As president, Roosevelt’s anti-colonial sentiments were revealed as early as 1941 in his discussions with England’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill.⁹ The result of these talks was the U.S.-U.K. “Atlantic

views are normally considered as in contention, however, historian Tony Smith has argued that the notions of realism and internationalism are not irreconcilable; rather, “the promotion of democracy worldwide [liberalism] advances the national security [realism] of the United States.” Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 13-19, 32, *passim*.

⁶ The “principle of self-determination” was generally regarded as one of Wilson’s “14 Points.” The actual term was not employed, but the concepts of “impartial adjustment of all colonial claims” (point 5) and other similar references to “the freest opportunity of autonomous development” (points 10 and 12) suggested U.S. support for limited support for the self-determination of peoples. A copy of Wilson’s 14 Points, delivered to the U.S. Congress on 8 January 1918, is available in Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, vol. II, Since 1914, Documents and Essays, 4th edn. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1995), 38-39.

⁷ Sir Brian Urquhart, a former British military officer who served on the UN Secretariat for thirty-nine years (1945-1984) traced the development of America’s endorsement of universal self-determination in Brian Urquhart, Decolonization and World Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1989), 4-19.

⁸ For a survey summary of FDR and his political idealism, see Patrick J. Maney, The Roosevelt Presence: A Biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 17, 174-92.

⁹ FDR’s anti-colonial idealism reflected his interests in reshaping world trade

Charter” of 1941, which (among other things) endorsed “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.”¹⁰ Despite allied resistance to such ideas, FDR advocated a post-war international system wherein colonial holdings would be groomed toward independence as “trusteeships.”¹¹ Aspects of FDR’s idealist convictions were eventually written into the United Nations Charter. Signed by the United States and fifty other nations in 1945, the UN Charter endorsed the self-determination of peoples as the goal of the UN “trusteeship” program (under article 76). On the other hand, this was a limited program that was applied mostly to former colonies or holdings of the defeated Axis powers.¹² America’s allies would not endorse political “interference” in their territories, which were defined under separate provisions of the UN Charter as “non-self-governing territories” (articles 73 and 74).¹³

relations that were “controlled” under the “spheres of influence” system that characterized colonialism. See, for example, account of FDR’s conversations with Churchill during the Atlantic Charter conference, Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1946) cited in Paterson and Merrill, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, II: 187-88; and Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 40-54.

¹⁰ A number of points in the Atlantic Charter were restatements of President Wilson’s 14 points. Point 3 of the 8-point Atlantic Charter, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 14 August 1941. Cited from copy in Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), 569.

¹¹ Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: the United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 61-73.

¹² In this respect, the UN trusteeship program was reminiscent of the “Mandate” system employed by the League of Nations to transfer control of defeated Central power territories to the victors—who were then to “guide” these territories until they were able to “stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.” (Article 22, LON Covenant). For more on the LON Mandate system, see F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 192-220.

¹³ Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, 40-42. See excerpts of the UN Charter at Appendix A.

After FDR's death, America's commitment to international idealism was often overruled by parochial strategic concerns. Initially, post-war rhetoric in support of liberal sentiments remained strong. In 1947, for example, U.S. President Harry S Truman listed "active support for the wider realization of . . . rights and freedoms . . . [as] a primary objective of United States policy in the United Nations." He also asserted that "America has long been a symbol of freedom and democratic progress to peoples less favored," and that the United States "must maintain [these peoples'] belief in us by our policies and our acts."¹⁴ But, as post-war allies split into opposing eastern and western camps, Washington's concerns for "national security" emerged preeminent.¹⁵ As a result, when colonial disputes were debated before the United Nations, US representatives to the United Nations often were directed to support European colonial policies in the interests of preserving the "Atlantic coalition" (after 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). But there were costs associated with maintaining a "strong" Western alliance. Favoring "strategic decisions" over liberal principles damaged Washington's relations with the emerging nations. These countries, many of them former colonial holdings, adamantly advocated the "right" of all peoples to self-determination. This expanding "third-world," as it came to be called, looked to the United States government to support nationalist struggles for independence. Consequently, Washington's policymakers were asked to make difficult decisions. In

¹⁴ President Harry S Truman, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 5 February 1947, in Department of State, The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President of the United States on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein for the Calendar Year 1946, Submitted to the Congress Pursuant to Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law No. 264, 79th Congress, 1st Session, DOS Publication 2735, Report Series 7 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1947), vi, vii.

¹⁵ For a development of America's preoccupation with "national security" interests after the Second World War, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1992), and *idem*, "National Security" chapter in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 202-13.

most cases, politics being what it is, U.S. presidential administrations tried to avoid offending either party. By walking this "thin line," America's intention of pleasing everyone, backfired. In the end, both sides were disappointed. The examples of Indonesia's struggle for independence (1945 to 1951) and later, Indonesia's dispute with the Netherlands over the status of West New Guinea (1950 to 1963) are especially enlightening in this regard. An analysis of U.S. decisions regarding these disputes as they were brought before the United Nations is a central concern of this chapter. These cases also demonstrate how decolonization affected the development of UN peace operations and how such issues were handled by the United Nations and the U.S. government.

"Good Offices" Mediation and Observation in Indonesia (GOC/UNCI)

Indonesia was the subject of one of the first complaints brought before the UN Security Council during early 1946. At that time, the Ukrainian SSR representative complained that British military forces were infringing upon the rights of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Indonesia."¹⁶ In actuality, the British were attempting to arrange for the peaceful repatriation of Japanese soldiers. More than anything else, the Ukrainian complaint was a propaganda initiative orchestrated by the Soviet bloc in response to western complaints concerning the presence of Soviet troops in Iran.¹⁷ A year later, when the issue of Indonesia was raised again before the Security Council, the situation was more serious. In late 1945, the British authorities had decided to

¹⁶ Achmed Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta proclaimed the republic's independence on 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrendered. David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 294. United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 1st year, 14th meeting, 206. (Hereafter, SCOR).

¹⁷ At the same time, the Soviet Union complained of British forces in Greece. See the discussion of these events outlined earlier in Chapter Three of this study.

allow their Dutch allies to resume colonial rule of the "Netherlands' East Indies" (NEI). Three hundred years of Dutch control had been interrupted by German conquests in Europe and Japanese occupation of the islands in 1941. The Europeans thought it "only proper" that pre-war "relations" should be reestablished. But things were not to be that simple. During the post-war transfer of Indonesian control from the Japanese, to Americans, then British, and finally to the Dutch, Indonesian nationalists had established an indigenous government.¹⁸ On 17 August 1945, Achmed Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta announced the establishment of an Indonesian "Republic" on the main NEI islands of Java and Sumatra.

The Dutch government was not in a conciliatory mood. It vowed to eradicate the Indonesian Republic and reestablish colonial control. Dutch leadership in the Hague viewed the NEI as an irreplaceable asset that was needed to spur the Netherlands' post-war economic recovery. Indeed, many considered Indonesia "the world's richest island empire." In addition to its 75 million people inhabiting 3,000 islands of vast mineral and spice resources (including rubber, tin, and teas), Indonesia held the largest known oil reserves of any regional country.¹⁹ Before the war, Dutch businessmen were earning more than \$100 million per year from "investments" in the NEI. A study conducted by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in 1945 concluded that, before the war, one-sixth of the Netherlands' national wealth was invested in the East Indies.²⁰ After the war, the Dutch government was determined to regain control

¹⁸ An account of Indonesia's struggle for independence from 1942 to 1949 is provided in J. K. Ray, Transfer of Power in Indonesia, 1942-1949 (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967); the UN's role is best covered by Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960); and the U.S. role in these incidents is best covered by McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia; and by Paul F. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears: Fifty Years of U.S.-Indonesian Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).

¹⁹ The Dutch petroleum concessions in Indonesia were primary resources of "Shell Oil." McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 144-45.

²⁰ U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), "Effects of the Japanese Occupation," Research and Analysis Report number 3293, 1945, Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

of NEI; they would not easily give up so lucrative a possession without a serious fight.

Sukarno and his guerrilla forces were equally set against the reinstitution of foreign control. During 1946, it looked like small-scale skirmishes would lead to war. Skillfully, the British intervened and persuaded both parties to adopt a negotiated settlement. It was obvious that the goal of both parties was control of Indonesia, but Britain's Lord Killearn was able to get the Republic leaders to accept a cease fire in return for limited political recognition. The result was the Linggadjati agreement, signed on 15 November 1946.²¹ This treaty outlined a formula for "sharing power," whereby both parties agreed that Sukarno's Republic would exercise limited control over domestic political issues, while the Dutch colonial office retained absolute control over Indonesia's "external" issues, such as trade, defense, and foreign relations. Predictably (since, sharing "sovereignty" is nearly impossible), the Linggadjati agreement fell victim to differences of "interpretation."

In early 1947, relations between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic leaders soured. On 16 July, the Dutch colonial authorities unilaterally abrogated the Linggadjati agreement and initiated what has come to be called their "first police action." [See map depicting the Dutch and Republican positions at Appendix B.] On 30 July 1947, this Dutch "armed suppression" of Indonesians was jointly raised as a complaint before the Security Council by Australia and India (two non-permanent members of the 1947 Council). In reality, this "police action" was full-scale warfare. The Dutch forces, as of July 1947, were estimated to have employed nearly 100,000 soldiers against an unprepared foe numbering perhaps 200,000.²² According to Australian and Indian representatives, a protracted Dutch-Indonesian conflict held serious international ramifications and justified a UN response. The Netherlands, a

²¹ A text of the Linggadjati agreement is reprinted in Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960), 464-67; and in Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. II, Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 6-8.

²² McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 168-71.

country of approximately 9 million citizens in 1947, was a “close” American ally and a European country struggling to recover from the ravages of world war. Indonesia was a country of 75 million inhabitants,²³ a majority of which were adherents to the Islamic faith. Concerns about possible mistreatment of Muslims stirred emotions from Southeast Asia to North Africa. Also, as an “Asian” issue, the cause of the Indonesians gained support from emerging regional leaders such as India’s Jawaharlal Nehru.²⁴

Initially, the western allies, the United States included, had desired to resolve the Dutch-Indonesian dispute outside of the United Nations—away from international involvement, especially that of the Communist countries.²⁵ Now that hostilities had escalated and gained international interest, the UN debates were inevitable. To respond constructively was a major early test for the United Nations. The Security Council, which was charged with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN Charter article 24), was faced with its first attempt to publicly resolve a divisive colonial dispute.²⁶

On 1 August, the UN Security Council approved its very first resolution that called upon contending parties to accept a UN-directed cease fire and a negotiated

²³ At the time, the NEI (what would become Indonesia) was the fifth largest country in the world. By 1950, independent Indonesia was the fourth largest in total population and the second largest Muslim country. Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears, xvii.

²⁴ India was within two weeks of gaining its own independence from European colonialism and Nehru emerged as an influential regional leader.

²⁵ This was the reason that the British mediations leading to the Linggadjati agreement in November 1946 were conducted outside of the United Nations. See discussion by McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 119-33, 173; and Lawrence D. Weiler and Anne Patricia Simons, The United States and the United Nations: The Search for International Peace and Security (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), 204.

²⁶ Department of State, The United States and the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947: Second Annual Report on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3024, International and Conference Series III, 1 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1948), 10.

settlement.²⁷ The “legal” debates that preceded this UN action are instructive for subsequent discussions and apply to nearly every colonial dispute that would be brought before the United Nations. The Netherlands’ representative argued that under article 2.7 of the UN Charter, the dispute did not fall within the “legal competence” of the United Nations. This article states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of an state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.²⁸

This article reflected the UN framers’ conception that the United Nations organization was to concern itself with the resolution of international disputes—at a time when diplomats may not have fully appreciated the degree to which “internal” disputes could just as readily threaten international peace. Or more likely, the UN framers did not wish to threaten the jealously-guarded “sovereignty” of the organization’s potential member-states.²⁹ In the case of Indonesia, the Netherlands was trying to establish that the Indonesian “revolutionaries” did not represent a sovereign state. Accordingly, the dispute in question was not between states, but was an intra-state problem. Just as Americans would agree that the United Nations should have no jurisdiction over an insurrection in west Texas, colonial states argued that the United Nations should not

²⁷ SC resolution 27, S/459, SCOR, 1 August 1947. A copy of this resolution (and all subsequent Indonesian resolutions cited in this chapter) is reproduced in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 9.

²⁸ The end of this paragraph provided a single exception: “but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII.” Since only UN actions taken in Korea, and later sanctions applied against Northern Rhodesia in 1966 were clear UN “enforcement actions,” this caveat did not apply to the colonial debates under consideration. See Appendix A for excerpts of the Charter.

²⁹ This sensitivity had roots in the U.S. Congress’ refusal to ratify U.S. membership in the League of Nations (1920) because of a common defense clause (article 10) that seemed to commit the U.S. to action without constitutional action. See Northedge, The League of Nations, 61-63; Warren F. Kuehl and Lynne K. Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997), 15-18.

“meddle” in a sovereign member-states’ “domestic jurisdiction.” This argument was repeated by every colonial power.

Returning to the case of Indonesia, four factors persuaded UN members that the Dutch defense did not apply. First, the “Republic of Indonesia” had been declared in August 1945 at a time when external rule had been disrupted. Second, and related to the first, many UN member-states (including some members of USUN) believed that the Indonesian people should have the “right” to choose their own form of government and allegiances. Third, and from a more legal perspective, under the Linggadjati agreement, the Dutch had granted the Indonesian Republic “*de facto*” sovereignty over Java and Sumatra.³⁰ And fourth, and most often cited in subsequent cases, certain member-states argued that the Dutch military actions in Indonesia fell under the Charter rubric of “threats to the peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression.”³¹ Since none of these terms was universally defined (in international law or in the Charter), complaints about colonial suppression often employed such terminology to justify UN involvement. In response to such charges, colonial states claimed that their military or “police” actions were necessary for preserving or restoring “law and order.” Predictably, when pressed further, colonial powers fell back on the issue of UN “legal competence” under article 2.7 (as quoted above). This cycle of arguments was replayed by various actors before the Council and General Assembly for the next twenty years.³² Nonetheless, the precedents for UN action in Indonesia established an international expectation that the United Nations could make a positive difference.

³⁰ McMahon, *Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia*, 133.

³¹ These terms comprise the title of UN Charter Chapter VII (articles 39 to 51). See Appendix A.

³² A notable exception to these debates was the French response to UN member-states’ protests. When pressed, France cited article 2.7 and no more. When further questioned, the French delegation simply departed. Anytime the issue was raised again when the French were present, their delegation would “walk out.” This pattern was adopted in the mid-1950s and persisted into the early 1960s—by then French colonialism had been defeated in Indochina, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.

On 25 August 1947, by a vote of 7-0-4 (Columbia, Poland, USSR, and U.K.); the Security Council approved a second Indonesian resolution (SC 30) that curiously requested that "career consuls stationed in Batavia [the principal city on Java, later Jakarta] jointly report on the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia."³³ This request reflected two underlying issues. First, the United Nations was established without possessing an information- or intelligence-gathering agency. Accordingly, as almost every dispute was brought before the organization, its members were forced to employ imaginative measures for gathering "impartial" facts. As the years went by, the organization routinely deployed "member-state contingents" to act as "impartial" civilian or military observers. In this case, such precedents had yet to be established. Second, the United States and its western allies were keen to prevent any direct Soviet involvement in Indonesia. During the debates for SC 30, the USSR representative had suggested that the Council create a committee representing all eleven members of the Security Council (as had been done in Greece). The western states countered with supporting a "consular commission" option because the six UN member-states with diplomatic offices in Batavia, conveniently, did not include any Communist countries.³⁴ The Soviet representative recognized this ploy, complained bitterly, but did not veto the proposal (instead, Poland and the USSR abstained).³⁵

In the same resolution (SC 30), the Council simultaneously requested that the Batavia consuls supply a number of military observers to help patrol the proposed cease fire agreement and assist the consuls generate more accurate reports.³⁶ The formal employment of these consular soldiers as UN "peace observers" was

³³ SC Resolution 30, S/525-1, 25 August 1947, paragraph 3.

³⁴ The six UN member-states with consuls in Batavia at this time included: Australia, Belgium, the United States (the three members that later also served on the Good Offices Committee), China (Nationalist China), France and Great Britain. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 304.

³⁵ For the transcript of these debates and the Russian objections, see SCOR, 2nd year, 193rd meeting, 2180-81.

³⁶ Paragraph 4 of S/525-1.

incorporated into a later resolution approved 1 November 1947³⁷—just eleven days after the General Assembly had created similar “peace machinery” for northern Greece.³⁸ Hence the UN’s first two mediation and observer missions—one dealing with colonial issues, the other a civil war with external complicity—developed in parallel and established precedents for the more ambitious peace operations that followed.

On 25 August, the Council passed a second resolution (SC 31) that added a dimension of political “peace-making” to SC 30’s initiation of fact-finding and peace observation.³⁹ SC 31 extended the Council’s “good offices”⁴⁰ to the Netherlands and Sukarno’s Republic by creating a three-nation “Good Offices Committee” (GOC). The GOC was charged with a primary responsibility for prodding diplomatic negotiations. It was composed of two representatives—one selected by each disputant—and of a third representative chosen by the first two representatives. The Netherlands chose Belgium, the Republic chose Australia (both serving as elected non-permanent members of the Security Council during 1947), and the two representative-states agreed upon the United States as the third (to serve in what became the key position).

³⁷ SC resolution 36, S/597, 1 November 1947.

³⁸ The General Assembly created UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) on 21 October 1947. See Chapter Three of this study for more on Greece. Of note, the United Nations official history of “peacekeeping” does not regard either mission as a UN-controlled endeavor since the observers reported to their national governments and not to the UN secretariat. This is a narrow perspective that is not shared by all scholars who have studied UN peace operations.

³⁹ SC 31, S/525-2, 25 August 1947. The vote was 8-0-3 (USSR, Poland and Syria abstained).

⁴⁰ Ambassador Philip Jessup’s account kindly describes the confusing distinction between “good offices” and other forms of mediation. According to Jessup, “‘Good Offices’ is a technical term which describes the role of an intermediary who acts merely as a channel of communication between the parties to a dispute. The Good Officer is thus differentiated from a ‘mediator’ who may himself initiate proposals which he submits to the parties.” Philip C. Jessup, *The Birth of Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 46. Note, the GOC was “upgraded” to a “commission” in January 1949—providing its agents with greater flexibility.

Through the GOC, the Security Council and its three national representatives pressed for a peaceful resolution of the Indonesian colonial dispute.

In October 1947, the Council received its first "consular commission" report.⁴¹ It confirmed that the situation in Indonesia remained tense and that the GOC needed greater authority. This motivated the UN members to request that "the consular commission, together with its military assistants, make [their] services available to the Committee of Good Offices"⁴² as a means of more effectively supervising the Council-directed cease fire.

At this point, the GOC gained increase cooperation from both parties. In addition, the efforts of the GOC chief mediator, American Frank P. Graham, were important in securing a diplomatic agreement between representatives of the Indonesian Republicans and the Dutch officials. These "Renville Agreements," signed on 19 January 1948 on board the U.S. naval ship of the same name, were hailed as a diplomatic victory. In the estimation of the U.S. Department of State (DOS), these accords represented a "detailed program for a military truce and a set of principles to serve as a basis for a political settlement."⁴³ The agreement embodied a truce plan and enumerated 18 principles which later were thought to have "provided the underlying standards for the final framework of political agreement."⁴⁴

Unfortunately, as with the Linggadjeti agreement, issues of "interpretation" led to

⁴¹ S/586, 22 October 1947.

⁴² SC 36, S/597, 1 November 1947, paragraph 3.

⁴³ Department of State, The United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1948 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3437, International and Conference Series III, 29 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, April 1949), 84.

⁴⁴ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3765, International and Conference Series III, 48 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, May 1950), 29.

subsequent hostile protest and military response. In sum, Indonesia wanted its full independence, while the Netherlands desired to maintain at least an "equal partnership" between themselves and the "Indonesian Union."⁴⁵ By the summer of 1948, it was obvious that a new diplomatic initiative would be required to preempt further military hostilities. The GOC, now comprising a different set of personalities (Frank Graham requested reassignment after securing the Renville Agreement and was replaced by career foreign service officer Coert duBois, who was replaced in August 1948 due to poor health, by labor negotiator H. Merle Cochran), attempted to negotiate a solution acceptable to both sides. On 18 December 1948, however, the Netherlands repudiated the Renville Agreement and launched the second Dutch "police action."⁴⁶ Dutch military units quickly captured the unsuspecting Indonesian Republic's capital. The Indonesian forces unfortunate enough to find themselves in the path of this onslaught, quickly escaped into the jungles and began planning for a protracted guerrilla war. In Jogjakarta, the Indonesian president and his prime minister were arrested and imprisoned. The Netherlands announced that the Republic was dissolved and a new "federation" of East Indies states (to be called the United States of Indonesia) would be groomed under Dutch tutelage. In response, on 19 December 1948, the Security Council met in another "emergency" session.

Prior to this second Dutch military escalation, the United States had conducted policy that was greatly supportive of its European ally.⁴⁷ Between December 1948 and January 1949, Washington's patience was severely strained. Speaking before the UN Council, the acting U.S. representative, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, condemned the Dutch offensive and accused the Dutch of violating international trust and specific provisions outlined in the Renville agreements.⁴⁸ Jessup stated that the Truman

⁴⁵ DOS, USPUN 1948, 85.

⁴⁶ Mary Allsebrook, Prototypes of Peacemaking: The First Forty Years of the United Nations (London: Longman Group, 1986), 4-5.

⁴⁷ McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 174-75, 304-12.

⁴⁸ Jessup argued that the second Dutch "police action" had "unified the State

administration “fail[ed] to find any justification for renewal of military operations in Indonesia,” and that events “at least as grave as that of August 1947” needed to be addressed by the Security Council. In response to these speeches (and others less diplomatic), the Security Council passed two resolutions, one on 24 December, another on 28 December. Both called for the Dutch military to “cease hostilities at once” and for the Netherlands authorities to release all Indonesian political prisoners.⁴⁹

By the beginning of 1949, the Security Council was calling for the Dutch to accept a cease-fire and to negotiate in earnest. On 28 January, the Security Council adopted a lengthy and detailed blueprint for prodding the Netherlands to honor peacefully its stated goals of granting Indonesia its independence.⁵⁰ The GOC was renamed the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and was given greater latitude to act as a “mediating” body. Previously, the GOC had been limited to “offering” its good offices—a diplomatic code for the least intrusive type of third party mediation. The GOC was also restricted from taking any actions that did not meet universal approval. The UNCI was specifically authorized to mediate based upon a majority opinion and more forcefully press the belligerents to consider compromise formulas.⁵¹

In March, a combination of U.S. political and economic “pressures” (as explained below) finally persuaded the Hague that it was best to settle the Indonesian dispute peacefully. Finally, the Netherlands proposed a “round-table” conference to be held “to discuss a program for the immediate transfer of [Indonesian] sovereignty.”⁵² During the summer of 1949, UNCI helped to negotiate the format of the proposed Dutch “transfer” talks. As a result, on 23 August the “Hague Round-Table Conference”

Department in favor of the Indonesians.” For Jessup’s anecdotal account of these events see Jessup, *The Birth of Nations*, 43-92 (the quoted passage is on p. 31).

⁴⁹ DOS, *USPUN* 1948, 87-88.

⁵⁰ SC resolution 67, S/1234, 28 January 1949.

⁵¹ Jessup, *The Birth of Nations*, 46, 84.

⁵² DOS, *USPUN* 1949, 30.

convened. It was successfully concluded on 2 November.⁵³ The ceremonies that enacted the round-table agreements were held at Amsterdam and Batavia (renamed Djakarta) on 27 December 1949. On that date, the Netherlands formally transferred sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat).⁵⁴ The next day, President Truman extended United States recognition to Indonesia and appointed H. Merle Cochran (the third U.S. member of UNCI) to become the first U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.⁵⁵ [See map at Appendix B.]

The Soviet Union was so upset by the western coalition's maneuvers that, in November 1949, the USSR representative vetoed a resolution that would have "congratulated" UNCI for its contributions toward the peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the Council was able to agree upon continuing UNCI's mandate for an additional year. Cognizant of how the earlier Renville Agreements had unraveled without a means of accountability or "enforcement," the Council was determined that UNCI should remain until the situation was completely resolved. Accordingly, UNCI was tasked to help both parties by supervising troop withdrawals and monitoring elections in parts of Indonesia.⁵⁶ The UNCI remained in Indonesia until the Commission disbanded itself on 3 April 1951—effectively terminating the employ of consular officers and military observers at the same time.⁵⁷ The total costs to the United Nations between 1949 and 1951 were under \$700,000.⁵⁸

⁵³ Allsebrook, Prototypes of Peacemaking, 5.

⁵⁴ The main issue left unresolved was that of West New Guinea/Irian Jaya. Regarding this dispute (as discussed below), both sides agreed negotiations would resume within a year to determine that territory's status. DOS, USPUN 1949, 28-29.

⁵⁵ Edward A. Dow, Jr. took Cochran's place on UNCI. DOS, USPUN 1949, 34.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 24.

⁵⁸ Not until the 28 January 1949 resolution was adopted, was the UN Secretariat tasked with accounting for "organizational expenses" and taking care of

During 1950, the United Nations continued its indirect “services” in Indonesia by financing sixty-three “international observers.” These officers, technically under UNCI, deployed in teams and helped with various tasks to include repatriating and discharging Asian soldiers that had served under the “Dutch-Indonesia Colonial Army.” This process was made more difficult by a revolt against Sukarno’s centralizing reforms that was centered in the southern Moluccas island of Ambon. [See map at Appendix B.] In April 1950, UNCI “offered its good services” to negotiate a settlement between the central Indonesian government and Ambon. The Indonesian government responded to UN officials that the problem was “an internal matter.” This assertion was uncontested by the international community. Although the Dutch thought that this ruling was unfair, a majority of Council members believed that Charter article 2.7 was “properly interpreted.” On 17 August, last-ditch plans for the Dutch to anchor an Indonesian “federated state” were dismissed by Sukarno. On 28 September 1950, Indonesia was restructured as a “unitary state” and admitted as the sixtieth UN member. In October, President Sukarno directed that military actions be executed against the Ambon rebels. The U.S. representative on the Security Council (acting as Council president in October) proposed that the Security Council debate the dispute, but no other Council member was willing to do so. In November, Indonesia completed its military campaign against Ambon—an action Sukarno justified as “quelling an insurrection.”⁵⁹

The United Nations’ role in Indonesia was publicly praised (and often overstated) by U.S. statesmen throughout the operation. As early as October 1947, the issue of U.S. membership on the GOC was touted for having been decided “at the highest levels of government” (President Truman personally appointed Frank Graham).⁶⁰ In late

remunerations. Apparently, the governments contributed observers and equipment gratis to the UN effort during 1947 and 1948. See Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 304-05.

⁵⁹ DOS, USPUN 1950, 94-95.

⁶⁰ C. P. Noyes to Ambassadors Warren A. Austin and Hershel V. Johnson, Memorandum dated 1 October 1947, U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 “General Records of the Department of State,” Lot 428 Box 2

1949, J. W. Halderman, a staff member of the UN section in the state department (UNP) suggested exaggerated praise of the United Nations for inclusion in President Truman's 1950 state of the union address:

Another part of the world where the UN has made a great contribution toward peace is Indonesia. The Good Offices Committee, the chairman of which is the representative of the U.S., has been extremely successful in adjusting the differences between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and in creating the basis for a stable and free Indonesia. It now seems probable that the work of the Good Offices Committee will be successfully completed during the coming year.⁶¹

Behind all the rhetoric and public statements, however, the influence of U.S. "realists" (led by the DOS European office and DOD military leaders) dominated the inputs of American "idealists" (those assigned to the DOS Asian bureau and USUN). Significantly, this minority faction pressed for a policy that more strongly embodied America's internationalist idealism. The tension between these schools reflected America's colonial policy-making dilemma. Consistently, Washington's leaders rated European solidarity and economic stability as America's top priority. The realists were convinced that U.S. support for Dutch control over Indonesia provided both. The idealists counter-argued that Dutch imperialism was disrupting regional stability, draining European resources, and providing political fodder for Communist insurgents. In the end, realists conceded that their inflexible support for "power politics" was potentially damaging to America's long-range interests.

The timing of the Netherlands' "second police action," launched in December 1948, was distressed American realists greatly. It upset plans for consolidating the western alliance and enhanced "Communist opportunism" in Asia. As early as 1947,

(59/250/49/35/01) "Bureau of United Nations Affairs Subject File Relating to Palestine, Political, Security, and Trusteeship Matters, 1946-1951."

⁶¹ J. W. Halderman, Draft Letter, (UNP) 11 October 1949, page 3, U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 "General Records of the Department of State," Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01) "Bureau of United Nations Affairs Subject File Relating to Palestine, Political, Security, and Trusteeship Matters, 1946-1951."

the United States began to view a solid western alliance as its best “defense” against the growing Soviet bloc. In March 1947, President Truman announced his famous “doctrine” for containing further Soviet expansion by means of a solid western alliance.⁶² In coordination with this plan to rebuild western Europe, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced America’s economic plan to invest in and provide huge loans to U.S. allies. Thereafter, on 17 March 1948, the West- European nations signed a defensive pact at Brussels. This action inspired American realists to expand that military alliance into what would become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). American domestic support for joining such a formal “entangling” alliance was fueled by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Soviet-bloc blockade of Berlin that began in June, and the routing of Chinese “nationalist” forces by Chinese Communists in Manchuria. The last thing alliance-minded policymakers in Washington wanted at this point was to have public opinion stirred up against the Dutch—but that is exactly what happened.

Prior to December 1948, idealists’ suggestions that the U.S. administration employ economic “pressures” against the Netherlands were ignored. The realists’ position was that the United States government did not use economic blackmail against its friends.⁶³ After the second Dutch military action in Indonesia, which generated significant public and Congressional outcries across the United States, these dominant viewpoints were called into question.⁶⁴ In Congress, continued funding for “Marshall Plan aid” was placed in jeopardy. On 7 February 1949, Senator Owen Brewster of

⁶² President Truman’s message to Congress on 12 March 1947, also known as the “Truman Doctrine,” is reprinted in Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963), 178-9.

⁶³ McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 267.

⁶⁴ It is interesting to note that during the United Nations’ early days, the Congress was more enthusiastically behind the organization. In this case, a majority of Congress-persons supported a resolution to “make it mandatory for the [Truman] administration to cut off assistance to any government that failed to live up to its United Nations’ obligations.” Weiler and Simons, The United States and the United Nations, 206.

Maine introduced a resolution (signed by nine other Senators) which called for the “suspension of all ECA [European Cooperation Administration] and other financial aid to the Netherlands until it stopped its military measures against the republic.” This amounted to only \$14 million that remained to be provided to the Netherlands under the ECA program. Already, the ECA had provided the Hague with \$54 million. Even this was less significant than the \$298 million that had already been sent to the Netherlands as European Recovery Program (ERP) aid (Marshall aid). The ironic significance of these dollar amounts was raised by a New York Times article released on 23 December 1948. This article noted that the \$1 million per day that the Dutch were using to support their armies in Indonesia, correlated with the amounts provided (to this point) by the United States to finance the Netherlands’s economic recovery. In other words, the U.S. government was underwriting Dutch colonial warfare.⁶⁵ Such graphic correlations strengthened the idealists’ arguments.

Finally, there was the issue of communism. All along, the Dutch government had played to realist fears by assuring the U.S. government that if Indonesia was granted independence, it would fall under Communist control. By the summer of 1948, U.S. intelligence sources estimated that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had at least 3,000 active members and were believed to have another 60,000 “supporters” in the Indonesian Labor and Socialist parties.⁶⁶ The Dutch used these figures to support their “need for strong actions.” Many realists were duped by such arguments. In actuality, Dutch repression and mounting political disillusionment in Indonesia were most responsible for the growing popularity of Communism—if you can call 3,000 members out of 75 million people popular. In any event, the Indonesian Republic leaders undermined these Dutch arguments by crushing a Communist rebellion in eastern Java during September and October 1948.⁶⁷ Even Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett

⁶⁵ Cited in McMahon, Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia, 255.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 236.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 242-43.

(a staunch Europe-first realist) was impressed.⁶⁸ By January 1949, the realists adopted the idealists painful recommendations to “pressure” the Dutch into granting Indonesia its full independence. Political pressures were supplemented with threats of withholding all future ECA and ERP aid. Dutch leaders resentfully accepted their marching orders.⁶⁹

In some respects, the Indonesian case unfolded in a manner representative of other disputes brought before the United Nations as “colonial issues”—where Colonial powers resisted granting indigenous peoples their “right” to political self-determination. In many of these cases, for example in Greece and Palestine (where the British simply quit and withdrew), the former Colonial power was not willing to launch costly military operations against the irrepressible forces of nationalism. The Dutch (like the French in North Africa and Indochina, for example) were less willing to grant independence without a fight. Nor were these colonial powers (who were in most cases supported by Washington) willing to hand the matter over to the United Nations.⁷⁰ Nonetheless, in many instances, the United Nations came to play a secondary role as forum for discussion. In other cases, UN “peace machinery,” that of impartial “investigation,” offering “good offices,” mediation, and military observers, were useful for U.S. propaganda and kept the international community “impartially” informed. In the case of Indonesia’s fight for independence, although the Western powers initially opposed UN “meddling,” UN resolutions and diplomatic machinery (aided by U.S. diplomatic initiatives and reluctant applications of “pressure” against the Netherlands) earned praise for the organization (and for the U.S.) from the non-aligned, emerging states.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Lovett wrote a circular letter in 31 December 1948 that noted that Sukarno’s Republic was “the only government in the Far East to have met and crushed an all-out Communist offensive.” Lovett to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad, December 31 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948, 6:618-20.

⁶⁹ McMahon, *Colonialism, Cold War and Indonesia*, 278-81.

⁷⁰ Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 38-43.

⁷¹ State Department insider Benjamin Cohen speculated, “If the situation had not been brought before the Security Council and if there had not been the stimulus of a

UN involvement in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute, in many respects, was representative of other "colonial" cases in which UN operations for peace found a certain amount of success. Some of these cases were handled within the UN Trusteeship Council between 1945 and 1968; most, however, resulted from UN General-Assembly initiatives to promote self-determination for "non-self-governing territories"⁷²—those not considered as "trusteeships" and most under Western colonial or "administrative" rule. Many of these transitions to independence were handled so well the Security Council was not even involved.⁷³ In the most-difficult cases, the Security Council took up the initial debates. Later, especially after 1950 (with the adoption of the U.S.-sponsored "uniting-for-peace resolution") the General Assembly became actively involved. In some cases, especially in disputes involving French and Portuguese territories (such as Algeria and Angola), the United Nations was not permitted to advance its discussions beyond the applicability of article 2.7. In other cases, such as Indonesia, the Security Council was able to contribute toward limiting hostilities or defusing tensions. In this case, U.S. officials expressed public and private praise for the UN efforts in helping to resolve the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.⁷⁴

The determinant of Security Council's "effectiveness" in these colonial disputes was the stance adopted by the five "permanent members" (the P-5). In Palestine, for

strong demand within the United Nations for conciliation and settlement it is highly doubtful whether the American government would have asserted its influence so affirmatively and effectively." Cohen, "The Impact of the United Nations on United States Foreign Policy," 277.

⁷² The UN Charter discussed the status of "non-self-governing territories" in Chapter XI. See Excerpts at Appendix A.

⁷³ Indeed, of the dozens of states considered "Trusteeships" in 1945, all but five had been granted independence by the mid 1960s.

⁷⁴ "Drafts of the Department of State contribution to the President's State of the Union Message for 1950," p.6, U.S. National Archives II [NAII], Record Group [RG] 59 "General Records of the Department of State," Lot 428 Box 2 (59/250/49/35/01) "Bureau of United Nations Affairs Subject File Relating to Palestine, Political, Security, and Trusteeship Matters, 1946-1951."

example, the convergence of P-5 interests for UN involvement (the U.S.S.R. wanted the British out of the region; the U.S. favored the creation of a Jewish homeland) worked toward active Security Council involvement. In such cases, Council "unity of purpose" (even though motives varied) provided United Nations moral suasion backed by nations wielding significant power.⁷⁵ The opposite effect was true in cases of Security Council "deadlocks" over trusteeship or "colonial" issues. Eastern Europe (U.S.S.R.), Indochina and North Africa (France), as examples, were regions essentially removed from Security Council considerations due to P-5 member vetoes. In the case of Indonesia, between 1947 and 1951, the Dutch neither possessed a Council veto, nor were its P-5 allies (the United States, United Kingdom, or France) or skeptics (USSR) willing to cast negative votes that would have precluded UN involvement. As a result, the international community assisted a former colonial people transition to independence. The keys to UN success in helping Indonesia gain its independence were a combination of tough Security Council resolutions, the dispatch of negotiators and "peace observers," and support for a peaceful resolution of the dispute by the international community. From the United States' perspective, the end result is not one that Washington would have pressed for without the public outcry that was raised in Congress resulting from what UN observers documented regarding Dutch brutalities inflicted upon the Indonesian peoples during December 1948. In the words of Ambassador Jessup, "the United Nations proved its value. It would have been inconceivable for the United States to have promoted the evolution of Indonesian independence through unilateral diplomacy. It was only with the aid of United Nations mechanisms that Indonesia was born in 1949."⁷⁶

⁷⁵ This was the best the UN could hope for, denied military forces of its own as envisioned by the Charter's Article 43—a provision also foiled by P-5 irreconcilable differences.

⁷⁶ Jessup, The Birth of Nations, 92.

Self-Determination, New Members and the Rise of Neutralism

During the United Nations' first 23 years, a large number of former "colonial holdings" emerged as independent nations. During these years, many "non-government entities" were fighting for, and gaining, political self-determination; while others achieved independence by virtue of UN "trusteeship" programs. The ramifications of this international systemic transformation were far-reaching. They are also at the heart of this study of U.S. and UN involvement in international crises and attempts to promote conflict resolution. The United Nations was reshaped during these politically turbulent years. Specifically, the world organization was inundated with bitterly debated "colonial" and "trusteeship" issues; and transformed by an exponential rise of new United Nations member-states and by the emergence of a growing, influential "neutral" voting membership "bloc."

The formulation of an American response to these challenges was not always well-orchestrated. The U.S. administrations agonized over each debate. The dilemma posed to the United States was to choose between the heavy-handed politics effected by America's traditional European allies, thereby alienating the United States from the emerging political "third world;"⁷⁷ or to favor more high-minded ideological notions, such as the right of all peoples to "self-determination," which risked undermining the "Western alliance." For the most part, the "colonial powers" were Washington's strategic and military partners—most members with the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the cases where Washington decided that the United States did not have a primary, direct interest in the outcome, USUN ambassadors were directed to quietly support U.S. colonial allies—this was especially true for cases involving the British and French. In most of these United Nations' debates, USUN predictably noted that the position of the United States was to

⁷⁷ Third world, neither a positive nor negative term, was a contemporary term used to describe the emerging politically "neutral" bloc of nations that desired to remain politically aloof from the ideological East-West battles of the Cold War.

encourage “quiet diplomacy” between the parties involved. Debating these issues at the United Nations raised the issue of UN Charter article 2.7—a provision that colonial powers cited when arguing that such affairs were matters outside the legal purview of the United Nations. In most cases, U.S. representatives to the United Nations agreed.⁷⁸

Regarding the issue of trusteeship, between 1953 and 1961, the United Nations “administered” approximately 70 dependent territories. These areas were grouped, under the United Nations Charter, into two administrative categories—“trust territories” and other “non-self-governing territories.”⁷⁹ The United Nations directly supervised the administration of all Trust territories through the Trusteeship Council.⁸⁰ The Charter required “supervisory” member-states of non-self-governing territories (there were at least 50 of these territories during the 1950s) to submit annual status reports.⁸¹ These requirements, outlined in article 73, were not always adhered to and,

⁷⁸ This U.S. “standard line” was employed whenever a UN member-states proposed to debate the problems experienced by the French in North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria); and the British in any of their colonial holdings, especially Cyprus.

⁷⁹ Charter Chapter XI, articles 73 and 74, provided rules for reporting to the United Nations (“declaration”) about administration of “non-self-governing territories.” Chapters XII and XIII, articles 75 through 91 outlined the “trusteeship system” and operations of the Trusteeship Council. In the UN system there remained 11 “trust” territories: 7 in Africa and 4 in the Pacific area. These had a total of over 18 million people. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1955, DOS Publication 6318, International Organization and Conference Series III, 115 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 1956), 177.

⁸⁰ The Trusteeship Council met annually to consider the progress of these “trusteeships”—most of which were territories formerly belonging to Germany and Japan. In 1953 there remained eleven such territories. During this time, the United States was responsible for the “Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands”—held by Japan during World War I—some 98 island groups comprising the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas (except Guam which was separately considered to be a U.S. territory; similar to Puerto Rico.) Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953, DOS Publication 5459, International Organization and Conference Series III, 100 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1954), 167.

therefore, were the subject of controversial debates.⁸²

In their public speeches, U.S. presidents heartily endorsed the United Nations trusteeship system and encouraged other nations to do the same. On 20 June 1955, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke on this topic during the tenth anniversary conference commemorating the signing of the United Nations Charter. The American president charged that "on every nation in possession of foreign territories, there rests the responsibility to assist the peoples of those areas in the progressive development of free political institutions so that ultimately they can validly choose for themselves their permanent political status."⁸³ The point of political discretion, however, rested upon how one chose to define ambiguous terms such as "ultimately." Nonetheless, either as a result of insurgent, nationalist warfare or by freely-granted political elections,⁸⁴ the number of these territories that gained independence during the Eisenhower administration years, was significant. After gaining political independence, the majority of these nations sought membership in the United Nations (gaining some degree of international respect and attention). Unfortunately, during these years, the granting of membership status to new nations by the United Nations Security Council had fallen victim to intense Cold-War posturing. As a result of Soviet vetoes cast between 1950 and 1955, for example, not a single new member was admitted. After 1955, however, the membership "log-jam" was broken.

⁸¹ As of 1955, there remained 58 non-self-governing territories with a total population of more than 100 million people. Of these, the U.S. held 5 territories: Alaska, Hawaii (both granted statehood status in 1959); Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. DOS, USPUN 1955, 177.

⁸² The U.S. decided, unilaterally, to stop "reporting" on the status of Puerto Rico in the mid-50s. As a result, a number of others (such as Denmark, regarding Greenland) followed the U.S. lead.

⁸³ DOS, USPUN 1955, 176.

⁸⁴ These elections, or national plebiscites, were often sponsored by the United Nations and supervised by a UN "impartial" commission. This was especially true in Africa during the 1950s.

In 1955, a compromise was reached between East and West to break much of the United Nations membership “deadlock” which had persisted since 1950. In effect, the Eisenhower administration decided to stop opposing Soviet bloc demands for a “package deal.”⁸⁵ Thereafter, the UN membership was more readily granted. Of note, fourteen of the twenty-five new members admitted to the United Nations between 1946 and December 1955 achieved independence since the UN Charter was signed.⁸⁶ In his 1955 letter of transmittal to Congress outlining U.S. annual participation in the United Nations, President Eisenhower applauded the long-awaited approval of sixteen new members to the UN.⁸⁷ The UN membership total at the end of 1955 was seventy-six.

Although the Eisenhower administration had yielded to Soviet bloc demands in order to break the membership deadlock, it did not change its position on the divisive “Chinese membership” debate. Between January and July 1950, the Soviet representative had “walked out” of the United Nations to protest the organization’s failure to recognize mainland China (PRC) as the “only” true Chinese delegation. The

⁸⁵ In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in a speech before the ninth General Assembly, “unless ways can be found to bring all peace-loving, law-abiding nations into this organization, inevitably the power and influence of this organization will progressively decline.” Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954, DOS Publication 5769, International Organization and Conference Series III, 104 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1955), 90. In 1955, the Eisenhower administration finally bowed to the soviet insistence for admission of Albania, Hungary, and Bulgaria (even “Outer Mongolia” which the ROC vetoed, not the U.S.) in return for breaking the membership deadlock. USUN abstained on all votes for nations Washington did not deem fit for membership in order to gain a similar response from the U.S.S.R.—a move the U.S. justified based on the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution (of the U.S. Senate) calling for a “voluntary agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council to remove the veto from the admission of new members.” After securing membership for Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria, Moscow abstained on Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Italy, but vetoed the applications of Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam. DOS, USPUN 1955, 87.

⁸⁶ DOS, USPUN 1955, 175.

⁸⁷ Letter of Transmittal, President Eisenhower to the Congress, in DOS, USPUN 1955, v.

United States expended a considerable amount of energy (and international prestige) each year to maintain nationalist China's position. This debate was especially critical when one considers that, in addition to casting votes in UN General Assembly debates, the "Chinese" (however defined) also held "permanent-member status" in the Security Council. The United States was not willing to concede an additional potential veto in to "international communism." As a result, each year the U.S. opened with condemnations of Communist China's behavior. Ambassador Lodge, and his deputies, denounced the PRC for its "aggressor" role in the Korean conflict and pointed to its failure to adhere to internationally-acceptable human rights' standards. Thereafter, the U.S. delegation would urge the Assembly to "postpone for the duration" of the current session, "all proposals to exclude the representatives of the National Government" (PRC) and to "seat representatives of the 'Central People's Government' [ROC] to represent the Republic of China."⁸⁸ America's wielding of political might in embassies around the world was required to generate support for this extreme position. USUN's "success" resulted in postponing the inevitable for decades beyond what most UN members saw to be appropriate—and cost the Eisenhower administration some degree of political credibility in the eyes of many UN member-states.

In 1956, an additional five memberships were granted. At this point, the United States began to realize certain ramifications of these changes. A Department of State report, written in 1957 noted that:

The increase in UN membership from 60 to 81 in a little over a year, [and] a preponderance of this increase coming from Africa, the Near East, and the Far East, [has] substantially changed the voting complexion of the Assembly. African and Asian members, rather than the American Republics, now have one-third of the votes, or sufficient if they vote together to block action on matters requiring a two-thirds majority.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ DOS, USPUN 1953, 92.

⁸⁹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, DOS Publication 6577, International Organization and Conference Series III, 124 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, December 1957), 5.

In general, the USSR and its satellites constituted the only group that consistently voted as a bloc. Regarding the "colonial disputes," however, the emerging new states predictably banded together.⁹⁰

In 1960, another seventeen new members were admitted to the United Nations. Sixteen of these were African, the other was the former British holding of Cyprus.⁹¹ Another African independent nation, Mauritania (a former French Colony, which was also claimed by Morocco) was not granted membership in December 1960 when the USSR decided to "link" its acquiescence for membership to that of the United States (and others) allowing Outer Mongolia's admission. The U.S. representative "deplored" this Soviet action as a continuation of its 1950 to 1955 "policy of blackmail."⁹²

The results of admitting all these new, most recently independent countries, to the United Nations were dramatic. In the first decade of United Nations operations, the United States could virtually guarantee that it could command a General Assembly majority (and even two-thirds, when required to carry substantive issues). This capability began to wane with the rise of a "neutralist" international political movement. In April 1955, a large number of non-aligned, Asian, Arab, and African nations met for a conference in Bandung, Indonesia.⁹³ During a series of meetings, the national leaders of these states agreed upon "a common expression of their objectives and areas of

⁹⁰ The report also noted this fact. *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹¹ DOS, USPUN 1960, 87.

⁹² To reflect the near doubling of UN membership by 1960, there was considerable support in the General Assembly, (not by the P-5, of course) for allowing more members on the Security Council. Changes to the UN Charter were not made until 1965 (when Council membership was increased from 11 to 15). Between 1960 and 1965 the United States professed to support such changes (along with reducing its "fair share assessments.") The USSR representative, in 1960, however threatened to veto any such effort, claiming: "not until a satisfactory solution has been found to the Chinese representation question will it be possible to amend the provisions of the Charter relating to the composition of the principal organs of the United Nations." DOS, USPUN 1960, 89-93.

⁹³ Bandung is on the island of Java, just south of the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta.

concern.” They vowed to work together, thereafter, to pursue these goals. During the 1955 UN Tenth General Assembly, the United States delegation noted the results of both this conference at Bandung, and of a meeting of Heads of Government at Geneva in July 1955. According to the U.S. report three changes unfolded: “a loosening of free-world alignments; [an] intensified pursuit by the smaller and less-developed countries of objectives that raise conflicts within the free world; and [an] increased flexibility of Soviet-bloc tactics.”⁹⁴ Much to the Eisenhower administration’s dismay, this “neutralist-bloc” was complicating U.S. control of daily operations in the United Nations. Nonetheless, the unceasing efforts expended by Cabot Lodge and his staff managed to retain the “free world’s” mantle of leadership. Thereafter, America’s leadership position in the United Nations was most readily influenced (bolstered or undermined) by Washington’s conduct of foreign affairs.

The solidification of the “neutralist position,” encouraged by the April 1955 Bandung Conference and the growing “Afro-Asian” UN membership, significantly affected the UN debates regarding the status of the Dutch colonial holding of Western New Guinea. This island, administered in the eastern half by Australia as a trusteeship (Papua New Guinea), had been the subject of controversy between the Netherlands and Indonesia since 1950. The issue drew serious attention in 1962.

Western New Guinea [Irian Barat]⁹⁵

New Guinea is strategically situated in the southwest Pacific Ocean, just north of Australia, and southeast of the Philippines.⁹⁶ After the Second World War, the eastern

⁹⁴ DOS, USPUN 1955, 8, 82.

⁹⁵ The island territory was referenced as “Irian Barat” (and the island as “Irian Jaya”) by the Indonesians. This study will use the title “West New Guinea” for all references prior to 1963, except for in quotes that employ alternate titles (to include the United Nations’ preferred mixture: “West Irian”).

⁹⁶ New Guinea, the world’s second largest island, is 1,500 miles long and

section of the island was administered on behalf of the local Papuan peoples by Australia, under the United Nations' "trusteeship" program.⁹⁷ The western half of New Guinea remained under Dutch control as a colonial property.⁹⁸ [For a map of Western New Guinea/Irian Barat, see Appendix B.] In late 1949, the United Nations helped mediate an agreement⁹⁹ that resulted in much of the Netherlands' east Indies holdings becoming independent as the United States of Indonesia. West New Guinea (which lies approximately 2,000 east of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta), however, was not included in those agreements and its status was disputed between the Netherlands and Indonesia. When a year went by without an equitable resolution, the Dutch announced during 1950 that negotiations had broken down and the status quo would remain in effect. In Jakarta, this was not considered to be a satisfactory interpretation. The conflict intensified with the Netherlands resolved to maintain sovereignty and Indonesia determined to gain control of West New Guinea by any means.

For the next twelve years, Indonesia and the Netherlands waged diplomatic and

approximately 400 miles wide in the center (it is widest in the center and narrows at each end).

⁹⁷ New Guinea was divided into three political subdivisions since the early twentieth century. Its eastern half comprised Papua, which was under Australian authority since 1906, and the New Guinea Trust Territory, a former German possession that was placed under Australian mandate by the League of Nations following World War I. Australia remained "responsible" for the eastern New Guinea Trust Territory under the UN trusteeship system established in 1946. That territory gained its independence in 1975 as Papua New Guinea. West New Guinea remained under Dutch sovereignty until the early 1960s and was officially incorporated into Indonesia in August 1969.

⁹⁸ Officially, the Dutch held West New Guinea as a "colonial property" since 1828. Dutch shipping controlled much of the area since the early seventeenth century.

⁹⁹ The most complete account of the UN's role in these negotiations is found in Alastair M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960). Solid accounts can also be found in Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 293-322; Gardner, Shared Hopes, Separate Fears, 24-97; Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, 39-46; and Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 3-92.

military battles for control of West New Guinea. After the initial bilateral talks stalled, Indonesia brought the issue before the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁰⁰ As a result, the issue was debated in New York between 1950 and 1962. During these UN meetings, the Indonesian representative argued that the contest over West New Guinea's status was "clearly an international dispute"—by this, Indonesia meant to provoke UN intervention under terms of the Charter (specifically under article 1.1, and articles contained in chapters VI or VII). The Netherlands' delegation disagreed. Dutch representatives consistently claimed (at least until 1961) that the matter was one of "internal administration"—a legal shorthand asserting that the United Nations had no role in the issue, under proscriptions outlined in Charter article 2.7.¹⁰¹ The U.S. delegation's attitudes characterized these early debates. To policymakers in Washington, the legal status of Western New Guinea seemed clear enough: the island was not included in the territories ceded to Indonesia in the 1949 treaty. The only mention of New Guinea in the bilateral agreements was that the Dutch agreed to renegotiate the issue in 1950.¹⁰² Between 1953 and 1960, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration supported the Netherlands. Washington feared that any overt support for further concessions by the Netherlands would offend a European and North

¹⁰⁰ Indonesia was admitted as the organization's sixtieth member in 1950.

¹⁰¹ During the 1950s and 1960s, the words "internal" or "domestic" jurisdiction were oft cited by European UN member-states when they tried to invoke UN Charter article 2.7. This article states that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; . . ." See Charter excerpts at Appendix A.

¹⁰² The "Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty" that granted Indonesia its independence from the Netherlands, Article 2, item f stated that: ". . . the status quo of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia [December 1949], the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations." See excerpts in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*, II: 93.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally. In addition, the Eisenhower administration grew to distrust Indonesia's policy of neutralism and toleration of an influential (if small) communist party.¹⁰³ As a result, U.S. representatives to the United Nations abstained from voting on issues related to its allies "internal" (no mention of "colonial") matters. Between 1950 and 1955, therefore, Indonesia's claims against the European "colonialists" found few supporters. During 1954, for example, the most that the western-dominated Assembly would concede to Indonesia was a resolution calling on both parties to peacefully resolve their differences.¹⁰⁴

It was not until 1955 that Indonesia's claims to West New Guinea gained greater support at the United Nations. Two events accounted for this change. First, the "non-aligned" movement (of which Indonesia claimed a share of political leadership) received a significant boost from a springtime conference held that year in Bandung, Indonesia (just outside Jakarta).¹⁰⁵ Second, also during 1955, the United States and the

¹⁰³ The Eisenhower administration was also involved in an ill-advised covert operation in which the CIA supported a rebellious faction against President Sukarno's rule. This ended in defeat and exposure of Washington's complicity; it further damaged U.S.-Indonesian relations. For more on this "revolt of the Colonels" operation, see Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington: Acropolis, 1966), 181-83; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 250-51.

¹⁰⁴ This U.S. "abstention policy" also was applied to UN debates concerning British, French, and Portuguese territorial holdings between 1953 and 1960 under the Eisenhower administration. DOS, USPUN 1955, 83-84.

¹⁰⁵ The conference at Bandung was a significant political event that foreshadowed changes in international relations that would greatly affect politics at the United Nations. Thereafter, political leaders of self-declared "neutral" nations (those not aligned directly with East or West in the Cold War) supported each other's political aspirations. Leaders such as President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India used both East and West by dangerously playing both sides to gain an inordinate amount of political, military, and economic support—in effect, both East and West were easily manipulated as both capitals feared "losing" important neutral states to the "other side." See for example, H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press,

Soviet Union resolved a long-standing disagreement over admitting new members into the United Nations.¹⁰⁶ Thereafter, the organization's character was transformed.¹⁰⁷ Each year, the presence of numerous newly-admitted member-states affected debates about "colonial" issues, in general, and West New Guinea, specifically. During the Tenth Regular General Assembly (1955), fifteen new members sided with Indonesia against the Netherlands.¹⁰⁸ An emerging "neutralist" coalition grew in strength each year afterwards. Still, it would take years to build a new coalition capable of out-voting the powerful Western (pro-colonial) bloc that had dominated the UN General Assembly since 1946.¹⁰⁹

1989), 3-10; 110-18; 264-5; 313-27. Brands summarized Bandung's significance by writing that "If the Yalta Conference marked the origin of the bipolar superpower order, another meeting, held ten years later at Bandung in Indonesia, symbolized the rejection of that order by countries having no part in its creation and no interest in its continuance." Quoted in *idem*, 3.

¹⁰⁶ As early as 1946, the Soviet Union began to veto applications for membership in the organization. The United States countered by voting against Eastern European (Communist) states' applications. In 1955, both sides agreed to a "package deal" whereby 16 new members gained admission—four from Eastern Europe, six aligned with the West, and another six non-aligned Afro-Asian states. Thereafter, applications for UN membership were rarely rejected and total membership rapidly increased (see following note).

¹⁰⁷ After 1955, the "non-aligned" or "neutralist" movement gained great political power by voting more as a "bloc" in the UN General Assembly. As the number of UN membership increased from its original 51 in 1946 to 100 in 1960 and 126 by 1968. The "neutral bloc" (especially member-states from Africa and Asia) quickly became the largest voting power in the Assembly. (Especially significant, Afro-Asian member-states numbered 10 in 1945 and exceeded 60 by 1968). Emerging neutral leaders (such as Indonesia's President Sukarno, and Egypt's President Nasser) used this voting bloc as leverage against European colonial powers—one clear example was the 1960 UN GA "Declaration on Colonialism" (discussed in text below) which called on all colonial powers to provide self-determination to their territories as soon as possible. See, for example, Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, vol. II, *The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 1-17; 175-97.

¹⁰⁸ DOS, *USPUN* 1955, 82.

¹⁰⁹ Western intransigence on colonial questions, more than any other issue,

By 1960, with 40 new UN member-states having been admitted since 1955 (increasing the total membership from 60 to 100), the “neutralist” (especially the states that formed the “Afro-Asian” bloc) members formed the largest single group of states that tended to vote together on specific issues.¹¹⁰ The power of this group was behind the 14 December 1960 “Universal Declaration on Colonialism” that was passed in the GA by an overwhelming 90-0-9(U.S.) vote. This historic resolution (GA resolution 1514) condemned colonialism “in all its forms and manifestations” and gave new impetus to the organization’s involvement in a number of festering international disputes. As it turned out, UN actions in this area served to accelerate the pace of colonial powers’ granting self-determination to their former colonial territories.¹¹¹

The Eisenhower administration sided with U.S. allies by deciding not to support this UN “Declaration on Colonialism.” The U.S. delegation claimed that it abstained on the vote because Washington desired a more inclusive colonialism declaration—one that would have taken the public focus off western Europe and would have included a specific reference to Moscow’s domination of Eastern Europe as “a form of colonialism.” This weak justification drew contempt from the emerging neutralists; and

generated sour relations between the U.S.-led alliance and the emerging neutralist bloc. During the late 1950s and, especially, during the 1960s, “Western issues” consistently gained less support from neutral UN member-states. Some authors have argued that the 1971 General Assembly’s two-thirds majority that unseated U.S.-supported Taiwan and replaced it with mainland China was the tocsin that sounded the end of America’s political control of the United Nations. See Urquhart, *Decolonization and World Peace*, 4, 9-25.

¹¹⁰ Of the original 51 states admitted to the United Nations in 1945, only ten were from Africa or Asia. By 1960, approximately 40 of the 100 member-states were African or Asian. By 1968 another 26 states joined this group, leaving the “Afro-Asian bloc” potentially in control of 66 out of a total 126 votes—this figure does not include the approximate two dozen South and Latin American “non-aligned” member-states. Figures are compiled from lists of UN membership. For such a listing of UN states admitted by year, see Hovet and Hovet, *Annual Review of United Nations Affairs*, 308.

¹¹¹ Luard wrote that “the Declaration inaugurated a long and intensive campaign within the organization over the coming years to bring about that aim.” Evan Luard, *A History of the UN*, II: 181.

in some cases “confirmed international suspicions” that the Eisenhower administration was more committed to its colonial allies than to its ideological rhetoric concerning indigenous peoples’ “right to self-determination.”¹¹² The fact that the United States delegation “voted with” Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom—all UN member-states with significant “colonial” holdings (or close ties to those that did)—confirmed such suspicions. This western camp would soon find itself fighting a losing battle at the United Nations. The 1960 Declaration on Colonialism applied the weight of world opinion against western Europe’s colonial practices and focused attention on the affairs of colonial and non-self-governing territories. At the same time, ironically, the UN “non-aligned” majority failed to challenge Moscow’s continuing subjugation of Eastern Europe—despite the USSR’s recent brutal suppression of “self-determination” in Hungary during 1956 (a drama reminiscent of events in Czechoslovakia during 1948, and repeated there in 1968). The U.S. delegation continued to argue for censure of Moscow’s tactics, but the UN majority must have realized that this would do little good. Instead, the emerging Afro-Asian bloc applied international pressure against Europe’s democratic governments, knowing that these entities were more susceptible to public pressures.¹¹³

In 1961, the General Assembly followed up the previous year’s December resolution by creating a “Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (also called the Special Committee of 17 or 24).¹¹⁴ This committee considerably expanded the United Nations’ involvement in a number of politically divisive issues. U.S. Ambassador Sidney R. Yates (also the U.S. Trusteeship

¹¹² Ironically, this political concept was most closely associated with United States’ rhetoric—from President Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Peace Talks to Eleanor Roosevelt’s speeches before the UN Human Rights Commission.

¹¹³ DOS, USPUN 1960, 39-41.

¹¹⁴ This General Assembly resolution (GA 1542) also condemned colonialism “in all its forms” and called on colonial powers to grant independence to all subjected peoples. The text is in General Assembly Official Records, 1961 (hereafter GAOR).

Council representative) participated in the "Committee of 17"¹¹⁵ meetings as the U.S. representative during 1961. Yates claimed that the new Kennedy administration's approach to decolonization debates, would be to support the United Nations' efforts "to replace the paternalism of the past with political relationships based on consent."¹¹⁶

Encouraged by these developments, Indonesia renewed its West New Guinea arguments before the 16th General Assembly. This time, Indonesian representatives claimed that the 1960 declaration on colonialism mandated that the Netherlands should abandon all claims to West New Guinea. In response to this convergence of demands (matched by increased political pressures applied by the Kennedy administration), the Netherlands' Foreign Minister Joseph Luns reversed his nation's long-standing refusal to relinquish control of West New Guinea. On 26 September, Luns stated that the Netherlands' government was prepared to "terminate sovereignty over the territory," but only if the indigenous peoples' (the Papuans') self-determination was "properly safe-guarded." Minister Luns then proceeded to propose a number of novel suggestions to make West New Guinea's transition a reality. The Netherlands stipulated that it would transfer its sovereignty to an "international authority established by or operated under the United Nations." In addition, the Dutch government would contribute approximately \$30 million annually to this authority (claiming this was the amount they were currently spending to administer the territory). Luns also proposed that a UN commission and plebiscite should be administered by the United Nations to

¹¹⁵ In December 1962, the Special Committee's membership was increased from 17 to 24 (the U.S., USSR, and U.K. were among the original 17). By 1963 this committee was so busy that it met in three sessions for a total of 101 meetings. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963, DOS Publication 7675, International Organization and Conference Series 51 (Washington D.C.: GPO, August 1964), 35.

¹¹⁶ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962, DOS Publication 7610, International Organization and Conference Series 45 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, November 1963), 52-53. For a dissertation study of the Kennedy administration's policy toward Indonesia, see Frederick P. Bunnell, "The Kennedy Initiatives in Indonesia, 1962-1963," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1969.

determine whether the people desired to remain under the Netherlands, become independent, or transfer sovereignty to Indonesia.¹¹⁷

Indonesia objected to the Netherlands' innovative proposals. In essence, President Achmed Sukarno's Indonesian government claimed "Irian Barat" for itself and would not even consider allowing the Papuans a chance for "self-determination"—a notion that inferred that the Papuans would be allowed to choose independence instead of "uniting" with Indonesia. On 27 October 1961, the Indonesian delegation circulated a letter that stated, in effect, that if the Netherlands and the United Nations continued with such a scheme, "there would come a time when Indonesia would "liberate its brothers in West Irian by force." The Dutch, however, were not deterred from their commitment to seek a compromise solution. In November, the Netherlands' delegation repeated its proposal for the United Nations to establish an "international development authority" and for an impartial determination of the Papuans' self-determination. Indonesia again rejected these offers and announced that Jakarta would remain committed to its "policy of confrontation" (which it claimed had persuaded the Dutch to make the concessions they were now offering).¹¹⁸ In December 1961, President Sukarno carried out his threats by mobilizing his armed forces and stepping up "infiltration of Indonesian soldiers by sea and air" into West New Guinea. If the Dutch would acknowledge that West Irian belonged to Indonesia, Sukarno contended, the dispute could end "peacefully."¹¹⁹

During its first year, the Kennedy administration was initially inclined to back the Netherlands. But, as events unfolded, Washington demonstrated increased empathy with Indonesia's aspirations—especially as President Kennedy and his advisers began

¹¹⁷ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1961, DOS Publication 7413, International Organization and Conference Series 33 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1962), 166-67.

¹¹⁸ DOS, USPUN 1961, 168-70.

¹¹⁹ David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 137.

to view Indonesia as a potential strategic ally in Southeast Asia. This reevaluation was pushed to the forefront of Washington's attention when the Soviet Union began wooing Sukarno with "billions" in arms and equipment after January 1961.¹²⁰ Roger Hilsman (the new U.S. Department of State's "director of intelligence and research") recorded that these considerations helped Kennedy's advisers convince the president to move from a policy of "passive neutrality" towards more active efforts to promote an "acceptable peaceful solution."¹²¹ On 22 November 1961, Jonathan B. Bingham (the U.S. expert who debated similar issues before the United Nations' Trusteeship Council) presented the new U.S. approach to the General Assembly. Bingham praised the innovative Dutch proposal as one that could "serve as a model for responsible decolonization." He stated that the U.S. "perceived no valid reason why an expression of the will of the people should be denied to the inhabitants of West New Guinea." In addition, the U.S. representative argued that it should be in Indonesia's interest to accept the Dutch proposal and then to pursue its objectives "through peaceful means." Not willing to alienate President Sukarno, however, Bingham suggested that the United Nations administering authority should provide access to Indonesian representatives as well—so that "every reasonable opportunity" would be granted Indonesia "to pursue its objective of achieving the integration of West New Guinea."¹²² Sukarno's Bandung strategy—that of playing to both superpowers with the ultimate goal of advancing his own nationalist aims—was working as intended.

Despite these diplomatic offers and the Kennedy administration's movement from staunch support of the Netherlands toward a more pro-Indonesian approach, the Indonesian government remained suspect of the Dutch proposals. The Indonesian Foreign Minister claimed that his government would oppose "any attempts by the

¹²⁰ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 372-75.

¹²¹ Ibid., 374-78.

¹²² Emphasis added. DOS, USPUN 1961, 170-72.

colonial powers to introduce ethnic or regional self-determination as interpreted by the Netherlands.” Indonesia asserted that such interference would “confuse the national struggle for independence” and would “imply the legalization of colonial reoccupation.” In effect, Indonesia was opposed to any actions except those leading to West New Guinea becoming Indonesian property. With India and other non-aligned member-states supporting Indonesia, the Dutch proposal was not adopted by the General Assembly. The vote was 53-41-9, in favor, but under UN Charter article 18 voting rules, resolutions dealing with the West New Guinea dispute required a two-thirds majority for passage.¹²³

Each of the belligerents reacted to the latest Assembly vote. The Netherlands claimed that a majority of states had voted for its proposal; and, therefore, since no other majority plan had surfaced, it would “proceed in confidence with its plan.” Indonesian representatives condemned the Netherlands’s intentions and claimed that Indonesia would also proceed with its course, that of “liberating West Irian from colonialism.”¹²⁴ Not surprising, during December 1961, hostilities between Indonesian and Dutch forces resumed. In January 1962, a naval conflict off the West New Guinea coast resulted in the Dutch sinking an Indonesian vessel. As a result of these headline-making clashes, the UN membership came to consider the dispute more seriously as a potential “threat to international peace.”¹²⁵

During January 1963, UN Secretary-General U Thant attempted to prevent any further escalation of fighting between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The UN

¹²³ Article 18 describes Assembly voting rules. Normally, the “president of the General Assembly” either decides (on his own) or takes a vote to categorize specific items as “important matters.” Historically, this designation was almost automatic for colonial issues and disputes that were considered as “threats to international peace.” In this case, the vote of 53-41 (ignore the abstentions) yielded a 56.4% concurrence ratio (53 out of 94). West New Guinea was designated as a “matter of importance,” hence, the two-thirds majority rule [found in Charter article 18 (2)] applied. See Charter excerpts at Appendix A, and DOS, USPUN 1961, 173-74.

¹²⁴ DOS, USPUN 1961, 175.

¹²⁵ DOS, USPUN 1962, 170.

secretary-general wrote letters to each government and suggested that they cease hostilities and initiate diplomatic talks. Backed by U.S. political pressures exerted against the Netherlands,¹²⁶ Thant was able to arrange a "prisoner exchange" (a move that benefited Indonesia, since few Dutch soldiers were actually captured) and to gain concurrence that diplomatic talks would resume. For this purpose, the Kennedy administration offered the services of Ellsworth Bunker (a U.S. diplomat, officially President Kennedy's "Ambassador at large"¹²⁷) to mediate high-level talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia. On 20 March, Secretary-General Thant agreed to support a meeting of delegations from the Netherlands and Indonesia with Ambassador Bunker near Washington D.C. In May, Bunker released a set of proposals (later known as "the Bunker Plan") that became the basis for the successful negotiations that were completed in mid-August.¹²⁸

On 15 August 1962, the secretary-general presided over the signing of formal agreements that were intended to settle the dispute over West New Guinea.¹²⁹ Both Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed that a cease-fire would immediately go into effect; that the United Nations would dispatch military observers to help supervise the termination of hostilities; and that, between 1 October 1962 and 1 May 1963, the territory would be administered under a UN "Temporary Executive Authority"

¹²⁶ Hilsman noted that the Netherlands would not blame the U.S. for this pressure directly, but the Hague did release a statement that "The Netherlands could not count on the support of its allies, for that reason we had to sign." Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 380.

¹²⁷ Ellsworth Bunker had previously served as president of the International Red Cross and U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Italy and India. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Bunker served as assistant secretary of state and ambassador at large, until being posted to Saigon in 1967. Under Kennedy and Johnson, Bunker substantially contributed to UN efforts by mediating international agreements concerned with disputes in West New Guinea, Yemen, and the Dominican Republic.

¹²⁸ DOS, USPUN 1962, 171.

¹²⁹ These agreements and "exchanges of notes" are catalogued as UN Documents A/5710, 20 August 1962; and also are in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 437, 274-91.

(UNTEA).¹³⁰ During this seven-month period, the United Nations would assume territorial sovereignty and supervise the transition of government from the Netherlands to Indonesia.¹³¹ After 1 May 1963, Indonesia would administer the territory, provided that the Papuans' right to self-determination would be "guaranteed." To fulfill this final stipulation, Indonesia agreed that the Papuans were to be granted a free choice to determine their national sovereignty no later than 1969. One final, and significant stipulation of these agreements was that the Netherlands and Indonesia agreed to absorb all costs incurred by the United Nations.¹³²

These arrangements for the peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from one nation's sovereignty to another were novel. For the first time, the United Nations organization was to assume direct responsibility for a transitional government (UNTEA). The authority granted to the secretary-general to assign territorial administrators and raise a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) was unprecedented. Regarding the peacekeepers, the fact that a single nation, Pakistan, agreed to supply the entire 1,500-man "peacekeeping force" (UNSF) was also unique. Previous "international" UN forces were comprised of forces from a number of different member-states. (Although all UNSF ground forces were Pakistani,¹³³ the air operations

¹³⁰ Of interest, the agreements included a stipulation that they would come into effect "... upon the adoption of an approving resolution by the General Assembly." Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 100.

¹³¹ The UNTEA period from 1 October 1962 to 31 December 1962 was conducted as a "joint" UN-Dutch administration; the period from 1 January 1963 to 30 April 1963 emphasized phasing-in Indonesian administrators into top government and security positions. The mechanics of UN officials acting as UNTEA are not covered in detail by this study. A comprehensive report can be found in Paul Van der Veur, "The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique," International Organization (1964), 62-67; see also United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDPI, 1996), 643-45.

¹³² DOS, USPUN 1962, 172.

¹³³ The Papuan police forces assisted the Pakistani UNSF to maintain "law and order;" however the local officer corps was mostly Dutch. In accordance with the

were conducted by approximately 50 USAF crew members and an additional 12 Canadians.¹³⁴) Finally, the offer by both parties to share UNTEA expenses marked the first UN peacekeeping mission funded solely by the two contending parties. This innovative offer saved the United Nations from facing further financial difficulties; and reflected the fact that the organization was already suffering from staggering peacekeeping costs and the refusal of certain member-states to pay assessments.¹³⁵ UNTEA's "volunteer financing" formula set a precedent followed in the Yemen peacekeeping mission and again in Cyprus. As it turned out, this financial arrangement worked well in the case of West New Guinea. However as a long-term solution, this method of financing peacekeeping was not without its problems, especially as tenuous commitments and enduring missions undermined the financial foundations of UN efforts in Yemen and Cyprus. Additionally, the fact that the Security Council was hardly even involved in the West New Guinea dispute¹³⁶ was unusual, especially given

agreements, these officers were scheduled to depart as rapidly as possible. As an interim measure, the secretary-general coordinated to have a number of Filipino police officers serve in these positions until Indonesian officers could be phased-in. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 417.

¹³⁴ In November 1962, the USAF contingent assigned to UNSF numbered 99 (24 officers; 75 enlisted). This number was incrementally reduced to 37 (11 officer, 26 enlisted) by April 1963. The Canadian contingent remained more steady at 8 enlisted and 2 to 4 officers. Wainhouse noted that, due to West New Guinea's poor infrastructure, UNSF and UNTEA remained "heavily dependent upon sea and air transport." UNSF included, for the first time, a small naval contingent (approximately 100 Pakistanis) with five small water craft employed primarily for transport of personnel and equipment. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 144.

¹³⁵ The financial crisis resulted from the exorbitant costs associated with sustaining peacekeeping operations in the Sinai (UNEF) and the Congo (ONUC). A number of member-states (notably, the Soviet bloc and France) refused to pay their "peacekeeping" assessments—despite a decision by handed down by the International Court of Justice in July 1962 that such expenses were "valid assessments." For more on this court decision, see "Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion," International Court of Justice Reports 1962, 157-80.

¹³⁶ A few reports were filed with the Security Council concerning hostilities

the fact that the secretary-general considered the dispute a clear case of a "threat to international peace." Such a categorization clearly falls within the responsibilities of the Council under Charter article 24.1. Nonetheless, the bilateral agreements and the General Assembly's resolution made no mention of the Council. Instead, the UN resolution simply sanctioned the Dutch-Indonesian agreements and passed all responsibility for West New Guinea directly to the secretary-general and his staff.¹³⁷

On 21 September 1962, the General Assembly unanimously¹³⁸ sanctioned the Dutch-Indonesian bilateral agreements, passing GA resolution 1752, by a vote of 89-0-14.¹³⁹ Thus, despite Indonesia's demonstrated willingness to resort to violence where diplomacy failed, or perhaps for that very reason, the United Nations agreed to act as intermediary to resolve the West New Guinea dispute. Significantly, this resolution was cited by the secretary-general as approval to go ahead with operations that he had already been conducting since 15 August (under his own broadly-expanded "authority"¹⁴⁰). Considering that the Soviet Union was on record as opposing

between the Netherlands and Indonesia between 1960 and 1962, but no Council resolutions were adopted. Higgins noted that communications to the United Nations concerning hostilities were filed as Security Council documents, "whereas discussions on the status of West Irian had always previously occurred in the Assembly." Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 100.

¹³⁷ UN Secretariat personnel filled many of UNTEA's top governmental positions during the period of UN transition for West New Guinea. Eventually officials from thirty-two different member-states contributed to this effort. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 142; 155.

¹³⁸ The Senegalese representative cast his vote in favor, but later requested that it be logged as a negative vote. See Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 111.

¹³⁹ Note, a "unanimous" vote does not consider the number of members that vote to abstain. A copy of the resolution is included in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 110-11.

¹⁴⁰ Although Charter articles 97 and 98 describe the secretary-general as the organization's "chief administrative officer," and task him to "perform such functions as are entrusted to him," U Thant's actions find no clear authorization under the Charter. See Charter excerpts at Appendix A.

independent actions by the previous two secretaries-general,¹⁴¹ some authors note that it was strange that Communist representatives did not lodge a single protest regarding U Thant's activism in West New Guinea. Actually, Moscow's motivations were fairly clear. Most simply, the United Nations' course in West New Guinea was set to serve Indonesia (a country that had recently signed arms agreements with the Soviet Union and whose leaders were willing to promote relations with Moscow) and, at the same time, would deprive a NATO country of a strategic "colonial holding."¹⁴²

During August 1961, the secretary-general's "military adviser," India's Brigadier General Indarjit Rikhye,¹⁴³ concluded arrangements for both the observer and peacekeeping forces (these actions were also taken prior to receiving official Council or Assembly authorization). On 17 August, Rikhye arrived in Hollandia (the territorial capital, later renamed Kotabaru) to make arrangements for implementing the agreed-upon cease fire. Within twenty-four hours, he began to dispatch a small cadre of 21 UN military observers and assign them regional responsibilities.¹⁴⁴ Between 18 August

¹⁴¹ The Soviet Union was on record as having declared both previous Secretaries-General (Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld) *persona non grata* over UN actions in Korea and the Congo, respectively.

¹⁴² See, for example, comments by the Soviet representative at the General Assembly's 1058th meeting, of GAOR, 1961, 707.

¹⁴³ Rikhye was veteran of UN peacekeeping in the Sinai and Congo. He later served as the secretary-general's representative in the Dominican Republic during a crisis in 1965-66. He is an author of a number of "peacekeeping" books to include, Indarjit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980); Indarjit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: UN peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and he collaborated with two other military peacekeeping warriors, Michael Harbottle and Bjorn Egge to write The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

¹⁴⁴ All but two of these 21 observers were "borrowed" from other UN peacekeeping missions in progress in the Middle East and the Congo. The observers represented six different UN member-states: Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria, and Sweden.

and 21 September, these observers helped to separate belligerents and to spread the word that a cease fire had gone into effect. This "UN Military Observation Mission," although small (by no means could it have "enforced" the cease fire), performed its assigned duties admirably and contributed to an orderly cessation of hostilities in West New Guinea. In retrospect, the parties' mutual acceptance of the agreements made the UN observers' job principally one of information and coordination. The UN observers were withdrawn on 21 September.

At the same time that the UN observers were helping to implement the cease fire, General Rikhye coordinated for the creation of a UN military force that would become the United Nations Security Force (UNSF). UNSF's tasking was to support the UN "Temporary Executive Authority" (UNTEA) as its international police and military force during the time of government transition from Dutch to Indonesian control.¹⁴⁵ Pakistan volunteered to contribute a large contingent to serve the United Nations. Politically, Pakistan was accepted by both parties as "sufficiently impartial." Within weeks, this 1,500-man army was on its way to West New Guinea as the newest UN "blue helmet" force. The actual agreement with Pakistan was signed on 30 August. Again, at the time this took place, the General Assembly had yet to "authorize" such actions. Nonetheless, the secretary-general justified these "preliminary" actions as in the organization's best interests and as dictated by the necessity to put the bilateral agreements into effect.¹⁴⁶

Also during August 1962, Washington offered to provide aircraft and crews to help implement the cease fire and to provide full-time mission support and transportation for the new UNSF mission. This too, was unusual. Between 1956 and 1961, the previous secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld had made it a foundational premise of UN peacekeeping that "great powers" should not be directly involved in UN

¹⁴⁵ UNSF's "mandate" was derived from article VII of the Dutch-Indonesian "Agreement." For a full text, see Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 101-06.

¹⁴⁶ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 642.

operations.¹⁴⁷ U Thant selectively reversed this “rule” and relied heavily upon “liaison” U.S. assistance in the Congo and direct U.S. participation as the assigned UN air force in West New Guinea. Moscow had complained about U.S. military involvement in the UN Congo operations. At nearly the same time, however, the Soviets permitted direct U.S. Air Force (USAF) participation in West New Guinea as part of both the observer and UNSF missions because they were viewed as “advancing the demise of European colonialism.” Ironically, the Kennedy administration did not view U.S. support of the UN mission in West New Guinea as harmful to the Netherlands, but rather as helping the Dutch reckon with the inevitable.¹⁴⁸

The U.S. Air Force performed a variety of missions in support of UN operations in West New Guinea. The USAF’s first assignments were to airlift over 300 tons of food and stores to Indonesian troops that were isolated in West New Guinea. Within weeks, the USAF contingent had repatriated 531 captured Indonesian troops and transported the 1,500-man Pakistani contingent for its assignment to UNSF. At first, six U.S. H-19 helicopters and four twin-engine C-47 transports¹⁴⁹ (and their crews) were provided by the Kennedy administration to support internal UNSF and UNTEA mobility requirements. During November, once UNSF operations had stabilized, the

¹⁴⁷ The second UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld held firm beliefs that the United Nations could best serve as an international peacekeeping agent if “great powers” were not directly involved in UN peacekeeping. The rules he established for the large (6,000-man) force that patrolled the Sinai and Gaza Strip (as UNEF I) were considered by many to be the pillars of UN peacekeeping. See Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 22-51, 213-48; and Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana, 1961), 98-125.

¹⁴⁸ Evan Luard, A History of the UN, II: 336-46

¹⁴⁹ The C-47 was the military equivalent of the Douglas DC-3 “Gooney Bird.” Wainhouse documented that “within 18 hours of their arrival” these USAF aircraft conducted operations that included: “. . . dropping pamphlets informing soldiers of the cease fire . . . deliver[ing] tons of emergency food and medical supplies and picking up soldiers . . . for delivery to central collection points.” Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 152.

USAF withdrew its helicopters and all but three of its transport aircraft.¹⁵⁰ Those aircraft (and assigned crews) that remained in West New Guinea continued to support UN supply and reconnaissance missions through April 1963. Total U.S. military costs incurred in support of UNTEA and UNSF were \$627,072.¹⁵¹ Later, the Netherlands and Indonesia, via the United Nations, reimbursed the United States for the cost of these services.¹⁵²

UNTEA was terminated on 1 May 1963. On that date, Indonesia assumed responsibility for the administration of the territory, in accordance with the Agreement of August 15, 1962. Total costs for UNTEA and UNSF, which were split between Indonesia and the Netherlands, were approximately \$26 million.¹⁵³ Six years later, in mid-1968, Secretary-General Thant appointed Fernando Ortiz Sanz as the UN representative to advise Indonesia concerning its obligations regarding Irian Barat's "act of free choice." As feared by Dutch representatives when the original agreements were signed, Indonesia thwarted attempts to hold a genuine plebiscite. In the end, Jakarta designated Papuan representatives assigned to the island's "consultative assemblies" (representing eight political regions) to vote for or against "joining" with Indonesia. These representatives, as noted by Mr. Sanz, were "hand-picked" by the

¹⁵⁰ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 145.

¹⁵¹ The USAF conducted 649 sorties, transported 3,205 passengers, and delivered 482,777 pounds of cargo in support of UNTEA/UNSF. About two-thirds of this amount were costs for USAF and U.S. Navy transportation services for bringing in and taking home the Pakistani forces: the Air Force transported the troops into New Guinea and the Navy's U.S.S. Blatchford was used to transport the Pakistani forces home. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. II, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 92-94.

¹⁵² DOS, USPUN 1962, 173-74.

¹⁵³ The original U.S. DOS reports estimated costs at \$35.8 million, but an in-depth study concluded in 1973, concluded that final costs were \$26,442,790. See Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 140; and DOS, USPUN 1963, 131.

Jakarta government. Thus, it came as no surprise in August 1969 when Indonesia announced that the local representatives voted unanimously that Irian Barat should "remain part of Indonesia."¹⁵⁴

As a result of this series of events, a few scholars and statesmen noted that UN sanction of Indonesia's actions did not reflect well upon the United Nations' image "as champion of human rights and self-determination."¹⁵⁵ Even the secretary-general's personal representative filed a report highlighting his disappointment at the Indonesian government's malfeasance.¹⁵⁶ During September 1962, when the General Assembly had approved the Dutch-Indonesian agreements, some of the 14 member-states that "abstained" on the vote raised objections that such treatment of the Papuans was foreseeable. During these debates, for example, the representative from Dahomey noted, "despite all its goodwill, my government cannot endorse arrangements whereby a people of 700,000 is transferred from one power to another under a bilateral treaty concluded without previous consultation with the party chiefly concerned, the Papuan people."¹⁵⁷ At that time, Dahomey represented a small minority. Seven years later, apparently even fewer UN member-states seemed to notice. From this perspective, the

¹⁵⁴ Fernando Ortiz Sanz, "Report of the Secretary-general's Special Representative to West Irian," UN document A/7723, 2 November 1969, in GAOR, 1969; UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 648.

¹⁵⁵ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 139. Evan Luard compared the case of West New Guinea (and the UN's "profound indifference" to the rights of those "most directly concerned") to the cases of Eritrea (taken by Ethiopia) and Goa ("swallowed by India") as examples of how the UN "failed to defend the rights of the peoples of small territories." See Luard, A History of the UN, II: 347.

¹⁵⁶ Sanz concluded that the Indonesian manipulation of the Papuan's "free choice" could "only be viewed as a blot on the UN's image as champion of human rights and self-determination." See Fernando Ortiz Sanz, "Report of the Secretary-general's Special Representative to West Irian," UN document A/7723, 2 November 1969, Annex, p. 70 in GAOR, 1969.

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 114.

United Nations has been accused of acting as the instrument of a “dishonorable settlement.”¹⁵⁸

Of course, the concerns of the international community regarding West New Guinea should be placed within the broader climate of international events. During September 1962, the United Nations’ greatest preoccupation was with events in the Congo. It was also concerned with events in Angola, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia. On top of these problems, the General Assembly was faced with a vote to authorize a \$200 million loan (bond issue) to keep the organization solvent (due to the high cost of peacekeeping operations in the Sinai and the Congo). Outside of the United Nations, especially within the East-West struggle, the world was approaching its most dangerous hour. China was preparing to launch a raid into north India. The superpowers were locked in an escalating arms race, while Nikita Khrushchev was intent on secretly placing nuclear missiles and bombers into Cuba (some say, to counter U.S. missiles in Turkey). The United States was rebuilding its conventional military forces and was concerned with events in the Congo, in Cuba (allegations of Soviet build-ups there began in August) and in Southeast Asia (specifically South Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand—preventing these from “falling into the Soviet orbit”). In perspective, safeguarding the rights of 700,000 “backward people living in West New Guinea”¹⁵⁹ were not considered to be of great consequence. The international community, overall, was satisfied with the United Nations’ resolution of the West New Guinea dispute.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 115; Wainhouse and others, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, 139; and Luard, *A History of the UN*, II: 346.

¹⁵⁹ Luard, *A History of the UN*, II: 337.

Chapter Summary and Analysis

UN Security Council involvement in Indonesia (1946 to 1951) provided a number of lessons about the conduct of early UN peace operations. First of all, the Council was able to conduct its business—avoiding P-5 vetoes—at a time when today's analysts argue that the Cold War rendered the Council ineffective. The fact that the United Nations simultaneously was contributing toward peaceful resolutions in Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, and Korea demonstrated that the organization was not “ineffective” during these years of heightened East-West tensions. Second, the Council's initiatives for resolving the Dutch-Indonesian dispute were innovative and precedent-setting. The Council even-handedly opposed both belligerents' breaches of mediated cease-fire agreements, and its resolutions implored both sides to give up violence and seek diplomatic solutions. The Council members sought to obtain impartial information, to provide impartial patrolling of cease-fire lines, and to mediate a lasting peace. Toward these objectives, the Council made use of a “Consular Commission,” military observers, and a “Good Offices Committee” (reconstituted as the UN Commission for Indonesia in 1949). These early “instrumentalities” were the results of an international organization searching for the means and methods to advance international peace. In the case of Indonesia, these bodies contributed to the United Nations' objectives and provided lessons for the organization's later attempts to resolve international disputes. Finally, without the cooperation of the parties involved (the Netherlands and Indonesia) and without solid support from Council “permanent” members, there would have been no multilateral successes. Admittedly, the Netherlands did not wish to grant full sovereignty to Indonesia for another decade or so. By peacefully accelerating this process, the patience of Indonesian diplomats and the overwhelming political and economic pressures brought to bear upon the Dutch government (mostly by the U.S. government) proved to be the most important factors leading to Indonesia's “early” and mostly peaceful transition to independence by December 1949.

A decade later, the United Nations contributed toward managing a peaceful transfer of “West New Guinea” to Indonesian control (1962-63). The United Nations’ operation of a complicated seven-month transitional government in West New Guinea (as UNTEA) and its associated UN observer/Security Force (UNSF) have generally earned praise.¹⁶⁰ As opposed to the UN experimental operations that helped to manage Indonesia’s independence in 1949, by 1962, the United Nations had accumulated “considerable experience” in supervising arrangements for cease fire, troop withdrawals, and similar measures. David Wainhouse, author of a number of detailed studies of international peacekeeping, evaluated UN contributions to the West New Guinea settlement. He argued that, “in no case had [the United Nations] discharged its functions more expeditiously and successfully than in West New Guinea.” Wainhouse cited “the prompt arrival and deployment of military observers, aerial support by the U.S. Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force, lack of any outside interference, and above all, full cooperation given by the two parties” as specific reasons for this “success.”¹⁶¹

Conspicuously missing from Wainhouse’s list was the U.S. political support that served to “pressure” the Netherlands and Indonesia to compromise on a peaceful solution. This was true in both 1949 and in 1962. In return for these efforts, the U.S. government received criticism from both sides—perhaps confirming U.S. even-handedness. The Netherlands claimed that they had been “pushed into an unfair agreement,” whereas Indonesia felt that the U.S. government had unnecessarily “held them back.” According to Roger Hilsman, a State Department officer during the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy acknowledged that the “role of the mediator is not a happy one” but, in this case, the United States was “prepared to have everybody mad” as long as U.S. long-term interests were secured.¹⁶² The U.S. objectives of maintaining

¹⁶⁰ See, for example: Van der Veur, “The United Nations in West Irian,” 62-67; Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation, 416-21.

¹⁶¹ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 155.

¹⁶² Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 380.

regional stability and averting a military conflict (perhaps one that could have afforded the Soviet Union or its proxies an opportunity to form closer ties with Indonesia) was secured. Without U.S. political, economic and military clout, and without the United Nations' offers (and capacity) to act as intermediary, it is doubtful that the cases of Indonesia's 1949 struggle for independence and, thirteen years later, Indonesia's acquisition of West New Guinea from the Netherlands, would have been resolved as quickly or as peacefully.

With respect to the end result, in each of the cases studied in this chapter, the "success" or "failure" of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking was due to a combination of factors. Of foremost importance, was the cooperation of the parties involved (in the cases study above, that of the Netherlands and Indonesia). Secondly, the positions—supportive, insouciant or oppositional—of UN Security Council members, especially those of the P-5, were of key determinants. The political, military (technological and logistical), and financial foundations of UN peace operations, especially in the case of difficult or long-term disputes, primarily rested upon the P-5 member-states. With these established, broad-based UN member-state contributions were also required. In the case of Indonesian independence, at least six UN member-states (those with consular offices in Batavia) contributed diplomats and military observers. In the second example, that of West New Guinea's transfer to Indonesia, Pakistan's major troop contribution along with police and air units supplied by three other UN member-states provided peacekeepers that were instrumental in helping the multinational administrative staff manage a peaceful territorial transition. In this respect, these studies of UN efforts to resolve colonial disputes (as for most UN peace operations) demonstrated that the key to UN effectiveness was the synergy of its member-states' contributions.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE AND FALL OF "TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING" IN SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA, 1956 TO 1968

Peacekeeping is the most important task of the United Nations.

USUN Representative and U.S. Senator Clifford P. Case¹

Between 1956 and 1968, the concept of United Nations' (UN) "traditional peacekeeping"² took shape in response to and was refined by three interstate conflicts that occurred in South and Southwest Asia. Wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1956 and in 1967 marked high points of international concern and UN involvement in the Middle East (or Southwest Asia). In between these Arab-Israeli

¹ Senator Case was a primary U.S. delegation representative to the 21st General Assembly. Quoted in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966, DOS Publication 8276, International Organization and Conference Series 77 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1967), 71.

² Since the term "peacekeeping" has come to be used as a generalized "catch-all" phrase to describe UN peace operations, this study employs the characterization "traditional peacekeeping" to describe those operations modeled on the United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF) that was created as a result of the 1956 Suez war. The characteristics of this type of UN peace operation will be defined in the chapter which follows. The terms "inter-positional," "buffer" or "barrier" and "plate-glass" are apt synonyms for UN "traditional peacekeeping." The work of Alan James, long-time professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, was seminal in suggesting such distinctions between various UN peace operations. See, for example, Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969); and *idem*, "UN Action for Peace," I: "Barrier Forces," II: "Law and Order Forces," The World Today Numbers 11 and 12 (November and December 1962).

wars, another international conflict was waged between India and Pakistan (August 1965 to January 1966). In 1956 and, again in 1965, a UN “inter-positional” operation was generated to help separate contending forces. In 1967, host nation consent for the UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai was rescinded and the UN buffer was withdrawn. A war between Arabs and Israelis ensued within two weeks. The force’s legacy was ten years of relative calm between two bitter enemies. It had provided mediators with a decade of relative stability within which to negotiate a more lasting regional peace. That such diplomatic efforts failed, should not be blamed on “peacekeeping,” *per se*. Instead, the recurrence of war between Arabs and Israelis in 1967 demonstrated that peacekeeping without “peace-making” cannot endure. This chapter will examine the conflicts that gave rise to traditional peacekeeping, describe the characteristics of this innovation as a multinational tool for separating belligerents and stabilizing volatile borders, and then summarize traditional peacekeeping’s utility and limitations. Common to all three crises associated with these UN traditional peacekeeping missions was an elevated level of international concern, corresponding multi-lateral diplomatic initiatives, and Washington’s sustained support for the United Nations as a central coordinating agency.

In many respects, the United States was the United Nations’ key peacekeeping supporter between 1956 and 1968. The political, financial, and logistical support of the U.S. government was critical for launching and sustaining each of these ambitious extensions of UN “peace operations.”³ Significantly, U.S. political support for UN peacekeeping, during these years, was bipartisan—provided by three consecutive U.S. presidential administrations, one Republican, the other two Democratic. A variety of considerations buoyed such broad U.S. support for UN peace missions. At bottom, Washington’s motivations can be explained by the fact that both parties valued international stability as a central foreign policy objective. Most U.S. policymakers

³ This study employs the term “peace operations” to characterize the gamut of UN missions ranging from observation, “traditional peacekeeping,” “enforcement” to “nation-building” missions that represent the range of mission-types (from least intrusive and simplest “field mission” to those more dangerous and ambitious).

agreed that the United Nations was the “most appropriate forum” for pursuing multinational aims.

This is not to say that U.S. domestic support for acting through the United Nations was universal. Some critics claimed that U.S. political efforts and the funds authorized by Congress to support UN peace operations were ill-spent. Over the life of the United Nations’ Emergency Force mission (UNEF, which operated for more than ten years in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip) the U.S. government contributed nearly \$100 million of the UN’s total \$217 million in expenses for UNEF.⁴ In absolute terms, \$100 million was a sizable investment—especially to sustain a mission that, in the end, did not prevent the outbreak of another Arab-Israeli war. On the other hand, this can be compared to the \$200 million price-tag associated with the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s decision to land 15,000 U.S. Marines in Lebanon four just four months during 1958.⁵ In light of the alternatives, UNEF (the main case study outlined below) helped to stabilize a volatile, strategic region for more than a decade—at a relatively low cost. The mission did not lead to a “political solution,” but the fact that war erupted between Israel and Egypt within weeks after the mission’s termination was no coincidence.

The broader political and strategic context of these events is also relevant to this study of UN peacekeeping. Between 1956 and 1968, the Cold-War remained, more or less, a strategic stalemate. As a result, the East-West “battle for influence” in the peripheral regions (in this case, in South and Southwest Asia) grew in relative importance. In these areas, United Nations’ “impartial” peace initiatives often provided

⁴ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. IV, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 164-65.

⁵ For comparative purposes, UNEF averaged around 5,000 men and lasted over ten years. For information on the U.S. sending 15,000 Marines to Lebanon during 1958, see Caroline Anne Pruden, “Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace” (Ph.D. diss., University of Vanderbilt, Nashville, TN, 1993), 606, 662; also see Chapter Three of this study.

an alternative to direct superpower involvement. Leaders in Moscow and Washington came to value international mediation of certain disputes as an alternative to “risking” direct superpower confrontation. The development of peacekeeping as an international collective action (usually through the United Nations⁶) decreased the chances of direct great-power engagement resulting from proxy involvement in peripheral disputes. Disassociating these powers’ meddling in such conflicts was particularly important in the early years of the nuclear era—a time when the consequences of East-West warfare were potentially catastrophic. Rather than recognizing these achievements for what they were, critics complained that UN actions failed to “solve” difficult regional disputes. In reality, the ultimate solution to these intractable problems, if possible at all, required considerable concessions by all parties involved and could not easily be “imposed” by the United Nations organization. Until such concessions were made (as a result of applying the proper incentives to both sides), the best that could be hoped for was to minimize the chances for further military hostilities. In this respect, collective mediation through the United Nations and the advent of UN peacekeeping as a means to contain regional disputes, together, served to improve long-term prospects for international peace. Each of the following case studies serves to highlight these considerations.

⁶ For a discussion of UN mediation efforts that were not solely controlled by the United Nations, see discussion of the Korean conflict in Chapter Two and analysis of “Hybrid Peacekeeping” in Chapter Seven of this study.

The "Suez War"⁷ and the Creation of a United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF)⁸

Between October 1956 and March 1957, the United Nations pioneered new methods for mobilizing international consensus and promoting regional stability.⁹ During and after the Suez war, United Nations' mediations and innovations helped to secure an early cease fire. Thereafter, the United Nations' General Assembly authorized the UN secretary-general to collect a group of international contingents and to deploy it between belligerent armies. This peacekeeping buffer, christened the United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF), greatly expanded the scope and potential of international peace operations. UNEF became the largest multinational operation under "command and control" of the United Nations (to that date),¹⁰ and established

⁷ A solid U.S.-international perspective of the Suez war is found in Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981). An account of events from the perspective of the first UNEF commander is offered by E. L. M. [Eedson Louis Millard] Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto, Canada: Clarke and Irwin, 1962).

⁸ The institutional UN history of peacekeeping refers to this UNEF operation as "UNEF I," to distinguish the 1956-67 mission from its 1973-79 successor, UNEF II. This study will use the shorthand of UNEF to reference only UNEF I. See United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDPI, 1996), 33-56.

⁹ Ironically, some of the international community's enthusiasm for the United Nations' successes in the Middle East during 1956 and 1957 was concurrently attenuated by the Soviet "invasion" of Hungary and the United Nations' inability to persuade Moscow to respond to international criticism. Such critics, however, naïvely misunderstood what the United Nations could and could not do. From the beginning, Cold War or not, the United Nations was designed to act on behalf of the "great powers;" or at least not against them (hence the veto). The case of Suez was remarkable because UN actions (backed by both the United States and the USSR) actually influenced two permanent members (the United Kingdom and France) to reconsider their actions in light of international opprobrium.

¹⁰ Control of the "United Nations' operation in Korea" was delegated to the United States government, which acted "as the United Nations command." (See Chapter Two for more on how the U.S. commanded the UN "sanctioned" multinational operation in Korea, 1950-1953).

the model for what came to be called “traditional peacekeeping.”

The United Nations Emergency Force’s organization and mandate proved to be precedent-setting in many respects. UNEF was constituted as a multi-national body (initially, ten different national contingents participated¹¹). It was deployed between enemy armies as a “buffer” force. Its presence was dependent upon “host-nation consent”—when this was removed in 1967, UNEF was terminated. Like earlier UN observers, UNEF peacekeepers were directed to use deadly force only in self defense. In fact, most of UNEF’s “peacekeeping standards” were derived from lessons learned during the UN observer and field missions that had operated earlier in Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, and the Kashmir. But, with respect to its ambitious size (which averaged 5,000 soldiers, over ten years), its area of operations (in Gaza, along the international boundary between Israel and Egypt, and in south-east Sinai) and its method of interpositional deployment, UNEF became the prototype for a new genre of subsequent UN “peacekeeping operations.” From an analytical perspective, UNEF’s early success epitomized the strengths and weaknesses of multinational action through the United Nations. Figuring prominently in both positive and negative aspects of peacekeeping, was the financial, military, and logistical support that was provided by a majority of the UN member-states—including the critical contributions made by the United States government and U.S. military services. The development of UNEF, as a force and as a “peacekeeping precedent,” and how the U.S. played a prominent role is

¹¹ A total of 24 UN member-states “formally” offered to contribute troops to UNEF (which averaged around 5,000 total personnel). Of the 10 nations that participated, the Finns (255 men) and Indonesians (582 men) were recalled after the first year. In October 1958, Columbia recalled its 492 personnel, leaving seven states to pull the load. Of these, India’s contingent of 1167 was the largest, Canada’s strength, at 982, was second largest. Other contributing states and their contingents as of the end of 1958 included Yugoslavia (676), Brazil (630), Norway (571), Sweden (502), and Denmark (407). See Robert C. R. Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peacekeeping Forces (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 12-25. For annual UN reports (1957 to 1967, respectively) see UN documents A/3694; A/3839; A/4210; A/4486; A/4857; A/5172; A/5494; A/5736; A/5919; A/6406; and A/6672. These reports provide UNEF troop strength figures at approximately annual intervals.

best analyzed in the context of the events that shaped the October 1956 Suez war.

During 1956, the escalation of tensions and military “raids” between Arabs and Israelis was a source of concern to both the United Nations and the United States. In March 1956, UN observers (those already in the region, assigned to the UN Truce Supervision Organization¹²) reported large-scale military build-ups by all parties along the armistice demarcation lines. These actions were criticized by UN members as violations of the general armistice agreements (GAAs) that had been signed by Israel and its neighboring Arab states in 1949. As regional violence increased, the top U.S. representative to the United Nations¹³, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., voiced Washington’s public position. Before the UN Security Council, Ambassador Lodge encouraged “full compliance with the armistice agreements” as the essential first step in “restoring peaceful conditions in the Near East.” Ambassador Lodge also called on the United Nations to actively pursue efforts to heal, or at least contain, the festering Arab-Israeli dispute.¹⁴

As diplomatic relations worsened between Arabs and Israelis, the UN secretary-general, Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjöld, became actively involved in international mediation efforts.¹⁵ Between 10 April and 3 May, Hammarskjöld visited the troubled

¹² For information in this study on UNTSO, see Chapter Two.

¹³ This position was officially called the “United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations”—although it is not a “permanent” posting. See Chapter One of this study, “Key U.S. and UN Officials” for a more complete discussion of similar issues.

¹⁴ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956, DOS Publication 6577, International Organization and Conference Series III, 124 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, December 1957), 37-39. Note, the terms “Near East” and “Middle East” are, for the purposes of this paper, synonymous with “Southwest Asia.”

¹⁵ The UN secretary-general’s involvement and visibility as an international mediator grew to such a degree during the 1956 Suez war that, henceforth, Dag Hammarskjöld (and some of his successors) became known as the “international servant for peace.” See, for example, Wilder Foote, ed., Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of the

region. Upon his return to New York, the secretary-general reported finding "a general spirit of distrust" and noted a lack of central control over the Arab (mostly Palestinian) guerrilla forces.¹⁶ In June, following more flare-ups, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution reiterating Washington's call for "full compliance of the armistice agreements" as a "prerequisite to progress."¹⁷ This resolution not only adopted the U.S.-supported diplomatic approach, it charged the secretary-general with greater responsibilities representing the Security Council. Prior to 1956, the secretary-general's role had been limited to more administrative and less executive functions. During the Suez crises, and thereafter, Dag Hammarskjöld gained overwhelming support from the international community as the UN's chief negotiator and mediator.¹⁸

Despite greater international attention and direct UN secretary-general negotiations, Egyptian-Israeli "border tensions" rose during the summer of 1956. UNTSO observers reported that the parties "had failed to take adequate steps to forestall border incidents and that, in specific instances, they were ignoring their

United Nations, 1953-1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). The most comprehensive scholarly work on Dag Hammarskjöld, as UN secretary-general, and as a key player behind UNEF's creation was written by a former British soldier who was employed by the UN Secretariat after his participation in the 1945 founder's conference (UNCIO), Sir Brian Urquhart: see Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 132-230.

¹⁶ Dag Hammarskjöld, "Report of the Secretary-General," 9 May 1956, S/3596. For all subsequent reports, unless otherwise noted, they are available in the compiled eight volumes of Public papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, eds. Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969-77).

¹⁷ Security Council Resolution 114, 4 June 1956. This was the last UN Security Council resolution passed in 1956 concerning the Palestine issue due to British and French complicity in the autumn. For a full text, see SCOR, 1956.

¹⁸ Previously, many of these duties had been assigned to ad hoc committees and other specially commissioned bodies. By 1957, the secretary-general's stature was raised to the point that a common expression in the halls of the UN and the press was "let Dag do it." See Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 179-94.

obligations under the armistice agreements.”¹⁹ As a result, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld concluded that another war between Israel and Egypt was imminent (after eight years of armistice). At the same time, other disputes were brewing which served to “internationalize” the impending Arab-Israeli conflict.

In July 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers had executed a political coup that terminated that country’s Western-oriented monarchy. Within two years, army Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had assumed control of Egypt, as president. The Eisenhower administration initially courted President Nasser hoping to arrange an alliance with Egypt (as part of a “Middle East Command”).²⁰ U.S.-Egyptian relations grew cooler as Nasser displayed his reluctance to trust the West. In Nasser’s eyes, Egypt had been manipulated as a Western colonial asset since the 1880s. By 1955, Nasser expressed his dissatisfaction with America’s increasingly staunch support of Israel. In addition, Egypt was in a position to play the West against offers for assistance from Moscow and Eastern Europe. As a result of a meeting of Third-World “neutral” leaders at Bandung (April 1955²¹), Nasser was convinced of the power inherent in ideological “neutralism”²²—that of using both East and West for his own purposes. His deal to accept Soviet military equipment (via Czechoslovakia) in 1955 angered U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Because of Nasser’s continued “defiance” of the West, in mid-1956, the Eisenhower administration decided to deny funding for Egypt’s Nile Dam project at Aswan. Perhaps in retaliation, but certainly as a means to assert Egypt’s rejection of further Western “manipulation,” on 26 July,

¹⁹ DOS, USPUN 1956, 41.

²⁰ On attempts to persuade Nasser to join in a Western-dominated “Middle East Command,” see Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 109-28.

²¹ See the discussion of Bandung in Chapter Four of this study.

²² For the best scholarly analysis of Nasser’s use of “neutralism,” see H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 223-304.

Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.²³

Nasser's seizure of the Canal outraged both the British and the French.²⁴ The U.S. government cautioned its allies against military retaliation. Reluctantly, they were persuaded to meet with 16 other governments to seek a diplomatic solution by forming a group of "canal users" (and 16 other nations) to barter with President Nasser. This U.S.-spurred initiative culminated in a conference, convened in London from 16 to 23 August, from which an 18-power "formula" for settlement was proposed to Egypt.²⁵ Nasser rejected the proposal and offered no counterproposal. Faced with this diplomatic set-back, the maritime-dependent governments joined together to form a "Suez Canal Users Association" (SCUA), on 21 September. This action gave greater clout to the users, but proved unable to reverse Egypt's intransigence.²⁶

At this point, Britain's Prime Minister Anthony Eden and France's Prime Minister Guy Mollet agreed that their nations' best option was to proceed with a direct military intervention against Egypt. These conspirators found a willing ally in Israel. Israel, too, was disenchanted with diplomacy and seemed ready to go to war against

²³ Many historians assert that Nasser's move to nationalize the Suez Canal was provoked by the U.S. decision to withdraw the Aswan dam funding. See, for example, Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); and Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

²⁴ The Eisenhower administration also was displeased by Nasser's decision. The U.S. government feared that such a move would set a precedent, spurring other Arab or Third-World leaders to seize other U.S. international assets. The British and French were particularly incensed due to their greater dependence upon the transit of oil and other commercial traffic through the canal. Another factor that is often overlooked, British and French investors immediately lost \$25 million in annual revenues from canal traffic. See Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, seventh rev. edn. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 154.

²⁵ The Eisenhower administration dispatched its highest-ranking diplomat, Secretary of State Dulles, to participate in the London conference.

²⁶ DOS, USPUN 1956, 42-43.

Egypt.²⁷ Shortly thereafter, the three nations adopted a scheme from which they felt all three would benefit. In the case of a general war between Israel and Egypt, they secretly proposed, the British and French would call for both sides to withdraw from the “threatened” Suez Canal region. Egypt, the plan rightly anticipated, would not agree. After Egypt’s refusal, British and French forces would invade under the guise of promoting international interests to “protect” the Suez Canal. If all worked out according to their plans, British and French forces would control the canal zone and President Nasser would be discredited because he could not be trusted to keep the “international asset” safely operational.²⁸ American intelligence remained mostly unaware of these plans, even to the moment they were put into full effect. When events unfolded, somewhat as the British, French, and Israelis planned, President Eisenhower felt betrayed. He immediately resolved to deny the belligerents—three of America’s closest allies—any profit from such “old-style gunboat diplomacy.”²⁹ This decision, especially in the eyes of many developing nations, stands out as President Eisenhower’s finest political moment. He had opposed America’s closest allies, within a week of his presidential re-election. That President Eisenhower justified his actions in terms of the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ Charter did much to strengthen the world organization’s credibility.³⁰

²⁷ Nasser had routinely refused to allow goods destined for Israel to proceed through the Suez Canal, and he ordered Egyptian troops to blockade the narrow Straits of Tiran (which was easily accomplished with military forces based at Sharm-el-Sheikh, a southeastern Sinai village); this effectively denied shipping access to Israel’s southern port city of Eilat. The Eisenhower administration condemned Nasser’s actions on both accounts. Israel thought U.S. support for its military actions would be forthcoming.

²⁸ A scholarly work that covers the international politics of the Suez crisis is Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez; for information on the British/French conspiracy see especially 205-10; 301-05.

²⁹ Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 225-239. Quote on p. 226.

³⁰ See, for example, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-61: The White House Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965).

On 29 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Gaza and the Sinai.³¹ When the Security Council met on 30 October, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld read reports from the UNTSO chief of staff that confirmed Israeli troops had crossed the international frontier and were occupying positions in the Sinai. Hammarskjöld reported that the UNTSO chief had recommended an immediate cease fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Israel did not comply. The United Nations was powerless to stop the Israeli advance. Egypt immediately appealed to the United Nations for substantial action. The Egyptian representative called for Israel to be “expelled” from the United Nations for violating its promises to abide by the organization’s Charter. In reply, the Israeli representative “asserted that his government had acted in self-defense as required to secure free access to international waters and to eliminate Egyptian “commando bases” in the Sinai Peninsula.”³²

The next day, on 30 October, the British and French governments called upon both Egypt and Israel to “stop all warlike action forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal.” These governments then “informed the world,” that Egypt and Israel had 12 hours to comply, “failing which [pre-deployed and briefed] British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to secure compliance.” In response, at the Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union (for different reasons), opposed the British and French unilateral decree. As expected, the British and French UN representatives cast vetoes against U.S.- and USSR-sponsored resolutions.³³

³¹ Both the Sinai and the Gaza Strip were territories granted to Egypt during the 1949 armistice agreements.

³² DOS, USPUN 1956, 48.

³³ This was the first Security Council veto cast by the British and the second by the French. UN experts question the legality of these vetoes because Security Council members, under the Charter, are to abstain on issues directly related to their own actions. Previously the USSR had been the only clear “violator” of this legal principal based upon article 27.3 that states, “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting [in the Security Council.” (See appendix A.) Ibid., 49.

These events were a variation of previous great power differences aired before the Council; but the end result was the same. The right of veto granted to each of the P-5 members served as intended by the Charter framers—the Security Council could not act against any single great power.³⁴ What Britain, France, and Israel did not anticipate, however, was that the confluence of U.S. and USSR interests and earlier U.S. initiatives to strengthen the General Assembly would provide an alternate means to rally world opinion against the BFI collaborative “scheme.”

The Eisenhower administration expressed both shock and displeasure at these great-power aggressive actions taken by its “close” allies. On the evening of 31 October, President Eisenhower delivered a televised speech that was aimed at both the intervening governments and the American people. The president described the events that had led to war in the Middle East, to include Egypt’s “seizure” of the Suez Canal and President Nasser’s political intransigence. Despite these diplomatic problems, President Eisenhower categorically stated that the United States would not tolerate a resort to colonial military aggression to resolve them. Eisenhower said that the actions by Israel, Great Britain and France were “taken in error” and without prior consultation with the U.S. government. He committed US support for the United Nations and set U.S. goals as “localizing” the fighting and ending the conflict as soon as possible.³⁵

At the Security Council, on that same day, Yugoslavia invoked the 1950 uniting-for-peace resolution.³⁶ This move, supported by both Moscow and Washington,

³⁴ The veto guaranteed that the Security Council would work to advance only those issues seen as within the permanent members’ (P-5) mutual interests. See discussion of the veto in Chapter One of this study.

³⁵ Diane B. Kunz, in her Yale dissertation turned monograph, convincingly argued that U.S. “economic pressures” persuaded the United Kingdom to concede the defeat of its aggressive approach to “solving the problem of Nasser.” See Diane B. Kunz, *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*; and DOS, *USPUN* 1956, 49.

³⁶ The November 1950 U.S.-sponsored “uniting-for-peace resolution” was an effort that was, ironically, intended to strengthen the General Assembly as an alternative forum to work around Soviet vetoes. In this case, Washington and Moscow, together, supported moving the initiative to the General Assembly (away from the deadlocked Security Council). For more on the development of the U.S.-

provided the legal means to circumvent British and French Council vetoes and move the UN debates to the General Assembly. As a result, the first "Emergency Special Session" (ESS-I) of the General Assembly was called to take action where the Council could not.³⁷ The ESS-I debates began on 1 November 1956.³⁸ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke on behalf of the U.S. delegation.³⁹ Dulles called for the adoption of a UN resolution to impose an immediate cease fire in the Middle East and for all parties to promptly withdraw behind pre-war boundaries. Furthermore, he suggested that the UN secretary-general be called upon to "observe and promptly report on the compliance with the resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly." The derivative U.S. proposal was adopted 2 November by the Emergency Assembly, 64-5-6. In his speech, in addition to calling for a cease fire, Secretary Dulles also spurred an early ground-swell of support for mounting an expanded UN peace operation for the Sinai region. He said:

There needs to be something better than the uneasy armistices which have existed now for these 8 years between Israel and its Arab neighbors; there needs to be a greater sense of confidence and security [established in the area.]⁴⁰

sponsored uniting-for-peace resolution see Chapters One and Two of this study.

³⁷ The UN General Assembly was not in session, as it normally would have been this time of year. Apparently Dag Hammarskjöld had approved an earlier U.S. suggestion to delay the 1956, 11th Regular Assembly until after the U.S. national elections in November. As fate would have it, the Suez war forced international politics to the forefront of U.S. political debates a week before Americans went to the polls.

³⁸ Three days later, the same procedure (introduced by the U.S., not Yugoslavia) was repeated, over a Soviet negative (procedural) vote, to consider events in Hungary. As a result, ESS-II convened concurrent with proceedings of ESS-I. Both sessions terminated when the 11th Regular Assembly began on 12 November (and both topics remained at the top of the Assembly agenda).

³⁹ This was unusual in that U.S. secretaries of state previously had addressed only the opening meetings of annual Regular Assemblies.

⁴⁰ DOS, USPUN 1956, 50-51.

That “something better” was the United Nations’ Emergency Force that was formulated, approved, and deployed between November 1956 and March 1957.

The core-ideas for such an expanded UN observer mission, had been devised by Lester Pearson,⁴¹ a long-time UN representative from Canada, and Ralph J. Bunche, an American Nobel laureate working as an assistant secretary-general within the UN Secretariat.⁴² On 4 November 1956, Pearson, Bunche, and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld proposed to the Emergency Session representatives that the secretary-general should be authorized to make arrangements for a United Nations force “large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.” The U.S. secretary of state immediately endorsed this idea and proclaimed that he and President Eisenhower fully supported the establishment of such a force.⁴³ The ESS-I Assembly did so, as well. That same day (4 November), by a vote of 57-0-19, the Assembly approved resolution 998. This document tasked the secretary-general “as a matter of priority” to submit a plan within 48 hours for the establishment “of an emergency international UN force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of [earlier resolutions].”⁴⁴

⁴¹ The following year, Mr. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to the United Nations in convincing the secretary-general and his staff to create the international peacekeeping force that became UNEF.

⁴² The most comprehensive scholarly work on the creation of UNEF by Pearson, Bunche and Hammarskjöld was written by a former Secretariat “insider,” Britain’s Sir Brian Urquhart. See Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 264-90; and his own story of UN involvement, in *idem*, A Life in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 131-39.

⁴³ DOS, USPUN 1956, 53.

⁴⁴ Resolution 998 (ESS-I) is considered the “enabling resolution” that launched the United Nations’ Emergency Force. The UN documents related to UNEF are found in many compilations, see for example, E. Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents (New York: Praeger, 1960); Robert C. R. Siekmann, Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985); and Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. I, The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 227-41.

Thus commissioned, Dag Hammarskjöld and his Secretariat worked to transform Pearson's and Bunche's concepts into reality. For the most part, lessons from earlier field operations informed their efforts. [For a depiction of UNEF's deployment as of August 1957, see map at Appendix B.] But in one respect, Dag Hammarskjöld and his advisers reversed a Charter premise regarding the role of great powers as guardians of international peace and security.⁴⁵ The secretary-general proposed that the national contingents recruited to serve in UNEF come from member states that were not permanent members of the Security Council.⁴⁶ Hammarskjöld's decision to reverse this long-standing UN practice was influenced greatly by Egypt's concerns and by the growing political power of the "neutralist" movement at the United Nations. The United States supported Hammarskjöld's proposals to bar Security Council permanent members (the P-5) from donating national contingents to UNEF. The secretary-general envisioned great-power involvement in "peacekeeping" as limited to an indirect (though critical) support role—providing air and sea transport, logistics, and the greatest share of financing. In this respect, UNEF also set a precedent relegating U.S. involvement in many subsequent UN peace operations to an "indirect" or supporting role. Despite this new "rule," U.S. contributions remained of primary importance to the success of most every United Nations' operation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union resisted Hammarskjöld's proposal to exclude Council "permanent members" (the P-5) from direct involvement in UNEF. Moscow argued against UNEF as a mechanism that represented "forfeiting" P-5 "enforcement rights" (as intended by the Charter's original framers) to "neutral" ad hoc peacekeeping forces. On 5 November,

⁴⁵ See for example, UN Charter articles 42-47 (excerpts are in Appendix A). These provisions clearly demonstrate that the UN founders intended international peace and security to be, primarily, a "great power" responsibility. When it didn't work out as planned, innovators like Dag Hammarskjöld were able to find viable alternatives.

⁴⁶ According to Mark Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld formulated this approach after his first two years as secretary-general convinced him that this was the best way to employ the United Nations and to keep great power politics out of UN operations. For the development of Hammarskjöld's ideas, see Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 22-197; 213-54.

the same day that the British and French forces finally landed their forces in Egypt, the Soviet representative proposed that if British, French, and Israeli troops did not immediately withdraw, then the USSR and the United States should jointly provide military assistance to Egypt. The Eisenhower administration opposed this Soviet proposal.⁴⁷ Instead, the U.S. consistently backed the secretary-general's alternative plans. As a result of its staunch support for the secretary-general, the Eisenhower administration allowed a new UN approach to peace operations to become reality. Subsequently, as a model for traditional peacekeeping, UNEF substantially enhanced the UN's credibility and its capacity to act as a guardian of international peace.⁴⁸

Another concept that marked UNEF as "traditional peacekeeping" was that of "host-nation consent." Although the secretary-general was appointed in resolution 998 (ESS-I) as the primary negotiator, Hammarskjöld delegated a great deal of initiative to Major General E. L. M. Burns to gain consent for UNEF from Egypt and Israel. As the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) chief observer, (and soon to be UNEF's first commander⁴⁹) Burns relied a great deal upon his staff officers assigned to UNTSO. These international observers had gained experience working sensitive issues with Israel and its Arab neighbors. Their expertise and personal

⁴⁷ In light of the concurrent USSR "intervention" in Hungary (to quell a popular rebellion), Ambassador Lodge was said to have characterized the Soviet proposal as "unthinkable." Abba Eban, *Abba Eban: An Autobiography* (New York: Random House, 1977), 227.

⁴⁸ The Eisenhower administration, for its part, gained great favor with the developing world for these statements; but the U.S. lost much of what it gained by continuing to support its European allies on "colonial issues" (as outlined in Chapter 4) and with its unilateral "invasion" of Lebanon in 1958 (see Chapter Three). The UN, for its part, suffered criticism concerning its inability to act on behalf of Hungary. Although a study of the UN's inability to act in Hungary is outside the scope of this study, for an excellent discussion of the UN's limitations and the reasons why it could not act within a "great power's sphere," see Zacher, *Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations*, 52-132.

⁴⁹ Dag Hammarskjöld chose Canada's General Burns to command UNEF because Burns was the current UNTSO chief of staff and had local contacts and expertise. For Burns' account of these events, see Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*.

contacts smoothed the way for UNEF's implementation. It is important to note that UNEF was not created to replace UNTSO. Instead, UNTSO was retained to preclude any notion that the 1949 General armistice agreements were no longer in effect. This decision also proved to be precedent-setting. Between 1957 and 1967, the two forces complemented each other—with UNEF picking up the primary responsibility for the Egyptian-Israeli border areas and UNTSO patrolling the other three border areas (as before).⁵⁰

With these new ground-rules under discussion, Dag Hammarskjöld and General Burns skillfully negotiated with Egypt and Israel to gain "host" nation's "consent" for UNEF's establishment and its continued operations. Hammarskjöld conferred with the British, French, Israelis, and Egyptians a number of times during November and December 1956. During the first week of November, the British and French had agreed to support the interposition of a UN force between the armies of Egypt and Israel in the Sinai as a precondition to British and French forces withdrawal. Egypt hesitantly agreed to the stationing of impartial UN troops on its soil—acknowledging that the British and French forces would refuse to "surrender territory" to the Egyptians. Israel, for its part, agreed to a cease fire, but was determined to "exploit" a perceived gap between implementing an "immediate" cease fire and troop withdrawals "as soon as possible." Israel's Prime Minister David Ben Gurion desired to hold out for some concessions granted by President Nasser, prior to performing an unconditional retreat to pre-hostility boundaries.⁵¹ Just as obstructionist to UN purposes (and with greater long-term ramifications), Ben Gurion refused to allow UN

⁵⁰ This approach was repeated by Dag Hammarskjöld's successor, Burma's U Thant, who created a separate UN force to supplement UNMOGIP in the Kashmir when war was waged between India and Pakistan in 1965. See UNMOGIP and UNIPOM discussions, in this chapter, below. DOS, USPUN 1956, 53.

⁵¹ Eban, Autobiography, 225-227. Eban was concurrently the Israeli Ambassador to the United States and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1949-59). He was later the Israel foreign minister (1966-74). He was not an "insider" to the British-French-Israeli schemes of October 1949, but he played an important role in the following UN debates.

troops to operate on Israeli territory.⁵²

Despite obstacles, the General Assembly voted to go ahead with UNEF as proposed by the secretary-general. At this point, the United States military, especially the U.S. Air Force, was called upon to effect a quick deployment of UN member-states' international forces (from around the globe). The key stipulation by the governments of France and the United Kingdom was that their forces would not withdraw from Egyptian territory (specifically the "Canal Zone") until the region was "kept safe" by arriving UNEF forces. Accordingly, the deployment of UNEF allowed the British and French to "save political face" by claiming that they had protected the Suez Canal and now had turned the area over to international UN forces, not to Egypt (which soon followed, in any case). As of 10 November (once nations notified the UN that forces were available for duty), the U.S. began its airlift operations. In deference to President Nasser's requests,⁵³ U.S. military aircraft were not allowed to deliver UN troops to Egypt. Instead, UNEF's initial contingents were assembled in Naples, Italy. From Naples, they were transported across the Mediterranean by Canadian, Italian or Swiss air carriers.⁵⁴ By 14 November, the first ninety-five UNEF troops were in place. By 22 November, 869 UN personnel were operating in Egypt. By 3 December, the British and French agreed that conditions had been met for them to begin a "phased

⁵² This decision by Israel (denying access to UNEF to both sides of the armistice line), remained Israel's policy for the next ten years. Failure to secure "equal access" was a "complication" in 1957. In 1967, Israel's trenchant refusal to allow UNEF to "cross-over" (as requested by the UN) was a major factor contributing to UNEF's ignoble demise. DOS, USPUN 1956, 54.

⁵³ Egypt's President Nasser closely associated the United States with its three enemy forces, and was not sure U.S. forces could be safe (or trusted) following the Suez hostilities. Similarly, Nasser was hesitant to admit Canadian forces on Egyptian soil. These objections were slowly overcome by Dag Hammarskjöld's arguments in favor of Canadian forces participation in UNEF.

⁵⁴ In fact, president Nasser even objected to Canadian participation (as close allies of the British and French), but Dag Hammarskjöld was able to convince the Egyptian leader to acquiesce to Canadian participation in UNEF.

withdrawal.” By 22 December, most British and French troops were withdrawn.⁵⁵

In early 1957 (just as UNEF's deployment was beginning to proceed smoothly), the Israeli government balked at further withdrawal of its forces without additional “conditions.” Speaking before the United Nations, the Israeli representative complained of Egypt's continued refusal to address its grievances—those that had “justified” Israel's military actions, to begin with. Israel wanted Egypt to renounce its continuing “state of war;” to agree to negotiate peace; to end an on-going economic boycott; to discontinue interfering with Israelis shipping through the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran;⁵⁶ and “to recall the commandos under its control in other Arab countries.” A number of nations were outraged by Israel's “dictating conditions for withdrawal.” Nonetheless, UNEF was neither large enough, nor mandated to “drive” Israeli forces back. Before the General Assembly, the Israeli representative argued that Egypt's belligerence and non-compliance with UN resolutions should be resolved first, since, as early as September 1951,⁵⁷ the Security Council had directed Egypt to recognize Israel's rights to freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. Israel proposed that, as a minimum, the UN force should be deployed in the region of Sharm-el-Sheikh in southeast Sinai, to prevent further conflicts in the Straits of Tiran. In this “condition,” the United States and France eventually backed Israel.⁵⁸ These “friends of Israel” were finally able to convince Secretary-General Hammarskjöld that a return to the status quo ante bellum would be like replacing the “box of matches

⁵⁵ DOS, USPUN 1956, 59.

⁵⁶ The Straits of Tiran, adjacent to the Egyptian Sinai region known as Sharm el-Sheikh, is a narrow Red-Sea passage from which a small force can effectively control shipping to Israel's southern, non Mediterranean, port city of Eilat. By the way, shipping to Jordan's only port city, Aqaba, must also pass through the Straits of Tiran.

⁵⁷ See Security Council resolution 95, 1 September 1951; SCOR, 1951.

⁵⁸ The decision to support Israel's guarantee of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran was formalized on 11 February 1957 in a memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to Israel's Ambassador to the United States (and to the United Nations), Abba Eban. See Eban, Autobiography, 240-41; and Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (London: Heinemann, 1964).

as close as possible to the gasoline soaked bonfire.”⁵⁹ Once convinced, and with Israel’s promise to continue its withdrawal, the UN secretary-general persuaded President Nasser that he should allow stationing UNEF forces in Sharm-el-Sheikh (to guarantee free shipping through the narrow Straits of Tiran) and along the boundary between the Gaza Strip and Israel. After two months of tension-filled negotiations, on 4 March 1957, Prime Minister Ben Gurion openly agreed to withdraw Israel’s forces behind the original armistice demarcation line (ADL).⁶⁰

Throughout UNEF’s deployment, the United Nations was faced with the daunting task of directly organizing and supervising a multi-lateral, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural task force.⁶¹ Dag Hammarskjöld, his Secretariat staff, and the UNEF chief of staff, General Burns, performed these tasks admirably.⁶² As of 4 March 1957, UNEF comprised approximately 6,000 troops, representing ten different UN member-states.⁶³ In UNEF’s first five months, a number of difficult administrative and organizational problems were solved. In many respects, the molding of such disparate ad hoc forces into a single “peacekeeping force” was an organizational miracle.⁶⁴

On the other hand, UNEF’s financing proved to be a serious problem. UNEF’s

⁵⁹ Eban, Autobiography, 238.

⁶⁰ DOS, USPUN 1956, 59-67.

⁶¹ As outlined earlier, the “UN coalition in Korea,” under the “UN Command” was directly controlled by the U.S. government and Department of Defense—not by the United Nations.

⁶² For studies that address the issues of organizing and commanding the multi-national United Nations’ Emergency Force, see Abdel-Latif M. Zeidan, The United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1967 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1976), 110-128, 164-189; and Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 116-141.

⁶³ The UN had also received offers for additional forces from fourteen other member-states. Siekmann, National Contingents, 14.

⁶⁴ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 55-70.

financial “basic rules” had been “unanimously” approved by ESS-I, on 7 November 1956.⁶⁵ A majority of member-states agreed that nations providing units would pay for their own soldiers’ basic salary, and provide basic operational equipment. Other costs, it was agreed, should be financed by the United Nations general budget.

Hammarhjöld proposed such expenses be “apportioned among Member-States on the basis of the scale of assessments adopted for the United Nations [annual] budget.”⁶⁶

This specific proposal was adopted by the 11th General Assembly on 21 December 1956, by a vote of 52-9-13.⁶⁷ The Soviet bloc voted against these financing rules.

Each year, afterwards, Moscow refused to pay its “apportioned” share for UNEF expenses—setting a damaging precedent that other member-states would later adopt.⁶⁸

On 26 November, the General Assembly had approved a special “initial” account of \$10 million for UNEF expenses. Recommendations of a “special financial committee” were adopted by the General Assembly on 27 February 1957. These included authorization for the secretary-general to exceed the initial \$10 million and for the organization to accept voluntary contributions from member-states to help support expenditures in 1957. Of the additional \$6,500,000 estimated to be required (above the ten million), the U.S. volunteered to pay 50%—conditionally: “if other governments

⁶⁵ Assembly Resolution 1001, ESS-I, 7 November 1956. The vote was 64-0-12 (Soviet bloc, others abstained). The USSR justified its later refusal to pay “assessments” for UNEF by noting it had not voted “in favor” of this resolution. France, which also later refused to pay its share, could not make this claim. See Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, I: 234-35; and Sidney D. Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-1964, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 647.

⁶⁶ DOS, USPUN 1956, 72.

⁶⁷ General Assembly resolution 1089, GAOR, 11th Session, Supplement 17, A/3572, 46; also in Lauterpacht, The United Nations Emergency Force: Basic Documents, 7-8.

⁶⁸ When the USSR adopted a similar attitude toward the ambitious UN operation launched in the Congo (Zaire), the United Nations experienced its first major “financial crisis” during the mid-1960s. (See also Chapter Six of this study).

would contribute the balance.”⁶⁹ UNEF’s first year was the most expensive (due to deployment and mobile operations), costing nearly \$30 million.⁷⁰ Its expenses averaged just under \$20 million per year, thereafter.⁷¹

Within four months after three national armies had invaded Egyptian territories, therefore, the United Nations successfully negotiated a cease fire, arranged for the withdrawal of all belligerent forces⁷² and created the world’s first international interpositional peacekeeping force. In addition, the United Nations contracted an international salvage operation that quickly cleared the Suez Canal of scuttled ships and repaired other canal damages. For the first time, the United Nations provided a glimmer of living up to its potential in the field of international conflict resolution. The results of the United Nations’ effort was aptly summarized by an annual Department of State report: “world public opinion acting through the United Nations had made effective its disapproval of resort to force to settle disputes among nations.”⁷³ Thereafter, three U.S. presidential administrations annually praised the continuing

⁶⁹ This conditional payment system adopted by the United States was a good incentive for others to contribute. Regardless of such generous “incentives,” however, the U.S. paid the lion’s share each year thereafter. DOS, USPUN 1956, 73.

⁷⁰ Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, 168-69.

⁷¹ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, IV: 161.

⁷² The credit for Israel’s peaceful (albeit belated) withdrawal from the Sinai should go to the U.S. Department of State and French Foreign Ministry. These painstaking diplomatic negotiations conducted outside the United Nations were responsible for bringing the extreme positions of Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld together.

⁷³ The root causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict were not solved in the wake of the 1956 war. In that year, over 922,000 Palestine Refugees remained directly dependent upon international assistance (most coordinated through the United Nations’ program called UNRWA) for their very survival. Contributions by governments to support this growing population (750,000 in 1949) in that one year alone totaled some \$23 million (of which the U.S. government contributed \$16.7 million). DOS, USPUN 1956, 69-70, 74.

operations of UNEF as a “stabilizing force” in Southwest Asia, between 1957 and 1967.⁷⁴

That the United Nations’ Emergency Force helped stabilize the Israeli-Egyptian boundaries for over ten years remains undisputed. A more critical look at UNEF’s performance, however, reveals certain shortcomings in light of its original over-optimistic mandate. The UN force was established: (1) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt; (2) to prevent raids across the border between Israel and Egypt, and (3) to insure compliance with the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement in accordance with all the terms of the Assembly’s resolutions of November 2, 1956, and February 2, 1957.⁷⁵ This mandate was far-reaching, and in many respects, impossible to fulfill. In its first few months of operations, UNEF supervised the cessation of hostilities and provided cover for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Once in place, UNEF reported on border violations and may have prevented others. It could not, however secure a cessation of hostilities, nor was it able to ensure compliance of all aspects of the armistice agreements—to carry out these duties would have required a number of armored divisions, not 5,000 lightly-armed peace-keepers. Despite these critiques, UNEF represented a major advancement in international cooperation. Before the UN “enforcement” operations conducted in the Congo (1960-1964), UNEF was the most ambitious peacekeeping effort conducted and supervised by the United Nations.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ See for example, Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Congress, Letter of Transmittal, 26 June 1958, in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1957, DOS Publication 6654, International Organization and Conference Series III, 128 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, June 1958), v.

⁷⁵ DOS, USPUN 1956, 2.

⁷⁶ The special case of UN involvement in Korea (1950-53) was, in reality, an operation conducted by the United States government and military commands. The United Nations lent political credibility by sanctioning the “UN effort.” In return, the U.S. government kept the United Nations informed of its actions taken and took into consideration subsequent resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly.

Throughout UNEF's existence, the U.S. government and Department of Defense provided airlift, sealift, and miscellaneous equipment on a "reimbursable basis" (per authority granted by the UN Participation Act⁷⁷). In the first six months (through April 1957) the USAF transported over 3,600 international troops to Naples, Italy.⁷⁸ The Eisenhower administration supplied UNEF with jeeps, radios, rations, and even the famous "blue helmets" (U.S. army issue helmet liners, painted blue with white "UN" lettering). The value of U.S. logistical support for UNEF through 1958 exceeded \$7 million.⁷⁹ In 1959, the U.S. contributed another \$1 million in supplies.⁸⁰ Through the United Nations, as a member state paying its "fair share," the United States was formally "assessed" approximately 32 percent of the UN's calculated costs for UNEF operations (these assessments came to approximately \$6 million per year, for 11 years). About \$8 million of this total was reimbursed to the U.S. government for military services and supplies provided in support of UNEF.⁸¹

⁷⁷ U.S. Public Law 264, 20 December 1945, as amended by Public Law 341, 10 October 1949. These two U.S. laws formed the basic statutory foundations for U.S. participation in the United Nations and were supplemented by presidential executive orders, such as 10206, 19 January 1951. For a clear discussion of "U.S. statutory bases" for support of UN peacekeeping, see Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 519-22.

⁷⁸ DOS, USPUN 1957, 84.

⁷⁹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958, DOS Publication 6852, International Organization and Conference Series 4 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1959), 69.

⁸⁰ From 1957 to 1959 the Eisenhower administration's direct support for UNEF totaled over \$8 million. Between 1957 and 1967, U.S. assessments and contributions in support of UNEF totaled \$93.8 million or approximately 44% of all UN expenses (see Chart C4). Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1959, DOS Publication 7016, International Organization and Conference Series 12, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, August 1960), 59.

⁸¹ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, IV: 96.

A failure to place UNEF (and subsequent UN operations) on a sure financial footing, however, threatened not only UNEF's, but the UN organization's survival. Foreshadowing UNEF's future fiscal troubles, as early as 1957 the Soviet representative voiced his nation's "opposition to UNEF's continuation." He argued that UNEF's creation by the General Assembly, was "unconstitutional, since only the Security Council could create UN armed forces."⁸² The Soviet-bloc and other member-states agreed with Moscow's arguments and, increasingly, refused to pay UNEF's expenses. To make up for non-payments of certain member-states (the Soviet bloc, and later others), the UN solicited "voluntary contributions." The United States, again, gave generously.⁸³ [For a depiction of U.S. total payments see Chart C4.]

Despite these costs (which were insignificant compared to U.S. military budgets which averaged over \$85 billion per year⁸⁴), and controversies (which proved to be politically damaging to the United Nations), the Eisenhower administration continued to praise UNEF. During the 1958 General Assembly, for example, the U.S. delegation emphasized that "the United States continued to hold the view that the establishment of UNEF was one of the outstanding accomplishments of the United Nations and was worthy of the full support of all members in carrying out its important

⁸² DOS, USPUN 1957, 86.

⁸³ For the first \$15 million in voluntary payments collected, \$13 million was provided by the U.S. In fact, U.S. financial support of UNEF for the first two years, 1957 and 1958, amounted to about 47 percent. In 1959, total U.S. contributions accounted for approximately 44 percent. DOS, USPUN 1958, 238-39.

⁸⁴ The average U.S. defense budget (not including foreign military assistance) averaged \$85 billion between 1946 and 1968 (in constant 1975 dollars). See Richard Smoke, "The Evolution of American Defense Policy" in American Defense Policy, 5th edn., John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, eds. (Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 94-135. Total military assistance expenditures between 1950 and 1967 totaled another \$34 billion—about \$2 billion per year. See Department of Defense, "Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1967" (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1969), 503 (table 47). In constant 1997 dollars, the average annual U.S. defense budget was over \$300 billion between 1948 to 1991. See "1998 Military Spending: Behind the Numbers, How the Pentagon is Spending Your Money," The Defense Monitor XXVI, Number 3 (June 1997).

responsibilities.”⁸⁵ Ambassador Lodge and others agreed that UNEF was to be regarded as “one of the outstanding achievements of the United Nations,” and declared that, “UNEF should be continued so long as it is needed.”⁸⁶

The international community agreed that UNEF was needed. Accordingly, it was annually renewed by the General Assembly. For ten and one-half years, UNEF successfully patrolled the Gaza Strip and Straits of Tiran, acting as a buffer force and defusing tensions between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, other regions in South and Southwest Asia remained concerns of the United Nations. UNTSO continued to mediate disputes along Israel’s eastern and northern frontiers. During 1962, Iraq threatened to invade the newly independent Kuwait (a former British colony).⁸⁷ Between 1963 and 1964, the Security Council and secretary-general also mediated an arrangement between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia to establish a UN observation mission in northern Yemen. And two-thousand miles to the northeast, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) continued to patrol the Kashmir (since 1949).⁸⁸ In 1965, UNMOGIP’s operations gained sudden international attention and were supplemented by a new peacekeeping force during a renewed India-Pakistan war. In retrospect, the “success” of the United Nations’ Emergency Force prompted a rapid rise in the number of UN operations for peace, worldwide.⁸⁹ The analysis below concentrates on the 1965-66 war between India and

⁸⁵ DOS, USPUN 1958, 69.

⁸⁶ DOS, USPUN 1957, 86.

⁸⁷ The United Nations’ and Arab League’s “regional” response to this threat to Kuwait is covered in Chapter Seven of this study.

⁸⁸ Between 1957 and 1968 the United Nations generated new “peacekeeping” operations (conducting observation, enforcement and nation-building) in Lebanon, Yemen, West New Guinea, the Congo, and Cyprus. These operations are discussed in Chapters Three, Four, Six, and Seven, of this study. In total, the UN sponsored, or was involved in ten different international peacekeeping efforts between 1956 and 1968.

⁸⁹ In this respect, the “surge” of UN peacekeeping missions launched between 1988 (when the organization received the Nobel peace prize for “peacekeeping”) and

Pakistan and the events that led to UNEF's withdrawal in 1967. Both incidents demonstrate the utility and shortcomings of UN "traditional peacekeeping."

The United Nations, India and Pakistan Redux (UNMOGIP/UNIPOM)

Between the late 1950s and mid-1960s, there was a steady increase in the number of cease-fire "violations" and other complaints lodged with the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)—a UN observer force that had been stationed along the tense Kashmiri cease fire line since 1949.⁹⁰ By the summer of 1965, Pakistan and India were again at war. The initial battles began south of the Kashmir in a region between India and Pakistan known as the Rann of Kutch.⁹¹ The fighting spread northward and, by August, the uneasy cease fire in the Kashmir broke down. [See map at Appendix B depicting border incursion locations and troop positions held.]

Since 1949, when the UN presence was established on the Indian subcontinent, the dispute between India and Pakistan over the regions of Jammu and Kashmir (commonly called the Kashmir) had eluded diplomatic solution. Despite continued

1995 was reminiscent of the rapid pace of first generation of peacekeeping operations launched between 1956 and 1968. In 1993, the UN was involved in 17 peacekeeping missions, with over 78,000 personnel deployed. By January 1998, the number of peacekeepers had dropped to under 15,000. Source: "Fewer Peacekeepers Reported by the UN," The Washington Times, 10 January 1998, A7. Both eras experienced major challenges and were followed by years of questioning and concern for United Nations' "over-extensions."

⁹⁰ A study of UNMOGIP, its creation and operations, is included in Chapter Two of this dissertation. For a multi-faceted study on UNMOGIP (originally a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Keele University in 1987), see Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London: Hurst and Company, 1994).

⁹¹ For an analysis of this three month skirmish, see Higgins, "Findings on the Rann of Kutch," World Today April 1968, 134-36.

political differences, the 1949 UN-mediated cease fire remained stable.⁹² As a result of the July 1949 Karachi agreements, India had gained control of some 73% of the disputed region's land (to include the "highly-prized" Vale of the Kashmir, a fertile valley region), and approximately 81% of the Kashmiri population. The government of India was satisfied with this settlement. Pakistan was frustrated by the *de facto*, (if not *de jure*) partition of the region and India's failure to live up to its 1948 "promise" that it would support a national plebiscite to determine the region's political determination. In April 1965, hostilities erupted south of the Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces. Initially, the British government, without UN assistance, was able to broker a cease fire agreement; but this did not hold. In May and June, military incursions were made by Indian forces (to the north) across the cease-fire line (CFL) in the Kashmir.⁹³ Observers from UNMOGIP were able to negotiate a reversal of this violation, but Pakistani-supported rebels were already planning a major counter-offensive. On 5 August 1965, elements of the "Azad" (free) Kashmir rebel forces crossed the CFL and began harassment operations against Indian military units. After ten days of hit-and-run warfare, the Indian army retaliated in force. In response, regular Pakistani troops openly joined the Azadi attacks.

The India-Pakistan war was the culmination of fifteen years of unresolved hostilities that had long held the attention of the world community. The United Nations had kept a watchful eye on the situation ever since the late 1940s. For the first ten years, UNMOGIP's reports dealt with minor infractions and confirmed that relations

⁹² For information on UNMOGIP and the 1949 UN mediation efforts, see Chapter Two of this study. See also Pauline Dawson, The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), especially 14-39.

⁹³ India claimed that Pakistan was using its positions near Kargil (on the Pakistani side of the CFL) to "interfere with traffic on the major highway between India and the far northern district of Ladakh where Indian troops faced the Chinese." Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. III, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 117.

between India and Pakistan were tense, but stable. In 1954, the United States government signed a military treaty with Pakistan. As a result, U.S. direct participation in UNMOGIP ceased when India declared U.S. observers “partial.” As Washington gravitated toward friendly relations with Pakistan, Moscow aligned more closely with India. A debate concerning the Kashmir situation in 1958 demonstrated this international realignment. At that time, the Security Council considered a complaint raised by Pakistan about India’s public statements that New Delhi was moving to establish a permanent union with the section of the Kashmir under India’s control. The Soviet representative vetoed a proposal because India opposed it. This marked a change of the previously-neutral USSR position with respect to issues between India and Pakistan.⁹⁴

During the early 1960s, relations between India and Pakistan grew more tense as superpower maneuvers complicated the dispute. Washington policymakers, for example, had become sensitive to a potential “Communist penetration” of India. In 1962, the Kennedy administration approved large-scale military assistance to help New Delhi in its northern boundary war with Communist China (PRC)—ostensibly to “counter the expansion of Soviet influence into the Indian subcontinent.” This American shift toward India prompted Pakistan to seek closer relations with the PRC. In 1964, Beijing announced its “full support” of Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.⁹⁵ Moscow, in the meantime, had suffered a break in its formal alliance with China (1960) and had begun to court both India and Pakistan. All things considered, between 1954 and 1965, international interest in the Kashmir dispute became more convoluted and dangerous.⁹⁶ In 1965, the UN Security Council members were aware of these changes. They agreed that the war between India and Pakistan should be ended quickly.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ DOS, USPUN 1958, 56-57.

⁹⁵ The Kashmir region shares its northern boundary with Mainland China.

⁹⁶ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, III: 116-19.

⁹⁷ Alan James wrote that the great powers agreed upon the ends, but

On 4 September 1965, the UN Council adopted the first of four resolutions calling on India and Pakistan to cease fire and return to positions occupied before 5 August.⁹⁸ Officially, the governments of India and Pakistan responded to the third of these calls. As a result, a shaky cease fire was established on 22 September. At the same time, the Council's unanimous resolutions of 6 and 20 September tasked the secretary-general to "take all measures possible to strengthen UNMOGIP" (Resolution SC210) and to "provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease fire" (Resolution SC211).⁹⁹ Armed with these orders, Secretary-General U Thant decided to double the number of observers assigned to UNMOGIP (from roughly 50 to 100) and recommended creating another, separate "peacekeeping" operation to patrol the international boundary south of the Kashmir. The secretary-general's reasoning was that UNMOGIP's "terms of reference" were limited to the Kashmir region; whereas Indian and Pakistani forces were engaged along the entire international boundary.¹⁰⁰ Thant proposed creating a UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) to perform similar functions as those successfully implemented by the United Nations' Emergency Force in the Sinai during early 1957. The creation of this new force, he argued, would preserve UNMOGIP's mandate and add a supplementary force to help disengage armies, then serve as a buffer force south of the Kashmir. Pakistan called on the UN to take more serious measures by generating a major force

disagreed over the means to halt the fighting on the subcontinent. In addition to supporting the UN initiatives, Moscow offered to mediate (under its "neutral" banner); the U.S. and the U.K. suspended military assistance and cut economic aid; and China (the PRC) threatened to intervene. See Alan James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 118-20.

⁹⁸ These resolutions were approved with consideration given to approving sanctions. See Security Council resolutions 209-211, and 214 (4, 6, 20, 27 September, respectively); and debates recorded in *SCOR* 1965.

⁹⁹ Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*, vol. II, *Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 423-4.

¹⁰⁰ This decision is reminiscent of Dag Hammarskjöld's creation of UNEF to supplement, but not replace, UNTSO. (As discussed earlier in this chapter.)

that would, once and for all, solve the Kashmir dispute. India, for its part, initially opposed creating any new UN mission. After a short while, both belligerent governments allowed the secretary-general to generate UNIPOM for an initial period of three months, effective 22 September.

The new UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission was established quickly, but (characteristic of all UN ad hoc missions) it came together haphazardly. The first group of observers were detached from the experienced personnel assigned to UNMOGIP, and were "in place" the first day the cease fire went into effect. Three days later, on 26 September, these UN personnel were joined by another 15 experienced observers detached from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (from Jerusalem). These "temporary" observers were later returned to their assigned posts as new forces arrived and were trained to take their places. As of 5 October, there were 80 observers assigned to UNIPOM, representing ten different UN member-states. By the end of the year, the force strength stabilized at approximately 100 observers and another 100 troops assigned to a support Canadian air squadron.¹⁰¹ As a UN coalition force, UNIPOM suffered from communications and transport problems, from beginning to end. As an example, it was approximately two months before basic radio linkages had been established between UNIPOM headquarters and its observers in the field.¹⁰² Although the U.S. government played a key role as a supplier of transportation and equipment, American involvement in UNIPOM was less important when compared to other missions. Much of this can be attributed to a lack of U.S. supplies available in theater, the willingness of the parties themselves to provide technical and political assistance, and the role played by others,

¹⁰¹ The mission's peak strength was 101 observers, but averaged around 90 for its six months of operations. An attached Royal Canadian Air Force unit was another 101 men. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, III: 131-32; 185.

¹⁰² Wainhouse quoted one participant who stated that "UNIPOM was badly mishandled in the early stages." Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 80-81.

especially Canada, to provide full-time air support and miscellaneous supplies.¹⁰³

Between September and December 1965, UNMOGIP and UNIPOM worked to disengage belligerent military units and monitor the cease fire. Nonetheless, sporadic breaches of the cease fire continued. On 5 November, the Security Council adopted another resolution (SC215), by a vote of 9-0-2(USSR).¹⁰⁴ This resolution condemned both sides for repeated violations of the 22 September cease fire and “demanded” that India and Pakistan meet with a representative of the United Nations to formulate a plan for full disengagement and withdrawals. The secretary-general designated Chile’s General Tulio Marambio to carry out this tasking. As negotiations were underway, UNIPOM’s initial three-month mandate approached expiration (by 22 December). In mid-December, India and Pakistan agreed to allow the secretary-general to extend the UN mission for another three months (and to maintain double manning for UNMOGIP).

At the same time that UN negotiations were taking place, the Soviet Union persuaded the Indian prime minister and Pakistani president to meet with Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin in Tashkent (in south-central Asia, the capital of the Uzbek SSR, at that time). On 10 January 1966, an agreement was announced from Tashkent that both parties, no later than 25 February, would withdraw to positions held as of 5 August.¹⁰⁵ Gen. Marambio followed-up on this initiative and negotiated the detailed rules for implementation. To carry-out these agreements, UNMOGIP and UNIPOM assumed primary roles. As of 26 February, all withdrawals were completed. At the same time, UNMOGIP was reduced to approximately 45 observers and it resumed its long-established duties supervising the Kashmiri CFL.¹⁰⁶ The secretary-general was

¹⁰³ Ibid., 84-92.

¹⁰⁴ A copy of this resolution can be found in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, II: 425-26; and in SCOR, “Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council,” 20th year, 1965.

¹⁰⁵ S/7221, SCOR, 1965.

¹⁰⁶ This return to the status quo ante bellum remained in effect until hostilities

satisfied with the results and authorized the termination of UNIPOM, effective 22 March. UNIPOM's total costs were approximately \$2 million.¹⁰⁷ President Lyndon B. Johnson also was pleased with the United Nations "performance." A year later, reviewing these events Johnson characterized UNIPOM as "a major contribution to international peace." He credited the mission with "arresting a full-scale war on the sub-continent" and with having "prevented untold tragedy in Asia." This mission, along with the continuation of UNEF in the Sinai, in president Johnson's eyes, "proved anew" the United Nations' "value as an instrument for peace."¹⁰⁸

The Demise of UNEF, the "Six-Day War," and Resolution 242

Between 1957 and 1967, observers assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) investigated and attempted to mediate disputes between Israel and its Arab neighbors along the eastern and northern sectors of Israel's boundaries. Patrolling the Israeli-Egyptian (southern) frontier during these years was the responsibility of the United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF). [See map at Appendix B for UNEF's May 1967 deployments.] In all quarters, disputes between Israel and its Arab neighbors were regularly referred to the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) that were established in 1949 and had helped to defuse tensions for another seventeen years. The most difficult cases passed along through the MACs to the UN Security Council. In forming its decisions, the Council relied heavily upon

again erupted between India and Pakistan in 1971. See UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 138-39.

¹⁰⁷ Wainhouse cited UNIPOM's expenses in 1965 as \$1,160,000; and another \$560,000 in 1966; for a total of \$1.72. In an annex, Wainhouse itemized UN "budget estimates" that totaled \$2.2 million. Presumably, the later were overestimates. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 79, 101.

¹⁰⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson, "letter of transmittal to the Congress," 9 March 1967, White House Central Files, Box #10, LBJL, 1.

the judgment and impartial investigation provided by UNTSO and UNEF observers and their respective chiefs of staff.

UNEF and UNTSO faced increasing complaints and violations in the 1960s, although Israel's northern boundary with Lebanon remained the most quiet. UNEF officials witnessed a rise in tensions between Israel and Egypt, especially with increased violence in the Gaza Strip. A number of other regional disputes, those between Israel, on the one hand, and Jordan and Syria, on the other, were serious enough to warrant extended consideration by the Security Council. For the most part, these debates culminated in ineffectual resolutions that called on the belligerents to cooperate more closely with the MACs. In each of these cases, the Council delegated great responsibility to the secretary-general and his field representatives.

As the United Nations faced serious financial difficulties during the 1960s, a number of member-states supported efforts to cut back on these field missions in an effort to curtail UN expenses. Other states, supported by the secretary-general, considered that the UN presence in the Middle East "remained clearly indispensable to the maintenance of peace in the area." In a report, released on 2 December 1963, U Thant recommended that if cuts had to be made "modifications" would have to be sought in the areas of daily operations and force composition.¹⁰⁹ Three years later, calls were still being made to cut back on peacekeeping expenses. On 29 November 1966, U Thant disseminated a report that suggested ways to increase UNTSO's effectiveness. Significantly, there was little talk of terminating the long-lived mission—its service was considered essential, as the secretary-general's analysis confirmed: UNTSO's had proven an enduring "capacity to decrease tensions and resolve recurring conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors."¹¹⁰ U Thant suggested that the ideal solution would be enlarging UNTSO in the manner of UNEF as a means of improving UNTSO's ability to deter the rising disputes along Israel's northern and eastern

¹⁰⁹ DOS, USPUN, 1963, 116-17.

¹¹⁰ U Thant, "Report of the Secretary-general on the Status of UNTSO," S/7603, 29 November 1966.

boundaries. The secretary-general realized, however, such an initiative would not be approved while the organization was having difficulty remaining fiscally solvent. As a result, the secretary-general offered more limited suggestions to “strengthen” the observer mission, without changing its existing mandate. He proposed that Security Council members act independently to encourage the Arab states and Israel to attain a number of goals. First, the parties must be persuaded to “more fully cooperate” with UNTSO and the UN peacekeeping “machinery” (such as the MACs) that was being under-utilized or frustrated by a lack of cooperation by one party or both. Second, U Thant proposed that Israel and its Arab neighbors must grant UNTSO observers “full freedom of movement in the area of incidents.” Since 1949, such “freedom” had been denied or granted on a limited basis to UN personnel, especially by Israel. Third, U Thant encouraged that the parties make it possible for investigating officers and the MACs to be able to “contact responsible authorities” at any time. In this regard, a lack of timely responses to past UNTSO and UNEF requests resulted in significant delays for investigation. Fourth, U Thant proposed that UNTSO must be authorized to deploy mobile patrols and more strategic observation posts. Again, the realization of these goals had been opposed by one or both belligerents in the past. Finally, the UN secretary-general proposed that the Security Council member-states should consider authorizing upgrades to UNTSO’s investigating capabilities—to include providing them with helicopters, a speed boat (for operations on Lake Tiberias), demolition experts, searching and tracking dogs, and other investigation supplements. The U.S. assistant secretary of state “welcomed” the secretary-general’s recommendations, but the other member-states were less enthusiastic and none of these suggestions were formally implemented.¹¹¹

Until 1967, the majority of Arab-Israeli disputes debated before the Security Council concerned Israel’s stormy relations with Jordan and Syria. Unexpectedly, it was the breakdown of international relations along Israel’s southern boundary that triggered the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. President Nasser, long the “champion” of calls for

¹¹¹ DOS, USPUN 1966, 48.

Arab unity and propaganda against Israel, acted to reassert his leadership role in 1967. In early May, Nasser claimed that his sources confirmed that Israel was preparing to launch a "major attack" against Syria.¹¹² On 16 May, without consulting any UN personnel, the UAR's¹¹³ president demanded the withdrawal of UNEF.¹¹⁴ At the same time he ordered his armed forces to advance toward the Sinai ADL. Secretary-General Thant was placed in a difficult position. UNEF units were stationed on Egyptian soil (Israel refused to allow UNEF to operate on the Israeli side of the ADL); and one of UNEF's primary foundations was that of "host government consent." U Thant conferred with his closest aides and the legal advisers of the Secretariat before announcing that he would comply with President Nasser's demands.¹¹⁵

A great deal of criticism was directed at Secretary-General U Thant for complying so "readily" with President Nasser's request. In reality, he had very little choice. On 18 May, U Thant informed the General Assembly (the UN organ that had created UNEF during an Emergency Special Session in November 1956) of the UAR's request and his legal counsel that the force must be withdrawn. He remarked that the United Nations could not challenge the "sovereign authority of the government of the United Arab Republic within its own territory." U Thant also noted that, in making this decision, he had "serious misgivings." UNEF had successfully defused tensions

¹¹² Nasser's "sources" were, most likely, the Syrians and, perhaps, the Soviet Union. These reports were popular in the Middle East newspapers, at the time. However, and concurrently, UNTSO reported no build-ups by "either party" along the northern borders. It is not clear whether Nasser was fooled or just employing a readily available excuse to posture for war against Israel. DOS, USPUN 1967, 29.

¹¹³ The United Arab Republic, or UAR, was the national designation retained by Nasser's Egypt in the 1960s, despite the fact that the political union between Syria and Egypt (which spawned the title in 1958) disintegrated during 1961.

¹¹⁴ This message was initially transmitted to the UNEF commander on 16 May and was "officially" delivered to the UN secretary-general on 18 May.

¹¹⁵ Of note, U Thant requested that Israel allow UNEF to "cross over" and resume its buffer operations on the Israeli side of the ADL—the Israeli government refused this request. Perhaps they were convinced (rightly) that if Nasser wanted a war, Israel would easily defeat UAR forces.

between Egypt and Israel for ten years. Its withdrawal, the secretary-general accurately predicted, "would have grave implications for peace."¹¹⁶

The United States, like most UN member-states, was disappointed with both the withdrawal of UNEF and the way that the secretary-general had gone about "announcing" his decision. On 23 May, President Johnson expressed "dismay at the hurried withdrawal of UNEF without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council." In response to the storm of criticism, the UN secretary-general departed for Cairo on 22 May.¹¹⁷ Even before U Thant arrived, however, UAR forces had ousted UN forces from their position at Sharm-el-Sheikh and President Nasser announced resumption of the "blockade" of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. As a result, the 1956 casus belli was reinstated. Israel did not tolerate such a blockade at that time. It would not again. President Nasser knew this. He was looking for war on the presumption that his forces were ready and that a "victory" would reestablish him as the uncontested "leader of the Arab world."¹¹⁸ He was to be gravely disappointed.

In the eyes of most UN member-states, Nasser's announcement that he was closing the Straits of Tiran to all shipping bound for Israel's southern port city of Eilat, cast the UAR into the role of "aggressor." President Johnson declared, as had President Eisenhower in 1956, that the U.S. considered the waters off the coast of Sharm-el-Sheikh to be "an international waterway." As a result, Nasser was viewed as having challenged a fundamental international law and "a vital interest of the entire

¹¹⁶ DOS, USPUN 1967, 30.

¹¹⁷ An account of U Thant's visit to Cairo is included in Indarjit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980), 63-86.

¹¹⁸ During the mid-1960s, as tensions increased between Israel and all its Arab neighbors except Egypt, Syrian and Saudi leaders accused President Nasser of "hiding behind UNEF's skirt." Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 59. See also, Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

international community.”¹¹⁹ The United States pushed for immediate action by the Security Council. The USSR, a firm supporter of President Nasser since the mid-1950s, opposed any Security Council actions “pending the return of the secretary-general from Cairo.” On 25 May, U Thant returned to New York. He delivered his “report” to the Security Council the next day.¹²⁰

The Security Council debated these issues, and except for the USSR, would have reached a consensus that the United Nations needed to provide a way to “reassert itself for peace.” In a move which further exacerbated the situation, the UAR representative, Mohammed El-Kony, was invited to speak before the Security Council, on 29 May. El-Kony stated that his government’s actions were clearly justifiable. First, he asserted, “closure of the Straits of Tiran was permissible under international law because the navigable channel through the Strait was in UAR territorial waters.” Second, he asserted that the UAR was justified in preventing shipping bound for Eilat because “Israel was not a legitimate littoral state on the Gulf of Aqaba, having occupied the port of Eilat by force after the signing of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement.” And finally, the UAR was “permitted to exercise its belligerent rights,” El-Kony argued, because “a state of war existed between Israel and the UAR.”¹²¹ Clearly, there was no room to forge a compromise on this issue. The UAR government asserted that it “would not hesitate to exercise its [perceived] inherent right of self-defense.” Israel, for its part, stated that it was “compelled to react to Nasser’s gross violation of international law.” Israeli representatives also cited a defiant 26 May

¹¹⁹ President Johnson’s speech was to the nation on the evening of 23 May, 1967. Quoted in DOS, USPUN 1967, 31.

¹²⁰ U Thant, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East Situation,” 26 May 1967, S/7906. Arthur Lall noted that this report was “so consequential a document” that the Council adjourned for three days to decide what to do next. Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, revised edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 32.

¹²¹ Cited in DOS, USPUN 1967, 33; see also Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 35-37.

statement issued by President Nasser saying that the upcoming battle, “will be a full-scale one” and the UAR’s “basic aim will be to destroy Israel.”¹²² Israel’s survival was formally challenged; its forces rallied in response.

In the early morning hours of 5 June 1967, Israel launched a preemptive aerial bombardment strike, first against the UAR, and within hours against Jordan and Syria. The majority of the Arab forces’ bombers and fighters were destroyed on the ground. Within hours, Israeli air superiority for the upcoming ground battles had been guaranteed. The Arab armies, which would probably have been defeated in an even fight, were overwhelmed by Israel’s ground attacks backed by control of the skies.¹²³ The Security Council was in session calling for a cease fire by 9:30 a.m. on 5 June. The USSR, thinking that the Arab armies would prevail, initially opposed a cease fire resolution.¹²⁴ It was not until the next afternoon, when Soviet intelligence confirmed that the Arab armies were taking a beating, that the Council was able to adopt a unanimous resolution requesting a cease fire.¹²⁵ The Arabs, however, were not so easily convinced that they were suffering defeat. Only Jordan accepted the Council’s call for a cease fire—which Israel acknowledged after securing control of Jerusalem. Syria and the UAR refused to comply and continued to fight. By 7 June, the Soviet

¹²² DOS, USPUN 1967, 33.

¹²³ For detailed accounts of the “Third Arab-Israeli War” see Eric M. Hammel, Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (New York: Scribner’s, 1992); and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967, a Study of the Conflict from the Perspective of Coercion in the Context of Inter-Arab and Big Power Relations (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

¹²⁴ After all, total Arab military forces surrounding Israel outnumbered the Israelis by over two-to-one (547,000 to 264,000); and Egypt recently moved in 100,000 fresh troops to the Sinai. See Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Complete History of the Struggle and the Efforts to Resolve It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 65-67.

¹²⁵ Of note, this resolution (based on the Johnson administration’s desires) did not tie a cease fire to military withdrawals. This was later cited by the Arab leaders as the cause for their early refusal to comply. See Security Council Resolution 233, 6 June 1967, in SCOR, 1967.

representative at the Security Council was “demanding” compliance by all parties to the cease fire. At 4:45 p.m. New York time (2045 GMT) Israel informed the Council that it had accepted the cease fire with Jordan. The next day, the Soviet representative introduced a resolution that would “vigorously condemn Israel’s aggressive activities” and “demand” that Israel withdraw behind positions held on 4 June. The U.S. delegation opposed any resolution that called on Israel to withdraw. Late on 7 June, the UAR conceded defeat and requested that the Security Council intervene to save the Egyptian army from further embarrassment. Syria, however, was not ready to quit for another two days. On 9 June, General Moshe Dayan commanded his Israeli forces to move out of their defensive positions on the northeastern front and to go on the offensive. As a result, the Syrian government “urgently requested” that the Security Council “demand hostilities cease.” After Israel made significant gains against former Syrian territory in the Golan Heights, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol accepted the Syrian cease fire. The six-day war was over. The Israel Defense Force had defeated three Arab armies (as it had in 1948) and more than doubled Israel’s national territories.¹²⁶ [See map of “Israeli Conquests” at Appendix B.] The Arab governments, which had supported forcibly driving Israeli armies “into the sea,” were humiliated.

Throughout the war, the Security Council was often limited in its debates by an inability to ascertain what was actually happening.¹²⁷ UNEF forces had been pushed aside. Even worse, some of its observers were wounded and killed during the initial hours of the war.¹²⁸ UNTSO observers, subsequently, were asked to “expand” the

¹²⁶ Israel occupied the entire Sinai peninsula (recognized internationally as UAR territory); took the “West Bank”—the region between the narrow strip that was Israel to the Jordan River—(administered by Jordan, on behalf of Palestinian Arabs, from 1950 to 1967); and seized the strategic Golan Heights in north and east of Lake Tiberias (formerly Syria’s territory, recognized as such since the First World War).

¹²⁷ For a study of Security Council actions during this conflict, see Istvan Pogany, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 85-114.

¹²⁸ For information on UNEF casualties, and reasons why, see the account of UNEF’s last commander, India’s Major General (ret.) Indarjit Rikhye, The Sinai

scope of their operations to keep the United Nations better informed.¹²⁹ On 9 June, in its resolution calling for a cease fire on the northeast zone, the Security Council authorized deployment of UNTSO forces along the new Israeli-Syrian front.¹³⁰ On 10 June, the Syrian representative complained to the Security Council that his country was continuing to “suffer full-scale attacks from Israel.” The UNTSO chief of staff, Norway’s General Odd Bull, was then charged with organizing patrols that would “ensure all sides were aware of the cease fire that was now in effect.” Along the southern front, UNEF’s role as a buffer force between Israel and Egypt was missed sorely. In July, and again in October, the UAR complained of renewed fighting along the Suez Canal cease-fire line (CFL). On 25 October, Security Council resolution 240 approved the deployment of additional UNTSO observers to expand the UN presence to that zone, as well.

In the meantime, during the five months after June 1967, the international community debated how to resolve the political and physical disruptions that accompanied the third Arab-Israeli war. At the United Nations’ Security Council, the Soviet representative called for a “condemnation of Israel” and for Israel’s immediate, unconditional withdrawal to its pre-war positions. The U.S. representative stated that such a resolution would do nothing to eliminate the causes of the war and would leave the region ripe for further conflict. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg (U.S. chief Ambassador to the United Nations between July 1965 and June 1968) proposed

Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967 (London: Frank Cass, 1980), especially 150-55.

¹²⁹ That the United Nations lacked a “real-time” intelligence assessment capability was a major limiting factor in times of international crises. These shortfalls were still being addressed three decades later. See for example Butros-Butros-Ghali’s “An Agenda for Peace,” 1992. This issue is closely tied to the need for third-party or “impartial, fact-finding” to inform just about every UN debate—a weakness that is only overcome by concessions granted to the UN (or other international organizations) allowing “access” to perform such investigations.

¹³⁰ Security Council Resolution 235, 9 June 1967, SCOR, 1967.

working for a more “stable and durable peace.”¹³¹ The Soviets promised a veto of any proposed U.S. resolution. The USSR then called for convening an “Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly”—a UN organizational maneuver that, ironically, originated with the Truman administration’s attempt, in 1950, to outmaneuver Soviet vetoes in the Security Council. The U.S. delegation initially opposed referring the issue to the General Assembly (perhaps because the Soviets suggested it; or just as likely, the U.S. was afraid it would lose “control” of the debates in the General Assembly¹³²). Nonetheless, a majority of Council members agreed with the Soviet position. As a result, the fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly (ESS-V) convened on 17 June 1967.¹³³

Two days later, President Johnson announced “five principles” that the U.S. government supported to guide the framing of a UN resolution regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. president stated that the United States would support Israeli troop withdrawals—conditional upon the Arab states’ recognition of Israel’s “political independence and territorial integrity.” The Johnson administration was convinced that President Eisenhower’s decision to force Israel to withdraw in 1957 without “guarantees” for peace was a mistake.¹³⁴ This time, the U.S. president wholeheartedly supported Israel’s “conditions.” These included: “freedom of innocent maritime passage” through international waters (meaning the Straits of Tiran and the Suez

¹³¹ DOS, USPUN 1967, 37.

¹³² The days of “automatic” U.S. majorities in the General Assembly were numbered. For more on this transformation of the General Assembly see in Chapter Four of this study.

¹³³ For a discussion of the “unique” aspects of this Soviet call for an “Emergency Special Session” of the General Assembly, see Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 116-22.

¹³⁴ William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 63-71.

Canal); international determination to address the Palestinian refugee problem;¹³⁵ and international agreement to prevent or limit the “arms race” between Israel and its Arab neighbors.¹³⁶ This “linkage” between Israel’s withdrawal and Arab concessions—along with international commitments to address related problems—was slowly molded into resolutions proposed by UN member-states during ESS-V and the 22nd General Assembly. The result was the adoption of the historic Security Council “resolution 242” of 22 November 1967. Resolution 242, which incorporated many of the Johnson administration’s conditions, established a widely-recognized diplomatic basis for peace in the Middle East.¹³⁷ Unfortunately, Syria rejected the resolution immediately, and the rest of the Arabs refused to address any thought of formally recognizing Israel. Other problems were caused by “interpretation differences” (a problem common to many UN resolutions).¹³⁸ The Johnson administration supported this approach. The U.S.

¹³⁵ The number of Palestine refugees created by the 1967 war increased from nearly 1 million to approximately 1.5 million. A number of Palestinians did not flee, and instead, they continued to live within “occupied” territory. On 4 July, pursuant to a Security Council “humanitarian resolution,” the secretary-general appointed Sweden’s Nils-Göran Gussing as his “Special Representative” for humanitarian efforts in the immediate wake of the war. Gussing coordinated the efforts of UNICEF, the International Red Cross, and UNRWA to help civilians and Palestinians displaced, wounded, or killed during the war. On financing the United Nations’ Relief and Works Administration for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the U.S. pledged about \$22.2 million “in cash and food-stuffs” during 1967. Over the life of the UNRWA (since the late 1940s) the U.S. government had contributed approximately \$500 million—this accounted for about 70% of all international donations to that program. DOS, USPUN 1967, 41-42; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1968, DOS Publication 8482, International Organization and Conference Series 88 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, October 1969), 52-53.

¹³⁶ DOS, USPUN 1967, 38-39.

¹³⁷ For an insider’s account of this U.S. effort, see Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (The Hague, Netherlands: M. Nijhoff, 1985).

¹³⁸ On 23 November 1967, in accordance with Resolution 242, U Thant appointed Gunnar Jarring (at this time Sweden’s Ambassador to Russia) to serve as another “Special Representative.” Jarring shuttled between capitals in the Middle East and was unable to find any consensus by the end of 1968.

president wrote, that “the principles for settlement adopted by the Council resolution [242] were entirely consistent with those suggested and supported by the United States.”¹³⁹ A year later, speaking before the 1968 General Assembly, Ambassador George Ball (Goldberg’s successor) confirmed that resolution 242 remained “the best hope for the attainment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”¹⁴⁰

Chapter Summary and Analysis

The United Nations’ Emergency Force, created in response to the 1956 Suez war, established the model for what became “traditional” UN peacekeeping. Between 1956 and 1960, UNEF’s “foundational principles,” as defined by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, were thought to have established new ground-rules for all subsequent UN peacekeeping endeavors. These principles were defined as “consent, impartiality, and a resort to arms only in self-defense.”¹⁴¹ A corollary principle, especially in the mind of Dag Hammarskjöld, was that “great powers” should not contribute contingents to UN peacekeeping forces. This, the reasoning went, would help to “insulate” UN peacekeeping from Cold-War entanglements.¹⁴² As events proved, these “principles” were not as universal as originally touted. Prior to UNEF, the United States had contributed military and administrative personnel to nearly every UN peace operation. The Eisenhower administration acquiesced to Hammarskjöld’s request that the “great powers” avoid direct participation in UNEF. Nonetheless, Washington provided the critical financial, logistical, and political support that sustained Hammarskjöld’s “impartial” operation. After Hammarskjöld’s death in 1961,

¹³⁹ Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 1 October 1968, in DOS, USPUN 1967, iii.

¹⁴⁰ DOS, USPUN 1968, 41.

¹⁴¹ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 4.

¹⁴² Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld’s United Nations, 66-98.

the Kennedy administration increased U.S. military support for UN operations in the Congo. A year later, the USAF directly participated as one of two air contingents assigned to the United Nations for the transition of West New Guinea to Indonesia. In early 1964 the Johnson administration offered U.S. forces for a "NATO peacekeeping operation" (that did not materialize, as such) in Cyprus. And in 1965, a division of U.S. military soldiers anchored the UN-sanctioned Inter-American Peace Force that performed "peacekeeping" in the Dominican Republic. Other examples of how these "principles" of consent, impartiality, and use of force in self-defense were subsequently "stretched" can be cited. The point is that UNEF did break new ground as a UN operation—in scope and ambition. But, as this dissertation demonstrates, most every case of "first generation" UN peacekeeping was unique—there were no standard rules, despite official UN rhetoric to the contrary. On the other hand, as this study demonstrates, UN peace operations can be grouped and analyzed by general typology.

The war between India and Pakistan during 1965 and 1966 took place in circumstances similar to those which gave rise to the United Nations' Emergency Force. The India-Pakistan conflict was an interstate war conducted along pre-defined boundaries. In both cases, the interposition of a UN "buffer force" helped to separate contending armies and established an opportunity for national leaders to negotiate. In the case of India and Pakistan, UNIPOM was disbanded after a cease fire was agreed upon at Tashkent. As for UNEF, the international community failed to persuade the Arabs and Israel to adopt a lasting peace. The legal debates concerning UNEF's withdrawal aside, when "consent" was denied the United Nations in May 1967 for stationing international peacekeepers on either side of the armistice line, the force was withdrawn. With the international "plate glass" removed, war ensued within weeks. The contrast between the end result of these two cases of "traditional peacekeeping" is stark. The lesson is clear: peacekeeping operations provide diplomats an opportunity to pursue a more lasting political solution, but if "peace-making" does not accompany peacekeeping, another major conflict is likely.

CHAPTER SIX

BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING: THE CONGO, 1960 TO 1968

The Congo crisis was like nothing else except, perhaps, the game of croquet in Alice in Wonderland, where the balls were hedgehogs that took every opportunity to unroll and creep away and the mallets were flamingos that interrupted every stroke by turning back their heads to argue with the players.

Roger Hilsman¹

[Director of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State]

During the United Nations' first 23 years, involvement in the "Congo crisis"² proved to be the organization's largest, costliest, and most controversial action.³

¹ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 233.

² In addition to the UN's official account of its operations recorded in The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, third edition, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 173-200; a number of "Congo crisis" books have been written from various perspectives. Legal perspectives are outlined in Georges Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operations in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) and (to include reprints of most all documents) in Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, Vol. III: Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1980). Of the myriad of other books on the UN and the Congo, Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) provides an assessment of Washington's motivations. Lefever's account, however, should be supplemented by the scholarly work of Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa—From Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1982).

³ Harlan Cleveland, President John F. Kennedy's assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs wrote that the Congo operation was "the most complex and most difficult peacekeeping assignment ever taken on in the history of the

Between August 1960 and May 1963, the United Nations maintained a Congo “peacekeeping force” that numbered between 15,000 and 19,828 men (from 16 to 27 UN member-states).⁴ Fielding this body—averaging the size of a large army division—cost approximately \$10 million per month.⁵ In addition to armed personnel, the United Nations also directed the nation-building efforts of 2,000 to 3,000 administrators.⁶ These “international servants,” military and civilian, operated across a vast African nation nearly the size of Western Europe and worked side-by-side with Congolese who held loyalties to 200 different tribes and spoke in nearly three hundred “principal languages.”⁷ [For an overview map of the Congo, see Appendix B.] Because of the magnitude and difficulty of these conditions—which were exacerbated by domestic and

United Nations. Harlan Cleveland, “The UN in the Congo: Three Questions,” in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An “Africa Report” Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 72. This statement remained true until March 1993 when ONUC was eclipsed in magnitude by UNISOM II—the second UN operation in Somalia.

⁴ Indarjit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 330-31 (diagrams C.2 and C.3).

⁵ By comparison, the UN peacekeeping mission to the Sinai (UNEF) averaged 5,000 men and cost less than \$2 million per month. (See Chapter Five.) The financial burden of these combined “peacekeeping costs” served to nearly double all “assessed” costs and (in part) led to UN “financial crisis.” (See discussion later in this chapter.)

⁶ David Wainhouse characterized this civilian mission as “another massive operation . . . unprecedented for the UN in terms of magnitude, scope and duration.” David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 276.

⁷ French was the designated official language of the Congo; but in 1960 less than ten percent of the population could speak or read it. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960 - December 1961 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1965), 5-8; G. Mennen Williams, “U.S. Objectives in the Congo, 1960-65” [written in August 1965], in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An “Africa Report” Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 144.

international political intrigues—the tasks assigned to the UN Congo mission (known by its French title, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, abbreviated as ONUC), surpassed in scale and difficulty all previous UN missions.⁸ ONUC soldiers were tasked to assist the Congolese government (itself divided) to maintain law and order while also deterring external meddling with Léopoldville's limited political control. Unfortunately, in most respects, the international community made ONUC's job even more difficult. Rather than supporting the beleaguered force and the organization's stated goals, member-states—including the United States—fiercely guarded their perceived “national interests” in the Congo. As the organization's mission took shape, ONUC's mission was undermined by this ideologically-divided support of rival Congolese factions. The resulting administrative, financial and political battles severely challenged two secretaries-general and their Secretariat staff.⁹ ONUC was forced to pursue a shifting course with uncertainty and inconsistency.¹⁰ In the end, the repercussions of the Congo crisis nearly destroyed the United Nations itself.

With respect to the United States, Washington was concerned with the Congo even before that nation's troubles began. President Dwight D. Eisenhower made the initial decision to pursue U.S. interests in the Congo through the United Nations. This approach, 18 months later, was adopted by the John F. Kennedy administration.¹¹ Both

⁸ In fact, it was not until the late 1970s when the UN dispatched a “peacekeeping” mission to southern Lebanon (UNIFIL), in the midst of another region devoid of central government control and facing civil war (with international complications), that another UN mission faced challenges similar to those faced by ONUC. Thereafter, UN operations of this kind became much too familiar.

⁹ Some even intimated that international “pressures” placed on Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld caused him to seek personally a diplomatic agreement from Katanga's political leader, Moïse Tshombé in September 1961—indirectly leading to the secretary-general's death in an aircraft crash, en route to meet with Tshombé. See Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 578-89.

¹⁰ These divisions and their influence on ONUC's mission are the focus of Lefever's Uncertain Mandate.

¹¹ Kalb, The Congo Cables, 209-10.

administrations defined U.S. interests in the Congo as working for a “stable,” “unified,” Congo that was either Western-oriented, or neutral. Keeping the Communists out was the underlying objective. These policies were endorsed (at least financially) by large majorities in both Houses of the U.S. Congress. The fact that “sold” the mission to U.S. policy- and law-makers was the threat of Moscow gaining a potential “foothold” in central Africa. According to Harlan Cleveland, President Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, “The only way to prevent a competitive [Cold-War] power play [in the Congo] was to inject the United Nations.” He also wrote: “The Congo was not a local affair from which [the United States] could abstain. It was . . . just about the most international affair one can imagine; from which [the United States] could abstain only at the ultimate peril of [its] own national security.”¹² President Kennedy’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson (the Democratic nominee for U.S. president in 1952 and 1956) also laid out the situation in similar terms. Stevenson consistently argued that international support of the United Nations as “the only institution that offers an alternative to imperialism.” He also stated that the Congo crisis should be viewed as a contemporary “Balkans”—meaning a potential cause of world war.¹³ In fact, during the Kennedy presidency, the “Congo Crisis” was ranked as comparable to problems in Cuba and Vietnam—each demanded the creation of a full-time presidential task force.

¹² Harlan Cleveland, “The UN in the Congo,” 75.

¹³ Adlai E. Stevenson, Jr., New York Times, 3 March 1961; quoted in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 238.

Background and ONUC Phase-In (July to September 1960)

On 30 June 1960, the former Belgian colony,¹⁴ then called the Congo (Léopoldville),¹⁵ gained its independence. The Congolese central government, however, proved incapable of holding the vast, diverse territory together. Within a week, it became apparent that Léopoldville also was unable to maintain domestic law and order. This did not come as a great surprise. The fact that Léopoldville would prove unable to rule once the Belgians departed was widely predicted.¹⁶ Even the UN secretary-general, Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld, who made a visit to Africa in early 1960, suspected that the Congolese would need additional "international" assistance once that nation was independent. In May, Hammarskjöld dispatched Ralph Bunche to the Congo to remain "on hand" to offer assistance or otherwise be available for consultation.¹⁷ When the UN military mission was approved in mid-July, Bunche

¹⁴ Between 1885 and 1908 the Congo was legally the personal property of Belgium's King Leopold. From 1908, the Congo was considered a Belgian colony.

¹⁵ This study will abbreviate the title "The Republic of the Congo, (Léopoldville)" as the Congo or the Belgian Congo. Realize that the adjacent French former colony of "French Equatorial Africa" became independent as "Congo (Brazzaville)" in 1958. In the 1960s, official documents normally used the title "the Congo" followed by either Léopoldville or Brazzaville to distinguish between the two adjacent African states. In October 1971, the former Belgian Congo changed its national title to the Republic of Zaïre. In 1996 this same nation changed its name to "The Democratic Republic of Congo"—not to be confused with the former French colony, its neighbor, called the "Republic of the Congo."

¹⁶ U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox under President Eisenhower also visited the Congo in the spring of 1960. Speaking before the United Nations Security Council, Wilcox summarized that he was "concerned with [the Congo's] pressing problems and impressed with its unparalleled opportunities." Prophetically he added, "the new Republic of the Congo will have a long and difficult road to travel." Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1960, DOS Publication 7341, International Organization and Conference Series 27 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, March 1962), 42.

¹⁷ Dr. Ralph J. Bunche was one of Dag Hammarskjöld's most-trusted

became Hammarskjöld's first "Special Representative" in charge of coordinating the UN effort.¹⁸ Thus, UN "involvement" in Congolese affairs pre-dated the crises that followed.¹⁹

Administratively, the newly-independent Congo was divided into six provinces: Léopoldville in the West (the national and provincial capital, also named Léopoldville, was situated about 250 miles up the Congo river from the Atlantic Ocean); Equateur, situated north of Léopoldville (with its provincial capital Coquilhatville), Orientale province to the northeast (Stanleyville); the mineral-rich Katanga province in the far southeast (Elisabethville); Kasai in central Congo (Luluabourg); and Kivu (Bukavu) to the east of Kasai, between Orientale and Katanga.²⁰ [See maps at Appendix B.] The provincial capitals were isolated. The national infrastructure was weak, with transportation primarily based upon five winding rivers and a few rail lines. Notably, the southern province of Katanga was rich in copper, cobalt, and industrial diamonds,²¹

Secretariat advisers. Bunche had experience in the U.S. Department of State, and was the UN's former chief administrator of "Trusteeship" issues. Coincidentally, Bunche was also co-architect of two earlier UN peacekeeping missions—UNTSO and UNEF. For the most detailed account of Bunche's contributions to the United Nations, see Brian Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche: An American Life* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); with Bunche's role in the Congo described in pages 299-360.

¹⁸ This position was later called "Officer in Charge," although it was always held by a civilian. A list of names and tenures can be found in Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate*, 227.

¹⁹ See Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 389. For Bunche's impressions and his tribute to Hammarskjöld's efforts in the Congo, see Ralph J. Bunche, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, ed. Charles P. Henry (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 189-204.

²⁰ These provincial boundaries, although twice changed in the next few years, figured prominently as divisions or "strongholds" for aspiring separatist regimes.

²¹ In 1960, the Congo held approximately 70% of the world's industrial diamond reserves; 60% of its cobalt; and 10% of its copper and tin reserves. Most of these deposits were in the southern Katanga province. Albert P. Disdier [economist and specialist in sub-Saharan Africa] "Economic Prospects at Independence: Myths and Realities" in *Footnotes to the Congo Story: An "Africa Report" Anthology*, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 3.

but this was as much a curse as blessing because of foreign investments and “economic interests.” These obstacles to national government and the Congo’s myriad of diverse, competing tribes were bound to challenge central political control. Brussels was aware of the situation that Léopoldville was about to inherit. As a gesture of good will, the Belgians offered a structures bill of 253 articles, called the “Loi Fondamentale,” to serve as a first constitution, “until such time as the Congolese Parliament drafted its own “organic legislation.”²²

Even more so than expected, the Congo’s first week following independence was difficult and foreshadowed extensive troubles. On 7 July, the Security Council unanimously recommended that the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) be admitted for membership to the United Nations. Yet even as this vote was being registered in New York, the Léopoldville government was losing control. Throughout the week, the national 25,000-man Force Publique (soon renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise, or ANC) had worked overtime to keep “celebrations” and other activities in check. The military, unlike most other sectors of the population, realized no benefits with independence. It had remained under the strict control of 1,100 Belgian officers who retained all positions of authority, including minister of Defense. These administrative rules were sealed by independence agreements and a “treaty of friendship” between Brussels and Léopoldville. After a few “celebrations” turned violent, the Force was ordered to suppress crowd demonstrations. In reprisal, the African soldiers mutinied against their officers, demanding increased pay and promotion opportunities for themselves.²³ Rapidly, a local military insurrection in Thysville (just south of Léopoldville) spread throughout the nation.²⁴

²² DOS, USPUN 1960, 42.

²³ Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 87-90; Kalb, The Congo Cables, 4-7; Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 6-9; Urquhart, Hammaraskjold (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 391.

²⁴ There is some speculation as to whether this mutiny was pre-planned or inspired by the central government. Jean-Claude Willame asserted that “the excellent telecommunications network” between units contributed to the “rapid spread” of the

Subsequent Congolese atrocities committed against Europeans living in the Congo raised international concerns and led to a military intervention by the former colonial power. In accordance with the terms of the (un-ratified) treaty of friendship, Belgium had maintained control of two military bases: one at Kitona (near the Congo River mouth in western Léopoldville) and the other at Kamina (in northern Katanga). At these bases, Brussels maintained a force of approximately 2,500 troops. Once news spread that the ANC men were raping, looting, beating and killing Europeans, the Belgian government requested that Léopoldville authorities call on the forces at Kitona and Kamina to help establish order. The Congolese government, under President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba refused. At this point, the Belgians considered "humanitarian" justification sufficient to "violate" the terms of their treaty with the Congo. On 8 July, two and one-half companies of Belgian paratroopers were dispatched from the African bases. The next day, Brussels announced that it was sending an additional 1,200 troops to supplement those already alerted in the Congo.²⁵ The Congo's "internal security troubles" were, thus, compounded by an uninvited "external" intervention. Simultaneously, the Congo was threatened with territorial fragmentation. On 11 July, Moïse Tshombé, the "provincial premier" of mineral-rich Katanga (supported by Belgium and a coalition of European states and their colonies) declared his province to be an "independent country." Within the next few months, a number of other provincial leaders entertained similar notions, notably Albert Kalonji of Kivu and Antoine Gizenga of Orientale.²⁶

The Léopoldville government desperately sought to regain control. Initially, the

mutiny. Jean-Claude Willame, "The Military Intervenes" in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An "Africa Report" Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 167.

²⁵ Eventually Belgian troops were deployed to 23 different regions in the Congo. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 6. Helen Kitchens, "The Linchpin Gives Way: Revolt of the Force Publique," chapter in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An "Africa Report" Anthology (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 20-22.

²⁶ DOS, USPUN 1960, 43.

Congolese attempted to calm their ANC troops. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba seemed to be making progress when the Belgian "invasion" was launched 8 - 9 July. In response to this provocation, the ANC reacted angrily and uncontrollably. On 10 July, Kasavubu and Lumumba met with the U.S. Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake and the UN Representative Ralph Bunche. These men recommended that the Congo turn to the United Nations and formally request "technical assistance of a military nature"—meaning a UN peacekeeping force. This international force, they suggested, would help reestablish order and deny the Belgians (and others) the pretext for interfering in the Congo's "internal affairs." The Congolese government agreed to send this request, but as it turned out, it proved to be too late to dissuade the Belgians from taking unilateral military action. Battles between ANC and Belgian forces escalated the afternoon of 10 July.

The next day, compounding internal disorder with national disintegration, Tshombé declared Katanga's independence. To the Léopoldville government, the Katanga secession and the Belgian intervention were mutually supporting. This impression was reinforced when Belgian troops deploying to Katanga began disarming the ANC forces designated to oppose Tshombé's rebellion, but did not disarm Katangan gendarme units. In fact, Brussels overtly supported Tshombé and viewed an independent Katanga as the best means to keep Belgium's human and economic assets there most "secure."²⁷ With the ANC disarmed in Katanga and Belgians in control of 23 areas across the country, the Congolese desperately sought outside assistance to counter Tshombé and his Belgian supporters. Subsequently, Léopoldville issued requests for military assistance to the United States, Ghana (representing the African, "non-aligned" or "neutralist" states), the United Nations (again), and to the Soviet

²⁷ Of note, Brussels did not officially "recognize" Katanga; but this was a political strategy adopted to allow Tshombé to build up his base of power out of the international spotlight. Belgian staunch support of the Katangan secession remained strong until Belgium's national elections in March 1961 that brought a new government to power in Brussels under Théo Lefever with internationalist Paul-Henri Spaak as the foreign minister. Nonetheless, Belgium held 96% of the Congo's foreign investments in 1960. See Williams, "U.S. Objectives in the Congo," 144.

Union.

On 12 July, as Kasavubu and Lumumba were out of Léopoldville (surveying the situation and trying to regain control), the Congolese deputy prime minister, Antoine Gizenga and the foreign minister Justin Bomboko, requested that the U.S. Ambassador (Timberlake) arrange with Washington for the dispatch of 2,000 American troops.²⁸ In reply to the Congolese request, the Department of State informed Timberlake that President Eisenhower “categorically ruled out the use of U.S. troops in the Congo under any circumstances.” This response raises the question as to why the United States did not choose to accept the Congolese “invitation” and why President Eisenhower entrusted the Congo crisis to the United Nations. This decision has been questioned by certain scholars who accuse the Eisenhower administration of “inconsistency”—especially when considering that just two years earlier he had deployed U.S. marines to Lebanon (see chapter Three this study) in a very similar situation.²⁹ In the president’s defense, it can be argued that a U.S. unilateral response to the Congo’s request would have endangered U.S. military personnel in a region where U.S. vital interests were not “directly” threatened. This U.S. “interest” was based on the facts that there were only a few dozen Americans living in the Congo as of 1960 and that the United States had few economic ties with Congo. In addition, it is certain that Eisenhower had little desire to risk direct military action against Belgium, a NATO ally. Of no less importance, internationalist policymakers recommended that

²⁸ Hoskyns (and Lefever quoting Hoskyns) mention a request for 3,000 troops, but supply no source documentation. Madeleine Kalb based her citation of 2,000 troops upon U.S. DOS message traffic, specifically Léopoldville Cable 54, Ambassador Timberlake to DOS, 7/12/60. See Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, 8 (and documentation referenced as note 20).

²⁹ Caroline Pruden’s dissertation analysis implied that Eisenhower, as America’s “oldest president ever (up to that time),” with a new secretary of state, Christian A. Herter, and a new USUN chief (Cabot Lodge was on the campaign trail with Richard Nixon), combined to make the Eisenhower administration’s policy “tired, weak, and incoherent.” Caroline Anne Pruden, “Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1993), 631.

action through the United Nations would preclude a Soviet "response" to U.S. unilateral actions.³⁰ This tactic for "keeping the Cold-War out of the Congo," however, was not completely successful. Moscow's policymakers had plans of their own.

USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev was looking for an opportunity to enhance Soviet affluence in Africa. On 12 July, the Congolese government provided the pretext he desired. In the midst of its flurry of requests sent out to anyone who would resist Belgian intervention, Léopoldville requested Moscow's military assistance, "should the Belgian aggression continue." Khrushchev promised USSR "sympathies and assistance" against "NATO's colonial efforts." What followed, according to a contemporary Soviet affairs expert, was the "USSR's most spectacular and concrete effort to . . . introduce its presence and power into Africa."³¹

As Moscow pursued closer ties with the Congolese central government, specifically with Prime Minister Lumumba, Washington quickly reassessed the Congo's "significance." In this respect, the ideological Cold War was extended to the Congo. As a result of Soviet "activism" in the Congo, the Eisenhower administration ordered the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to devote more attention to the Congo—although no more than a handful of men were actually assigned to operate within the Congo. The agency, later orchestrated at least one "maneuver" that was seen to safeguard U.S. interests there.³² Despite these developments, the Eisenhower,

³⁰ The U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, Clare Timberlake sent a cable to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on 10 July that recommended the "UN umbrella" as the most prudent means to restore order to the Congo and to "keep bears out of the Congo caviar." By this, Timberlake meant that in the absence of a UN presence, the Soviet Union coveted the Congo's economic assets. Quoted in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 7.

³¹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Soviet Union and China: Where They Stood in 1960" in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An "Africa Report" Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 25.

³² As discussed below, the CIA took credit for supporting Col. Mobutu's September 1960 coup d'état. In addition, much speculation has been written about the "authorization" by someone high in the Eisenhower administration to look into

Kennedy and Johnson administrations remained committed to the UN option as the most appropriate means for pursuing U.S. interests without risking a direct superpower confrontation. As will be described below, however, Washington's commitment to UN actions in the Congo was not always firm. When the United Nations was seen as diverging from the desired U.S. approach, Washington contemplated taking other actions and selectively withdrew support for certain UN initiatives. Despite this wavering, the U.S. financial and logistical support provided to the UN operations in the Congo proved critical. Without U.S. support, in fact, the United Nations could not have successfully deployed or sustained its Congo operations.³³ In addition, the U.S. decision to pursue its interests "multilaterally" through the United Nations (and sticking to this as its primary instrument of policy) precluded the Congo crisis from becoming an even more dangerous theater of superpower confrontation.

Between 13 July and 9 August, the United States supported three UN Security Council resolutions that defined the initial UN involvement in the Congo. On 13 July,

poisoning "an unnamed African leader." The testimony of the Senate investigations of "Alleged Assassination Plots" in 1975 (often called the Church Committee investigations) concluded that the Eisenhower administration intended this fate for the Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba—who Washington viewed as a Soviet puppet after August 1960. See Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 253; see also Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Books, 1981), 311. Kalb asserted that the Eisenhower administration gave the CIA "the green light" to kill Lumumba: see Kalb, "Getting Rid of Lumumba: Fair Means or Foul," chapter in The Congo Cables, 52-55; 128-156.

³³ David Wainhouse, who has conducted the most detailed studies of "national support" for UN peacekeeping, asserted that U.S. support was "pivotal." Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 277; and in a more detailed, four volume study, Wainhouse wrote: "ONUC stands out as the operation in which U.S. support played its largest role. Practically every phase of the operation was highly dependent on U.S. [sic] for every category of equipment, supplies and services." Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. I, Final Report, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 7.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld convened³⁴ the Council in response to Congolese demands that the UN consider the Belgian intervention, as a “threat to international peace.”³⁵ Security Council resolution 143 (S/4387) was approved the next day by a vote of 8-0-3. China (Taiwan), France, and Britain abstained. Thus, only two permanent members actually voted in favor of this resolution, which established the United Nations’ military mission (ONUC) and authorized the secretary-general to “take the necessary steps” to make it a reality. Although Council resolution 143 called upon Belgium to “withdraw its troops” from the Congo, because a Russian amendment to “condemn” Brussels was defeated, the British and French “allowed” the initiative to pass without their veto.³⁶ In effect, the resolution proved “vague” enough to allow all permanent members to support its passage.³⁷ It also demonstrated the tenuous balance of interests that characterized the ideologically divided Council. Unfortunately, this resolution was precedent-setting in this regard. As a result, ONUC’s political foundations were shaky from the start and the UN mission was forced to operate with an “uncertain mandate.”³⁸

ONUC’s initial mandate was similar in some ways to that of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). For example, both operations permitted “external” forces to withdraw from a former-colonial territory while being “replaced” by UN forces.

³⁴ Dag Hammarskjöld invoked his authority under article 99 to convene the Security Council. This was the first time in the UN’s history that article 99 was specifically employed. (See Charter excerpts at Appendix A.)

³⁵ UN document, S/4382, telegram from Congo to the UN secretary-general, 12 July. Cited in UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 177.

³⁶ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 15.

³⁷ A number of participants have written that the “keynote” of the authorization provided to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was “ambiguity.” The Security Council members could agree that the UN should do “something” but they disagreed as to what. In essence, the initiative remained with the secretary-general. See, for example, Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 237.

³⁸ Hilsman’s point was the focus of Lefever Uncertain Mandate, 15-23.

This role, played by UNEF in the Sinai, had allowed British, French, and Israeli forces to depart with some of their national dignity intact. In the Congo, Belgian troops were offered a similar “exit strategy.” During Security Council deliberations between 20 and 22 July, this initial ONUC function was accepted by Belgium’s representative, Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny. Wigny justified Belgium’s intervention on behalf of European citizens living in the Congo, but he “pledged” that his nation’s troops would withdraw “as soon as UN troops arrived in sufficient numbers.”³⁹

Despite ONUC’s unprecedented size⁴⁰ and its being created from scratch, the UN force came together sooner than anticipated. Thanks primarily to a massive U.S. military airlift,⁴¹ UN forces quickly took up positions in all provinces except Katanga. By 17 July, ONUC’s strength was at 3,500 men, comprising the first contingents that arrived from Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia. By the end of July (in less than three weeks since the secretary-general was tasked to create the ad hoc force), there were approximately 15,000 ONUC forces in the Congo.⁴² [For a depiction of initial ONUC force deployments, see Appendix B.] As these forces arrived, they were dispatched across the vast Congo to “assume responsibility” for law and order, to “relieve” Belgian forces and to supplement ANC regional forces. Unfortunately, Brussels ordered its 1,700-man force to remain in Katanga and Tshombé would not

³⁹ DOS, USPUN 1960, 45.

⁴⁰ ONUC averaged 15,000 troops, reaching a peak of 19,828 in July 1961. The next closest UN military mission in size, during these years, was the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai and Gaza Strip. UNEF averaged 5,000, peaked at 6,073, and stood at 3,378 at its withdrawal in June 1967. The UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) peaked at 6,411 in June 1964 but was reduced steadily thereafter. UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 693, 706, 709.

⁴¹ Wainhouse’s detailed study concluded that the USAF supplied 83% of the initial airlift to the Congo. In the first 5 months, the USAF delivered 16,379 troops to the Congo (the U.S. Navy delivered another 1,767 troops during this period). Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 284-86.

⁴² This number increased to 19,400 by December 1960. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 330.

“permit” ONUC forces to enter the breakaway province.⁴³ Unfortunately, the issue of Katanga was not initially viewed with the seriousness it deserved. In fact, Belgium and its allies proudly proclaimed Katanga the “safest” province in the Congo. The UN’s failure to act against Tshombé or his Belgian supporters was condemned by the Soviet bloc (and others) as a “NATO plot.”⁴⁴ The “radical”⁴⁵ African states also condemned the UN and NATO. One of their spokesmen, Ghana’s president Kwame Nkrumah (also a close friend of Congo’s Lumumba), proclaimed that Katanga was yet another example of “blatant neocolonialism.”⁴⁶

Meanwhile, on 22 July, the Council unanimously passed another vague resolution (Security Council resolution 145, document S/4405).⁴⁷ Again, the United States and the USSR voted “together” in favor of the resolution. But this illusory consensus was based more upon “selective interpretation” than upon a convergence of opinions. Resolution 145 was another compromise that pleased both sides. Its first operative paragraph called upon Belgium to “implement speedily” withdrawals as earlier stated in

⁴³ Tshombé accomplished this block-out strategy by controlling who could land at his provincial airfields. In addition, until they were “invited” in, ONUC forces were directed to avoid any confrontations, and to use force only in self-defense.

⁴⁴ Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 175.

⁴⁵ The “radical” African states (backed by Moscow) included Guinea, Mali, Ghana (which was often more “moderate” than the others), Morocco, and the United Arab Republic (UAR). This classification system is borrowed from Robert C. Good’s article “Four African Views of the Congo Crisis,” in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An “Africa Report” Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 45-57. According to Good, the radicals saw the “enemy” as neo-colonialism; and viewed the UN’s role as to act against this “or get out!”

⁴⁶ Ghana’s charismatic leader, characterized the secession of Katanga as a clear example of neocolonialism—manifesting the same spirit as the Berlin Conference of 1884 that had “carved up Africa.” Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967), x; 66-73.

⁴⁷ Full text available in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, III: 17.

resolution 143. This statement satisfied the Soviet political bloc (the Communist states) and its growing coalition of radical African and Asian states, who insisted that the United Nations' foremost concern in the Congo should be to act against the "colonial-backed Katanga secession." They interpreted resolution 145 as calling for Belgium's immediate withdrawal (even though it read "speedily") from all of the Congo, especially from Katanga. But the resolution did not even mention Katanga. Belgium, and its Western allies, on the other hand, claimed that such plans were "already in effect." The West and their "moderate"⁴⁸ African supporters in the United Nations instead chose to emphasize resolution 145's second operative paragraph: that "all states should refrain from any action [in the Congo] which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order."⁴⁹ This paragraph highlighted the West's gravest concern, that of a need for the Congo to safeguard its citizenry.⁵⁰ The Eisenhower administration's support for this resolution demonstrated Washington's resolve to employ the United Nations as a "buffer" against any other state's [read the USSR's] direct involvement in the Congo's internal affairs. In fact, the day before resolution 145 was adopted (on 21 July), four Soviet aircraft had arrived in Léopoldville, delivering supplies and Andrei Fomin, the new USSR chargé.

Washington's concerns of Russia's meddling in the Congo proved to be well-founded. Fomin and Lumumba soon signed additional agreements and by the end of August, another ten Soviet transport aircraft (each carrying "supplies") were operating

⁴⁸ Robert Good listed Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, and Tunisia as the "moderate" African states. These countries viewed the role of the United Nations as that of supporting the Congo's territorial and political integrity, supported by the rule of law. These states backed Hammarskjöld's view and normally aligned with Washington. Robert C. Good's article "Four African Views of the Congo Crisis," 45-57.

⁴⁹ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 17.

⁵⁰ Of these citizens, nearly 100,000 were Europeans, although as many as 25,000 had fled in mid July. Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 127.

out of Léopoldville.⁵¹ Moscow also dispatched two cargo ships, the Leninogorsk and Archangelsk carrying food, 100 trucks, spare parts and a number of “technicians.” In the eyes of the West, Khrushchev was backing up his rhetoric. Earlier, the Soviet premier had proclaimed that the Congo was “a vital prize in the worldwide competition with the West.”⁵² The Security Council resolution adopted on 22 July was the first of several UN statements that accurately reflected Washington’s fears of increased Soviet intervention in the Congo.

The issue of Katanga proved to be the focus of the third Security Council Congo resolution.⁵³ By the first of August, as a result of the previous resolution and the successful deployment of ONUC, Belgian forces had dutifully withdrawn from all other Congolese regions. Léopoldville, backed by its vocal allies, pressed the secretary-general to take immediate action to secure Belgium’s withdrawal from Katanga, as well. On 4 August, Ralph Bunche traveled to Elisabethville, the provincial capital of Katanga. Tshombé put on a “show of strength” and the secretary-general’s representative was intimidated. Bunche returned to Léopoldville and reported to Dag Hammarskjöld that if ONUC forces attempted to enter Katanga, they would be forcibly opposed by “every last man.”⁵⁴ As a result, Dag Hammarskjöld delayed his plans for

⁵¹ Kalb wrote that in early September the CIA estimated there were a total of 15 Soviet aircraft, 250 USSR “technicians” and another 80 Czechoslovakian advisers. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 78.

⁵² Helmut Sonnenfeldt, “The Soviet Union and China” 29-34.

⁵³ The United States opposed the Katanga secession for two reasons. First, Katanga was originally designated a province of the Congo at the Brussels “Round Table” talks of January 1960—all parties accepted this stipulation at that time. Second, Washington opposed the “Balkanization” of the Congo—if Katanga was allowed to secede, other provinces would like follow suite and few would be “economically viable.” This would cause instability and “invite” foreign intervention. See Williams, “U.S. Objectives in the Congo,” 147-48.

⁵⁴ Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana, 1961), 280. At this time Hoskyns estimated that Tshombé had only 1,000 men in his national “Gendarmerie”—but they were officered by Belgians and a number of foreign “mercenaries” from Rhodesia, South Africa, and later, from France. Hoskyns,

an ONUC “entry” into Katanga. Instead, he went before the Security Council and argued that a more specific resolution should be adopted to provide ONUC a clearer mandate regarding Katanga. Foremost on Hammarskjöld’s mind was arranging a “peaceful” UN entry into Katanga. The Security Council obliged the secretary-general by passing resolution 146 (S/4426) on 9 August 1960, by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and Italy).⁵⁵ This resolution declared that “the entry of the United Nations Force into the province of Katanga [was] necessary” and invoked Charter articles 25 and 49 to remind all UN members that Council resolutions must be supported by all other members and complied with as law.⁵⁶ Armed with this more specific mandate, on 12 August, Dag Hammarskjöld flew to the Congo and personally “led” the first ONUC units into Katanga.⁵⁷ Within two days approximately 2,000 UN troops had arrived at Elisabethville airport. ONUC’s integration and the Belgian retreat, however, was slow. By 9 September, the last Belgian “combat troops” departed Katanga.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, by this time Tshombé had built up his gendarmerie to the point of being able to support his self-proclaimed independence from Léopoldville. The United Nations, for now, refused to take any direct actions against Tshombé. Such action, in Hammarskjöld’s opinion, was beyond the UN mission’s mandate and, furthermore, would be

The Congo Since Independence, 163. For details of Bunche’s report, see Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 382-85.

⁵⁵ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, III: 19-20.

⁵⁶ See excerpts of Charter at appendix A.

⁵⁷ The secretary-general negotiated Tshombé’s acceptance at the Elisabethville airfield then unloaded two companies of Swedish UN troops. Later, other units followed. The official UN peace operations history proudly claims that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld “personally led the first United Nations unit into Katanga.” UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 180. A more detailed account is provided in Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972), 424-27.

⁵⁸ Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 427.

“interfering” in Congolese internal politics.⁵⁹

The Congolese Constitutional Crisis (September 1960 to August 1961)

The introduction of UN forces into Katanga failed to resolve the issue of Tshombé's political secession. As a result, officials in Léopoldville became divided between those who supported Hammarskjöld's legalism (and calls for a solution by negotiation) and those who advocated an immediate “military solution.” On 5 September, the Congo government split between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. Nine days later, Colonel Joseph Mobutu⁶⁰ announced that due to the state of political dissension he was “taking power in the name of the Army . . . neutralizing [all] politicians until the end of the year.”⁶¹ Thus began a battle for political control of the Congo that was not resolved until August 1961.

Kasavubu and Lumumba had long been political rivals. Their “coalition” government was artificially arranged by the Belgians in the spring of 1960. Their tenuous alliance self-destructed in September. The strains that led to the coalition's

⁵⁹ Hammarskjöld's “legal” defense, attacked by the activists, was based upon two principles. First, the UN mission (to this point) was prohibited against using force, except in self-defense. Second, under the Charter, specifically article 2.7, the United Nations was not to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”—except in matters defined under chapter VII as “enforcement.” These prohibitions were less strictly interpreted by Hammarskjöld's successor, U Thant. See Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjöld's United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 150-164.

⁶⁰ Mobutu was a military clerk until 1960. He had been promoted to ANC chief of staff in mid-July as all Belgian officers were replaced by Congolese. He was a relative unknown before September, but there is evidence that the American Central Intelligence Agency thought of him as “their man.” Andrew Tully reported that “the CIA came up with the right man at the right time and thereby started to bring a measure of stability to the new state.” See Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Morrow 1962), 219-22.

⁶¹ Kalb, The Congo Cables, 89-90.

demise mounted in late August as Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba condemned all Congolese who opposed “subduing the rebel [Belgium-backed] government in Katanga.” Kasavubu, on the other hand, was more inclined to pursue diplomatic negotiations with Tshombé. Kasavubu accepted Western arguments that it was best to avoid “Africans killing Africans,” whereas Lumumba increasingly turned to Soviet support to build up his forces for an attack against Katanga. As a result of Lumumba’s “unauthorized adventurism,” on 5 September, the president broadcast that he was “dismissing” Lumumba and appointing Joseph Ileo (the Senate leader) as the new prime minister. In response, Lumumba broadcast that he held parliament’s continued support and, on his authority was “dismissing” Kasavubu.

The international community mirrored Congolese dissension. The Soviet Union and a number of Afro-Asian nations sided with Lumumba; the United States (and eventually a majority of the United Nations) maintained that President Kasavubu retained governmental authority. The “Lumumbists” based their claim on the prime minister’s national support. The United States based its claim on a strict reading of the Congo’s Loi Fondamentale—the fact that Lumumba was acting like a “Soviet puppet” also influenced Washington’s choice.⁶² The events of September 1960 vaulted the issue of government “legitimacy” to the top of the UN’s Congo concerns.

Predictably, at this decisive point, the UN Security Council “deadlocked” due to the incompatible views of East and West. As a way to keep these UN debates alive, the United States delegation sponsored an initiative under the uniting-for-peace formula.⁶³ The subsequent Council “procedural vote” was approved and the General Assembly’s “Fourth Emergency Special Session” (ESS-IV) was called into session

⁶² In fact, the USSR’s strident stance against Belgium closely matched Lumumba’s feelings and the two sides grew closer together once the Congo government split. DOS, USPUN 1960, 46-49.

⁶³ The vote to call ESS IV was 8 (United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, etc.) - 2 (U.S.S.R., Poland) - 1 (France). Under terms of the ‘uniting-for-peace resolution’ (General Assembly resolution 377, 3 November 1950) this was a procedural vote, thus, the Soviet veto was not “in effect.” DOS, USPUN 1960, 49.

between 17 and 20 September.

The Emergency Session also proved to be acrimonious; but, unlike the Security Council, the Assembly was unimpaired by the "great power" veto. The Assembly's advantage, according to the Charter (article 18) was that a two-thirds majority—with all votes weighted equally—was required to approve resolutions "on important questions."⁶⁴ During the initial discussions, the U.S. delegation accused the Soviets of directly intervening in the Congo by introducing military forces (disguised as "technicians"—based on an agreement signed by former Prime Minister Lumumba) and of attempting to transform the Congo into a "battleground struggle between the great powers." The U.S. recommended a resolution that condemned "unilateral actions" by any other state and recommended that the UN become the "sole source of outside assistance to the Republic of the Congo." The Soviet delegation, for its part, was furious that Moscow's "friend" Lumumba was being "illegally" shut out of the Léopoldville government. Just two days earlier, it had been demonstrated to Moscow how important Lumumba had been to its foot-hold in the Congo. On 15 September Kasavubu, Ileo and Mobutu "demanded" that all Soviet and Czechoslovakian personnel depart the Congo within forty-eight hours. These diplomats had no choice but to comply.⁶⁵ In response, the Soviet UN delegation accused the United States and the secretary-general of "using the United Nations as a broad screen for imperialist aims in Africa."⁶⁶ This last point revealed the Soviets' growing animosity expressed against the person and institution of the UN secretary-general. From this point onward, the Soviets labeled Dag Hammarskjöld a Western "lackey" and proposed a "Troika"

⁶⁴ See charter excerpts at appendix A. Unfortunately, as discussed in earlier chapters, Assembly resolutions were considered recommendations and did not have the "force of law" that were considered inherent to Security Council resolutions. In practical effect, both were equally ignored by belligerents.

⁶⁵ Kalb, The Congo Cables, 90-91.

⁶⁶ DOS, USPUN 1960, 50-51.

system to replace the secretary-general with a three-man executive body.⁶⁷

As a result of these intense debates, a resolution sponsored by 17 Arab, Asian, and African states was approved on 20 September. This resolution (GA 1474, ESS-IV), to Washington's satisfaction, closely followed U.S. arguments. It was overwhelmingly adopted 70-0-11 (Soviet bloc). It "reaffirmed previous Security Council resolutions" and added a warning against "the direct or indirect provision of arms and military personnel to the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) except upon the request of the United Nations through the secretary-general."⁶⁸ Resolution GA 1474 also requested the secretary-general to "take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of [earlier] resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security."⁶⁹

During the regular Fifteenth General Assembly, which was in session between 20 September and 20 December 1960, the UN's most controversial Congo resolution was

⁶⁷ During the opening days of the 15th General Assembly, Soviet Premier Khrushchev spoke with fury (beating his shoe on the rostrum) before the GA. He condemned Dag Hammarskjöld for "abusing" the position of United Nations Secretary-General and proposed abolishing the single secretary-general and replacing it with a three-man "troika." This three-man "institution" would represent the 1) the Western powers; 2) the Soviet bloc; and 3) the "neutralist countries." Later, when other nations failed to back the Soviet position, Khrushchev began pounding on his desk. The U.S. opposed the USSR proposal as inefficient and, ultimately, destructive. The U.S. representative in the UN accused the Soviet representative of following the Russian philosophy of "what we cannot control we will destroy." See section "Soviet attack on the Secretary-General" in DOS, USPUN 1960, pp. 52-53. Urquhart stated that Hammarskjöld viewed the troika proposal as an attempt to "extend veto power to the working of the Secretariat." Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 460.

⁶⁸ DOS, USPUN 1960, 51.

⁶⁹ The vote was considered by Hammarskjöld as a vote of confidence in his handling of the Congo crisis. Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 455. A copy of the resolution is available in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, III: 23.

approved. Since representatives of both Kasavubu and Lumumba arrived in New York and demanded to be seated as the "real" representatives of the Congo, the issue was raised before the UN "credentials committee" and then before the General Assembly. For two months, the U.S. delegation expended a great deal of political capital ensuring a victory for Kasavubu, "button-holing every delegate in sight" and encouraging all allied representatives to do the same.⁷⁰ The General Assembly final vote was 53(U.S.)-24(USSR)-19. It proved to be a costly "victory."⁷¹ The delegate from Mali, convincingly argued for those who voted against the resolution, saying that "until the Congolese are able to solve their problems themselves" taking such a vote could only "widened the gulf between the Congolese." As an alternative, he suggested that the United Nations should have pursued diplomatic mediation through the recently organized Congo "Conciliation Commission"⁷² and delay making such a divisive ruling. Despite the resolution, the secretary-general's commission was still directed to go to the Congo and "study the situation." However, by the time the task force departed for the Congo, in January 1961, other events rendered its intended mediation efforts ineffective.⁷³

Between September 1960 and February 1961, in addition to other issues, the fate of Patrice Lumumba was a grave concern of the United Nations. In early September, Lumumba had been placed under "house arrest" by Mobutu and Kasavubu. Ironically,

⁷⁰ Kalb concluded that this effort "paid off, despite the bruised feelings." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 155.

⁷¹ This issue almost evenly split the UN member-states. Only "U.S. pressures" were able to make the decision for Kasavubu "stick." Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 83.

⁷² On 23 August 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld formed an advisory committee of states contributing troops to ONUC. He consulted with them on at least ten occasions in 1960. On 5 November 1960, the advisory committee voted to establish a "conciliation commission" that would go to the Congo and try and work out a political compromise in the Léopoldville central government. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 64-65.

⁷³ DOS, USPUN 1960, 51.

for the next two months Lumumba's "safety" was ensured by a detachment of ONUC forces—the very same UN forces that Lumumba accused of being a tool of his enemies. In late November, despite a double security cordon around his house (ONUC was ringed by a group of ANC soldiers ready to shoot the former prime minister on sight), Lumumba escaped.⁷⁴ From Léopoldville he made a less-than-stealthy trek across the Congo (stopping to make political speeches) on his way to assume political control of the breakaway northeast province of Orientale—home to his most ardent supporters and another secessionist movement.⁷⁵ En route, Lumumba was intercepted and captured by forces loyal to President Kasavubu. The prisoner was forcibly returned to the capital. This time, Lumumba's political "immunity" expired. He was not return to "house arrest." Instead, the former prime minister was scheduled to stand trial for "crimes against the state and against human rights."⁷⁶

The Soviets were outraged by Lumumba's treatment.⁷⁷ They called for an "emergency meeting" of the Security Council which met between 7 and 14 December. In the Council, the Soviet representative condemned the arrest of Lumumba and charged that "imperialist aggression against the Republic of the Congo [was being]

⁷⁴ Kalb noted that the UN credentials decision "may have spurred Lumumba's decision to make an escape to Stanleyville." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 155-57.

⁷⁵ In fact, during December 1960, the Soviet bloc began supporting the Stanleyville regime (led by Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's loyal follower). On 14 February 1961, the Communist bloc "recognized" Gizenga's government as the "true" Congo faction. This move was soon followed by the UAR, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the Algerian NLF faction—The UAR, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco also protested Lumumba's death by pulling their contingents out of ONUC. This provincial secession was co-opted in August 1961 when Gizenga accepted a position in the Adoula government (see below), but it continued to fester for another five years. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 235.

⁷⁶ Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 266-8. See also UN document A/4614, "Escape of Lumumba."

⁷⁷ Roger Hilsman noted that Lumumba's arrest (which led to the murder of Lumumba) "completed the alienation of both the Communist bloc and the radicalist African and Asian states from the UN's effort in the Congo." Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 235.

carried out by NATO under cover of the United Nations flag.”⁷⁸ When all was said, however, opposing Soviet and U.S. proposals proved incompatible. Again, the UN debates shifted to the General Assembly under provisions of uniting-for-peace.⁷⁹ Between 16 and 20 December, the Assembly also proved unable to generate a two-thirds majority for any proposals. As a result, it only agreed to “retain the Congo question” on its agenda when the regular 15th General Assembly session reconvened in March 1961. At this point, Dag Hammarskjöld seized the initiative that had eluded the Security Council and General Assembly. He noted the serious nature of the organization’s “dual failure” and announced that he would continue to work for peace in the Congo “according to the terms of [earlier] mandates given him by the Security Council and the General Assembly.”⁸⁰ In support of the secretary-general, at the last minute, a slim majority approved ONUC’s financing for another year.⁸¹

This financial question deserves further discussion. Paying for the United Nations’ military and civilian mission to the Congo was no minor matter. The expenses involved in fielding a 15,000-man international force in the Congo, combined with Soviet bloc’s (and others, including France’s) refusal to pay “UN assessments” spelled financial disaster for the United Nations. To put these expenses into perspective, consider that in 1959, the UN General Assembly approved a total budget of \$63.1 million for 1960. In 1960, the Assembly approved a total budget of \$72.9 million for 1961. Expenses for Middle East peacekeeping (UNEF), to this point the largest “supplemental” cost (not included in the annual budget figures) were averaging \$20

⁷⁸ In fact, the Eisenhower administration had alienated itself from the African states by taking such an overt anti-Lumumba stance. For example, a U.S.-sponsored resolution in the GA in December 1960 (which failed by one vote) garnered not a single African vote in its favor. DOS, USPUN 1960, 54-55.

⁷⁹ This resolution did not generate an ESS-V since the General Assembly was already in session.

⁸⁰ Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 490.

⁸¹ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 28-29.

million per year. The costs for ONUC's first six months of operations amounted to some \$66.6 million. The \$86.6 million required to sustain UN peace operations in 1960 more than doubled member-states' assessments. To make matters worse, as a result of unpaid "arrears" (past dues owed to the United Nations for UNEF and ONUC), the organization was increasingly burdened with debt. Looking ahead, a year later (in late 1961) the United States government sponsored a UN "bond" measure that amounted to a \$200 million loan—nearly half of which was eventually purchased (at a two percent rate of return) by the U.S. Congress.⁸²

During these years, the United States paid approximately one-third of all annual assessments and one-third of all costs incurred in support of UN peacekeeping missions.⁸³ The next highest assessments were those of the USSR which averaged near fifteen percent of the general budget⁸⁴—but Moscow refused to pay for peacekeeping, effectively cutting its contributions in half. In support of the UN drive to make up for peace operations' arrears, the Eisenhower administration (since 1956) annually contributed "volunteer" payments. In 1960, for example, the U.S. contributed \$3.2

⁸² DOS, USPUN, 1962, 377.

⁸³ In 1953, the U.S. fought for setting its "ceiling" share at 33.33 percent. In 1946 it was proposed that the U.S. pay 48.89%, but in actual fact, it paid 39.89%. In 1953 it was 35.12% and scheduled for 33.33% in 1954. Between 1954 and 1957 U.S. paid 33.33 percent of the total UN budget. For 1958 this was reduced to 32.51 percent with a revised goal of 30% by the U.S., but this was conditionally accepted by the UN only after 1961, "provided more members joined to help defray additional cost assessments to continuing members." Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1953, DOS Publication 5459, International Organization and Conference Series III, 100 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1954), 201-02; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1957, DOS Publication 6654, International Organization and Conference Series III, 128 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1958), 238-39. See also United Nations Department of Public Information, Everyman's United Nations, 7th edn. (New York: UNDPI, 1964), 450-52.

⁸⁴ The Ukrainian S.S.R., between 1960 and 1964, was separately assessed another 14.97%; but it too (being controlled from Moscow) withheld all payments assessed for peacekeeping. *Ibid.*, 452.

million for UNEF and an additional \$3.9 million for ONUC. In another magnanimous gesture, Congress waived costs for the initial USAF-provided ONUC airlift—\$10.3 million. Combined, during 1960 alone, the U.S. contributed approximately \$30 million in direct support of ONUC.⁸⁵ These fiscal appropriations reflected the majority U.S. Congress opinion that UN peace operations directly supported U.S. interests.

United States' military and logistics support also was critical to the initial and continued success of the United Nations' operations in the Congo. A detailed study, completed in 1970, concluded that "the dependence of the ONUC operation on U.S. support can be described as practically total during the launching phase and very high throughout the operation's four-year life."⁸⁶ During 1960, the U.S. military support in airlift and sealift accounted for approximately 83% of the operation's total strategic lift requirements. Additionally, the United States supplied one-third of the aircraft designated for full-time ONUC internal airlift—claimed to be ONUC's "key to mobility." Just as for UN peacekeeping missions to the Middle East, the U.S. Department of Defense, provided vehicles, communications equipment, and other vital supplies. The support provided by the Eisenhower administration, overall, translated into making ONUC operational months before it otherwise would have been.⁸⁷

At the beginning of 1961, Washington was crediting the UN Operation in the Congo for preventing widespread civil war in the Congo and for forestalling a great-power confrontation in the heart of Africa. Through its civilian operations, the United Nations had prevented a total collapse of the economic and financial structure of the troubled country. Another important UN contribution, from the U.S. perspective, was that the Congolese had been able to expel the large number of Soviet technicians who

⁸⁵ DOS, USPUN 1960, 241-42.

⁸⁶ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations (ACDA/IR-161), vol. II, Background Papers, eds. David W. Wainhouse and others (Washington, D.C.: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 91.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 91, 92.

had “flooded the country in the first months of independence.” On the other hand, little had been done to discipline or train the ANC or to resolve the larger problems of Congo’s national reconciliation. Rival governments in Léopoldville, Elisabethville, Stanleyville, and Bakwanga exercised varying degrees of regional sovereignty—each backed by differing amounts of internal and external support. This factionalism complicated the UN effort. The most serious of these regional secessionist movements remained that of the mineral-rich Katanga province, under “president” Moïse Tshombé. Tshombé’s bid for independence (and his treasury) was backed by foreign investors and a powerful international mining consortium.⁸⁸ In addition, Tshombé’s political claims were solidified by the Congo’s second-largest military force, the Katangan “gendarmarie”—officered by nearly 500 European mercenaries.⁸⁹

In January 1961, the UN “Conciliation Commission for the Congo” visited the former Belgian Colony to recommend further UN initiatives. The commission concluded that the Congo, at that time, was divided into at least four “warring factions” and that the civil war in northern Katanga was threatening to spread. Just as menacing, from the in-coming John F. Kennedy administration’s perspective, the commission confirmed that these secessions were inviting increased direct “foreign military interventions.” The UN commission’s recommendations became the basis for further UN initiatives. Politically, the Congo’s “fundamental law” (the “Loi Fondamentale”) was endorsed as the nation’s interim guidance, until a new national constitution could be drafted. The commission encouraged all factions to reconvene the national parliament—which had been suspended in mid-September 1960. The UN commission recommended that ONUC should contribute to the Congo’s national

⁸⁸ This mining consortium was led by the “Union Minière du Haut-Katanga” which had its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. A significant portion of its stocks were held in London and some in Paris. Its support for Tshombe’s Katangan secession was criticized by the Soviet bloc, and others, as part of an “imperialist scheme.”

⁸⁹ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1961, DOS Publication 7413, International Organization and Conference Series 33 (Washington D.C.: USGPO 1962), 58-59.

reconciliation by establishing general order, removing foreign troops and mercenaries and preventing civil war from escalating between various factions of the Congolese National Army (the ANC). Significantly, the commission's report recommended that to carry out such "increased responsibilities" ONUC would need to be "strengthened to a considerable extent, both in men and modern equipment."⁹⁰ Ironically, this recommendation came at a time when ONUC was about to lose one quarter of its forces as a result of political disaffection.

In mid-January 1961, a pro-Lumumbist mutiny took place in Thysville (where the Lumumba was being held) and a number of troops attempted to free the former prime minister. As a result, Kasavubu and Mobutu made a fateful decision. The Léopoldville leaders concluded that Patrice Lumumba was a greater threat alive than dead. On 17 January, they arranged to "transfer the prisoner" to Katanga—Lumumba would have stood a better chance had he been tossed to the lions. Upon his arrival there, Lumumba was taken into custody by Tshombé's thugs and never seen again.⁹¹ It was not until 13 February that the Katanga press announced that Lumumba had been killed "in mysterious circumstances."⁹² The Soviets and other Afro-Asian member-states were outraged. They called for an immediate convening of the Security Council to condemn Tshombé and his "Western supporters" for Lumumba's murder. The Soviet representative (with support of other member-states) called for a "full investigation." The Eisenhower administration, disenchanted with Lumumba since his "alignment" with Moscow in August 1960, voted against the proposed Soviet resolution. This

⁹⁰ DOS, USPUN 1961, 58-61.

⁹¹ The "timing" of this move has been interpreted by some, notably Madeleine Kalb, as suspicious. Kalb speculated that, since John F. Kennedy's inauguration was 20 January, Mobutu and Kasavubu decided to kill Lumumba before a new U.S. administration took office to potentially side with the more vocal Afro-Asian "Lumumbist" majority. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 196.

⁹² A UN investigation later concluded that Lumumba was probably murdered on 17 or 18 January. Kalb asserted that the CIA had desired to kill Lumumba, but in this case, its plans were not carried out—but "not for want of trying." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 184-96; 189.

decision was the Eisenhower administration's last official vote on the Congo crisis. It further alienated the United States from the African and Asian UN member-states.⁹³

In response to these developments, on 15 February, Adlai E. Stevenson (in his first participation as the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador), delivered the Kennedy administration's "first substantive statement" on the Congo problem. Stevenson characterized the Congo as a "grave crisis." He said that in recent days ONUC had lost two national contingents⁹⁴ and his government was concerned about Soviet threats of unilateral intervention.⁹⁵ As a result, the United States was concerned that the Congo "must not become the battleground of the Cold War." Ambassador Stevenson cited U.S. support for the "preservation of the unity, the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo." He also said that the Kennedy administration supported the Secretary-General's proposals to strengthen and reorganize the Congolese national army; with the final objective to be a restoration of the Congo's constitutional process and the reconciliation of all major political elements.⁹⁶ There was optimism expressed by neutralist states that perhaps, with the change of U.S. administrations (and political parties), the American policy would become more progressive.

⁹³ DOS, USPUN 1961, 68.

⁹⁴ After Lumumba's death, between January and April 1961, a number of pro-Lumumbist states pulled out their national contingents in protest. These states included: Egypt (the UAR); Guinea; Indonesia (returned in 1963); Morocco (the largest contingent pulled: 3,100 troops), and the Sudan. As a result, ONUC's strength was reduced by approximately one-quarter, losing 5,989 out of 19,400. Just as the secretary-general was considering pulling ONUC out of the Congo due to insufficient manning, the mission was saved by India's agreement to send a "large" (4,700 men) contingent, and by Tunisia's and Liberia's agreement to increase the size of their national forces assigned to ONUC. UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 184; and Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 293.

⁹⁵ The Soviets supported the "Lumumbist" breakaway government in Stanleyville (provincial capital of Orientale in northeast Congo) which was established under Lumumba's long-time political ally, Antoine Gizenga. The U.S. delegation rallied against this independent Soviet "intervention" as damaging the UN effort for Congo's national reconciliation.

⁹⁶ DOS, USPUN 1961, 64-67.

To some extent, the Kennedy administration did prove more receptive to the “internationalist” foreign policy approach. As Senator and presidential candidate, Kennedy campaigned against Eisenhower’s “lack of interest” in African affairs. Kennedy’s “New Frontier” strategy promised a “bold new approach” to U.S. foreign affairs. Unfortunately, according to insiders, President Kennedy came to office without specific plans for handling the first major crisis to face him—that of the Congo.⁹⁷ In reality, his administration was divided between the “old guard” and “new Africa group.” The new U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, the State Department’s “European Affairs section, and the Pentagon backed the old-guard “realists” who wanted to continue Eisenhower’s policies of “negotiating from strength.” This group was also in favor of closely coordinating all foreign policy with NATO allies.⁹⁸ The “idealists,” led by Adlai Stevenson and the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams argued for staunchly backing the UN effort and paying more attention to issues important to the emerging African states—a position that annoyed former colonial powers who were also America’s NATO allies.⁹⁹ Kennedy tried to play to both sides and, as a result, pursued an inconsistent policy with regard to the Congo.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Kalb, The Congo Cables, 199-201.

⁹⁸ Rusk, for example, recorded that, personally, he had “always looked upon the United States as the junior partner in Africa.” Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, as told to Richard Rusk and edited by Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 273.

⁹⁹ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 249-50.

¹⁰⁰ Kalb wrote that whenever Kennedy “leaned toward the Frontiersmen view” a friend from the British embassy (Ambassador Ormsby-Gore) would “stop by the White House for a drink, and change Kennedy’s mind.” Kalb, The Congo Cables, 339. For more on the Kennedy approach to the Congo, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New York: Viking Press, 1972); and Donald Aida DiPace, John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966).

Following Stevenson's statement of U.S. support for UN efforts in the Congo, the Security Council passed a landmark resolution (SC 161, S/4741) on 21 February 1961. This resolution was the first Congo initiative approved by the Council since August 1960 (Moscow and Paris abstained—allowing the resolution to go forward without a veto). SC 161 called for expulsion of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel from the Congo, urged the Congolese to convene a full assembly of the national parliament and authorized, for the first time, ONUC's "use of force, if necessary, in the last resort," to prevent civil war in the Congo.¹⁰¹ Prior to this authorization, ONUC's mandate for employing force was limited to that of self-defense only.¹⁰² Taken as a whole, this resolution was a compromise that proved acceptable to both East and West. The first half of the resolution reflected the West's concerns, whereas the second half bowed to radical cries for "action" in the wake of Lumumba's death. Unfortunately, the immediate effect of the resolution was to cause friction between ONUC and the Léopoldville faction. Mobutu and Kasavubu employed a number of "foreign advisers" and they were ruffled that the UN resolution made no such allowances. They interpreted the resolution as impinging upon Congolese sovereignty. In response, Mobutu called upon the Congolese to "resist the threat of a UN takeover." ONUC positions were attacked by ANC forces and were forced to retreat from a number of strategic positions, especially on the Atlantic coast. This situation did not improve until the end of April when the UN Secretariat was able to work out a separate agreement with Léopoldville to redefine the 21 February resolution

¹⁰¹ The resolution was approved 9-0-2 (USSR and France). A full text of S/4741 with commentary is included in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, III: 30-31.

¹⁰² In fact, ONUC was the only "first-generation" peacekeeping mission (of those established in the organization's first 23 years) that authorized its peacekeepers to use force other than in self-defense. The fact that it operated in the midst of a civil war had much to do with this "non-traditional" mandate. Marrack Goulding, a UN former under-secretary general for peace-keeping operations, provided an excellent discussion of "traditional" and "non-traditional" UN peacekeeping in, Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," International Affairs 69/3 (1993): 451-463.

as applicable to "those foreign personnel not under the employ of Léopoldville."¹⁰³

Over the long-run, SC resolution 161 was important in that ONUC's mandate had been "redefined." This would figure prominently in the actions taken by the UN force a few months later. Until that time, however, ONUC did not move quickly enough to satisfy the radicals. As a result, the February Security Council consensus did not last long.

In mid-March, the Congo debates dominated the resumed Fifteenth General Assembly session. The Soviet representative decried ONUC's "failure" to take action against Katanga. He suggested an ultimatum: action or the total cancellation of ONUC within one month. The U.S. countered that the organization must give ONUC a chance to do its job. Ambassador Stevenson argued that ONUC "was not an external coercive force" as charged by the Soviets; rather, he promoted ONUC as "the only instrument available to control the warring factions [in the Congo] while time is gained for mediation and agreement."¹⁰⁴ At the end of these discussions, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions (all dated 15 April, 1961).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Between 21 February and 17 April, the Léopoldville government turned against Dag Hammarskjöld (and especially against his "Special Representative" in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal). ONUC forces were attacked by ANC forces and the UN was "ousted" from its positions in the port towns of Matadi and Banana. It was not until April 17 (after Congolese reconciliation efforts had failed at Tananarive and at Coquilhatville) that Kasavubu agreed to repair relations with the United Nations. See detailed discussion under the topic of "Relations with the Host State," in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 183-192; and Dayal's narrative in Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission For Hammarskjöld: The Congo Crisis (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Additionally, Abi-Saab noted that Dag Hammarskjöld employed the threat of pulling all UN technical and economic assistance if Léopoldville did not cooperate with ONUC and desist from encouraging attacks against UN forces. Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 109.

¹⁰⁴ DOS, USPUN 1961, 69-70.

¹⁰⁵ The U.S. voted against a fourth draft sponsored by the Soviet delegation, which had called on the Congo to convene its parliament within 21 days (this failed 29-53-17). The U.S. delegation, as a general course, did not favor resolutions that imposed time-limits for action. It is not clear if this was due to bureaucratic "empathy" or the rhetorical reasons stated: "The United States opposed this resolution because it contravened the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo by intervening in internal politics." DOS, USPUN 1961, 71.

The first 15-April Congo resolution (GA 1599) recommended that “all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under UN command . . . [should be] withdrawn”—implying from Katanga, but not stated as such. It was approved 61(USSR)-5(Belgium)-33(U.S.). The second resolution (GA 1600) called upon the Congolese to resolve their political differences and to “convene Parliament without delay.” It was approved 60(U.S.)-16(USSR)-23(most of the radical African and Asian states abstained). The third resolution (GA 1601) established a “Commission of Investigation” to look into the death of Lumumba. This was also approved 45(radical states, in favor)-3(Congo, against)-49(U.S. and USSR, abstaining).¹⁰⁶ The Kennedy administration directed that the U.S. delegation abstain on GA 1599 due to the “extreme language” (less than that considered “diplomatic”) which was leveled against Belgium (a U.S. ally in NATO). A number of scholars have written that the Kennedy administration came to office inclined toward improving U.S. relations with the African states.¹⁰⁷ The USUN vote on GA 1599 (and the “justification” provided) demonstrated that the “Europe first” mentality remained in effect three months into the new administration. Notwithstanding, the effect of these resolutions was to demonstrate the international community’s desire to foster a national political reconciliation in the Congo. Between April and August 1961, the UN civilian and military missions played a key role helping to repair the Congo’s constitutional breakdown.

On 17 April, ONUC assisted arranging a major conference of the Congo’s regional leaders in Coquilhatville (a city in north-central Congo, approximately 500 miles northeast of Léopoldville.) As a result of this “leadership conference,” a

¹⁰⁶ Recall, votes to abstain do not influence whether GA resolutions pass or fail; the total number of votes for determining percentages also do not include abstentions. All three resolutions and voting records are included in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 33-37.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Kalb, The Congo Cables, 197-280; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 245-47; Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 277-78.

concerted effort to reach a parliamentary solution was strengthened. After each legislator's safety was "guaranteed" by the ONUC commander, the Congolese national Parliament met in mid-July through the first of August on the Lovanium university campus just outside of Léopoldville.¹⁰⁸ After two weeks of non-stop talks (the candidates were essentially locked-in with ONUC forces providing strict security), the Congolese delegates approved a new coalition government—retaining President Kasavubu and nominating Cyrille Adoula (a pro-West "moderate") as prime minister.¹⁰⁹ Antoine Gizenga (an associate of the former prime minister Lumumba) was incorporated into the coalition government as the deputy prime minister. This move, it was hoped, would serve to reconcile the northeast Orientale province (with its "Stanleyville government faction") into the central government. Thus, by 2 August 1961, over three-fourths of the Congo was reunited. Provincial Premier Tshombé, however, did not agree to end his Katanga secessionist movement—in fact, in July, Elisabethville "celebrated" its one year independence-day anniversary.¹¹⁰ For the next eighteen months, the problem of Katanga was the major concern for the Congo central government and for ONUC.

¹⁰⁸ An in-depth account of these political maneuverings and the UN's role is included in Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 358-83.

¹⁰⁹ Kalb documented that the U.S. Department of State had backed Adoula as prime minister. His victory was considered Kennedy's "first victory over the Russians." Washington cautioned its officials not to celebrate publicly for fear of "ruining Adoula's chances of establishing himself as a respected neutralist leader." This message was followed by another sobering reminder that "anything could happen in the Congo." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 276-77.

¹¹⁰ Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence, 358-83.

ONUC's "War:" The Katanga Secession (August 1961 to January 1963)

Moïse Tshombé had first declared Katanga's independence on 11 July 1960. In the year that had passed (during the constitutional crisis), the secession had not only "hardened;" but "the foreign roots on which it fed had become more diffuse. . . making them more difficult to control, identify and sever."¹¹¹ As "provincial president," Tshombé enjoyed strong (if "unofficial") political support from Brussels, London, Paris, and certain members of the U.S. Congress.¹¹² The Katangan secession also received political support, manpower, and supplies from Portuguese Angola, Britain's "white-ruled" colonies of Rhodesia and South Africa, and from certain French and former French-ruled colonies in Africa, notably the Congo (Brazzaville).¹¹³ Tshombé's secession was fiscally sustained by contributions (or with-holdings) of the international mining companies operating in Katanga. Before July 1960, these corporations accounted for 60% of the Congo's national revenues. Denied these assets, the Léopoldville government was crippled. As a result, many Léopoldville officials were determined to regain the resource-rich province, either by diplomacy or direct military engagement. The new Adoula government, however, was persuaded to give the United Nations a chance. As a result, Adoula's prestige rose and fell with UN

¹¹¹ Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 113.

¹¹² Late in 1960, Tshombé had dispatched , an "adept propagandist" (a Belgian named Michel Struelens) to the United States. According to Urquhart and Hilsman, he was "spectacularly successful." One of his closest supporters in Washington was Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut. Dodd was an influential member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (although he was discredited in 1966 when allegations of "financial impropriety" led to a 92-5 Senate vote to censure him for diverting public funds for private use). Dodd consistently spoke out against ONUC and in favor of a separatist regime in Katanga under Tshombé. See Urquhart, Hammaraskjold, 554; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 247-62. For Struelens' account, see Michel Struelens, The United Nations in the Congo, or ONUC and International Politics (Brussels: Max Arnold, 1976).

¹¹³ Fulbert Youlou of Brazzaville staunchly supported Tshombé, and fell to a Marxist-oriented revolution shortly after Tshombé's secession failed in 1963.

“success” and “failure” regarding the situation in Katanga.

Up to this point, ONUC’s evolving mandate was based on a number of vague and somewhat contradictory resolutions—four approved by the Security Council and another five by the General Assembly. *Inter alia*, these resolutions tasked ONUC: to “maintain the territorial integrity and political independence” of the Congo; to “assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order;” and to “prevent the occurrence of civil war—by force, if necessary, in the last resort.” Also, since Tshombé’s rule relied heavily upon foreign mercenaries, the UN proscriptions of these types of persons operating in the Congo figured prominently in ONUC’s guidance regarding Katanga.¹¹⁴

During late March and early April 1961, relations between ONUC and Katanga grew more strained. At that time, Premier Tshombé and his “Interior Minister,” Godefroid Munongo, had encouraged Katangan forces to harass ONUC with small-scale “hit-and-run” attacks. These hostilities were temporarily calmed by the “spirit of conciliation” that marked the Congo’s talks at Coquilhatville and at Lovanium. ONUC’s decision to move nearly half its military contingents into Katanga also contributed to more circumspect behavior by Tshombé’s gendarmerie. These force readjustments provided the United Nations with a temporary numerical superiority of some 8,000 peacekeepers to Tshombé’s 6,000 gendarmerie.¹¹⁵ This “balance,” however, was not sufficient to convince Tshombé to attend the Lovanium conference in July, nor to renounce his secession by joining with the new Adoula coalition government in August 1961.

Previously, ONUC had resorted to “military force” only to protect troop positions that came under fire. As a result, the “initiative” remained with Tshombé’s forces—they were in control, they set tempo and had the advantages of mobility and

¹¹⁴ DOS, USPUN 1961, 74-75.

¹¹⁵ Figures of Katangan gendarmerie are estimates—Tshombé continued to recruit additional forces from within the province and from his neighboring “allies” in Angola and Rhodesia. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 220-48.

initiative. In general, the gendarmerie were arrogant and scorned the peacekeepers as cowardly. Accordingly, the first UN “offensive” (designated “Operation RUMPUNCH” by the United Nations) clearly surprised the Katangans. On 28 August ONUC forces secured the radio station, post office (a “telecommunications center”¹¹⁶) and other key positions in Elisabethville. ONUC then aggressively “rounded-up” a few hundred of the estimated 500 Katangan mercenaries.

Operation RUMPUNCH was a reflection of ONUC’s frustration with passive measures and empty entreaties to Tshombé for cooperation. It was, similarly, motivated by the international community’s accusations that ONUC had failed to take positive action against Katanga. Most importantly, from Washington’s perspective, as early as mid-August, officials from the Adoula government in Léopoldville were informing UN representatives that if something wasn’t done about Katanga, the new coalition government would not survive long.¹¹⁷ As a result, Hammarskjöld was driven to expand his limited concept of ONUC’s mandate. Nonetheless, the secretary-general was careful to cover his actions with a “legal justification.” Hammarskjöld and his staff in Léopoldville (now run by a Swede, Sture Linnér, and a Tunisian, Mahmoud Khiary) asked the Adoula government to issue an official Congolese proclamation “demanding the immediate departure from the Congo” of all “mercenaries in Katanga.” This Congolese “ordinance 70/1961” was issued on 24 August. In Hammarskjöld’s mind, this provided the necessary legal pretext for ONUC’s operation RUMPUNCH, conducted four days later.¹¹⁸

RUMPUNCH was a military success, reversed by a political blunder. The hero, and also the goat, was the new UN “Representative in Elisabethville,” Irishman Conor

¹¹⁶ Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 255.

¹¹⁷ Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 553.

¹¹⁸ As a result of the order, Hammarskjöld stated that ONUC was operating in accordance with earlier UN resolutions and the request of the Congolese “sovereign government.” Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 553-57.

Cruise O'Brien.¹¹⁹ He had been personally recruited by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld in June 1961 to carry a more aggressive style to the UN leadership in Katanga.¹²⁰ After ONUC secured its objectives and apprehended some 315 mercenaries,¹²¹ O'Brien was persuaded by Tshombé and members of the Belgian and British "consulates" in Elisabethville to allow them to "assume responsibility" for their nationals. He naively handed-over the captured mercenaries to the Western consuls; assuming they would assiduously detain and deport those apprehended. O'Brien later justified this decision as "in the interest of avoiding violence."¹²² Unfortunately, the majority of the foreign gendarme officers that were captured claimed they did not wish to be "repatriated" and were subsequently allowed to go free. Most of these mercenaries resumed their positions as Katangan officers—albeit exercising their leadership less visibly (for example, many discarded "uniforms" in favor of civilian clothes).¹²³ Operation RUMPUNCH, in the end, was a costly lesson proving who the

¹¹⁹ For his colorful (and discredited by others as self-serving) account of these events see Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962).

¹²⁰ Urquhart noted that O'Brien "was known to be a talented, high-spirited, and courageous man." Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 548-49.

¹²¹ Rikhye put this number at 315, but sources vary. Kalb and Urquhart asserted that only 81 mercenaries were "rounded-up for deportation." The discrepancy appears to be between the number "captured" and those that were eventually deported. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 257; Kalb, The Congo Cables, 289; Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 556. At nearly the same time, the Belgian government stepped up its independent actions to recall its nationals from Katanga. According to Urquhart, this led to the withdrawal of another 204 "Belgian officers"—leaving at least 304 foreign officers of various nationalities (about 100 of these were rogue Belgians). Ibid., 554.

¹²² UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 191.

¹²³ Soon after this UN operation, the new Belgian government (assuming power in April 1961 and more cooperative with the UN effort) took firmer actions against its nationals in Katanga. A concerted effort netted about 200 Belgians and left another 100 more "missing." After this, the Western governments claimed that their citizens acting as mercenaries in Katanga were "on their own" and nothing more could be done to persuade them to leave peacefully. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the

United Nations could and could not trust in Katanga. Just as disastrous, the gendarmerie had been surprised once, they would be ready “next time.”

Nearly coincident with these UN actions, Tshombé and Munongo launched an intense campaign against the Baluba tribes-people of Katanga. The strategy behind these attacks was two-fold. First, most Baluba rejected Tshombé’s claim to provincial leadership. Tshombé viewed them as a political liability. Second, Munongo and his cadre spread the word that the UN troops were committing atrocities and causing general disorder in Elisabethville. In fact, the opposite was true. The secretary-general had directed ONUC to provide care and protection for the Baluba refugees. By 9 September 1961, some 35,000 Balubas were living in a makeshift camp outside of Elisabethville guarded by ONUC. Feeding and caring for these refugees complicated ONUC’s already-difficult duties in Katanga.¹²⁴

For the next few months, the political game of “cat and mouse” continued between the UN forces in Katanga and the provincial government under Premier Tshombé. Between September and November 1961, ONUC forces seized key points in Elisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga—only to hand them back to after gaining assurances of future cooperation and assistance. In each case, promises made by Tshombé and his mercenary forces were broken. In addition, as a result of the UN’s perceived “soft” attitude, Tshombé continued to authorize hit-and-run military operations against ONUC to see if the UN would fold.¹²⁵

On 13 September, Mahmoud Khiary (the Tunisian UN civilian operations chief in the Congo) and Conor O’Brien decided to attempt another Katangan mercenary round-

Secretary-General, 256.

¹²⁴ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 191.

¹²⁵ Tshombé was encouraged by the Soviet bloc and others at the United Nations who were calling for ONUC’s termination. The costs for ONUC were mounting. The longer Tshombé could stall, the better he saw his chances to ride out the international organization’s efforts aimed at reintegrating the Congo.

up.¹²⁶ This operation, named MORTHOR—meaning “smash” in Hindi, was a disaster for the United Nations. MORTHOR provided the Katangans with an excuse to escalate operations against ONUC and led to the first sustained fighting between ONUC and the gendarmerie. ONUC did not fare well. In Elisabethville, alone, ONUC forces were outnumbered two to one.¹²⁷ After the one-day round-up failed on 13 September, ONUC positions were attacked for an additional week with no operational plan beyond holding their positions—only reacting to Katangan attacks.¹²⁸ Between 13 and 20 September 1961, UN contingents were pinned down, lost entire units as prisoners, and suffered a number of casualties.¹²⁹ In eight days of fighting, 20 UN soldiers and another 50 gendarme soldiers were killed. Many more were wounded on both sides.¹³⁰

In response to the escalation of fighting between ONUC and Tshombé’s forces, Dag Hammarskjöld decided that the United Nations’ most appropriate response should be to arrange an immediate cease fire in Katanga. By coincidence, the UN secretary-

¹²⁶ Accounts vary. Sture Linnér, Dag Hammarskjöld’s most trusted adviser in the Congo may not have been directly involved in this operation. Kalb wrote that Linnér was “nominally in charge,” but his “deputy” Khiary was “strong-minded” and “. . . shared O’Brien’s views about the need for immediate action and was in a position to put those views into effect.” Kalb, The Congo Cables, 293. Abi-Saab agreed that Hammarskjöld’s orders had been “misconstrued” by his officials in the Congo. Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 144-45.

¹²⁷ According to General Rikhye, at the end of August 1961 the Katanga had 3,000 gendarmerie in Elisabethville and the ONUC had 1,600. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 255.

¹²⁸ DOS, USPUN 1961, 77-78.

¹²⁹ For example, an entire company of Irish ONUC troops (191 men) was taken prisoner by Katangan forces on 13 September. They had been sent to Jadotville (another Tshombé stronghold) at the request of Western consulates “to protect Europeans” there. The unit was repatriated in a once-delayed prisoner exchange on 25 October. ONUC reported 11 members killed and claimed to have killed nearly 50 Katangan forces. See Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 55-57; Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 280.

¹³⁰ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 251.

general was just arriving in Léopoldville on 13 September as MORTHOR was less than twelve hours old. He was traveling en route to meet with the Adoula government when the operation was launched—apparently the escalation took place without his authorization¹³¹—and he was dismayed that his lieutenants had provoked a military conflict in Katanga. He immediately called for a cease fire. Hammarskjöld's convictions that UN objectives should be pursued peacefully were enough to motivate him to do so. But, just to make sure, the U.S. and British diplomats in Léopoldville demanded that Hammarskjöld do something to stop the fighting in Katanga.¹³² Within a few days, Hammarskjöld agreed to meet with Tshombé in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (approximately 100 miles southeast of Elisabethville, just across the Katangan border). Early on 17 September, Tshombé had demanded favorable terms and was unable to be contacted thereafter. Hammarskjöld sent a list of his own demands, but did not wait for a response before departing to meet with Tshombé. As events proved, the Katangans claimed victory and took advantage of the cease fire to regroup and re-supply the gendarmerie. Hammarskjöld had expressed his concerns that he would be accused of giving in to Tshombé, but the secretary-general was dedicated to peace at nearly any cost.¹³³ At 5 p.m. on 17 September, Hammarskjöld departed for Ndola. His

¹³¹ Hammarskjöld cabled Bunche in NY after he arrived in Léopoldville and stated that "the first I knew about this development, I learned by tendentious Reuters report in Accra on my way to Leo." Quoted in Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 565.

¹³² Kalb noted that both the British and Americans threatened to discontinue support for ONUC if the secretary-general did not stop the fighting in Katanga. Urquhart's account recorded that Hammarskjöld was "infuriated" by these "extraordinary démarche." Rajeshwar Dayal (Hammarskjöld's representative to the Congo between September 1960 to May 1961) said that Hammarskjöld was "haunted by the ultimatum of the British Government and the warnings of the United States. He had no choice but to throw himself as a pawn into the desperate gamble." Dayal, Mission For Hammarskjöld, 281. Abi-Saab noted that the Kennedy administration threatened that "U.S. support would evaporate" if conditions in the Congo toppled the Adoula government. Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 149.

¹³³ According to Urquhart, Hammarskjöld was "anxious to tackle the residual problem of Katanga" before the 16th GA met later that month. He viewed the issue of Katanga's secession as leading to an upcoming "extensive and poisonous debate . . .

Swedish Transair D.C.-6B left Léopoldville in the evening to employ the cover of darkness to avoid a possible attack by the Katangan Fouga jet. Approximately five hours later that night, the secretary-general's aircraft crashed nine miles from its intended destination.¹³⁴ The UN secretary-general and his 14-person staff were all killed.¹³⁵ The next day, after it was announced that Hammarskjöld had died, Mahmoud Khiary (representing the office of the UN secretary-general) traveled to Ndola and granted Tshombé the cease fire that both sides had been seeking. Sporadic firing continued in Katanga until 13 October when an additional "protocol" was signed to resolve the issues that were not addressed in the original cease-fire agreement. As a result of operation MORTHOR, the United Nations had lost its respected chief executive and had forfeited its "shield of impartiality."

In New York, the Soviet bloc seized upon the occasion of the secretary-general's death to renew its drive against UN operations in the Congo. In addition, following-up on Premier Khrushchev's September 1960 initiative, the Soviet delegation aggressively promoted its campaign to transform the UN executive position to be comprised of a three-man "troika." This political battle was waged for nearly two months. Finally, in November 1961, the Soviet bloc compromised and supported the appointment of Burmese diplomat U Thant as "acting" secretary-general. The Soviet Union's continued to press the new secretary-general to designate at least three powerful

that would do neither the Congo nor the UN any good." Quoted in Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 546. Hammarskjöld also seems to have been convinced that if he personally went to meet Tshombé perhaps the latter could be convinced to "accompany" the secretary-general back to Léopoldville and reconcile differences with the Adoula government. Ibid., 585-86.

¹³⁴ The time of the crash was later established as between 10:11 and 10:13 p.m. based on the stopped watches of the passengers. Ibid., 589.

¹³⁵ One man (Harold Julien) survived the crash, but died a week later. The official UN investigation (completed in April 1962) found no evidence of sabotage. It appeared that the flight crew descended too low during a circling pass over the airfield and was downed by the tree-tops. Ibid., 592.

undersecretaries representing the international blocs.¹³⁶

Meanwhile in the Congo, the October cease fire in Katanga was breaking down. Encouraged by earlier air victories, Tshombé supplemented his Fouga jets with a few Dornier attack aircraft. These mercenary-piloted aircraft waged an uninterrupted campaign against UN positions in Katanga and in neighboring Kasai (the adjacent province to the north). Katangan jets strafed UN troops and attacked railway links, communications, and ONUC-controlled air strips. By early November, the UN forces finally began to respond, in kind. Despite opposition from the Western capitals, ONUC established a small "air force" of its own. The UN managed to recruit four Ethiopian F-86f and five Swedish Saab J-29 jet fighters, complemented by six Indian Canberra fighter-bombers.¹³⁷ Only after instituting air patrols and warning Tshombé against further air attacks was the Katangan air force temporarily grounded.

Nonetheless, these military successes were not complemented with political progress. In late October, reconciliation talks between Prime Minister Adoula and President Tshombé broke down completely. On 27 October, Adoula declared (over central Congolese radio) that his government had "exhausted all means for peaceful reconciliation and would continue with its police action to restore law and order in north Katanga and end the Katanga secession." At this point, a sporadic civil war erupted between ANC and Katangan units. ONUC was caught in the middle, mostly unprepared. The UN military mission was not manned or equipped to prevent large-

¹³⁶ A U.S. Department of State analysis noted that "there are no provisions in either the UN Charter or the staff regulations of the UN Secretariat for the carrying on of the functions of the secretary-general in the even of his death, incapacity, or absence from the UN headquarters; nor is there any order of precedence among the under secretaries." DOS, USPUN 1961, 175-77.

¹³⁷ London and Paris remained un-supportive. They refused UN air transit rights across their colonial or former colonies' airspace and London held-up shipment of bombs needed by the Indian Canberra bombers (made in Britain). According to Kalb, these governments believed that "the United Nations had no business being involved in a military operation that was likely to harm innocent civilians." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 314-15. See also Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 294.

scale hostilities. To its credit, however, ONUC deterred the escalation of hostilities between ANC and Katangan units.¹³⁸ As a result of this UN posture, especially during November 1961, ONUC forces were spread too thinly and began to suffer additional casualties—and not just in Katanga.¹³⁹

Between 13 and 24 November, the UN Security Council met to consider the escalation of the Congo's civil war and the impending collapse of the Adoula coalition government. Notably, Gizenga (encouraged by Tshombé's success against ONUC) had again deserted the Léopoldville government to establish a break-away regime in Stanleyville. The Soviet Union and other African states began to support Gizenga, again. U.S. proposals for increased efforts to "halt the flow of arms" and suggestions to "reorganize the ANC forces, including the training of a small air force" were all defeated by Soviet vetoes.¹⁴⁰ The only proposal that survived this divided Council session was SC resolution 169 of 24 November 1961. It proved to be the United Nations' last significant resolution on the Congo crisis. Resolution 169 asserted that the United Nations "completely reject[ed] the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent nation'" and it authorized the secretary-general to "take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force" to apprehend, detain, and deport all "foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command."¹⁴¹ This resolution was approved by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and

¹³⁸ The U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk recorded in his memoirs that "the alternative to this UN effort was to acquiesce in Katanga's secession and risk a civil war that would likely result in a great-power clash." Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, 278.

¹³⁹ For example, on 11 November, thirteen members of an Italian ONUC support air crew were "savagely murdered" by Congolese troops assigned to Stanleyville. DOS, *USPUN* 1961, 82.

¹⁴⁰ The Soviet veto of the U.S. amendment aimed at strengthening the Congolese ANC proved especially damaging to the central government's long-term chances for stabilizing the fragmentary Congo after ONUC departed. (More on this below.)

¹⁴¹ A full text version is available in Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*, III: 37-38.

Britain abstained). The Soviet Union voted for the resolution because Moscow desired action against Katanga, but opposed all U.S. proposals to include an ONUC mandate against Stanleyville.¹⁴² The acting secretary-general took this "renewed mandate" and assumed the initiative. For the next month, and again a year later, U Thant acted resolutely.¹⁴³ On more than one occasion, U Thant asserted that the UN must do all it could to assist the Congo "to eliminate foreign intervention."¹⁴⁴

In late November and early December 1961, Tshombé and his mercenaries stepped-up Katangan operations against ONUC forces. Citing the secretary-general's speech at the Security Council and noting ONUC's build-up in early December, the Katanga interior minister (Munongo) broadcast that "U Thant has just declared war on the small people of Katanga. . . . People of Katanga awake, the hour has come; let us defend ourselves furiously." Ironically, this proved to strengthen ONUC's case as it was "forced" to "defend itself" as mercenary-led attacks escalated. After having endured weeks of hit-and-run attacks, on 15 December, ONUC launched operation UNOKAT. In this case, the Kennedy administration's decision to support a request for large-scale ONUC internal airlifts and the grounding of the Katangan aircraft proved critical.¹⁴⁵ The Kennedy administration faced harsh criticism and opposition from its European allies for this support of UNOKAT. London stated categorically that it was "opposed to any UN offensives." It also denied key supplies (especially bombs for the British-manufactured Indian Canberra aircraft). Paris agreed and denied U.S. and all UN-related flights over its African territories. The NATO council called an emergency

¹⁴² Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 160.

¹⁴³ U Thant may have acted more aggressively than his predecessor Dag Hammarskjöld would have. Certainly both men were more decisive and independent than a "troika would have been.

¹⁴⁴ Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 168.

¹⁴⁵ In early September the Kennedy administration refused to grant Hammarskjöld's requests for additional internal ONUC airlift. This policy was reversed to support UNOKAT in early December. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 314.

meeting, and for the first time, a majority “condemned” U.S. support of UN actions.¹⁴⁶ The secretary-general, supported by strong U.S. resolve, was able to resist the pressures. Within three days, ONUC established effective control over Elisabethville.¹⁴⁷ Some 206 Katanga troops, 50 civilians, and 21 UN soldiers were killed.¹⁴⁸ As of 18 December, ONUC objectives were “secured” in Katanga, and Tshombé was ready to negotiate. At this point, the European cries for a “diplomatic solution” were belatedly heeded.¹⁴⁹ ONUC’s victories in December 1961 made the next few months of diplomatic initiatives possible. As an added bonus for Washington, the ANC turned its attention against Gizenga’s secession in Orientale. By mid January 1963 Gizenga was defeated and under arrest for “an assault on the security of the state.”¹⁵⁰

As before, when ONUC gained an advantage, Tshombé sought a diplomatic respite to regroup his forces. The day before UNOKAT was launched, Tshombé sent a cable directly to President Kennedy asking for the United States to mediate “reconciliation talks” with Prime Minister Adoula. President Kennedy accepted only after the UN operation was successful. On 18 December, the U.S. president designated his new Ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion as “his personal representative”

¹⁴⁶ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 254-55.

¹⁴⁷ At the time UNOKAT was launched, General Rikhye estimated Katangan troop strength at approximately 4,000. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 294. DOS, USPUN 1961, 85.

¹⁴⁸ Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 296.

¹⁴⁹ Lefever noted that UNOKAT drew criticism because of reported “atrocities” committed by both sides. Civilians were killed when UN troops took action against gendarmes firing upon ONUC from areas where civilians had not been evacuated. The United States and the Soviet Union, for different reasons, served to uphold U Thant during this time when he endured intense international criticisms. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 60; Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 167-68.

¹⁵⁰ Kalb, The Congo Cables, 326-8. Kalb also noted that the Kennedy administration wanted no more martyrs in the mold of Lumumba. As a result, Gizenga was imprisoned on an island near the mouth of the Congo River. Ibid., 329-35.

for the talks to be held at Kitona (located near the mouth of the Congo river just east of the Atlantic coast). Between 19 and 21 December 1961, American Ralph J. Bunche, acting as the UN's top executive in the Congo (as under secretary for "Special Political Affairs"), and the U.S. Ambassador Gullion, coordinated these Congolese talks. The resulting eight-point "Kitona Agreement" was circumspectly considered a diplomatic victory as the year came to a close.¹⁵¹

Despite ONUC's December 1961 "victory," the Katanga secession continued unresolved. In the first few months of 1962, Tshombé undermined the basis for the agreements signed at Kitona. In essence, Katangan provincial president "reinterpreted" the document to say that it sanctioned the "status quo" rather than working toward the territorial reunification of the Congo.¹⁵² Between March and June, the UN sponsored additional national reconciliation conferences in the Congo. Each time that Tshombé traveled to Léopoldville the United Nations provided air travel and "guaranteed" the rebel leader's safety. Tshombé, due mostly to continued support from France, the United Kingdom and their aligned nations, was able to thwart diplomatic initiatives on each occasion. Meanwhile, civil war smoldered in northern Katanga and tensions increased between UN forces and the Katangans in Elisabethville.¹⁵³

During the summer of 1962, U Thant became impatient with Tshombé's stalling. As a result, the secretary-general decided to support a U.S. initiative that would put additional "pressure" on Tshombé to end his secession.¹⁵⁴ In August, Thant announced

¹⁵¹ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 189.

¹⁵² Hilsman noted that Tshombé possessed "sophisticated stalling tactics" and that neither the United Nations nor the United States held sufficient political or economic "leverage" to gain Tshombé's adherence to promises easily broken. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 256.

¹⁵³ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962, DOS Publication 7610, International Organization and Conference Series 45 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1963), 70-74.

¹⁵⁴ For information on the United States' role in formulating the "Thant Plan," see Kalb, The Congo Cables, 345-59.

that “unity in Congo must be established” and “if persuasion failed, economic pressures might have to be applied”—especially against Katanga. In support of this effort, the secretary-general issued a UN “Plan for National Reconciliation.” In sum, this called for preparing a new Congolese federal constitution, dividing tax receipts and foreign exchange between the central government and Katanga, implementing national currency unification, reintegrating Congo’s military forces, and granting general amnesty to Katangan (and other) provincial separatists. On 23 August, this “Thant plan” was accepted by the Léopoldville central government as the Congo’s blueprint for national reconciliation. By 2 September, UN representatives had also succeeded in gaining Tshombé’s agreement. The Kennedy administration announced its commitment to the plan (since it essentially was a U.S. initiative) and offered to grant any assistance needed to implement the “secretary-general’s proposal.”¹⁵⁵

As expected, due to the Congo’s continuing rivalries and factionalism, the Thant Plan encountered implementation difficulties. In November 1962, after no progress was realized concerning Katanga, U Thant queried officials in Léopoldville and Elisabethville via formal letters. Tshombé’s reply blamed the central government. His excuses were wearing thin, however, as most UN officials regarded Tshombé’s intransigence as the main obstacle to Congo’s unification. The secretary-general wrote back and asserted that if Tshombé was really interested in progress his officers should take oaths of allegiance to the central government and Katanga must share provincial revenues with Léopoldville. Finally, as a result of Tshombé’s increased use of roadblocks to harass ONUC, U Thant asserted that UN forces must be allowed full “freedom of movement” within Katanga.¹⁵⁶ To this letter, Tshombé did not reply.¹⁵⁷

By November 1962, Katanga was again in full defiance of both Léopoldville and

¹⁵⁵ On the State Department’s drafting of the “Thant Plan,” see Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 258-59; DOS, *USPUN* 1962, 74-79.

¹⁵⁶ This concept of “freedom of movement” became a key catch phrase to “legally” justify ONUC’s final offensive in December 1962 and January 1963.

¹⁵⁷ DOS, *USPUN* 1962, 83.

the United Nations. During that month, tensions increased when the Katangan gendarmerie steadily surrounded static ONUC positions and began to confiscate or block the delivery of UN supplies. A U.S. State Department analysis of this period noted that “the combination of the [Thant] Plan’s frustration and rising tensions confronted the United Nations and the United States with the ‘moment of decision’ at the end of November.”¹⁵⁸ At this juncture, Secretary-General Thant anticipated future problems maintaining ONUC force levels. Mainland China had launched a ground offensive into northern India and Thant was worried that India would recall its 6,000 peacekeepers assigned to the Congo. And, as discussed below, the financial crisis resulting from peacekeeping costs was escalating. In late 1961 the United Nations General Assembly had resorted to issuing a \$200 million bond to keep the organization fiscally solvent. A year later the U.S. Congress had authorized the purchase of up to \$100 million, limited to half the total purchased.¹⁵⁹ Even this generosity could not be counted upon, indefinitely. ONUC costs were averaging \$100 million per year—in U Thant’s mind, late December was an opportune time for action.¹⁶⁰

The Kennedy administration’s concurrence set the stage for ONUC’s impending success. For the first time in 1962, the Kennedy administration ventured a temporary break with its European allies over UN actions in the Congo. After spending much of the year supporting allied insistence upon a purely diplomatic solution to Katanga, Washington supplemented UN military movements with threats of unilateral and

¹⁵⁸ During October and November 1962, the Kennedy administration was primarily occupied with the Cuban missile crisis. According to Kalb, President Kennedy was “grateful” for NATO support during these months and was leaning toward adopting their diplomatic approach toward Tshombé. He was forced to reconsider this stance when Adoula barely survived a Congolese “vote of confidence” during late November. As a result, Kennedy called his staff and was convinced to support ONUC’s last shot at Katanga. Kalb, *The Congo Cables*, 358-65.

¹⁵⁹ DOS, *USPUN* 1962, 377.

¹⁶⁰ U Thant, *View From the UN* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1978), 141-42.

coordinated economic sanctions against Katanga.¹⁶¹ Roger Hilsman, a Kennedy “insider” (as the State Department’s director of intelligence and research) noted that Kennedy was advised to either adopt a more active UN approach or call for a “total UN withdrawal.” London and Paris remained opposed to any UN offensive. But, according to Hilsman, Belgium’s new foreign minister, Paul Henri Spaak (who was a career “internationalist”¹⁶²) “carried the day” by announcing that Brussels supported a UN solution to Katanga, “even if that required force.”¹⁶³

In response to gendarmerie actions in Katanga, UN commanders moved troops and heavy support units into Elisabethville during late November and early December—relying heavily upon U.S. air assets.¹⁶⁴ As a result, by mid-December 1962, ONUC forces in Katanga outnumbered the gendarmerie 13,500 to 10,000.¹⁶⁵ In

¹⁶¹ On 27 November, President Kennedy announced a joint agreement with Belgium (the major controlling foreign market for Katanga’s mines) to apply “severe economic measures” if the situation in Katanga did not progress toward reconciliation. DOS, USPUN 1962 , 84-85.

¹⁶² Spaak, a lawyer and Belgian socialist, was committed to promoting “internationalist” solutions to political problems. He twice served as Belgium’s prime minister (1938-39; 1947-49). He was elected as the first UN General Assembly president in 1946 and, in 1949 he was the first chairman of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly. Between 1956 and 1961 Spaak served as NATO secretary-general. He resigned from this post to resume his Belgian political career as foreign minister. A biographical source is available at the NATO website: <http://www.NATO.int/cv/secgen/spaak.htm>. Also, see footnote 27 above.

¹⁶³ Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 263-65. Abi-Saab also noted that Spaak slowly changed the nature of Belgium’s support for Katanga after taking office on 25 April 1961. Abi-Saab, UN and the Congo, 124.

¹⁶⁴ Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 295.

¹⁶⁵ Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 60-61. Other sources estimated that Tshombé had as many as 18,000 men during December 1962. Kalb quoted this figure from a DOS intelligence summary dated 2 January 1963, in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 369. Hilsman, as DOS “director of intelligence and research” claimed that Tshombé had a force of “eight to ten thousand” with 200 Belgian “soldiers of fortune,” and another 300 mercenaries hired from South Africa, Rhodesia, and France (many of the latter with hardened experience in Algeria). Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 251.

response to this build-up, the Katangan gendarmerie resolved to strike first. Between 24 and 27 December ONUC forces were subjected to a number of attacks. [See Appendix B for a map of Katanga.]

On 27 December, ONUC retaliated as Operation GRAND SLAM was put into effect. Again, the ONUC surprised the Katangans by going on the offensive. During that day a number of rebel units were forced to retreat and many of their roadblocks were cleared in the name of regaining ONUC's "freedom of movement." By sundown, most of the Katangan forces in the immediate Elisabethville area were defeated. At the same time, UN aircraft attacked Katangan airfields and destroyed the rebel's bombers and fighters on the ground.¹⁶⁶ On 3 January 1963, another ONUC offensive overcame the penultimate rebel stronghold near the Katangan town of Jadotville.¹⁶⁷ Tshombé retreated to make his last stand in the northwest Katangan town of Kolwezi. On 8 January 1963, he informed reporters that he desired to "re-negotiate" his earlier acceptance of the Plan for National Reconciliation. Simultaneously, he threatened that his forces had placed explosive devices at key industrial and provincial power-production facilities. If UN forces approached Kolwezi, Tshombé threatened that he would order a "scorched-earth policy." This threat alerted Brussels, London and Paris—in response they all demanded that ONUC operations should immediately cease. The United Nations held its positions and refused to negotiate. As ONUC forces consolidated their positions, the remainder of Tshombé's gendarmerie quietly melted

¹⁶⁶ DOS, USPUN 1962 , 87.

¹⁶⁷ There was great apprehension about ONUC's movement into Jadotville. Apparently U Thant issued the order for the forces to hold short of the town (at the Lufira River)—this command was inspired by pressures from all Western capitals, including Washington. By the time the order reached the commander on the scene, however, by his account half the unit was already across the river. On his own initiative, the Indian commander decided to press on and his forces entered the strategic town peaceably. Accounts vary, and a UN "investigation" was later conducted to see why the force didn't hold short of Jadotville. The commander was exonerated of all charges, but the situation demonstrated the difficulties the UN faced trying to command and control multinational forces in a fluid war situation. This account is recorded in detail by Rikhye in Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 305-10.

away. On 17 January, the Katangan president announced his defeat—contingent upon the Adoula government honoring its previously-offered general amnesty. It did. On 21 January, ONUC entered Kolwezi without resistance. The Katangan secession was effectively ended.

In light of Prime Minister Adoula's fragile domestic coalition, Tshombé's reconciliation came at a politically important juncture. The Kennedy administration, despite its wavering between its European allies and support for the UN mission, breathed a sigh of relief and praised the UN victory in Katanga. Washington issued an official summary of ONUC's actions, describing them as instrumental in preserving the Léopoldville government while re-integrating the economically important Katanga province into the Congo without having destroyed it in the process.¹⁶⁸

ONUC's Phase-Out (1963-June 1964) and The Congo's Next Crisis:

During 1963, the United Nations gradually decreased its military presence in the Congo. ONUC was cut back from 18,200 men in January, to 11,800 in June, and again to approximately 6,500 by December.¹⁶⁹ With the Katangan gendarmerie demilitarized, Léopoldville's national security concerns shifted to dealing with tribal wars and sporadic violence. As a result, ONUC participated in major police actions during the months of January, February, May, August, and October.¹⁷⁰ Despite the ANC's failure to gain proficiency and reliability, ONUC forces continued to be

¹⁶⁸ A DOS report summarized the timely significance of ONUC's victory: "At stake in the final battle were maintenance of the Congo's unity, avoidance of civil war, and the preservation of Katanga's industrial structure." Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963, DOS Publication 7675, International Organization and Conference Series 51 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, August 1964), 72-87.

¹⁶⁹ Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 331.

¹⁷⁰ DOS, USPUN 1963, 77.

withdrawn. By December 1963, ONUC patrols were barely sufficient to control tribal tensions. The situation in the Congo was not improving, but, at this point, UN member-states' financial concerns outweighed all others.¹⁷¹

In December 1962, financial concerns prompted the UN General Assembly to approve a limited six-month extension for its two major peacekeeping efforts—UNEF and ONUC. As a result, in June 1963, the General Assembly met in a “special session” (SPS-IV) to consider the extension of funding for both missions. Up to this point, financing these operations imposed an increasingly severe strain because of both peacekeeping's escalating costs and accumulating arrears.¹⁷² The UN deficit increased by \$19.8 million during the first six months of 1963, leaving a total deficit of \$93.9 million. Of this amount, \$72.3 million was the debt attributable to UN military operations in the Congo. Despite these financial problems, SPS-IV approved resolutions that continued both UNEF and ONUC missions for an additional six months. For ONUC alone, SPS-IV approved \$33 million to cover costs through the end of the year.¹⁷³ During this session, a number of member-states expressed their hope that this would be the final Congo payment.¹⁷⁴ It was not. In October 1963, at

¹⁷¹ “Soapy” Williams (President Kennedy's and President Johnson's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, 1961-66) wrote that the U.S. desired to keep UN forces in the Congo “beyond June 1964,” but UN fiscal considerations “precluded” this. Williams, “U.S. Objectives in the Congo,” 151.

¹⁷² For example, as of May 1963, the Soviet bloc owed \$43.1 million in arrears. France also refused to pay for UNEF or ONUC. Both nations argued that the GA was incompetent to authorize peacekeeping missions. ONUC was authorized by the Security Council but later resort to the GA via the uniting-for-peace resolution justified their weak case against ONUC. President Charles de Gaulle was quoted as saying that UN actions were, at the same time, “inadequate” and “very costly.” It seems that they weren't costly at all to France! Quoted in Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 451.

¹⁷³ General Assembly resolution 1876, 27 June 1963, *GAOR*, 1963.

¹⁷⁴ A near majority of UN member-states were no longer interested in funding ONUC once the Katanga secession was defeated. Many argued that ONUC's continuation (despite the Congolese government's requests that the UN mission remain) was an infringement of Congolese domestic sovereignty.

the urgent request of the Congolese government, ONUC was granted an extension to June 1964—at the additional cost of \$18.2 million.¹⁷⁵

Despite the UN's financial troubles, the U.S. delegation at the United Nations called for building a firm Congolese military and economy able to survive after the termination of ONUC. On 15 January 1963, Ambassador Stevenson anticipated the end of the Katanga secession and suggested that “it should now be possible for a unified Congolese people, aided by the United Nations . . . to devote their full energies to the important tasks of reconstruction and development that still lie ahead.” To further these goals, the U.S. actively supported the UN program for improving Congo's internal security forces and continued to provide significant financial and technical assistance.¹⁷⁶ U.S. efforts, however, were opposed by the Soviet bloc and radical African states. Their representatives in New York argued that the UN role in the Congo should have ended with the defeat of the Katangan secession.¹⁷⁷

Despite concentrated U.S. efforts, the United Nations failed to build up the Congolese army (ANC) as a loyal and efficient arm of the Léopoldville government. This failure should be regarded as the UN mission's greatest disappointment. The

¹⁷⁵ General Assembly resolution 1885, 18 October 1963. GAOR, 1963. The savings from \$33 million to \$18.2 million were realized because of reducing the force from 6,000 men to approximately 3,300 during 1964; and because ONUC operations were more stationary, operating out of five locations: a Nigerian battalion in Léopoldville, a Swedish battalion in Luluabourg, two Ethiopian battalions in Katanga (one in Elisabethville, the other in Jadotville), and an Irish infantry group in Kolwezi. DOS, USPUN 1963, 72-79; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964, DOS Publication 7943, International Organization and Conference Series 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, released February 1966), 34. According to another source, London and Washington proposed to pay ONUC's final six-month assessment, although UN documents do not demonstrate that this was accepted. See Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 107.

¹⁷⁶ See discussion in “Chapter Summary” below on U.S. contributions to economic and technical funds for the Congo.

¹⁷⁷ DOS, USPUN 1963, 74-77.

mandate to “reorganize” and to bring the ANC “under discipline and control” was endorsed broadly in the initial Security Council Congo resolution of 14 July 1960. It was specifically outlined in the 21 February 1961 SC resolution (Part B). But, indicative of the growing schism regarding such a mandate, an attempt by the U.S. delegation to add a similar paragraph to the final Congo resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union (on 24 November 1961).¹⁷⁸ The roots of this international battle were established as early as August 1960, when the Soviets backed Lumumba against all other Congolese factions and the United States opposed Lumumba by backing Kasavubu and Mobutu. From that point on, the lines were drawn. In November 1960, the U.S. delegation pressed its advantage at the United Nations by having the Kasavubu government seated at the United Nations as the “true” representative of Congo. With “their man” shut out, the Soviet bloc opposed ONUC’s efforts to build up the ANC as a loyal and efficient arm of the central government (meaning Léopoldville).¹⁷⁹ Domestically, ANC officers undermined UN (and U.S.) efforts by failing to renounce tribal political ties rather than transferring their allegiance to the Léopoldville government. As a result, the ANC became as much a part of the problem, exacerbating continued factionalism and violence. In the absence of the international community’s resolve to help the Congo through the United Nations, other powers naturally gravitated toward “involvement” in the Congo’s unstable affairs.

After ONUC’s June 1964 departure, the Léopoldville government faced another major rebellion. In July 1964, the Adoula coalition government collapsed. In a controversial move, President Kasavubu appointed Moïse Tshombé as the new prime

¹⁷⁸ The U.S.-sponsored paragraph would have added a “request” that the secretary-general provide “assistance the government of the Republic of the Congo to reorganize and retrain Congolese armed units and personnel” and would have tasked the secretary-general “to assist the government to develop its armed forces for the tasks which confront it.” Document S/4989/Rev. 1; quoted in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 15, 30, 39.

¹⁷⁹ In this regard, Higgins asserted that “Moscow was hedging its bets” against the central Congolese government. Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, III: 39.

minister. In August 1964, Stanleyville (the provincial capital of Oriental in northeast Congo) fell to rebel forces.¹⁸⁰ Soon thereafter, Tshombé was back to his "old tricks." He supplemented the ANC national troops by enlisting the support of "international officers." His use of so-called "white mercenaries" to suppress an African rebellion caused the Organization of African Unity (OAU)¹⁸¹ to call an emergency meeting in early September. On 10 September, the OAU adopted a resolution that called upon the Léopoldville government (at this time the Congo was called the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC) to "stop recruiting mercenaries and to expel as soon as possible those already hired." In addition, the OAU resolution established a committee (the "Ad Hoc Commission") to investigate and assist in the DRC's national reconciliation efforts.¹⁸²

Meanwhile, the ANC (led by Tshombé's mercenaries) managed to defeat a number of "Simba" rebel units and retake Stanleyville. Unfortunately, a group of Simbas took refuge holding approximately 2,500 hostages. These rebels issued demands and threatened to kill their hostages. When their requests were not met, they began to do so. Five U.S. officials of the American consulate in Stanleyville were among the 58 American hostages held. International Red Cross (IRC) mediation efforts to free these hostages were unsuccessful. On 24 November, with the permission of the Léopoldville government, the United States and Belgium mounted a cooperative

¹⁸⁰ In fact, the years 1964-65 are categorized by some writers as the Congolese "civil war." See Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN: Relations between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, A UNITAR regional study, No. 2 (New York: Africana Publishing, 1976), 66-72.

¹⁸¹ The OAU was established in May 1963. It partly justified its formation on African dissatisfaction with the UN's handling of the Congo crisis. For more on the OAU's interests in the Congo. *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁸² In September 1964, the OAU failed by only one vote to generate an African "peace force" that would have assisted the Léopoldville government. Resentment against Tshombé prevented greater support. Williams, "U.S. Objectives in the Congo," 36.

“hostage rescue mission.”¹⁸³ The United States, granting cursory attention to “international legitimacy,” informed the United Nations of its intentions prior to carrying them out. The United States supplied twelve C-130 transport aircraft and Belgium supplied approximately 550 paratroopers. This mission was in and out of the Congo between 24 and 29 November. Although most hostages were rescued, a number of Belgians and a few “innocent” Congolese were injured or killed.¹⁸⁴

Conducting this rescue mission “outside of” the United Nations (and without consulting the OAU) further damaged the Johnson administration’s international prestige. This “Western intervention” incited a harsh response from many African and neutral UN member-states. The OAU contended that the mission disrupted its efforts and labeled the rescue a “flagrant violation” of the UN Charter, article 52.¹⁸⁵ Accordingly, the African states recommended that the UN consider the action as a “threat to peace and the security of the African continent.” The OAU later intimated that the Congo government either did not provide authorization for such a mission, or that it could not legally do so. In response, and demonstrating how other “actors” willingly filled the “void” left behind in the Congo, the Léopoldville government requested that the Security Council consider evidence that Algeria, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Communist China, and the USSR were “directly or indirectly assisting the [Congolese] rebels.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ The United States had signed a “Bilateral Military Aid Agreement” with Léopoldville in July 1963. The U.S. transport support was provided upon Léopoldville’s and Brussels’ request. *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, the U.S. consul general to Stanleyville, Michael Hoyt (who was one of the hostages) was under the impression that had the rescue mission not been launched when it was, most of the hostages would have been killed. Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, 279.

¹⁸⁵ Article 52 deals with rights of regional arrangements (such as the OAU). See excerpts at Appendix A.

¹⁸⁶ In fact, U.S. concerns of PRC (Communist China’s) involvement in Stanleyville were “confirmed” when “large amounts of Chinese military equipment” were captured by Congolese forces when they overtook rebel strongholds in late 1964

In response to a number of vituperative accusations leveled at the United States for its participation in the rescue mission, Ambassador Stevenson spoke on 14 December 1964. He “expressed his shock” at the “irrational, irresponsible, insulting and repugnant language in these chambers—and language used, if you please, contemptuously to impugn and slander a gallant and successful effort to save human lives of many nationalities and colors.”¹⁸⁷ On the subject of Soviet and other member-states assistance to rebels in the Congo, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that “if these countries sincerely wished the Government of the Congo not to seek such aid then they should scrupulously refrain from stirring up rebellion and aiding insurgents.” In sum, the U.S. ambassador suggested, “either governments recognize the right of other governments to exist and refrain from attempting to overthrow them, or else we will revert to a primitive state of anarchy in which each conspires against its neighbor.”¹⁸⁸ These end result of these extreme internal and external pressures exerted upon Léopoldville gutted the chances for democracy in the Congo. In November 1965, General Joseph Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese-Seko¹⁸⁹) ousted President Kasavubu and

and early 1965. For details, see Williams, “U.S. Objectives in the Congo,” 152. The Léopoldville request was before the Security Council on 9 December 1964. For full details of these debates, see SCOR 1964. For Washington’s perspective, see DOS, USPUN 1964, 38-39.

¹⁸⁷ Ironically, the U.S. justification for action was reminiscent of Belgium’s defense for intervention on behalf of its endangered citizens in July 1960. The experience emphasizes the importance of building an “international consensus” or base of support for U.S. international military actions.

¹⁸⁸ DOS USPUN 1964, 41-42.

¹⁸⁹ Mobutu initiated an “Africanization” policy in 1971 that resulted in renaming the Congo as Zaïre, Léopoldville as Kinshasa, etc. His rule brought stability but failed to overcome government corruption. Mobutu remained in power (amassing a personal fortune) until May 1997. He died in exile four months later (in Morocco). The fact that the Congo system was corrupt, however, should not be blamed solely upon Mobutu’s rule. According to numerous reports from the Congo during ONUC’s tenure (1960-64), the Congo’s politicians were then characterized as “influenced primarily by bribery, intimidation, and violence.” See quote in Kalb, The Congo Cables, 220.

seized political control in Léopoldville. The Congolese ANC struggled to maintain national unity and continued to receive U.S. and Belgian assistance for many years.¹⁹⁰

Chapter Summary and Analysis

The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations invested a great deal of logistical, financial and political support to establish a politically “moderate” and economically “stable” Congo¹⁹¹—acting (primarily) through the United Nations. The UN mission could not have been conducted without active U.S. backing. In fact, a detailed summary of U.S. assistance for ONUC prepared under contract for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concluded that: “The dependence of the ONUC operation on U.S. support can be described as practically total during the launching phase and very high throughout the operation’s four-year life.”¹⁹² Despite Washington’s vacillation between supporting U.S. “allies” (and their neo-colonial policies) versus adopting a more “enlightened” or multi-lateral response, U.S. military support throughout the life of the mission was extensive. During 1961, for example, the U.S. Air Force contributed 1,339 Congo sorties. It airlifted over 46,000 troops and 7,800 tons of supplies and equipment to and from the Congo. In addition, from October 1960 to December 1961, approximately 13,000 troops, 4,860 tons, and 612

¹⁹⁰ Jean-Claude Willame, “The Military Intervenes,” in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An “Africa Report” Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 161; 169.

¹⁹¹ U.S. goals for the Congo as of 1962 were summarized by Under Secretary of State George Ball as: first, a stable, progressive [read non-Communist] government. Second, to “insulate” Africa from military intervention by the Soviet bloc. Third, to “prevent Balkanization of the Congo.” See George W. Ball, “American Policy in the Congo,” in Footnotes to the Congo Story: An “Africa Report” Anthology, ed. Helen Kitchens (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), 65.

¹⁹² Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, II: 91.

vehicles were “sealifted” in or out of the Congo by the U.S. Navy. During the December 1961 ONUC redeployment, the USAF provided critical “internal” mobility that allowed the UN force to apply its presence where it was needed most. In light of the Congo’s vast distances (nearly 1/3 the size of the continental U.S.) and the gendarme’s control of most surface transport routes, this support proved to be decisive.¹⁹³ A DOS report noted that the December 1961 USAF airlift in support of operation UNOKAT was, “in terms of total miles traveled . . . the greatest single airlift ever carried out by any country at any time.”¹⁹⁴ All of this was accomplished “without a single fatal accident”—impressive considering that these operations were conducted in the midst of a civil war, with most operations in and out of Elisabethville (the capital of “enemy”-controlled territory).¹⁹⁵

Although Washington desired to prevent Soviet interventionism in the Congo, central Africa was not considered a primary zone of confrontation between East and West. In this regard, U.S. pursuit of its national interests by supporting the multilateral, UN “option” defined the nature and extent of the Cold War conflict in Africa. In years prior (and later, too), much smaller, seemingly insignificant nations threatened by similar “internal instabilities” (such as South Korea, 1950-1953; Lebanon, 1958; and Vietnam, especially after 1964), generated a quick, unilateral, U.S. military response.¹⁹⁶ Even after receiving a direct plea for U.S. military assistance to

¹⁹³ The USAF internally airlifted 1,575 troops and 928.3 tons of equipment in support of operation UNOKAT in December 1961. This USAF airlift acted as a “force multiplier” for ONUC. It provided the UN military operation with advantages in two of the most important aspects of warfare: mass (concentration of force) and mobility.

¹⁹⁴ From a “sustained” cargo airlift perspective the USAF effort in support of Berlin (“the Berlin airlift”) conducted between July 1948 and September 1949 was not eclipsed until the 1990-91 airlift operations in support of the Gulf War operations. “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm.”

¹⁹⁵ DOS, USPUN 1961, 87.

¹⁹⁶ Within a few years, although not worthy of direct intervention in 1954 (Dienbienphu), Vietnam would occupy much of the U.S. military forces’ attention between 1965 and 1972.

the Congo, the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations declined. Instead, they chose to pursue U.S. interests through the United Nations as the most appropriate course. Despite the drawbacks inherent to such a multilateral approach,¹⁹⁷ in this case, employing the UN option yielded a number of benefits. First, direct confrontation with the Soviets in central Africa was avoided—in effect, Cold-War competition in Africa was limited. As evidenced by the turmoil that ensued after ONUC departed the Congo, the UN mission served to keep most other “external” actors out of the Congo between 1960 and mid-1964. Second, although the U.S. government expended considerable assets to support the UN effort (net U.S. costs for ONUC were nearly \$120 million—not including an additional \$130 million in “economic assistance” funneled through the UN by the United States¹⁹⁸) a unilateral effort potentially would have cost more—both financially and in terms of international political capital.¹⁹⁹ Third, although it strained

¹⁹⁷ Such drawbacks include the tremendous amount of diplomatic coordination that was required to keep a large, multi-faceted UN mission supported and on-track; lack of central U.S. “control” or direction, and the inefficiencies and logistic difficulties inherent in fielding an *ad hoc*, multi-national force.

¹⁹⁸ The U.S. contributions to the “Congo’s Technical and Operational Assistance Program,” between 1960 and 1968, totaled \$129,962,390. This amount was exclusively contributed through the United Nations and excludes bilateral aid contributions through such programs as U.S. foreign aid and the military assistance programs. The U.S. government paid approximately \$179.8 million for ONUC if one adds all assessments, \$10 million for the waived initial airlift costs and another \$47 million in the “U.S. share” of UN bonds sold to support ONUC. Offsetting some of these costs, consider that UN contracts for purchase of U.S. goods and services to support ONUC amounted to approximately \$50 million—thus, nearly 30% of all U.S. contributions for ONUC was paid back to the U.S. government or to U.S. contractors. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 340-41; and Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, National Support of International Peacekeeping and Peace Observation Operations, II: 90.

¹⁹⁹ By comparison, the U.S. deployment of 15,000 marines in Lebanon, in 1958 (a mission that lasted approximately four months, but deployed almost the same number of troops to a much smaller country) cost between \$120 and \$200 million in 1958 dollars. See Caroline Anne Pruden, “Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace” (Ph.D. diss., University of Vanderbilt, Nashville, TN, 1993), 662. Consider also, Dag Hammarskjöld was quoted

the United Nations nearly beyond its limits, the international organization demonstrated both the potential and limitations of UN operations for peace. On the whole, the U.S. government was positive about the role the United Nations played in the Congo between 1960 and 1964. A June 1962 “confidential” Kennedy administration assessment noted, “it is difficult to see any alternative to UN involvement which would have had more chance of success—or which would have applied U.S. power in any more effective manner.”²⁰⁰ Three years later, in a July 1965 press conference, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk characterized the UN effort to assist the Congo as “a remarkable achievement.”²⁰¹ Considering the instability of Congolese domestic politics and the contention between UN member-states and other international coalitions, it is a wonder that the United Nations was able to act at all. Only the efforts of two active secretaries-general—one who lost his life in the Congo, backed by considerable U.S. political, logistical, and financial support for a UN-led effort, held the controversial mission together.

If the UN peace operation between Israel and Egypt (UNEF) defined “traditional peacekeeping,” ONUC proved how difficult it was to apply the same concepts to a very different situation. UNEF allowed foreign forces to withdraw from the Sinai and Suez Canal area after the 1956 war. Thereafter, UNEF was emplaced as a buffer zone—as an army positioned between Israel and Egypt. Theoretically, ONUC was to fulfill a similar initial function—that of replacing Belgian troops that had “invaded” the Congo to restore law and order. The withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo did

as saying that ONUC’s annual cost of near \$100 million was “less than one-half of the world’s daily bill for armaments.” Quoted in Urquhart, Hammaraskjold, 515. See Chart C4 for comparison of costs for U.S. assistance and interventions.

²⁰⁰ Harlan Cleveland [IO], “UN’s Role in Extinguishing Brush Fire Wars,” 25 June 1962, NSF Files, Box 313, NSC meeting 500, JFKL.

²⁰¹ DOS USPUN 1964, 35. Harlan Cleveland, Rusk’s Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, characterized the mission as “one of the brightest chapters in the history of international cooperation.” Harlan Cleveland, “The UN in the Congo,” 70.

not lead to stability. Instead, ONUC was faced with mobile operations (in a vast country) and was caught in the midst of an intermittent civil war.

UNEF employed force only in self-defense. Its legitimacy was derived from its impartiality. ONUC claimed impartiality, but was viewed by nearly all factions as an enemy force. During its first years, under Dag Hammarskjöld's extreme legalistic interpretations, ONUC refused to help any side against the other.²⁰² Later, under U Thant, ONUC acted more directly in support of Léopoldville's aims—except in the case of Katanga, where Léopoldville's desires were to launch a major offensive and precipitate an extensive Congolese civil war; ONUC successfully prevented this sure-to-be bloody struggle. Even so, the Katangan secession witnessed the most "aggressive" UN military operations in the organization's first two decades of peacekeeping.²⁰³ ONUC's broad interpretations of "self-defense" and especially that of "freedom of movement" were used to justify UN conventional military operations. This was not peacekeeping in the traditional sense. As a result, ONUC peacekeepers lost their shield of impartiality and also lost a great deal of international support. Even the Kennedy administration, generally thought to have been greatly supportive of ONUC's "offensive" against Katanga in December 1962 and January 1963, pressured U Thant to order a cease fire before the operation was completed.²⁰⁴ Had Tshombé

²⁰² Dag Hammarskjöld had once complained that his version of "strict impartiality" was being misconstrued "as partiality by all sides." Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 482.

²⁰³ As it was, all total, ONUC forces suffered 245 fatalities; over half related to the Katanga secession. It is estimated that Katangan forces lost at least double this number. The casualties related to "major" UN operations (UNOKAT and GRAND SLAM) were relatively light—for example in GRAND SLAM it was recorded that ONUC suffered 10 killed and 77 wounded during 24 days of "activity." UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 195, 709.

²⁰⁴ Concerning the Kennedy administration's vacillations during early January 1963, Kalb wrote: "Kennedy's top advisers were caught in an awkward situation. They were supplying major military assistance to the United Nations, but they were so concerned about the possibility of another split with their allies that they opposed any further use of that assistance by the UN force." Kalb, The Congo Cables, 369.

carried out his threats and destroyed the valuable mines and infrastructure of Katanga, the mission probably would have been recalled in shame. Since the secessionist leader surrendered peacefully, ONUC's "success" justified the Katanga operation and Washington's support for it.

Overall, from a negative perspective, UN involvement in the 1960-64 Congo crisis did not serve to advance Congolese democracy nor did it improve Léopoldville's capabilities to guarantee stability after ONUC's departure. Whether it could have or not, nascent political liberalism in the Congo did not survive UN intervention. Probably the only Congolese leader with enough national (and African) support to hold together a representative government was Patrice Lumumba. Once he turned to the activist African states and then directly to Moscow for external support, Lumumba lost all chance of reconciliation with the West. The fact that the Léopoldville government fell to Mobutu's West-leaning dictatorship, however, was recognized even by Dean Rusk as "not what [the United States] had worked for."²⁰⁵ The UN mandate to build up the Congolese national army (ANC) prior to ONUC's departure, similarly, must be considered a failure. Congolese leaders in Léopoldville were never secure enough to designate significant portions of their "loyal factions" for retraining. Initial ONUC efforts to disarm the ANC were fiercely opposed as "infringing upon the Congo's sovereignty." The April 1961 Security Council resolution that called for UN approval of all foreigners in the Congo was opposed by Léopoldville—despite the fact that ANC misconduct and factionalism was often the country's greatest threat to law and order. Externally, ONUC efforts to retrain the ANC were opposed by a number of UN member-states. After the UN "credentials controversy" (November 1960) was "settled" in favor of Kasavubu, the Soviet Union and "Lumumbist" Afro-Asian states opposed strengthening the ANC for fear that this would shore-up the "Léopoldville faction" against the "Lumumbists" in Stanleyville.

On the positive side, Belgian forces (which had intervened "without an invitation" in July 1960) were able to peacefully withdraw when multinational forces

²⁰⁵ Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*, 280.

took their place. The UN military force (ONUC) proved successful at safeguarding Congolese citizens (of all races), but was, itself, sporadically attacked by rouge political elements. At the same time it was striving to uphold law and order, ONUC succeeded in preventing a full-scale Congolese civil war between Léopoldville's ANC and Tshombé's "white" mercenary-led gendarmerie. Thereafter, while holding the ANC at bay, ONUC military "victories" over Katangan forces in December 1961 and again a year later led to the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo nation. Ending the Katangan secession unified the Congo and simultaneously recovered nearly 60% of that country's export wealth.

Unfortunately, after the UN force was withdrawn, the Congo's problems with lawlessness and rebel factions continued. The Johnson administration, with its attention turned elsewhere, resorted to "less troublesome" direct military assistance and encouraged Belgium (and other Western states) to do likewise. This approach, and especially U.S. participation in the November 1964 "rescue" effort, however, precipitated wide-spread censure and demonstrated the diplomatic pitfalls of Washington employing military force "outside the UN umbrella."²⁰⁶ In retrospect, from a U.S. policy perspective, America's interests—supporting a "stable and unified Congo"—were largely advanced through the United Nations, despite the serpentine path followed to achieve them. The benefits accrued to Washington by adhering to this tortuous multinational approach included: international legitimacy supporting U.S. aims, cost sharing (at least 50% of the total costs for the four-year UN operation were paid by other UN member-states), and the fact that not a single U.S. military service member lost his life in the Congo.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ The joint U.S.-Belgian rescue effort of November 1964 was vilified at the United Nations by a number of Afro-Asian member-states. The massacre of non-African hostages was "minimized" while the fact that Congolese rebels were "murdered" by American-supported Belgian colonial "mercenaries" was the topic of Security Council accusations on 9, 10, and 15-30 December 1964. See SCOR, 9-30 December 1964 (especially meetings: 1173, 1175-78, 1181, 1183-89).

²⁰⁷ Projecting backward a few years from U.S. domestic resistance to escalation in Vietnam, U.S. military action in the Congo may have met a similar fate.

CHAPTER SEVEN

HYBRID PEACEKEEPING: EXTENSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS' "SYSTEM"

The United States, as a leading party to both the regional and the universal collective security undertakings, has a vital interest in the complementary and mutually supporting growth of all these [peacekeeping arrangements].

[U.S. Department of State]¹

The United Nations Charter, specifically chapter VII "Regional Arrangements," authorized regional organizations to contribute to the United Nations "system" for international peacekeeping—provided that such organizations held values and objectives "consistent with purposes and principles of the United Nations."² Officially, the UN organization recognized such lawful regional arrangements by granting them "observer status" at the United Nations. The Organization of American States (OAS) gained this sanction in 1948. The League of Arab States (or Arab League), which was established in 1945, was granted observer status in 1950. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949, and through the period under study, was not officially granted such status—owing to Soviet objection. Later, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was granted UN sanction in 1965.³

¹ Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1951, DOS Publication 4583, International Organization and Conference Series III, 80 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1952), 8.

² UN Charter, article 52. See excerpts at appendix A.

³ Thomas Hovet, Jr., and Erica Hovet, Annual Review of United Nations

This chapter analyzes three UN “peacekeeping” operations in which regional organizations played a distinct role. Each of these efforts were supported by the United States as an “appropriate” or the “most appropriate” means of defusing potentially dangerous national, regional, or superpower hostilities. The case of Kuwait demonstrates the utility of a “regional arrangement” as a means to extricate a major or external power from a local dispute—thereby reducing the chances that other external actors would become directly involved. The case study of Cyprus focuses upon a UN peace operation that relied upon the British Commonwealth and its European allies as “peacekeepers.” The hybrid operation in Cyprus shows how regional conflicts generate the greatest political interests from parties with regional commitments to peace and security. The final case study, that of U.S./OAS/UN peacekeeping in the Dominican Republic, illustrates how a “regional response” served to legitimize a U.S. unilateral intervention (much as the 1958 UN observer missions to Lebanon and Jordan did). The OAS “Inter-American Peace Force” (IAPF) created for the Dominican crisis of 1965, was conducted, for the most part, outside the auspices of the United Nations. The Soviet Union and others expressed their displeasure that such a mission could operate outside the UN Council’s “supervision” (where the USSR wielded veto power). The eventual dispatch of a small UN observer mission (authorized to observe the IAPF, as much as to report on the situation in the Dominican Republic) placated Soviet protests and, ironically, served to provide the OAS mission with a greater international legitimacy.

These “hybrid” examples of multinational peacekeeping demonstrated the potential of the wider United Nations “system.” In the case of Kuwait a divided UN Security Council was unable to generate a peace mission. The “regional arrangement” stepped in to make a commendable contribution which averted war between Iraq and Kuwait—a war which certainly would have spread to involve Saudi Arabia and, perhaps, other nations. The United Nations’ peacekeeping mission to Cyprus (analyzed

to 1968⁴) was also a unique operation. As it turned out, between 1964 and 1968, not a single "Third-World" UN member-state contributed contingents; nonetheless, the predominantly-European peacekeeping force served to defuse both Cyprus' local and broader regional tensions. Finally, although the Dominican peacekeeping mission came about as a result of a unilateral U.S. intervention, the IAPF proved that Washington's aims could garner broad regional support and that "regional peacekeeping" could conduct successful operations as an extension of the UN collective peace and security "system."

The UN's First Sanction of "Regional Peacekeeping:" Kuwait, 1961-1963

On 19 June 1961, the United Kingdom formally granted the Sheikhdum of Kuwait its independence.⁵ That same day, the British government also signed a defense treaty with the Kuwaiti ruler, Abdullah as-Salem as-Sabah.⁶ Just as Kuwait had been a "protectorate" of the United Kingdom since 1899, it would remain "protected" even after it had gained local sovereignty.⁷ This treaty was the West's "insurance" for protecting its prized interest in Kuwait—namely oil. As of 1961, Kuwait ranked

⁴ Like UNTSO and UNMOGIP, the UN "peacekeeping" mission to Cyprus (UNFICYP) remained in effect for decades in the absence of an enduring solution.

⁵ The best study of the "Kuwait Crisis" and how this led to a "venture in regional peacekeeping" is found in David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 414-36. Other works that analyze these events, include Richard Gott, "The Kuwait Incident," chapter in Survey of International Affairs, 1961 (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), 519-45; and Benjamin Shwadran, "The Kuwait Incident," Middle East Affairs XIII/1 (January 1962): 2-13.

⁶ Copies of the "exchange of notes" that established this treaty are reproduced in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 429.

⁷ This point is also made by Elizabeth Monroe, in her enjoyable Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), 215.

second among the world's top petroleum-exporting nations.⁸ Both British and American oil companies held major concessions in the desert kingdom. Accordingly, the United Kingdom and the United States were very interested in maintaining Kuwait's "independence" and its pro-West alignment.⁹ [See map at Appendix B.]

Kuwait applied for membership to the United Nations in June 1961. Its admission, however, was blocked by a USSR negative vote. Moscow adopted a policy of opposing Kuwait's membership in order to harass the West's relations with the strategic Arabian/Persian Gulf states and to build closer ties with Iraq's autocratic General Abdul Karim Qasim. He coveted Kuwait's resources and argued that Kuwait "has never been a state in the internationally accepted sense;" instead, Qasim insisted the Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq." When the issue of Kuwait's admission as a UN member was debated before the Council in early June, the Iraqi representative argued that Kuwait had been held as a "vassal" of Great Britain and the territory should "resume" its proper status as an Iraqi province. In these assertions, Moscow directed the Soviet representative to support Qasim's claims. When the majority of UN members disagreed, however, the Iraqi leader abandoned diplomatic debates and ordered his military forces to prepare for conquest. By late June, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was imminent. The British countered Iraq's posturing by "responding to an invitation" from Sheikh Abdullah. As a result of the British military deployments, Moscow declared that London's actions were "threatening regional peace."¹⁰

⁸ At the time, Kuwait's oil reserves were estimated at 60 billion barrels—approximately 20% of the then-proven world total; and twice that of the United States. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1961, DOS Publication 7413, International Organization and Conference Series 33 (Washington D.C.: USGPO 1962), 118.

⁹ This remained true even in 1991—as this scenario was repeated and the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait and the U.S.-led coalition fought to reestablish Kuwait's independence.

¹⁰ By employing the term "threat to peace," the Iraqi/Soviet representatives were attempting to stir the UN Council to action under provisions of the UN Charter, specifically, chapter VII. See excerpts of the Charter at appendix A. DOS, USPUN 1961, 193.

The United Nations considered these developments in early July. The UK representative informed the Security Council that London had deployed 6,000 British soldiers into Kuwait¹¹ and moved a large British naval contingent to the north end of the Persian Gulf in response to a formal request from the Kuwaiti ruler. Despite the "legality" of London's actions, this "invasion" was condemned by the Soviet bloc and by a number of non-aligned states. The Kennedy administration stood by the United Kingdom's "furnishing of assistance." U.S. representatives argued that Kuwait was, indeed, a sovereign state and, accordingly, the Kuwaiti government was free to request bilateral assistance any time it felt threatened by a hostile neighbor. Thereafter, Moscow threatened to intervene on behalf of Iraq. To this, Washington reasserted its "firm support" for both Kuwait's sovereignty and the British deployment.¹²

In order to preclude further dangerous superpower posturing, the United Arab Republic representative to the United Nations proposed a regional solution. He stated that his delegation supported the independence of Kuwait "on the basis of self-determination"¹³ and recommended that the situation be resolved by the League of Arab States (LAS; also referenced as the Arab League).¹⁴ The British welcomed "any

¹¹ Many of these British forces had been "forward deployed" in Aden, Britain's colonial possession in southwest Arabia. Aden was one of London's few remaining "outposts" along the route to India. In 1967, London granted independence to Aden (as "South Yemen"). Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 213-15.

¹² DOS, USPUN 1961, 193.

¹³ Wainhouse noted that the UAR's President Gamal Abdel Nasser made a difficult decision. Nasser was striving to maintain his claim as "Arab leader" and he eventually recognized Kuwait's independence to damage Qasim's prestige. The fact that Kuwait's Sheikh Abdullah promised Nasser significant economic "incentives" in return for political support was also important. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 422.

¹⁴ The LAS was established on 22 March 1945. In 1950 it was granted observer status by the United Nations as a "regional arrangement" committed to the principles of the UN Charter. For a work on the Arab League and its involvement in the Kuwait dispute, see Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).

constructive steps" that the Arab League would offer, but refused to withdraw until Kuwait's security could be guaranteed. On 6 July 1961, the Security Council voted 7-1-3 on a British resolution that would have "called upon all states to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait" and would have had the Council consider more specific means for promoting regional peace.¹⁵ The single negative vote was a Soviet veto. As a result, the Council was precluded from considering more proactive steps, such as authorizing a UN peacekeeping mission for Kuwait. Despite this "failure of the Security Council to take action," in retrospect, the Council debates prodded the League of Arab States to consider taking action where the United Nations had not. In this "regional approach," an acceptable multilateral solution was reached.¹⁶

After a month of deliberations, the LAS secretary-general (Egypt's Abdel Khalek Hassouna) informed the United Nations that an agreement had been reached for the creation of an Arab League "Security Force" for Kuwait.¹⁷ This regional peacekeeping force was the first of its kind during the UN era. It came into effect during August and September as Arab contingents from five of the ten League member-states slowly replaced the British force that was deployed as a buffer force between Iraq and Kuwait. Although Saudi Arabia had sent a unit to Kuwait, it was not until 10 September that other Arab contingents began to arrive. Four days later, Sheikh Abdullah formally requested that British forces begin their withdrawals—which were completed a month later, by 10 October. By 17 September, an Arab force of approximately 3,000 men took up peacekeeping duties in Kuwait.¹⁸ Although the United Arab Republic (UAR)

¹⁵ SCOR, S/4855, 6 July 1961. This proposal did not specifically suggest the creation of a UN peacekeeping mission, but it would have served as the first step in that direction. The seven votes in favor of the proposal were cast by Chile, China (Taiwan), France, Liberia, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. Ceylon, Ecuador and the UAR abstained.

¹⁶ DOS, USPUN 1961, 120.

¹⁷ Ibid., 192-3.

¹⁸ Saudi Arabia supplied at least 1,200 men and Jordan another 800—thus these two states provided 2/3 of the total Arab force. Nasser's UAR promised as many

contingent soon dropped out, it was not until February 1963 that the last Arab peacekeepers withdrew and the force was considered disbanded. In the meantime, Iraq's military diverted its forces northward to deal with intermittent Kurdish revolts, and on 8 February, Qasim was overthrown in a bloody Iraqi revolt.¹⁹

In its establishment and operations, the Arab Security Force had followed UN precedents for peacekeeping, but it also improved upon certain UN arrangements. The League of Arab States relied heavily upon the precedent-setting UN "emergency force" (UNEF) when generating its similarly-oriented Arab peacekeeping mission. According to an in-depth study by David Wainhouse, the Arab Security Force copied a number of UNEF documents and adjusted them to fit the situation in Kuwait.²⁰ Going beyond UNEF, however, the Arab force clearly provided for the force's termination and funding—two areas that undermined the UN Sinai mission. According to the LAS agreements, the Arab force was "deployed in compliance with Kuwait's request and would also be withdrawn whenever withdrawal was requested by the Ruler."²¹ In addition, funding for the force was secured "up front" as the "primary responsibility" of the Kuwaiti government.²² Of course, as the Arab League's first (and only)

as 1,000 troops, but within a month (after some of these were in place), Nasser requested "permission" to recall his troops when Syria broke with Egypt and dissolved its participation in the UAR on 29 September. Sudan and Tunisia contributed smaller forces, at most 400 men each. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 420-24.

¹⁹ Phebe Marr, "Republic of Iraq," chapter in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 3rd edn., eds. David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 97; Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics, The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, Cyriot: Yale University Press, 1977), 273. William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 307-10. (Note, Qasim is alternately spelled Qassim or Kassem).

²⁰ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 425.

²¹ DOS, USPUN 1961, 121.

²² A "special fund" was established to "bear all transport and residence expenses of the force." See article 36 of the LAS "Status of the Arab League Security Force in Kuwait" filed as S/5007, 30 November 1961 by the United Nations. A copy

peacekeeping endeavor, a number of issues were criticized by outsiders. Elizabeth Monroe, a scholar of Britain's relations with the Middle East, criticized the Arab League for taking three months to replace the British force. She also asserted that the Arab coalition quickly "faded away contingent by contingent," demonstrating the League's "quarrelsome incompetence."²³ Two years later, in similar circumstances, however, the European nations took nearly as long to commit contingents to a UN-established peacekeeping mission in Cyprus.

In retrospect, although the Security Council had been prevented from acting by a Soviet veto, the UNEF example of inter-positional peacekeeping as a deterrent force (which had proven effective in the Sinai) served as the model for an Arab-League regional peacekeeping endeavor. The Arab Security Force, as a pioneering regional-coalition initiative, helped to defuse a potential interstate war. Not only was an interstate conflict prevented, but so too was a possible escalation that may have drawn in Moscow and Washington (or their proxies). Within a year after this Arab peacekeeping mission was terminated, the United Nations was involved in a similarly-dangerous conflict in Cyprus. Unlike the Arab League mission that emulated UNEF's "inter-positional" peacekeeping operations (as a deterrent to prevent international hostilities), the UN mission to Cyprus was a significantly more complicated endeavor to quell a domestic civil war that threatened to set southeast Europe ablaze. Like Kuwait, the pacification of Cyprus was critical to Washington's perceived international interests.

of the agreement is also in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 431-35.

²³ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 215.

CYPRUS: A UN/Western-Coalition Peace Operation (1964-1968)

A relatively small nation, Cyprus comprises some 3,500 square miles—measuring approximately 100 miles across and averaging 50 miles wide. Slightly larger than Crete, Cyprus is the largest island in the eastern Mediterranean. For centuries, the island was ruled by a succession of conquerors representing the shifting centers of Mediterranean power. After 1878,²⁴ Cyprus came under British supervision when London gained control of the island as a concession in return for supporting the weakened Ottoman Empire and its “Sublime Porte.”²⁵ London viewed this acquisition as a potential “key to western Asia” and as a new “staging post” along the route to India.²⁶ In 1914, Britain formally annexed the island when the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers during the First World War. This British act of colonization was “formalized” when post-war Turkey was forced to sign the Treaty of Lausanne on

²⁴ The Ottomans had taken control of the island (from Venice) in 1571. On 4 June 1878, the British signed a defense treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were reeling from successive defeats at the hands of advancing Russian forces. The treaty allowed Britain “to occupy and rule” Cyprus, but not to “possess” it. Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2. As a result of these Russian victories over the weakened Ottoman Empire between 1876 and 1878, the European powers met in Berlin during June 1878 to consider the changing “balance” of power in southeast Europe. During this “Berlin Conference of 1878” (and the associated “Treaty of Berlin”), Russia’s territorial gains in Asia were sanctioned by the European powers in return for increased Austrian influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the British acquisition of Cyprus. For the effects of these events on nineteenth-century Turkey and Cyprus, see Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris and Company, Ltd., 1993), 78-79.

²⁵ London often referred to Istanbul’s mystical government (or its foreign ministry) as the “Sublime Porte.” See M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923 (London: Longman, 1987), 230; Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 16, 27.

²⁶ It was from Cyprus that U.K. forces “staged” into Egypt during the 1956 Suez war; and into Jordan during the 1958 “leadership crisis.” Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 15, 195-206, 212.

24 July 1923. Significantly, Greece was also a signatory of this treaty. Greece had long held an interest in the political status of Cyprus—although the island had not been under Greek rule for two thousand years.²⁷ By the mid-1950s, London regularly consulted with both Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus' administration. The status of these three external powers as "Guarantors" of Cyprus' affairs was later established by diplomatic agreements signed in February 1959.²⁸

Upon gaining independence in August 1960, approximately eighty percent of Cyprus' 570,000 inhabitants spoke Greek or were affiliated with the Greek Orthodox religion.²⁹ Increasingly, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a number of these "Greek Cypriots" campaigned to unite Cyprus with mainland Greece—this political movement was termed *enosis* (Greek for "union").³⁰ By 1950, *enosis* was widely supported among members of the Greek-Orthodox church and by a great

²⁷ Most authors agree that Cyprus' "original Hellenic culture" remained strong despite successive centuries of rule from Egypt, Rome, Byzantium, Jerusalem, Venice, Istanbul, and London. See, for example, Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 16.

²⁸ The Zurich (11 February) and London (19 February) agreements were signed by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. They institutionalized a Constitution that was "forced" upon the Cypriot peoples as a condition for the island's formal (but not complete) independence. These agreements and the resulting Cypriot Constitution recalled similar arrangements made by the French in Lebanon a hundred years earlier—it does not seem to be a coincidence that these "formulaic" approaches to government (mandating percentages of representatives elected) in countries with fragmented populations led to similar destructive civil wars.

²⁹ A 1960 census enumerated 442,521 Greek Cypriots, 104,350 Turkish Cypriots, 20,955 British, and approximately 6,700 others (Armenians, Maronites, etc.). Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary*, vol. IV: *Europe, 1946-1979* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83.

³⁰ Most authors identify the roots of *enosis* as taking hold in Cyprus during Greece's war for independence from the Ottomans during the early 19th century. Despite centuries passing since Greece had held political control over Cyprus, the religious and cultural ties between Cyprus and Greece remained strong.

majority of Greek Cypriots.³¹ On the other hand, during the 1950s, at least eighteen percent of the island's population—most of whom held religious (Islamic), cultural or political ties with Turkey—opposed formal union with Greece.³² Increasingly, Turkey became interested in guarding the political “rights” of this Cypriot minority—commonly referred to as “Turkish Cypriots.” The Republic of Turkey was the island's nearest external power—just forty miles north of the Mediterranean island; whereas Greece lay more than 500 miles to the West. As the Cypriot enosis movement gained popularity during the 1950s, Turkey opposed enosis as representing Greece's “annexation” of Cyprus. Just as vehemently, Greece opposed Turkey's “meddling” in Cyprus' “internal affairs.” Historical animosities between Greece and Turkey had gained newly-found expression in the ideological battle over Cyprus.³³ During these years, Turkey supported British control of Cyprus as the best means to prevent enosis; whereas Greece supported the revolutionary movement led by Greek-Cypriot-Archbishop Makarios III. Eventually, the terrorist and political campaign wore down the British. When London demonstrated an interest in granting independence to

³¹ As evidence of this sentiment, during 1950 the island's Orthodox religious leaders sponsored an “unofficial plebiscite” that claimed approximately 95 percent of the group polled was in favor of “political union with Greece.” The study was cited in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954, DOS Publication 5769, International Organization and Conference Series III, 104 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, August 1955), 59.

³² Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1958, DOS Publication 6852, International Organization and Conference Series 4 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, July 1959), 51.

³³ Turkey traces its modern heritage to the Ottomans; whereas modern Greece was carved out of “Ottoman territory” in the early 19th century. Since the 12th century Ottomans were at war with Byzantium—a Greek culturally- and religiously-oriented empire. In 1453, the Byzantine capital of Constantinople fell to the Ottomans who established their capital, Istanbul, on the same site. After the First World War, Greek forces invaded what became the western regions of modern Turkey. Political relations between the two modern countries were embittered ever since. See, for example, William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 39-43, 157-80; Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923, 59-96, 297-321; and Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 138-72.

Cyprus during 1959, Istanbul asserted its concern for “safeguarding” the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot minority—ensuring the minority would secure both legal and external protection. Such “guarantees” were eventually written into the Zurich and London agreements signed on 11 and 19 February 1959, respectively. A year later, these diplomatic formulas were woven into a complicated and restrictive Constitution that was imposed upon Cyprus as a condition for political independence in 1960.³⁴

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United States’ government increasingly became concerned with the international aspects of the Cyprus quagmire. From its “Cold-War perspective,” the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration feared that disagreements between the UK and Turkey, on one hand (London and Istanbul often agreed as to how Cyprus should be “administered”) and Greece, on the other—all as NATO members—would be exploited by the Soviet Union. As a result, the Eisenhower administration backed the United Kingdom’s initial arguments (before the United Nations) that diplomatic efforts outside the aegis of the United Nations (away from Soviet and neutral bloc meddling) were the “best means” to pursue a diplomatic solution in Cyprus.³⁵

³⁴ The Constitution stipulated certain rights and prerogatives for the two major communities. It provided for the election of the president from among the Greek-Cypriot community and the vice president by the minority Turkish-Cypriot community. The president and the vice president were given veto power over certain aspects of foreign policy, defense, and security. The basic articles of the Constitution also required concurrent majorities of both Turkish and Greek members of Parliament for revenue measures and bills relating to the electoral laws and municipal government. Percentages were set for government officials, at either seventy or sixty percent Greek Cypriot and the other thirty or forty as Turkish Cypriots. The text of the 199-article Cyprus Constitution of 1960 is reprinted in *Parliamentary Information*, 3rd ser., no. 44 (October 1960), 141-87.

³⁵ Ellen Laipson characterized America’s Cyprus policy prior to 1963 as “Scarcely Present at the Creation.” Ellen B. Laipson, “Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy,” chapter in *Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985*, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides (London: Trigraph Limited, 1986), 54-81. For examples of USUN arguments against UN meddling in British “colonial matters,” see statements of Henry Cabot Lodge, in DOS, *USPUN* 1954, 61.

Countering the West's desires to keep discussions of "Britain's colonial issue" out of the United Nations, the Soviet bloc pressed for active UN debates. Between 1953 and 1960, under Premier Nikita Khrushchev,³⁶ the Kremlin supported Cyprus' independence movement as a means of "ousting" the British from the strategic eastern Mediterranean. After 1960, Moscow continued to support enosis as a means to embitter Turkish-Greek relations and to weaken NATO's southeastern flank.³⁷

In addition to East-West concerns, regional involvement in Cyprus' post-colonial affairs continued to be extensive. On 16 August 1960, the British granted Cyprus independence by means of a complicated arrangement that established a majority Greek-Cypriot community and a Turkish-Cypriot minority. Greece and Turkey participated in this arrangement as "guarantors" of their respective enclave's security.³⁸ Under a "Treaty of Alliance," Greece and Turkey were authorized to station 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops on the island, while the British retained sovereignty over two large military "Sovereign Base Areas" located near Limassol in the south (Akrotiri SBA) and near Larnaca in the southeast (Dhekelia SBA).³⁹ [See map at Appendix B.]

³⁶ Khrushchev gained preeminence after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953. In that year, Khrushchev became "First Secretary" of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1958, Khrushchev assumed the title of "Soviet Premier"—wielding control of the USSR until ousted in 1964.

³⁷ For an excellent summary of USSR policy vis-à-vis Cyprus, see Augustus Richard Norton, "The Soviet Union and Cyprus," chapter in Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution, ed. Norma Salem (New York: St. Martin's Press and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and security, 1992), 100-114.

³⁸ Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey each shared such "external authority" under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance. See United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 382: No. 5475; vol. 397: No. 5712.

³⁹ The British retained control of 99 square miles of Cypriot territory contiguous with its two "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBAs). Nancy Crawshaw, "Cyprus: the Political Background," chapter in Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides (London: Trigraph Limited, 1986), 1-19. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1964, DOS Publication 7943, International Organization and Conference Series 67 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, February 1966), 47.

Despite operating under the too-watchful eyes of outsiders, between August 1960 and December 1963, the Cypriot government in Nicosia attempted to implement its legalistic and restrictive Constitution. As expected, the divided communities held fast to their radically different values and interests. Their political representatives' inability to compromise was exacerbated by the constitutional provision that both the Greek-Cypriot president (Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III) and the Turkish-Cypriot vice-president (Fazil Küçük or Kuchuk) each possessed a veto over proposed legislation. Increasingly, Cypriot politicians failed to compromise on sectarian issues. As a result, government operations ground to a halt. On 30 November 1963, ostensibly attempting to break these deadlocks, President Makarios revoked the Constitution's veto arrangements (along with a dozen other articles).⁴⁰ The Turkish government characterized Makarios' gambit as a threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Istanbul authorities immediately threatened to exercise "rights as a Guarantor Power" by intervening on behalf of Cyprus' political minority. After Turkey's initial protests and posturing failed to dissuade Makarios' government from "illegally" amending the Constitution, on 21 December, violence erupted within Nicosia and spread to the island's other mixed communities. On 26 December, the Greek-Cypriot representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Zenon Rossides, complained to the Security Council about Turkey's actions that were exacerbating his country's domestic revolts.⁴¹ The next day, the Council convened to consider Cyprus' hostilities (that had left over three hundred Cypriots dead during December 1963) and how the

⁴⁰ A list of Makarios' 13 proposed amendments can be found in Linda B. Miller, "Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife," Harvard University Occasional Papers in International Affairs No. 19 (June 1968), 70-71; and in Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus: The Warlike Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis," Stanford Law Review XVII/5 (May 1966): 1043.

⁴¹ A great deal of controversy surrounds the UN decision to recognize Makarios' ally, Rossides, as the representative of Cyprus. Later, the Turkish Cypriots were granted an audience as a "party of the dispute" but they never gained the political rights held by the Greek Cypriots as a UN member (since Cyprus was admitted in 1960). This issue is discussed in James A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Dayton, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 36, 112-15.

Cypriot civil war was threatening to disrupt regional peace.⁴²

The Security Council invited representatives of Cyprus (both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot), Turkey, and Greece to participate in these debates.⁴³ First to speak was the Greek-Cypriot representative. Ambassador Rossides charged Turkey with aerial and naval violations of the island's airspace and coastal waters. He also asserted that Turkish police, stationed in the northern sector of the island, had "joined Turkish-Cypriot insurgents" fighting against the "national Cypriots." The Turkish representative, Ambassador Adnan Kura argued that the most recent conflict should be viewed as an "attempt to massacre the Turkish Cypriots." As one of the guarantors of the Cyprus independence agreements, Turkey warned that it was unable to "turn a blind eye to recent events." The Turkish representative refuted claims of his government's intervention in Cyprus, but admitted that a single aircraft had flown over the Greek-Cypriot sector of the island. He denied that any Turkish ships had been ordered to Cyprus.⁴⁴ Thereafter, the UN representative from Greece, Ambassador Dimitri S. Bitsios, expressed Greece's "satisfaction" with the Turkish representative's admissions and the Council moved on to other business. Most participants and analysts agreed that these early debates within the Security Council, although they did not lead to any UN resolution, helped to defuse tensions and may have even precluded a large-scale military intervention by Turkish forces. Regarding this last point, the new administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson also had a hand in persuading Istanbul to hold back.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, for the next three months, the political situation on

⁴² Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy," 59.

⁴³ The third "guarantor" of the 1959 London-Zurich agreements and the other Cyprus treaties signed in 1960 was the United Kingdom. It was already represented on the Security Council as a permanent member.

⁴⁴ DOS, USPUN 1963, 82-83.

⁴⁵ In December 1963, and again during the first months of 1964, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration exerted political pressures upon Athens and Istanbul to avoid a military conflict over Cyprus. President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent letters to Cypriot President Makarios and Vice-President Kuchuk on 25

Cyprus remained volatile.

In an effort to emulate UN peacekeeping precedents,⁴⁶ while at the same time exercising “control” as stipulated in the Zurich and London agreements, the governments of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey jointly offered to provide an “international military force.” This force, they proposed, would act as a peacekeeping force until a political solution could be arranged. On 26 December, the Cypriot government announced that it had accepted the three-nation offer. In reality, however, the tripartite peace operation splintered. The Greek forces supported Makarios, the Turkish force seized a 15-mile corridor between Nicosia and the northern port of Kyrenia, while the British shored-up security in its base areas. Only the British attempted to dispatch troops as “peacekeepers,” but these efforts were held in suspicion by the Greek Cypriots who associated British forces with the colonial oppressors they had fought just a few years before. As this tripartite mission began its operations in Cyprus, the Makarios government requested that the UN secretary-general dispatch a “personal representative” and a handful of impartial observers to monitor the coalition “peacekeeping operation.”⁴⁷ On 17 January, U Thant designated Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani, the most recent UN peacekeeping commander

December 1963. See Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, 61-62; U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 50, no. 1282 (20 January 1964), 90; and DOS Bulletin, vol. 50, no. 1287 (24 February 1964), 283-84. Later, President Johnson sent a blunt warning to Istanbul in June 1964—as discussed later in this chapter.

⁴⁶ Or, perhaps reminiscent of the days of joint-European colonial controlling actions, these “guarantor” powers had something else in mind. James Wolfe compared this European scheme with the “allied intervention” in Crete between 1896 and 1912—where Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary collaborated in a pacification effort. During that period, “Greek nationals” were fighting against a minority “Turkish” population; eventually the island was ceded to Greece in 1912. James H. Wolfe, “The United Nations and the Cyprus Question,” in Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution, ed. Norma Salem (New York: St. Martin’s Press and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and security, 1992), 233-34.

⁴⁷ DOS, USPUN 1964, 48.

in the Sinai,⁴⁸ to fulfill this function. A few months later, General Gyani became the first commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

After a difficult few months of trying to defuse tensions in Cyprus, London was feeling the strain of executing an essentially unilateral operation. On 15 February, the United Kingdom requested that the Security Council convene to authorize a supplementary international peacekeeping force. The UK representative, Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, reported that the situation in Cyprus had deteriorated and "tension between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities ha[d] risen gravely." As a result, he argued that an "augmented peacekeeping force" was required. Initially, Washington and London tried to rally UN support for the authorization of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led peacekeeping force. This effort was strenuously opposed by both the Soviet Union and its Security Council ally, Czechoslovakia (a temporary member of the Council in 1964-65). At this time, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a letter to Washington that characterized Cyprus' situation as portending "serious international complications" and warned the United States against supporting any peacekeeping force created outside of the UN Security Council's authority.⁴⁹ Moscow also persuaded the Makarios government that it would be to the Greek Cypriots' advantage to oppose a NATO force and to press for creating a more traditional UN force.⁵⁰ France, jealous of Washington's leading role in the European defense alliance also argued against creating a NATO peacekeeping force. As a result of this opposition, the Security Council reached a consensus for creating a

⁴⁸ Lt. Gen. Gyani had commanded the Sinai United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) between December 1959 and January 1964. United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDPI, 1996), 693.

⁴⁹ Nikita Khrushchev to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 February 1964, letter reproduced in Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, 155-57.

⁵⁰ Greek Cypriots protested the U.S. offer to create a "NATO force" in Cyprus by bombing the U.S. embassy in Nicosia on 4 February 1964. Laipson, "Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy," 59.

peacekeeping force “entirely under the aegis of the United Nations” to replace the three-nation force that was in Cyprus.

On 4 March, the Security Council unanimously⁵¹ adopted a resolution (SC 186) to create a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP), a UN civilian police detail (UNCIVPOL) and to appoint a secretary-general’s personal representative to act as political “mediator” in Cyprus. As the United Nations was in the midst of a severe financial crisis (caused by certain nations’ failure to contribute to peacekeeping expenses) this resolution adopted a unique funding strategy. The costs of the force were to be met by the governments involved, by the governments contributing forces, and by voluntary contributions from UN member-states.⁵² In certain respects, SC resolution 186 was more specific than earlier UN peacekeeping “enabling resolutions” had been. The resolution tasked the secretary-general to appoint a force commander and a diplomatic mediator. Both officials were to report directly to the secretary-general and to pursue their mandates of peacekeeping and peace-making in concert, yet separately. On the issue of finances, the resolution authorized the secretary-general to accept “voluntary contributions” to pay for all organizational debts incurred. And finally, the peacekeeping operation was limited to three-months duration, unless further extended by the UN Council. Accordingly, between March 1964 and June 1966, the Security Council met every three months to review and renew the UNFICYP mandate and the status of its “voluntary” funding. During the operation’s first nine months, from 27 March to 26 December 1964, the United Nations appropriated \$15.8 million for UNFICYP (not including transport costs or other voluntary services, or support provided). The U.S. government contributed \$6.6 million and waived the approximate

⁵¹ The unanimous vote was carried after the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and France abstained on a vote over operative paragraph number four. For a complete text of the resolution see Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 96-97.

⁵² Aspects of the first two suggestions had been employed in Yemen and West New Guinea UN missions (1962 to 1964), but the last concept was a precarious innovation. As it would turn out, UNFICYP’s operations were weakened by this unreliable funding foundation.

\$996,000 costs for the air transport that was provided by the U.S. Air Force. Washington's financial support figured prominently in the UN peacekeeping effort in Cyprus. During this first nine months, for example, the United States contributed approximately 42% of the force's funding—not including the costs of airlift.⁵³

On 6 March, U Thant appointed General Gyani as UNFICYP's first commander. By that date, the secretary-general was cajoling with a number of nations to provide contingents—toward meeting an initial goal for deploying a force of 7,000 soldiers. On 9 March, the British government agreed to “match contributions of contingents of all other countries” up to a British total of 3,500.⁵⁴ On 27 March 1964, UNFICYP was “officially” in effect, comprising 6,000 British and 950 Canadian soldiers. As other national contingents arrived, the British forces were proportionally scaled back. By the end of the year, UNFICYP strength was 6,238 including representatives from nine different countries.⁵⁵

Despite the USSR's zeal to prevent the creation of a “NATO force,” no Asian, African, or even Latin American states participated in what these “third world” states perceived to be “mostly a European problem.”⁵⁶ Because of these political attitudes, and perhaps due to the burden imposed upon states to “pay their own way,” third-world states declined to offer a single contingent for UNFICYP. As it turned out, four of the contributing nations were allied as members of the British “Commonwealth” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom); and the other five were Western European “neutrals” (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden).⁵⁷ Of

⁵³ DOS, USPUN 1964, 288-89.

⁵⁴ In actuality, the force strength peaked at under 7,000 and the British contingents quickly were reduced to approximately 1,100 troops. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 383-85.

⁵⁵ DOS, USPUN 1964, 54.

⁵⁶ Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 86.

⁵⁷ Initial UNFICYP national contingents (and their totals), as of mid June 1964 included: Austria (Hospital Unit): 48; Canada: 1,139; Denmark: 993; Finland: 957; Ireland: 1,059; Sweden: 849; and United Kingdom: 1,021. Total military: 6,066.

these states, Canada, Denmark, and the United Kingdom—core units of UNFICYP—were NATO members; so too were Greece and Turkey (each retained their local contingents) as was the mission's greatest financial supporter, the United States. In this respect, although the USSR was successful in creating a "UN peacekeeping mission"—one that was supervised by the UN secretary-general—the mission very nearly became what Washington and London envisioned in early 1964.

The fact that UNFICYP took so long to reach its "desired strength," has been analyzed from a number of perspectives. The reasons are fairly clear. First, with the British forces already present in Cyprus, few UN member-states perceived any urgency to dispatch national contingents. Second, since the mandate for UNFICYP included, from the start, a call to "restore law and order," international experience with a similar dangerous missions in the Congo (that began in 1960 and was not terminated until June 1964) deterred others from readily volunteering. Finally, prospects for receiving financial remuneration for peacekeeping were not promising. Few UN member-states were willing to volunteer military or political contingents to a new operation knowing that the home governments would have to bear the costs. In this respect, the British and Canadians contributed contingents that remained "virtually self-sufficient" (to include transportation). These units did not request UN funding or credits. The Irish, Danish, Finnish, and Swedish contingents provided their forces contingent upon an "understanding" that their respective governments would be reimbursed for outstanding costs incurred, including special salary allowances.⁵⁸ Given these considerations, it is

This force was augmented by UNCIVPOL, "a UN civilian police force," also international with contributions by: Australia: 39; Austria: 34; Denmark: 40; New Zealand: 19; and Sweden: 40. Total "international police" numbered 172.

⁵⁸ The demand for high pay "adjustments" for the Irish and Nordic forces caused certain morale problems for UNFICYP forces—since these "peacekeepers" earned vastly different pay for doing the same job. Some authors criticized these nations for employing "mercenary" peacekeepers. James Stegenga, wrote that, during UNFICYP's first four years of operations, "nearly two-thirds of UNFICYP's total budget has gone for pay and allowances to the volunteer mercenaries, chiefly from the Irish and three Scandinavian troop contributors." Stegenga, *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, 87-88, 175. David Wainhouse's detailed study compiled data to support

understandable why it took three weeks to get the first non-British contingent—a battalion of Canadians—in place. It was another two to three weeks before other national forces arrived. Sir Michael Harbottle, a UNFICYP chief of staff from 1966 to 1968 noted that this was not a totally negative delay, since these piece-meal arrivals allowed for the “orderly” incorporation of contingents into the force. He contrasted this to the chaos that characterized the early days of UN large missions employed in the Sinai (UNEF) and the Congo (ONUC).⁵⁹ Some analysts, however, have pointed to UNFICYP’s slow start to support arguments that call on UN member-states to “ear-mark” units that could be readily available to support UN peacekeeping.

Once assembled, UNFICYP was deployed by national contingents (normally of battalion strengths between 400 and 1,000 men) and each group was assigned to one of the island’s six provincial districts.⁶⁰ [For a depiction of UNFICYP’s deployment as of December 1965, see map at Appendix B.] Logistically, the force greatly benefited from support and supplies routed through the two British Cypriot SBAs. Of course, not all support could be provided locally. Except for the British and Canadians, the United Nations was tasked to provide the initial and rotation air transport for the other contingents. The U.S. Air Force provided approximately 40% of the initial airlift to and from Cyprus. During 1964, the USAF hauled approximately 8,400 troops and their supplies to and from Cyprus. The Canadians employed their own airlift, as did the

this contention. Between 1964 and 1969, \$61 million of a total \$73 million charged to the United Nations for troop costs went to Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Ireland charged approximately one-third the Nordic rate, accounting for \$6.6 million of these costs. No other contingent charged the United Nations more than \$2.2 million for these years. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 410.

⁵⁹ Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier (London, Oxford University Press, 1970), 22-23.

⁶⁰ The assignments shifted a few times in the initial months, but stabilized as contingents operating in the six provincial districts. This remained true until the mission was reorganized after the 1974 Turkish intervention and the de facto partition of the island mandated a stationing of UNFICYP along a national dividing line. See maps and discussion under “deployment” in Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 90-101.

United Kingdom—the latter also provided air transport for the Danish.⁶¹ Once the troops established predictable six-month rotations, the USAF airlift contribution increasingly was supplemented by other national air forces and commercial carriers.⁶²

UNFICYP's "mandate" was established by the Security Council's 4 March 1964 resolution (SC 186)⁶³ This resolution's fifth paragraph listed "preserving international peace and security," as the force's main objective. This was to be achieved by means of exerting "its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting." Secondly, the resolution tasked UNFICYP to "contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order" and, thereby, to strive toward restoring "normal conditions."⁶⁴ As usual, this peacekeeping "enabling resolution" was vague and, at the same time, overly-ambitious. As events proved, the contending parties in Cyprus "interpreted" the resolution to support their own agendas. The Greek Cypriots cited the mandate for establishing "law and order" as proof that UNFICYP should act as an ally of the Cypriot government and should support an agenda that would have rounded-up all Turkish Cypriots as rebels. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, emphasized the resolution's reference to "restoring normal conditions" as confirmation that political guarantees written into the 1960 Constitution should be "restored." Secretary-General Thant, like Dag Hammarskjöld before him in the initial stages of the Congo peacekeeping effort, strove to keep the United Nations "neutral" on political issues—thereby, upsetting both Cypriot factions. Not since the Congo mission had the Security Council adopted so bold and challenging a mandate with regard to the duties to be

⁶¹ The Italian Air Force also contributed by transporting over 1,000 Swedish troops to and from Cyprus. DOS, USPUN 1964, 55.

⁶² Stegenga calculated that the USAF contribution dropped to some twenty percent of the total provided for rotations between 1964 and 1968—carrying about 5,500 of the nearly 27,000 troops flown in and out of Cyprus during those years. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 158.

⁶³ SCOR S/5575, 1964.

⁶⁴ A copy of this resolution is reproduced in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 96-97.

carried out by UN peacekeepers. It was only by the professionalism of the soldiers deployed that UNFICYP successfully defused tensions and contained hostilities that threatened to escalate into a greater Cypriot civil war.

During UNFICYP's first month of operations, U Thant expounded the evolving aspects of the force's ambitious mandate. UNFICYP's specific objectives came to include: establishing "freedom of movement" on roads and in the cities; "removing fortified positions;" progressively integrating the Cypriot police; "disarming civilians;" controlling "extremists on both sides;" and arranging "security measures" and "other necessary conditions" to facilitate a "return to normal conditions." Despite these clarifications, the original mandate to reestablish "normal" conditions proved most troublesome. In retrospect, U Thant interpreted "normal" to mean that UNFICYP should support restoration of a peaceful status quo, while assisting in social and humanitarian programs that revitalized the island's disrupted economic institutions. The restoration of political "normalcy," however, was a task outside the responsibility of UNFICYP. It was a function of diplomatic mediation. As in all UN peacekeeping, the secretary-general stressed that success or failure was "the ultimate responsibility" of the "authorities and people of Cyprus themselves, since normality can come about only as a result of a determination by the two communities . . . to lay down their arms and seek to live again in peace."⁶⁵

Unfortunately, the Cypriot factions were intent upon importing arms and building up national forces with the support of Greece and Turkey. In response to revelations of major military assistance provided to the Makarios government by Greece during late May, Istanbul threatened a unilateral military invasion. In June, President Johnson sent a blunt letter to Istanbul that warned Turkey against taking actions against another NATO ally.⁶⁶ In July, the United States supported a European "Geneva convention"

⁶⁵ DOS, USPUN 1964, 56.

⁶⁶ In June 1964, President Johnson sent a harsh letter to Istanbul that warned Turkey about the consequences of fomenting war with another NATO ally. For a transcript of this letter, see President Lyndon B. Johnson to Prime Minister Inonu, 5 June 1964, cited in Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, 158-60.

that was another attempt to propose political solutions to resolve the Cyprus problem. President Johnson dispatched former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson to participate as "an interested observer" in Geneva. Acheson returned with proposals that came to be called "the Acheson plan," however these were never formally pressed by the Johnson administration.⁶⁷ Despite failing to generate a proposal supported equally by all factions, these efforts demonstrated the level of U.S. interest for mediating a political solution. In fact, between 1964 and 1968, President Johnson dispatched George Ball (under secretary of state) Dean Acheson, and Cyrus Vance (former under secretary of defense and future secretary of state) to offer their considerable talents as mediators. The problem, in each case, was that the Cypriots desired incompatible solutions and the Johnson administration did not want to risk further weakening of NATO's southeast flank, or straining U.S. relations with either Greece or Turkey.

It was due to these failed mediations, despite UN peacekeeping contributions, that, in August 1964, widespread Cypriot fighting resumed. When battles began in Tylliria (within the Turkish-Cypriot "Kokkina and Mansoura enclave areas" in northwest Cyprus), the Cypriot government protested the initial Turkish-Cypriot gains and called on UNFICYP to "stop this activity" or "stand aside and let the government do it." In reality, UNFICYP was not large enough to "enforce" peace. The 1960 "Treaty of Alliance" stipulated that no more than 950 Greek soldiers or 650 Turkish troops should remain on Cyprus. According to one source, however, by 1967,

George Ball, Johnson's Under Secretary of State (and later chief Ambassador to the UN), characterized this message "the most brutal diplomatic note" that he had ever seen. George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, Memoirs (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1982), 350.

⁶⁷ The Acheson plan, also called the "double enosis plan," called for the "dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and distribution of the island between Greece and Turkey." Its main provisions are listed in Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, 64-65. These ideas proved acceptable to the Turkish government but not to the Greek Cypriots or to Greece.

“upwards of 12,000 Greek soldiers were stationed in Cyprus.”⁶⁸ In addition, President Makarios’ “National Guard” numbered an additional 15,000 to 20,000. Opposing these forces were 10,00 to 15,000 Turkish Cypriots, supplemented by a few hundred Turkish regulars. In most every large-scale conflict, the UN force was outnumbered by at least two to one.⁶⁹ On 6 August, the Greek-Cypriot coalition forces retaliated against the Turkish-Cypriot village of Ayios Yeoryios. On the evening of 7 August, the area was over-flown by Turkish fighter (F-100) aircraft. The next day, Turkish aircraft returned and conducted “armed attacks on several villages.” According to the secretary-general’s report, during these battles, UNFICYP “made strenuous attempts to secure a cease-fire, but was continually hindered by the [Cypriot] government forces.” On 9 August, the Security Council adopted another resolution by a vote of 9-0-2 (USSR and Czechoslovakia abstained). This resolution, SC 193 (S/5868) called for an immediate cease-fire and requested that all parties “cooperate fully with the UN commander” to restore the peace.⁷⁰ The Turkish forces refused to call off their air strikes until the Cypriot government agreed to withdraw its forces behind “original positions.” On 10 September, the secretary-general described UNFICYP’s position as “the most delicate” of any previous UN mission.⁷¹ Nonetheless, as Greek-Cypriot forces withdrew, the tensions slowly subsided.

For his third quarterly report (October through December 1964), U Thant described the situation in Cyprus as “much improved.” Nonetheless, he also relayed

⁶⁸ Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, 38-39.

⁶⁹ Stegenga provided similar troop figures and agrees with this line of reasoning concerning UNFICYP’s inability to “enforce” a peace. UNFICYP’s best hope was to negotiate an early settlement and move its contingents into regions of tension before large-scale fighting broke out. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 81-83.

⁷⁰ Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 98.

⁷¹ U Thant wrote that UNFICYP was “not only in the midst of a bitter civil war but it is dangerously interposed between the two sides of that war.” Department of State, DOS, USPUN 1964, 58-59.

that “acute political conflict and distrust between the leader of the two communities . . . combined to create a state of potential civil war, despite the present suspension of active fighting.”⁷² On a positive note, during October, UNFICYP had been able to gain control of and open to traffic a major road between Nicosia and Kyrenia. Additionally, UNFICYP forces continued to conduct a number of “humanitarian operations,” such as assisting Turkish-Cypriot farmers and harvesters move safely to and from their fields for the autumn harvest. Unfortunately, the year’s hostilities had spawned a number of displaced persons and refugees. During 1964, some 25,000 of the island’s 104,000 Turkish Cypriots had fled or moved to safer enclave locations. Of these, approximately 4,000 were provided temporary shelter in UN-guarded refugee camps. The United Nations coordinated for the Greek-Cypriot government to allow the acceptance of relief shipments from the Turkish Red Crescent Society. The Cypriot government stipulated that the UN forces “supervise the storage and distribution” of these supplies, and they did so.⁷³

In the next few years, UNFICYP operations settled down in similar fashion, but relatively few incidents threatened to escalate out of control—thanks mostly to the bravery and diplomatic acumen exercised by UNFICYP field commanders and their men.⁷⁴ The lack of broader political progress, however, generated a growing resentment that culminated in widespread fighting during November 1967. The secretary-general later characterized these hostilities as “the worst crisis [in Cyprus] since early 1964.”⁷⁵ Prior to this fighting, U Thant’s June 1967 report had stated that there existed a state of “uneasy quiet, disturbed by frequent breaches of the cease fire,

⁷² U Thant, Report of the secretary-general, S/6102 (and Annexes 1-6), 12 December 1964.

⁷³ DOS, USPUN 1964, 60-62.

⁷⁴ A good insight into UNFICYP’s daily operations during these years is proved by a former UNFICYP chief of staff, then Brigadier General, Michael Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

⁷⁵ That is, until exceeded by Turkish military intervention into the fray during 1974. See U Thant, Report of the secretary-general, S/8286, 8 December 1967.

terrorist acts, and by the construction of new and provocative fortified positions.” The secretary-general’s report documented that UN forces in Cyprus were encountering a number of “restrictions” (including armed resistance) to carrying out their peacekeeping duties.⁷⁶ On 15 November, Cypriot fighting escalated near the south-central towns of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou.⁷⁷ The secretary-general’s report, delivered to the Security Council on the following day, was particularly critical of the Greek-Cypriot “National Guard” for its operations which appeared to be “planned in advance.”⁷⁸ Thereafter, Greece and Turkey postured such that the secretary-general considered a war between these larger states to be “imminent.”⁷⁹

At this point, the secretary-general designated another “special representative,” from the UN Secretariat, José Rolz-Bennett, to mediate between Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Thant and his mediators requested that Greece and Turkey consider a reduction in their standing forces stationed on Cyprus. They offered the services of UNFICYP to assist in such withdrawals. After Security Council consideration of these events on 24 and 25 November, other “interested parties” also dispatched diplomatic missions to the three governments involved. On 24 November, for example, President Johnson appointed Cyrus Vance as the U.S. “special representative” and sent him to mediate on behalf of the United States. Vance was instructed to “cooperate with” the UN representatives and with the secretary-general of NATO, Manlio Brosio, who was also in Cyprus “on a mission of peace.” The number of high-level diplomats scrambling to avert war between Greece and Turkey testified to the seriousness of the situation.

⁷⁶ S/7969, 13 June 1967, quoted in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1967 DOS Publication 8399, International Organization and Conference Series 81 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, released October 1968), 20-21.

⁷⁷ A first-hand account of these battles and their local ramifications are provided in Harbottle, The Impartial Soldier, 145-67.

⁷⁸ U Thant, Report of the secretary-general, S/8248 and Add. 1-9, 16 November 1967.

⁷⁹ DOS, USPUN 1967, 21.

Despite all this disparate political maneuvering, a DOS report concluded that these efforts “assisted the parties in reaching a degree of agreement on certain specific actions to lessen tensions in the area.”⁸⁰ Within days, the governments of Greece and Turkey backed away from war and resumed a state of tense wariness. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 22 December to continue UNFICYP’s mission for another three months and called on all parties involved to work towards reaching a settlement as proposed in its earlier resolution, dated 4 March 1964.⁸¹

During 1968, the situation remained “relatively calm.” The secretary-general attributed this to the “sobering realization by the parties of how close the island had come to catastrophe in 1967.”⁸² On 18 March, the Security Council perfunctorily adopted a resolution to extend UNFICYP for another three months, until 26 June 1968.⁸³ The same resolution called on both sides to “act with the utmost restraint,” and urged negotiations to take advantage of the “present auspicious climate and opportunities.” As it happened, the UN-appointed “mediator for Cyprus,” Mexico’s Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall (who, like Rolz-Bennett, also carried the title “secretary-

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁸¹ SC resolution 244 was unanimously adopted on 22 December 1967. A full text is reproduced in Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, IV: 103-04.

⁸² U Thant’s report noted that the Greek Cypriots “lifted” previous restrictions against the movement of Turkish Cypriots. As it would turn out, a great many more problems existed that precluded any “normal” relations between the two communities. Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1968, DOS Publication 8482, International Organization and Conference Series 88 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, October 1969), 26.

⁸³ During every three or six months, the Security Council had met to reconsider the progress, or lack of it, in Cyprus. In each case, the secretary-general delivered a report regarding UNFICYP and the UN mediator. In June 1967 UNFICYP’s mandate was extended for six more months. In December 1967 it was renewed for only three months. Shorter periods were adopted when the Security Council members wanted to “push” the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to negotiations; and the longer ones usually were adopted during lulls in antagonisms, when the situation simmered “on the back burner.” DOS, USPUN 1967, 22-23.

general's special representative for Cyprus") was able to get diplomatic talks scheduled to begin on 24 June 1968. In light of this opportunity for a more permanent solution, on 11 June, U Thant recommended that the Security Council approve an extension of UNFICYP for an additional six months "to help in maintaining peace [as] an essential condition for the success of the intercommunal talks." On 18 June, the Council did so.⁸⁴ Between June and December 1968, the situation in Cyprus remained calm. On the political front, the year ended with high expectations for the continuing diplomatic talks between Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot representatives. Militarily, the secretary-general and UNFICYP commander also took advantage of the state of greater tranquillity. By the end of 1968, they coordinated a reduction in the peace force by a total of approximately 25 percent. This was accomplished by altering certain peacekeeper positions and shifting other tasks to civilian police units.⁸⁵ In December 1968, the Security Council again renewed UNFICYP for another six months.⁸⁶

The expenses associated with UNFICYP for 1968 amounted to approximately \$18.5 million (compared with \$19.86 million for 1967).⁸⁷ Washington continued its

⁸⁴ DOS, USPUN 1968, 26-27.

⁸⁵ In the domestic intercommunal strife that characterized Cyprus, the role of UN "police" units was especially critical. See, for example the analysis of Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, 89, 101; and the testimony of a former UNFICYP chief of staff, Michael Harbottle's chapter "UNCIVPOL—A Success Story, in The Impartial Soldier, 176-82.

⁸⁶ At the time of this writing, UNFICYP continues (like UNTSO and UNMOGIP, missions in Palestine and the Kashmir) as a seemingly unending international commitment to peacekeeping. All efforts by the U.S. government, the European Community and others have failed to end the state of civil war that persisted since 1963. In 1974, Turkish forces invaded on the pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community. Since that time, the island was divided. A de facto partition has been in effect ever since (although diplomatic recognition for the breakaway Turkish-Cypriot government has not been extended by any nation except Turkey).

⁸⁷ The decreased cost reflected the 25% reduction in the force during the last quarter of 1968. As UN operations in Cyprus became more "routine," costs for UNFICYP stabilized at approximately \$20 million per year—nearly the same annual amount as that spent on peacekeeping in the Sinai between 1957 and 1967.

financial support of UN peace operations in Cyprus. For 1968, the U.S. government pledged \$8.0 million. This contribution raised the U.S. total (since March 1964) to \$40.1 million (of the total \$89 million paid; and of the \$95 million expenses accumulated). Despite these “voluntary payments,” the United Nations remained nearly \$6 million “in the red” for UNFICYP’s first four years of operations. Clearly, the volunteer financing system was not keeping up with expenses. Of note, neither the USSR nor France made a single “voluntary” payment—despite the fact that their votes in the Security Council had helped to authorize the mission.⁸⁸

Notwithstanding these problems, the Johnson administration was pleased with UNFICYP’s demonstrated capacity to help defuse regional tensions and limit Cypriot fighting when it did occur. In March 1966, President Johnson wrote to the U.S. Congress that he was pleased that the United Nations had “successfully organized a difficult peacekeeping operation in Cyprus.” As an “investment,” he and his advisers concluded that the UN mission directly supported broader U.S. strategic objectives. Most importantly, from the Johnson administration’s point of view, UNFICYP had (at least twice) helped to avert an extremely dangerous (and damaging) direct military confrontation between two of America’s NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.⁸⁹

In other respects, however, the United States (and other UN member-states) tended to over-state UNFICYP’s capabilities and influence. The secretary-general’s December 1968 report, for example, claimed that “the presence of UNFICYP on the island constitutes an assurance to both communities that no unforeseen accident will be allowed to initiate a chain of events that might bring back the tragic conditions of the past and disrupt the negotiations.”⁹⁰ This assertion was faulty in two respects. First, as

⁸⁸ These more affluent of all UN member-states had justified their refusal to pay for UNEF and ONUC because those missions were not approved by their Security Council representatives. Such arguments did not hold water with regard to their unwillingness to pay for UN peacekeeping in Cyprus. DOS, USPUN 1968, 237.

⁸⁹ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 1 March 1966, in DOS, USPUN 1964, iii.

⁹⁰ DOS, USPUN 1968, 27.

a limited UN peace force, UNFICYP could, at no time, “assure” peace; nor could it preclude “unforeseen accidents.”⁹¹ The UN peace force in Cyprus (as was true for most all other UN operations for peace), was important as a “symbol” of international interest. The peacekeeping force successfully deterred small-scale, local aggression; even if it was unable to prevent large-scale conflicts. In addition, it served as the United Nations’ local representative and reporting agency. Its reports to the secretary-general, and his periodic summaries, served to keep the international community “impartially” informed. Second, UNFICYP served to preserve a tense “status quo” in Cyprus. A number of analysts have criticized the peacekeeping force’s success (and others like it in Palestine and the Kashmir—which have also endured without political solution) as “inhibiting” the parties’ desire to seek a political solution. Logically, however, no peacekeeping force should be blamed for saving innocent lives and providing an opportunity for diplomats to pursue peace. As always, the responsibility for an “ultimate resolution” belongs to the political representatives of the belligerent parties involved. In this case, Cypriot factions refused to compromise and the member-states of the United Nations did not wield the necessary influence required to “push” the two sides into an agreement.

As a hybrid UN peace mission, UNFICYP was predominantly a European, Commonwealth and NATO-supported endeavor. Unlike the Arab League force that assumed independent responsibility for “peacekeeping” in Kuwait (outside of UN auspices), UNFICYP was supervised by the UN secretary-general and cannot be considered as a purely “regional arrangement” peacekeeping experiment under the strict definitions included in the UN Charter, specifically chapter VIII. It was, however, a unique example of how a regional coalition can serve to assist the United

⁹¹ UNFICYP’s military capabilities did not exceed those of any combination of belligerent forces. If the island communities waged full-scale war (and especially, when Turkey and Greece intervened on behalf of their patron communities, as they did in 1974), UNFICYP could not “militarily” stop them. It was not a conventional deterrent force—which no UN force, except certain phases of the UN operation in the Congo, and the U.S. forces “as the UN Command in South Korea” could ever claim.

Nations desire to contain violence and promote peace. The next mission examined in this chapter, that of the UN/Organization of American States peacekeeping operations in the Dominican Republic further demonstrates how such a “regional arrangement” can function (almost independently) as a peacekeeping organization “sanctioned” by the United Nations.

The Organization of American States as an Extension of the UN Peacekeeping System

The Dominican Republic has struggled to maintain political independence in the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola since 1844.⁹² Strategically, Hispaniola lies just east of Cuba along the natural oceanic route between Europe and the Panama Canal.⁹³ [See map at Appendix B.] During the first few years of the twentieth century, as a result of local corruption and external exploitation, the Dominican government accrued a significant international debt. Many of the country’s foreign creditors were businessmen and governments in western Europe. During 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt feared that Europe would resort to military intervention to collect its overdue payments. In what has become known as the

⁹² The political and diplomatic history of the Dominican Republic from 1492 (when Columbus “discovered” the island) to the early twentieth century is comprehensively covered in Sumner Wells, Naboth’s Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1884-1924, 2 Volumes (New York: Payson and Starke, 1928). Updated summaries are found in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 459-63; and Joseph S. Tulchin (director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C.) “The Promise of Progress, U.S. Relations with Latin America During the Administration of Lyndon B. Johnson,” chapter in Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1965, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 232-36.

⁹³ Haiti comprises the western one-third of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic’s capital and largest city is Santo Domingo. The country occupies approximately 18,800 square miles, about the size of Vermont and New Hampshire combined.

"Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," Roosevelt assured European business interests that the Dominican Republic's problems were a "hemispheric problem" and would be handled by Washington. As a result, in March 1905, the U.S. government assumed control of the Dominican Republic's customs and began paying its foreign creditors.⁹⁴ These actions reinforced U.S. interests in the Caribbean and were the first in a series of U.S. violations of the Dominican Republic's national sovereignty.

In 1916, after four years of continual domestic upheavals in the Dominican Republic, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ordered American Marines to Santo Domingo. This "U.S. occupation" continued until early 1924, when "free elections" were conducted. Afterwards, the Marines were withdrawn in September of that year. Between 1924 and 1930, the Dominican Republic again proved unable to establish a stable government coalition. Six years of political chaos (with some 123 different "rulers") finally gave way to the thirty-year authoritarian rule of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina. In 1960, U.S. President John F. Kennedy let it be known that his administration would not tolerate Trujillo's domestic or regional "antics" much longer.⁹⁵ On 31 May 1961, the Dominican president was assassinated. The story of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in this plot, according to Joseph S. Tulchin (a noted Latin American scholar), "has been told in many versions, but is no longer disputed."⁹⁶ In the wake of Trujillo's death, another era of Dominican political

⁹⁴ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 460.

⁹⁵ In June 1960, the Organization of American States voted to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic after Trujillo loyalists were linked to an assassination attempt against the President of Venezuela. See USPUN 1960, 61-64. For U.S. relations with Trujillo, see George P. Atkins and Larman C. Wilson, The United States and Trujillo (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973).

⁹⁶ DOS, FRUS 1958-60, 5: 806-08; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1981), 184-86; Darrell Garwood, Under Cover: Thirty-Five Years of CIA Deception (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 104-17; William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon And Schuster, 1978), 340, 428; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 153-62; and Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Promise of

instability began in the Dominican Republic.

In December 1962, the Kennedy administration was pleased (initially) that the Dominican Republic had elected a liberal president, Juan D. Bosch. Bosch assumed office in February 1963 and the U.S. government provided the Dominican Republic with solid political and economic support. Bosch, however, proved to be a much better ideologue than president. His reforms alienated both the Dominican political right and left and soon undermined his administration's bases of support. In September 1963, Bosch was ousted in a bloodless military coup. The Kennedy administration condemned the Dominican military's intervention in Santo Domingo's politics and severed U.S. diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic. Subsequently, U.S. foreign aid programs also were "ripped up by the roots."⁹⁷ A few months later, in December 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson resumed U.S. relations when the Dominican junta named Donald J. Reid Cabral (a former foreign minister) as chief of the government. Eighteen months later, however, Cabral's government was overthrown.

On 24 April 1965,⁹⁸ a two-sided revolt developed in Santo Domingo.⁹⁹ A first

Progress," 235.

⁹⁷ Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), 241; Tulchin asserted that the Kennedy administration "was not upset" when the military ousted Bosch. He based this on U.S. perceptions that Bosch was growing too friendly with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. Tulchin, "The Promise of Progress," 235.

⁹⁸ John Prados recorded that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had alerted President Johnson that the Dominican Republic was headed for political turmoil two weeks before the crisis began. For this reason, the U.S. Ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., had been recalled for "consultations" and was out of the country when the "crisis" began. John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council From Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 140.

⁹⁹ Monograph sources on the "Dominican Crisis" include: John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention, translated by Lawrence Lipson.

faction of approximately 3,000 “rebels,” (calling itself the “Constitutionalists”) deposed Cabral. These men, supported by a group of Dominican army officers (under Colonel Caamaño Deño), called for the reinstatement of a government under former president Juan Bosch.¹⁰⁰ As this group struck, another faction (later called the “Reconstructionists” or “loyalists”), supported by other Dominican military officers (initially led by General Elías Wessin y Wessin¹⁰¹), opposed the Bosch group’s new government. In response to Wessin’s counter revolt, the Constitutionalists adopted a plan that was intended to derail their Dominican military opponents. Colonel Caamaño’s followers broke into police armories and disseminated rifles and other weapons to a great number of malcontent civilians. Subsequently, widespread looting and hostilities erupted in Santo Domingo as local authorities were supplanted by armed gangs. In response to this breakdown of law and order, as early as Monday 26 April, embassy officials advised the approximate 3,000 American citizens to prepare for evacuation. In response, a number of U.S. citizens sought refuge within (or near) the embassy grounds, and prepared to leave the island. The Johnson administration became alarmed by the rapid rate at which the situation was deteriorating in the Dominican Republic.¹⁰²

On 28 April, the U.S. president decided to order a unilateral military intervention, initially deploying 500 Marines, later adding more Marines and Army airborne

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). [Originally published as “La Crise Dominicaine,” thesis no. 240, University of Geneva, 1965.]

¹⁰⁰ Prados numbered the rebel forces between 2,500 and 3,000, including “perhaps 200 men from an elite naval frogman unit.” Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 141.

¹⁰¹ Wessin was soon replaced by “loyalist” General Antonio Imbert Barrera. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 479.

¹⁰² According to Prados, as early as Sunday morning, 25 April, LBJ ordered units of the Atlantic Fleet Task Force 44.9 to “assume position off the coast of Santo Domingo” and to remain just out of sight. The next day, the president ordered a larger Navy-Marine amphibious group of six vessels including the helicopter carrier Boxer to prepare for civilian evacuation operations. Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 141.

contingents bringing total U.S. force strength to 22,500 by 10 May.¹⁰³ Afterwards, the Johnson administration worked hard to “justify” the U.S. intervention. Washington’s explanations were three-fold. First, the president announced that he was concerned for the lives of approximately 3,000 U.S. national citizens;¹⁰⁴ stating that these persons were “in great danger.”¹⁰⁵ In retrospect, the situation in Santo Domingo was serious. According to President Johnson’s memoirs, the international Red Cross estimated that more than 1,300 Dominicans were killed in the first five days of the insurrections.¹⁰⁶ The combination of political chaos and indiscriminate violence was enough to persuade at least 2,400 foreign nationals (mostly U.S.) to evacuate the island in the first few days.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, the local authorities were informing U.S. Ambassador W.

¹⁰³ Wainhouse documented that “within six days from the initial landing, over 15,000 troops including the assault element of the major force—nine battalions of the 82nd Airborne Division and three battalions of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade—were on hand.” He also noted that by 10 May, 14,000 tons of equipment had been delivered and troop strengths reached a peak of 22,500. Needless to say, no UN peacekeeping mission was ever so “efficiently” launched. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 469. Prados claimed that “more than 28,000” U.S. troops were deployed to the Dominican Republic by “early May.” No other source lists a number higher than 22,500. Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 145.

¹⁰⁴ Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations Vol. II: The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), 491.

¹⁰⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971), 190-92; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1965, DOS Publication 8137, International Organization and Conference Series 73 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, March 1967), 45. A number of sources have quoted President Johnson as stating the situation in Santo Domingo was “just like the Alamo.” Philip Geyelin titled his chapter on the Dominican crisis using this quote. Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 236-58.

¹⁰⁶ The president also wrote that another 700 Dominicans were killed in the next year. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 193.

¹⁰⁷ Accounts vary. Rusk’s memoirs stated that “some 5,000 people” were evacuated. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, as told to Richard Rusk and edited by Daniel S. Papp (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1990), 373.

Tapley Bennett, Jr. that the Dominican police could not be counted upon to restore order.¹⁰⁸ Second, to support its unilateral military intervention, the Johnson administration cited concerns about “signs that those trained outside the Dominican Republic” were seeking to “gain control” of the Dominican crisis. In this respect, memoirs and documents of U.S. officials reveal a near obsession with the possibility that events in the Dominican Republic would lead to “another Castro” or “another Cuba.”¹⁰⁹ As early as 27 April, Johnson justified escalating U.S. operations “as a first step toward preventing a Communist takeover” and as consistent with the Organization of American States’ (OAS) anti-Communist resolution adopted at Punta del Este, Uruguay in January 1962.¹¹⁰ President Johnson’s memoirs stated that the “Castroite” threat was “not overestimated,” but little evidence was ever produced to back these claims.¹¹¹ The most the U.S. government could generate was a “list”¹¹² of some 25-50

¹⁰⁸ This too, was cited by President Johnson in his first televised address concerning the Dominican crisis on 30 April. See text of the president’s remarks in U.S. Department of State Bulletin Vol. LII (17 May 1965): 742-43.

¹⁰⁹ This was a concern of the Johnson administration from the beginning; although President Johnson did not use the word “Communist” until his second Dominican crisis television broadcast on 2 May. Ambassador Bennett’s “Critic” (Critical Coding) cables from Santo Domingo typify this “alarmist” mentality. He recommended U.S. intervention as early as 28 April under the justification that “another Cuba” would rise up “out of the ashes of this uncontrollable situation.” To this Johnson quipped, “The last thing I wanted . . . was another Cuba.” Quoted in Johnson, The Vantage Point, 197-98. Joseph Tulchin wrote that “today, we can see that from the very beginning, the central objective of U.S. policy was to prevent “another Cuba.” Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress,” 236.

¹¹⁰ The Johnson administration often cited the “unanimous” inter-American resolution adopted at Punta del Este that concluded “the principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system.” See Resolution VI, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers, 22 to 31 January 1962.

¹¹¹ Johnson, The Vantage Point, 200. Others disagreed with the president’s assessment. Prados, for example, stated flatly that “the Communist argument was completely off base.” Prados refuted the CIA’s claims and asserted that only one Cuban-trained Communist was involved in the rebellion, and “the Cubans specifically prohibited [him] from engaging in guerrilla activities.” Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 143. Christopher Andrew wrote that the president’s staff, especially the new CIA

“trained Communists (generated by the Central Intelligence Agency) and to claim that some 4,000 Dominicans belonged to three indigenous Communist political parties.”¹¹³ A third and final category of U.S. justifications for its actions taken in the Dominican Republic, falls under the Johnson administration’s suspect arguments that the United States had acted under its obligations to the Organization of American States (OAS)¹¹⁴ and UN Charters—although limited, but official imprimatur was gained only after the fact. As it turned out, the United Nations never formally “authorized” U.S. intervention, but neither were proposals to condemn the U.S. intervention formally adopted. The OAS did provide a certain “sanction” for U.S. unilateral actions when a two-thirds majority¹¹⁵ voted to create the “Inter-American Force” (later, the IAPF)—

director Admiral William F. Raborn, was hard pressed to “produce evidence to support presidential hyperbole.” Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 325; and most significantly, Johnson’s own secretary of state, Dean Rusk, recalled that he advised stressing the danger to American lives and “the importance of preserving free institutions.” Rusk stated that he, personally, doubted “that a small number of Communists would play a decisive role.” Rusk, As I Saw It, 373. Tulchin asserted that President Johnson “used the gambit of Communist subversion in an attempt to win support in the court of U.S. domestic public opinion, but he succeeded only in confusing many people who would have been happy to support him.” Joseph S. Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress,” 236.

¹¹² Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 253.

¹¹³ Johnson, The Vantage Point, 200.

¹¹⁴ The OAS was formally instituted on 30 April 1948. Its General Assembly meets annually in Washington. Similar to the United Nations, the OAS has a “permanent” Council (the COAS). Unlike the UN, the COAS calls special meetings of American foreign ministers “to deal with urgent security matters.” For an overview of the OAS see David Sheinin, The Organization of American States (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995). For a contemporary overview of the OAS Charter and its approach to regional “peacekeeping” by a former OAS official, see Edgardo Paz-Barnica, “Peacekeeping Within the Inter-American System,” in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, ed. Henry Wiseman (New York: Pergamon Press and the International Peace Academy, 1983), 237-55.

¹¹⁵ The critical vote authorizing the OAS peace force (as an extension of the U.S. intervention) was secured by degree of political manipulation. As it turned out,

eight days after the U.S. Marines landed in Santo Domingo. Charges of the United States “manipulating the OAS”¹¹⁶ sparked legal arguments in the UN Security Council as to the OAS’ “capacity” to conduct such “enforcement” actions—a role ostensibly assigned to the United Nations under Charter article 53.1.¹¹⁷

The importance of securing an international “sanction” of U.S. unilateral military intervention is revealed by the Johnson administration’s keen desire to generate a UN or OAS resolution to justify American actions.¹¹⁸ As early as 27 April (the day before the first Marines were ordered into Santo Domingo), the United States requested a

the deciding vote was cast by a “representative” of the former Dominican Republic government (which was no longer in power). There is also evidence that Washington exerted considerable diplomatic pressure on OAS states to vote for creating the IAPF. See, for example, Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 153.

¹¹⁶ The Johnson administration admitted “lobbying” for OAS support to create the IAPF, however, some scholars argued that this was not undue coercion. Jerome Slater wrote that “there was a considerable amount of genuine support—usually more than a minimum of two-thirds—for a continuing inter-American role in the Dominican crisis.” Jerome Slater, “The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis,” International Organization XXIII/1 (1969): 54. On the other hand, Tulchin claimed that “After the Dominican crisis, relations with Latin America became a case of damage control, of trying to salvage something from the ashes of the dream.” Joseph S. Tulchin, “The Promise of Progress,” 236.

¹¹⁷ Article 53.1 states that “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies [such as the OAS] for enforcement action under its authority. No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. . . .” As will be explained below, the U.S. government argued that “OAS actions” were not “enforcement.” This evasion was possible because the concept is not defined in the UN Charter. See excerpts of Charter at Appendix A.

¹¹⁸ Prior to this “joint” U.S.-OAS peace operation in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson held the Organization of American States in low esteem. “The OAS,” the U.S. president had been quoted as saying: “couldn’t pour ---- out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel.” Later, LBJ was pleased that the organization provided international sanction for the unilateral U.S. intervention. Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 254.

meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States (COAS). When that body met, on 29 April, its members called for an immediate cease fire in the Dominican Republic and appealed to Emanuele Clarizo, the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo (as the senior diplomatic official there), to help mediate a peaceful resolution. The same day, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson informed the UN Security Council of President Johnson's decisions and of the actions under consideration by the OAS. The next day, the Nuncio successfully mediated the Dominican Republic's first temporary cease fire agreement.¹¹⁹ Also on 30 April, the COAS recommended establishing an "international neutral zone of refuge" (where the U.S. Marines had secured control) near the foreign-embassies' district of Santo Domingo. The COAS then voted to convene an emergency Meeting of Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers. This session, as the "10th MFM," began in Washington on 1 May.¹²⁰

During their first meeting, the OAS Foreign Ministers resolved to create a "Special Committee"¹²¹ that would proceed to the Dominican Republic and report back with recommendations. This five-man committee¹²² departed immediately and joined Dr. José A. Mora (secretary-general of the OAS), who was already in Santo Domingo. At this time, the Johnson administration pressed hard for the adoption of a resolution that would encourage other Latin governments to send forces as an "inter-American response." On 1 May, President Johnson baited the American ministers by announcing that Washington was placing an additional two battalions of parachute-qualified

¹¹⁹ At this point, the Bosch rebels were unsure of their position and they desired a temporary cease fire to regroup and decide on their next course of action.

¹²⁰ DOS, USPUN 1965, 46.

¹²¹ The vote was 19-0-1 (Chile abstained). The text of this and other OAS resolutions dealing with the Dominican crisis can be found in OAS Official Records. This specific resolution is document 78. It was recorded by the United Nations as S/6315.

¹²² The OAS "Special Committee" comprised OAS ambassadors from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama.

infantry (from the 82nd Airborne Division) on call "for use, as required by the OAS."¹²³ Three days later, the Special committee reported¹²⁴ back to the 10th MFM. Significantly, the committee members agreed that the U.S. forces in Santo Domingo were a stabilizing influence in the Dominican Republic. They recommended that the OAS should give serious consideration to generating a broad-based regional solution.¹²⁵ In the early hours of 6 May, after considerable debate and some diplomatic arm-twisting by the Johnson administration, the OAS agreed to request that all American governments consider providing police contingents and military forces as an Inter-American Force [later renamed the Inter-American Peace Force, IAPF]. Specifically, the OAS resolution mandated that the IAPF should "restore normal conditions," and "establish an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions."¹²⁶ Within a few weeks, Brazil supplied an army battalion and a marine company, while Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay dispatched

¹²³ As discussed earlier, President Johnson had decided to deploy additional forces, with or without OAS sanction. By making such announcements, however, the U.S. government was hoping to gain regional legitimacy. DOS, USPUN 1965, 47.

¹²⁴ OAS Official Records, document 47.

¹²⁵ This report helped overcome considerable Latin suspicions of U.S. actions and helped the U.S. representatives to the OAS dodge charges that U.S. intervention had been conducted in direct violation of OAS article 17. This article stated, "The territory of a state is inviolable" and cannot be occupied by another state, "directly or indirectly, under any grounds whatever." Cited in Miller, World Order and Local Disorder, 153.

¹²⁶ Paragraph 2 of the OAS Resolution adopted in the Third Plenary Session, 5-6 May 1965. For an in-depth study of the IAPF, see James R. Jose, An Inter-American Peace Force Within the Framework of the Organization of American States: Advantages, Impediments, Implications (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1970). A full copy of the OAS resolution is included in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 505. Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, Argentina, Paraguay, Haiti, Bolivia and Colombia voted with the United States—so too did the questionable "representative" of the Dominican Republic. Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico and Uruguay voted against the creation of the IAPF. The representative of Venezuela abstained—hence a tally of 14-5-1.

their own token military forces to participate in the IAPF. Costa Rica contributed a separate 21-man platoon to act as military police. On 31 May, General Hugo Panasco Alvin of the Brazilian army was designated as commander of the U.S.-dominated IAPF. As these Latin contingents arrived, U.S. forces were reduced quickly from 22,000 to less than 12,000. By the end of June 1965, the IAPF included 1,152 Brazilian forces and 250 or less men from each of the other Latin contingents. Logistically and financially, the United States continued to supply the preponderance of IAPF support. All logistics were supplied by the U.S. military. Financially, for seventeen months of operations in the Dominican Republic, Brazil contributed \$35,000 to the IAPF. By comparison, the U.S. government spent nearly \$180 million: \$3.3 million in OAS costs, an additional \$35 million to the Defense budget for "costs over and above normal expenses," and \$141.3 million in economic assistance extended during 1965 and 1966.¹²⁷

At the same time that the OAS created the IAPF, on 6 May, the American member-states passed a second resolution. This document called upon all Dominican factions to strictly adhere to the 30 April cease fire and to "respect" the "international safe zone" (ISZ).¹²⁸ The "zone" referenced in the resolution was that controlled (at that time) by the U.S. military forces. Initially, between 28 April and 2 May, U.S. marines controlled a small sector in western Santo Domingo. However, a U.S. "link-up operation" was conducted on 3 May between Marines already in place and forces brought in by air at San Isidro (east of Santo Domingo). This military operation was extremely important because it served to separate rival Dominican factions and established an "impartial cordon sanitaire."¹²⁹ According to one study, "with the

¹²⁷ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 477-78, 513.

¹²⁸ DOS, USPUN 1965, 47.

¹²⁹ U.S. Secretary of State Rusk's memoirs described the U.S.-controlled zone as "about sixteen miles long around the Dominican capital." Rusk, As I Saw It, 372. Evan Luard stated that the early U.S. "safety zone" comprised "nine square miles within the city" and later included the "corridor to link this with the San Isidro base."

creation of the ISZ and the link-up" approximately 80 percent of the pro-Bosch rebel forces were "sealed off with their backs to the sea." Accordingly, "the stage was set to effect a cease fire" and, just as important, the stable environment provided OAS diplomats an opportunity to pursue "a solution with contending parties."¹³⁰ On 15 May, President Johnson formally announced that the U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic would be assigned to the IAPF and fall under OAS direction. In accordance with article 54 of the UN Charter, the OAS informed the UN Security Council of its decisions and actions being taken.

Meanwhile, in New York, certain UN member-states were characterizing the U.S. intervention and subsequent OAS Dominican measures as "violations of the UN Charter."¹³¹ As early as 1 May, the Soviet Union had requested an "urgent" meeting of the Council to discuss "the armed interference by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic." For this purpose, the Security Council held 29 meetings between 3 May and 26 July 1965.¹³² In the USSR's opening speech, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko called the U.S. intervention a "flagrant armed interference in [the Dominican Republic's] domestic affairs." Fedorenko accused Washington of establishing "a reactionary anti-peoples dictatorship which suits the convenience of a foreign Power, namely the United States of America."¹³³ The Soviet

Luard, A History of the United Nations, II: 492.

¹³⁰ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 469.

¹³¹ It is difficult to make a case that would demonstrate how the U.S. intervention was not a violation of both charters. The Johnson administration characterized the intervention as "providing a helping hand." Regarding U.S.-Latin America relations, William Walker wrote that "the non-intervention of the Good Neighbor policy were swept away in maneuvers reminiscent of occupations earlier in the century." William O. Walker III, "Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin America," chapter in The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s, ed. Diane B. Kunz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 63.

¹³² UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 651.

¹³³ SCOR, 20th Year, 1196th meeting, 3 May 1965.

Union formally charged that the United States had violated UN Charter articles 2.4, 2.7 and 53¹³⁴ and forwarded a proposal to “condemn” the United States and to call for immediate withdrawals of U.S. troops from the Dominican Republic.¹³⁵

Ambassador Stevenson spoke before the UN Council in defense of U.S. actions. After describing a U.S. view of events that transpired in the Dominican Republic, he asserted that “the basic nature and overriding purpose of U.S. action was . . . to protect lives and to give the inter-American system a chance to deal with a situation within its competence.” He pointed out that U.S. emergency medical and food shipments were “distributed to all persons in need without regard to political affiliation.” After the OAS voted to create the IAPF (6 May), Stevenson cited “joint U.S.-OAS efforts” that he claimed were leading to “a more secure cease fire and negotiations for a peaceful solution.” He countered the Soviet charges of Charter violations by saying that “the United States had no designs on the territorial integrity and political independence of the Dominican Republic and had not violated article 2.4.” Regarding the next point, that of article 2.7, Stevenson argued that this did not, in fact, apply to the situation at hand.¹³⁶ Finally, he asserted that the actions of the OAS were “entirely proper under the Charter, which in article 33 calls for the settlement of disputes, . . . through regional organizations to deal with regional problems.”¹³⁷ As these debates continued, it became clear to the U.S. delegation that Moscow was most interested in attacking OAS actions in the Dominican Republic as an opportunity to establish a legal precedent

¹³⁴ The first of these condemns the use of force by one state against another. The second prohibits the United Nations (and by extension, its members) from interfering in any state’s domestic jurisdiction. The third article referenced by Fedorenko requires the UN Security Council to authorize any “enforcement action” taken by a regional organization. See Charter excerpts at Appendix A. This argument was never settled, however, as the U.S. delegation claimed U.S. and OAS actions were not “enforcement”—a concept not defined anywhere in the Charter.

¹³⁵ DOS, USPUN 1965, 48.

¹³⁶ USUN officials argued that article 2.7 applied only to action taken by the United Nations, not by individual states.

¹³⁷ DOS, USPUN 1965, 48-49.

whereby the UN Council (where the Soviet Union possessed a veto) could control collective actions taken by "legally recognized" alliances. As the debates continued, Ambassador Stevenson confronted the Soviet delegation on this point. He stated that "the time has come to stop the effort here to discredit the Organization of American States—a recognized arm of the United Nations—and to seek instead to build it up to show our faith in regional arrangements."¹³⁸ Answering to other Soviet charges, that of the U.S. "using" the OAS, or "hiding behind it to promote its own interests," Stevenson later argued that the U.S. had "scrupulously avoided giving assistance to either Dominican faction and had prevented the forces of both from using the zone of safety established by the IAPF." On this last point, it was true that U.S. military forces in the Dominican Republic held an overwhelming military advantage and could have easily eliminated either Dominican faction, had they been so instructed.¹³⁹ Finally, in defense of U.S. multi-lateral commitments (against further charges of U.S. aggressive opportunism), the U.S. ambassador stated that all U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic "would be withdrawn when the IAPF command determined that they were

¹³⁸ Similar debates of OAS "jurisdiction" were argued before the UN Council in 1954 when charges were levied against the United States for interfering in Guatemala's internal affairs. The United States offered to allow OAS investigations to certify if these charges were true. The Soviet Union rejected the propriety of such "internal policing." This debate was resumed when the OAS voted to impose economic sanctions against Trujillo's Dominican Republic and Castro's Cuba in 1960 and 1962, respectively. For these cases, see Luard, A History of the United Nations 1:297, and II: 379; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1960, DOS Publication 7341, International Organization and Conference Series 27, (Washington D.C.: USGPO, March 1962), 61-64; Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1962, DOS Publication 7610, International Organization and Conference Series 45 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1963), 91-99.

¹³⁹ In retrospect, it is interesting that the U.S. forces were as "impartial" as they were. From the beginning of the crisis, the U.S. ambassador (Tapley Bennett) and his charge d'affaires (William Connett) in Santo Domingo were advising against any return to power by Juan Bosch as "against U.S. interests." Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 246.

not needed.”¹⁴⁰

On 14 May, the Santo Domingo cease fire broke down. In response to arguments that OAS measures were not adequately “keeping the peace,” the UN Security Council met that same day and passed SC 203 (S/6355).¹⁴¹ This resolution called for Dominican factions to agree upon another cease fire and charged the UN secretary-general with sending a representative to the Dominican Republic. This representative’s mission, designated as the “UN Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-general in the Dominican Republic” (DOMREP), was mandated to attempt mediation and report regularly to the Council. That same day, U Thant dispatched his military advisor, Major General Indarjit Rikhye (a veteran commander of UN peacekeeping operations in the Sinai, UNEF, and the Congo) to the Dominican Republic as the DOMREP “advance party.” Within a few days, the secretary-general announced that Dr. José Antonio Mayobre (secretary-general of the Economic Commission for Latin America) would serve as the UN “Special Representative” in Santo Domingo. For the next seventeen months, Mayobre and Rikhye supervised a small staff and employed two UN observers.¹⁴² In addition to offering their services as mediators, this staff regularly sent status reports back to New York. During DOMREP’s first weeks in Santo Domingo, its presence was resented by the OAS committee that was already attempting to mediate a more permanent cease fire.¹⁴³ It

¹⁴⁰ DOS, USPUN 1965, 51.

¹⁴¹ The U.S. delegation did not support the allegations that OAS measures were ineffective, but voted to allow the resolution to pass since all it did was authorize a small investigative and reporting body. Franck wrote that “the U.S. still could not quite bring itself to cast its first veto, but . . . agreed to accept a UN presence [after ensuring that] the observer’s function was very limited.” Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985), 71.

¹⁴² These observers were alternately provided (no more than two at one time) by Brazil, Canada and Ecuador. UNDP, The Blue Helmets, 652.

¹⁴³ As if there were not enough “mediators” in the Dominican Republic during the first weeks of May 1965, President Johnson dispatched two successive “U.S.

was not until DOMREP assumed a secondary role to the OAS that frictions between the political organizations diminished.¹⁴⁴

On 19 May, Dr. Mayobre met with leaders of the Dominican factions, those of the anti-Bosch "Government of National Reconstruction" (GNR)¹⁴⁵ and their pro-Bosch rivals, the "Constitutionalist" rebels. Mayobre attempted to mediate an overall settlement, but was able to gain assurances of only a twelve-hour "suspension of hostilities." On 21 May, the International Red Cross took advantage of this suspension of the fighting to tend to the dead and wounded in the streets.¹⁴⁶ As the hostilities continued, the Constitutionalist group suspected that Washington (and by association, the OAS) was acting to advance the cause of their rival GNR forces. As of mid-May, the rebels sought to use the United Nations' interest in the struggle to their advantage. They accused the OAS of being partial and "incapable of resolving the situation."¹⁴⁷ The Constitutionlists' cause was supported by UN Council representatives from the

diplomatic missions." First LBJ sent the former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, John Bartlow Martin to see what could be done. Next, the U.S. president designated McGeorge Bundy (his head of the National Security Council) and Cyrus Vance (with others from the Department of State) to meet with Juan Bosch (in Puerto Rico) and then to proceed to Santo Domingo for a two-week "diplomatic mission." Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 145-46.

¹⁴⁴ The 19 May OAS' Special Committee's second report (S/6370) asserted that "the presence of the United Nations in the Dominican Republic had created a factor which had compromised and interfered with the task of the committee." This report also requested that the UN Security Council "suspend all action until regional procedures had been exhausted." The OAS report also noted the simultaneous "unhelpful" U.S. missions being conducted at the same time (see previous note). Quoted in UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 652.

¹⁴⁵ By this time, the army forces (called "loyalists" by some accounts) had designated General Antonio Imbert Barrera as their "president." The pro-Bosch "Constitutional" forces countered by designating Colonel Caamaño Deñó as their "president." Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 479 (note 60).

¹⁴⁶ UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 653.

¹⁴⁷ DOS, USPUN 1965, 50.

Soviet Union, France, Jordan, and the Ivory Coast. These member-states advocated expanding the UN mission to the Dominican Republic and questioned the OAS' impartiality. In response, the U.S. delegation refuted their arguments and continued to argue the case for OAS "primacy."¹⁴⁸ The U.S. representative argued that the Dominican crisis required a clear perspective by UN member-states concerning the relationship between the United Nations and the OAS.¹⁴⁹ In further defense of the OAS, and as a call for patience by UN members, Ambassador Stevenson asserted that the Security Council "should not seek to duplicate or interfere with action through regional arrangements so long as those actions remain effective and are consistent with our Charter."¹⁵⁰

On 22 May, the OAS secretary-general took credit for mediating an extension of the temporary cease fire. Santo Domingo's second uneasy truce held for another three weeks. At nearly the same time, on 23 May, the IAPF was "formally constituted" by a document signed by the OAS secretary-general and representatives of each participating contingent.¹⁵¹ These events sparked a renewed debate at the United Nations regarding the "authority" of the Organization of American States under the UN

¹⁴⁸ According to President Johnson, in a summary letter he wrote to Congress a year after the situation was resolved, "the Security Council dispatched United Nations representatives and observers to the Dominican Republic during the disorders there; but the primacy of the Organization of American States in dealing successfully with this regional problem, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, remained unimpaired." (Emphasis added.) President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 9 March 1967, in DOS, USPUN 1965, iv.

¹⁴⁹ This relationship was defined within the UN Charter in chapter VIII, "Regional Arrangements."

¹⁵⁰ Stevenson also noted that Dominican factions were taking the opportunity to "play off one international organization against the other." SCOR 1965, 1222 meeting, 9; DOS, USPUN 1965, 52.

¹⁵¹ At that time, the initial IAPF force were stabilized at approximately 14,000 men (12,500 U.S. and 1,500 others)—comprising an eight-fold U.S. predominance, but a "multinational force" nonetheless. A year later, the IAPF total force had been reduced by about one-third to a strength of 8,000. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 476.

“system.” On 3 June, the Soviet representative renewed his charges that the OAS had exceeded its authority by creating the IAPF. This point was consistent with Russian and French insistence, since 1956, that only the UN Security Council (where these members held veto power) could “rightfully” authorize international peacekeeping operations. This interpretation was broadly based on their charges that the IAPF was conducting “enforcement” actions that could only be authorized by the UN Security Council (per article 53). The U.S. delegation, however, was convinced that a majority opinion agreed that article 53 used the term “enforcement action” to mean action taken by an organization against a state. Since the IAPF had not acted against a “state,” (since the Dominican Republic had no established government) the IAPF could not have acted contrary to the UN Charter.¹⁵²

On 15 June, the second mediated Dominican cease fire broke down. According to U.S. government documents, the rebel forces had “attacked elements of the IAPF,” which “after continuous harassment and provocation,” used force to “restore and maintain the cease fire.” Thereafter, the IAPF advanced from its “security zone” and expanded its control of regions previously held by the Constitutionals. The Soviet representative, backed by France, Jordan, and Uruguay (the last two were non-permanent members of the 1965 Security Council) again protested this IAPF “offensive action.” These UN member-states also accused the OAS force of “violating” the cease fire. Ambassador Charles Yost, the USUN deputy to Stevenson, defended OAS actions. Yost insisted that the cease fire applied only to belligerents and not to an international peacekeeping force. The IAPF, according to Yost, was subject only to its mandate and the “traditional rules of impartial peacekeeping forces.” In this last regard, he stated that the IAPF “never initiated fire but, as in the case of UN peacekeeping forces, it was authorized to return fire when attacked.”¹⁵³ During the remainder of June and July, the situation in Santo Domingo remained tense, but stable.

¹⁵² DOS, USPUN 1965, 54-55.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 55-56.

The containment of rival military factions by the IAPF set the stage for successful mediations that were conducted by representatives of the Organization of American States. Earlier, on 2 June, the OAS had voted to create a new three-member ad hoc mediation committee. The experienced U.S. representative to the OAS, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker¹⁵⁴ became the committee's driving force. The committee's efforts eventually resulted in an "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" that was signed 31 August. In retrospect, it is clear that this event marked a turning point in the crisis. The accord was made possible by a combination of three complementary processes: the IAPF's preponderant peacekeeping, Ambassador Bunker's adroit diplomacy (peace-making) and significant U.S. economic incentives (\$20 million¹⁵⁵ to begin the nation-building process). Regarding peacekeeping's contributions to the successful diplomatic settlement, a study by David Wainhouse noted that "both contending parties finally accepted the idea that the military presence of the United States, in the first instance, followed by the presence of the IAPF, stood in the way of preventing a victory by either side."¹⁵⁶ Diplomatically, Bunker and his team patiently and assiduously mediated with the Dominican factions. Ambassador Bunker was as close to a "professional" international troubleshooter as the world possessed in the 1960.¹⁵⁷ A third element of the mission's long-term success was the significant amount of funding that the Johnson administration dedicated to building a foundation for democracy in the Dominican Republic. The costs of this "nation building" effort (at least \$141.3 million in 1965 and

¹⁵⁴ Bunker had previously mediated successful agreements in Yemen and West New Guinea. He had served as a U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, Italy and India (and would later serve in South Vietnam). The other two members of this OAS committee were Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho of Brazil and Ambassador Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas of El Salvador.

¹⁵⁵ Luard, A History of the United Nations, II: 509.

¹⁵⁶ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 491.

¹⁵⁷ Prados documented that Bunker met with the rebel leader Col. Caamaño "some forty-eight times and with Imbert or his representatives [of the GNR] fifty-three [times]." Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 147.

1966 alone) greatly exceeded the costs of the peacekeeping mission (which was, by itself, approximately \$38 million).¹⁵⁸ The return on these “investments,” in the opinion of the UN secretary-general’s personal representative (who also had served as the head of the international Economic Commission for Latin America) was that these efforts “advanced the course of constitutional government in the Dominican Republic by fifteen years.”¹⁵⁹

On 3 September 1965, a provisional government under President Hector Garcia-Godoy began operations in Santo Domingo. It was directly supported by the IAPF (at that time, about 12,000 men, representing 6 OAS states; 90 percent U.S. forces), which maintained law and order and endeavored to assist in “arms control” by collecting military weapons from the Dominicans.¹⁶⁰ The ultimate goal of the “Act of Reconciliation” was to establish a popularly-elected, stable government. The agreement guaranteed free national elections within nine months. For the most part, the IAPF guaranteed that the Godoy provisional government remained committed to the agreements signed on 31 August 1965.

During this time of political transition in the Dominican Republic, the UN operation (DOMREP) was continued to keep the United Nations “involved” and “informed.” On the other hand, the U.S. insistence that the OAS maintain “primacy” relegated the United Nations to a subordinate position. DOMREP’s “information” role,

¹⁵⁸ Even Secretary of State Rusk’s memoirs recalled that the U.S. government “spent lots of money keeping the [Dominican Republic] afloat during the unrest.” Rusk inferred that these expenses were justified by noting that this investment “helped the Dominicans avoid the tyranny of a Trujillo or a Castro and continue on a constitutional path.” Rusk, *As I Saw It*, 377.

¹⁵⁹ Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, 204.

¹⁶⁰ This was one of few international “peacekeeping” operations that was successful at simultaneously conducting an “arms control” mission. Wainhouse wrote that, after the Act of Dominican Reconciliation, the IAPF gathered-in a large percentage of the small arms that had been distributed to the rebels during the early days of the revolt. “Had these arms not been collected,” he speculated, “they would have constituted a grave danger to the new regime.” Wainhouse and others, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, 498.

in many respects, was mostly redundant, since the OAS also filed reports to the Security Council, in accordance with article 54 of the Charter.¹⁶¹ On the other hand, DOMREP reports served to legitimizing OAS peacekeeping efforts in the Dominican Republic. Since the IAPF was the OAS' first venture into regional peacekeeping and mediation, the UN's "over-the shoulder" presence served to convince skeptical UN member-states that the OAS was performing an admirable, if not totally impartial, international service. As a result, during 1966, there were no further UN member-state protests about OAS actions in the Dominican Republic.

On 1 June 1966, in accordance with the 31 August 1965 accords, the Caribbean Republic conducted national and municipal elections.¹⁶² A month later, on 1 July, a new government under president-elect Joaquin Balaguer was sworn in. International observers from eighteen countries documented that the Dominican elections were conducted openly and equitably.¹⁶³ The party of Juan Bosch finished a distant second.¹⁶⁴ The IAPF began its withdrawal on 28 June and its mission was terminated, officially, on 21 September. Similarly, U Thant reported to the Council that he was satisfied with the course of events. On 14 October the UN secretary-general recommended that the United Nations end the DOMREP mission. On 22 October, this was approved and the small UN staff departed the Dominican Republic. Total costs for the UN mission to the Dominican Republic were \$275,831. This amount was

¹⁶¹ DOS, USPUN 1965, 57.

¹⁶² According to Wainhouse, 27 senators, 74 deputies, 70 mayors, and 350 aldermen were chosen during the same elections. Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 494.

¹⁶³ President Johnson characterized this as "one of the most closely watched elections ever held in the Western Hemisphere." Johnson, The Vantage Point, 203.

¹⁶⁴ Bosch was reluctant to return to the island and start his political campaign. He feared that the U.S.-dominated IAPF would arrest or harass him. He finally went to the Dominican Republic and began campaigning in April—two months before the elections. The final results were 769,265 votes for Balaguer, and 525,230 for Bosch. UNDPI, The Blue Helmets, 657.

appropriated through the regular UN annual budget.¹⁶⁵

President Johnson's memoirs and those of his secretary of state, Dean Rusk, concurred as to the significance and results of the U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic during 1965 and 1966. Both men were satisfied that unilateral U.S. intervention, later backed by OAS peacekeeping and peacemaking, had resolved the Dominican crisis.¹⁶⁶ The peacekeeping task was not without its human and political costs, however. In seventeen months of operations, a total of 48 men were killed (47 U.S.) and another 300 wounded (283 U.S.).¹⁶⁷ Critics have noted that the OAS peacekeeping mission to the Dominican Republic "could hardly have been launched under less auspicious circumstances."¹⁶⁸ They claimed that the U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic (reminiscent of the Eisenhower administration's decision to send Marines into Lebanon during 1958) damaged U.S. relations with the world's developing countries and, especially, struck sensitive nerves in Latin America.¹⁶⁹ Certainly, gaining a "sanction" from OAS countries prior to sending in

¹⁶⁵ UNDP, The Blue Helmets, 771.

¹⁶⁶ President Johnson wrote that, considering the situation, "I would do it again to protect American lives." Johnson, The Vantage Point, 195. Rusk's memoirs state that "We did the right thing when we evacuated American and foreign nationals, helped prevent a blood-bath in Santo Domingo, helped to foreclose a left-wing or right-wing dictatorship, and arranged for free elections." Rusk, As I Saw It, 376. George Ball recorded that he accepted "the wisdom of our initial landing [in the Dominican Republic]." George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 328-29. Prados countered that LBJ's "over-reaction" had cost the administration valuable support in Congress, especially that of Senator J. William Fulbright (D. Ark.) who was the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 147.

¹⁶⁷ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 497.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 591. Paul Hammond wrote that the intervention in the Dominican Republic was "the most conspicuously embarrassing of Johnson's reactive policies in Latin America." Paul Y. Hammond, LBJ and the Presidential Management of Foreign Relations (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1992), 23.

¹⁶⁹ Prados wrote that "the intervention plans LBJ had cooked up smelled like a recipe for charges of Yankee imperialism." Prados, Keepers of the Keys, 144. Geyelin characterized the U.S. intervention as "an unreasoned, reckless, impulsive piece of

military forces would have been less controversial.¹⁷⁰ However, the Johnson administration justified its quick unilateral actions on the basis that building a multilateral consensus would have wasted valuable time.¹⁷¹ In addition, neither the United Nations nor the OAS maintained a standing or ready reserve peacekeeping force that could have adequately safeguarded U.S. (and other) foreign nationals jeopardized by the rapid breakdown of law and order in Santo Domingo after 24 April 1965. The findings of the OAS' investigative committee determined that U.S. actions were both necessary and deserving of regional support—even though the original U.S. actions were conducted without prior consultation or sanction.

The “legal controversy” regarding OAS actions under the UN Charter, served to resurrect and, in some respects, settle arguments about the “proper role” of regional arrangements within the “United Nations’ system.” The Soviet Union previously had argued before the UN Security Council against the OAS’ “legal capacity” to apply economic sanctions against Trujillo’s Dominican Republic (in August 1960) and against

jingoism” that produced “the lowest ebb in Lyndon Johnson’s standing as a world statesman in all of the first two years or more of his presidency.” Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 237. On the other hand, in addition to insiders Dean Rusk and George Ball, other authors have argued the U.S. “intervention” in Santo Domingo was “broadly welcomed, then and later in the Americas.” See for example, William O. Walker III, “Mixing the Sweet with the Sour,” 63; Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: the United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); and (General) Bruce Palmer, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1989).

¹⁷⁰ Geyelin noted that a comparison with President Kennedy’s skillful employment of the OAS in the Cuban crisis (August-November 1962) would be unfair. Kennedy had plenty of advance intelligence and possessed photographs as evidence. President Johnson had neither sufficient warning nor did he possess any hard evidence of external (Cuban or otherwise) interference. The OAS member-states that voted against creating the IAPF, for example, argued that the Dominican rebellion was an “internal” matter and did not warrant external interference. Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, 251.

¹⁷¹ Johnson, The Vantage Point, 198.

Castro's Cuba (during March 1962).¹⁷² In each of these discussions, the United States delegation had argued for the "primacy of OAS jurisdiction" as implied by UN Charter article 52.2.¹⁷³ This article states that "the members of the United Nations . . . shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."¹⁷⁴ The Soviet delegation countered by citing article 53.1 provisions that stipulated regional arrangement "enforcement actions" could not be conducted without "authorization of the Security Council." The U.S. delegation disagreed that OAS actions constituted "enforcement." Officially, this debate was unresolved.¹⁷⁵ From a practical perspective, however, the precedent set by successful OAS actions in the Dominican Republic went a long way toward demonstrating the potential contributions that a "legal regional arrangement" [as defined under article 52.1] could make toward resolving certain political crises.¹⁷⁶ In retrospect, the OAS experience built upon the

¹⁷² DOS, USPUN 1960, 61-64; DOS USPUN 1962, 91-99.

¹⁷³ In fact, this was President Johnson's emphasis in his letter of summary for UN events in 1965. The president wrote, that regarding the DOMREP mission, "the primacy of the Organization of American States in dealing successfully with this regional problem, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, remained unimpaired." Lyndon B. Johnson, "Letter of Transmittal to Congress," 9 March 1967, White House Central Files, Box #10, 2.

¹⁷⁴ Emphasis added. See Appendix A for excerpts of the UN Charter.

¹⁷⁵ In the secretary-general's annual report, after observing these debates, U Thant wrote that lessons from the "juxtaposition" of UN and OAS operations deserved "further study." U Thant, "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization," 16 June 1965-15 June 1966, supplement 1A, (A/6301/Add. 1), 4.

¹⁷⁶ Most previous studies narrowly view the UN mission in isolation of the OAS effort and, from that perspective, seem to disagree with this study's conclusion. Robert Riggs and Jack Plano, for example, have argued that "DOMREP served mainly to confirm the proposition that UN peacekeeping during the Cold-War period was unlikely to be viable within the regional sphere of a superpower." Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 2nd edn. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), 119-20. It is true that the inherent tension between the United Nations' "DOMREP operation" and the OAS

earlier “regional peacekeeping solutions” that were conducted by the League of Arab States in Kuwait during 1961 and by Europe member-states in Cyprus after 1964.

Chapter Summary and Analysis

Most surveys of UN peacekeeping note that these missions, especially the UN/OAS action in the Dominican Republic were “aberrations in the pattern of UN peacekeeping.” Such studies fail to demonstrate how these regional operations fit within the larger context of the UN “system” under the Charter. Henry Wiseman, for example, claimed that DOMREP “clearly” demonstrated that UN peacekeeping “is viable only outside the regional orbits of the superpowers.”¹⁷⁷ The three cases studied in this chapter prove this type of analysis is narrow and incomplete. On the one hand, Moscow’s repressive actions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1948 and 1968)—aided by Warsaw Pact allies in the last of these—were cases where UN peace operations were excluded. On the other hand, in regions under “Western” control or influence, even when direct UN mediation or peacekeeping efforts were resented, constructive participation by the United Nations was not normally precluded.¹⁷⁸ In

efforts were due mostly to the United States’ efforts to guard OAS “primacy.” Nonetheless, this study suggests that the UN “system” (broadly defined) was enhanced by the regional peacekeeping efforts of the OAS (in this case) and by those of the Arab League (Kuwait) and those of the Europeans (in Cyprus).

¹⁷⁷ Henry Wiseman, “United Nations Peacekeeping: An Historical Overview,” chapter in Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, (New York: Pergamon Press and the International Peace Academy, 1983), 43; Riggs and Plano, The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 119-20.

¹⁷⁸ The Soviet Union regularly exercised its “right” of veto to preclude UN “interference” in its “regional affairs.” The West, with the exception of the British and French vetoes cast in 1956 after their military incursion against Egypt, normally allowed UN missions to be conducted within their own spheres of influence. Between 1945 and 1968, the USSR representative cast 104 veto votes. During the same period, the West cast three (U.S.-0; U.K.-1; France-2). Taiwan, which often voted with the West, cast an additional two veto votes. Of course, when proposals failed to gain the

regions where both superpowers held equal influence (such as the Near East), regional-arrangement operations could be just as viable as a UN peace operation.

The case studies of this chapter demonstrate that peacekeeping conducted by regional political organizations can serve as viable alternatives to broader UN endeavors. The collaborative work of Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, for example, noted that regional arrangements held the “advantage of being a more homogeneous organization” that are normally free of certain problems that plague UN operations—“such as the disagreements among the great powers.”¹⁷⁹ Regional allies normally share similar cultures, languages, or political aspirations. Chances are more likely that regional armies share similar logistics or command-structure traditions. Accordingly, they may be more capable of operating more “efficiently” than disparate UN “multinational” contingents. Others counter that it would be difficult to enlist, for example, Arabs to take military actions against other Arabs.¹⁸⁰ This misses the point that peacekeeping is primarily a deterrent force. In this respect, a “plate-glass” force interposed between two Arab countries (to continue the analogy)—composed of Arab soldiers—would be a more (not less) effective deterrent.

Arguments can be made for or against the “political acceptability” of regional peacekeeping missions. Certainly, unfriendly or suspicious neighbors do belong to the same “regional arrangements”—an example of this would be Turkey and Greece as

required majority of votes, negative votes were not strictly considered to be a “veto.” The West regularly voted against proposals *en masse*—effectively casting a group veto. For an excellent discussion of voting and the veto at the United Nations, see John G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia and America*, 3rd edn. (New York: Random House, 1973).

¹⁷⁹ Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), 165.

¹⁸⁰ This argument was raised by certain members of the League of Arab States during its debates in July 1961 when contemplating raising an Arab Security Force for Kuwait. Cited in Wainhouse and others, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, 420-21.

members of NATO. But, that example is the exception, rather than the rule. In most cases, a state requesting foreign troops to operate within its sovereign territory would tend to be less wary of a multinational force that includes friendly nations sworn to defend against common enemies. This analysis holds true for all multinational peacekeeping. An example where UN contingents within the same peacekeeping force were treated as "unfriendly" by host nations included the initial Canadian contingent to UNEF that Egypt refused to admit (until convinced of their "neutrality") and the Indian contingent of UNEF (that was not treated kindly by advancing Israeli forces in 1967).

Finally, concerns about political "dominance" by certain states as members of regional alliances have traditionally been cited as reasons against peacekeeping by these organizations. The efficiency of the OAS "peacekeeping effort" and that of the European effort in Cyprus were primarily due to the advanced military systems (logistics, command and control, interoperability, etc.) that anchored these regional efforts. In these respects, regional arrangements hold potential for conducting peacekeeping operations more effectively than those of UN multinational forces. All this said, in cases where political concerns for "superpower" or regional power domination is an over-riding concern, the United Nations has proven capable of dispatching impartial observers (as in the case of DOMREP) or of "supervising" the entire peacekeeping operation (as in UNFICYP). Such "supplemental" observer or staff missions proved capable of giving a more broad-based authority to regional peacekeeping efforts in the past, and potentially, could do so again.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

The quest for peace through cooperation is the "assignment of the century."

Lyndon B. Johnson¹

On 12 April 1945, Harry S Truman was sworn in as U.S. president. He inherited tremendous responsibilities and quickly was faced with a number of unforeseen international changes. Victory for the "united nations" alliance² was imminent. But these nations united in war, quickly drifted apart in peace.³ As great-power relations deteriorated, so too did a foundational premise of the organization that would bear the alliance's name. The United Nations' Charter was signed by fifty nations in the summer of 1945—while hopes for post-war great-power unity still prevailed. The subsequent discord between the organization's five most powerful members (those

¹ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 1 October 1968, in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1967, DOS Publication 8399, International Organization and Conference Series 81 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, October 1968), iii.

² On 1 January 1942, in Washington, D.C., twenty-six allied nations signed a "United Nations declaration," subscribing to a "common program of purposes and principles" agreed upon by FDR and Prime Minister Churchill on 14 August 1941—the Atlantic Charter. Both documents are reproduced in Robert E. Summers, ed., Dumbarton Oaks (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1945), 92-94.

³ In fact, the allied foreign minister's conferences in London (11 September - 2 October 1945) and Moscow (16 -26 December 1945) were notable for the degree to which former allies disagreed on nearly every issue. See, for example, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945 Conferences and Foreign Ministers' Meetings (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1955, 1967-69).

designated by the Charter as “permanent members”⁴ of the UN Security Council) seriously undermined founders’ designs for an organization that would actively promote “international peace and security.”⁵

Even before the UN Charter was signed, Washington’s policymakers disagreed about whether such approaches to international “collective security” would be possible. As relations between ‘East and West’ soured, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vision of post-war great-power amicability proved to be unattainable.⁶ The growing strife between Moscow and Washington forced even U.S. idealists (those who favored a move away from “traditional power politics”) to reconsider the role that the United Nations organization (UNO) could play in a divided post-war world.

Ideological battles dominated the earliest meetings of the United Nations’ Security Council. These disagreements led to confrontational maneuverings and organizational “deadlocks.”⁷ If the United Nations was to fulfill any portion of its

⁴ The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, the U.S., and the USSR) were each granted the powerful right to veto resolutions or calls for action within the UN Security Council. These states are often referred to as the “permanent members” or the “P-5.” This paper employs both shorthand references.

⁵ Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” especially Articles 42 - 48 depended upon the allied powers of the Second World War to cooperate and create a UN “Force” that would guarantee international security. The former allies’ mistrust and disagreements gutted this section of the Charter by 1947. The innovative means generated to work around this deadlock over the years yielded what is today known as UN “peacekeeping.” See Appendix A for excerpts from the Charter.

⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt was well-known for his plans for regional “policemen” (nations) that would be responsible for postwar zones of peace and security. His “Four Policemen” concept for U.S., British, USSR, and Chinese security zones was later expanded to include France. These notions informed FDR’s bargaining at Yalta in February 1945. Jean Laloy, Yalta: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, trans. by William R. Tyler (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), 10-12, 62-68.

⁷ The term “deadlock” is an alternative expression to mean issues “vetoed” by one of the Permanent Five (P-5) members of the Security Council; preventing any

ambitious goals, especially that of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war”⁸ skillful diplomacy and innovative measures (including those not foreseen by the Charter drafters) would be required. In retrospect, the two part political “mission statement” of the organization—that of “maintaining international peace and security”—broke down into two separate endeavors: one beyond the organization’s capacity (collective security) and the other within reach (promoting peace), but only in specific circumstances, employing ad hoc “instrumentalities.”

An Analysis of First-Generation UN Peace Operations

By adapting and stretching Charter provisions to accommodate unforeseen developments in the international system, the United Nations accomplished its most significant political gains through the development and conduct of UN “peace operations.”⁹ The United States’ government, although not willing to rely upon the organization for safeguarding its own “national security,” was the organization’s greatest supporter with respect to “peacekeeping.” During the organization’s first 23 years, the United States provided the United Nations with critical political, military, economic, and logistical assistance. In fact, without U.S. aid and equipment, many of the UNO’s most successful peace operations either would not have been possible or would have been scaled-back significantly.

United Nations’ peace operations began modestly, but within two decades the concept expanded and was further refined. In the early years, small groups

further action on the issue or proposal up for discussion. (UN bureaucrats or lawyers often use the term “seized” in the same context.)

⁸ United Nations Charter Preamble. See Appendix A for excerpts from the Charter.

⁹ This term is broad-based. As defined by this study, peace operations included observation, interposition, limited engagement or “enforcement,” and nation-building. For more precise definitions and discussions, see the Preface.

representing UN member-states or their UN delegations were employed as observers and mediators to supervise international agreements or to generate reports for the United Nations to consider. From the beginning, however, adopting UN resolutions and fielding UN missions did not necessarily lead to fruitful "peace-making." In the earliest missions—Greece, Indonesia, Palestine, and the Kashmir—the organization's employment of mediators and fact-finders was supplemented by small contingents of "observers." As political solutions proved beyond the organization's reach (mostly because the organization's membership was divided and unwilling to compromise on tough issues) these UN observer missions were annually renewed, long after initial diplomatic talks had broken down. In effect, these "secondary" missions were more successful than their associated diplomatic endeavors. When long-term solutions eluded the United Nations, the organization settled for maintaining certain missions as a symbolic "UN presence" until such time diplomats could negotiate a more enduring settlement. In Palestine and the Kashmir, a continuing mandate for international observers was written into bilateral armistice or truce agreements. The United Nations honored these treaties and found it was useful to have "representatives" on the spot when "violations" required further, "impartial" investigation. Looking back over the record of these missions, the presence of UN observers and their role as moderators and reporters contributed toward stabilizing some of the world's most volatile, "peripheral areas"—those outside the direct control of the superpowers and those, concomitantly, most likely to attract superpowers interventions (if for no other reason than to "keep the enemy forces out"). From this perspective, UN peace operations performed a limited "collective-security" role that served the superpowers' mutual, secondary interests.

At the same time, however, UN observer missions were criticized. Some statesmen and analysts accused UN peace operations of preserving tense situations and blamed them for precluding the attainment of peaceful settlements. Such claims are analogous to complaining about crime because there are police on the streets. To remove the police would not end lawlessness. In reality, the responsibility to secure a

lasting peace rested with the parties themselves. Often the contending parties or governments were not serious about peace—usually because politicians were fearful of losing domestic political support as a result of “granting concessions.” In these cases, only external actors with the ability to exert positive or negative influences would have been able to nudge belligerents toward compromise. Too often, as was the case in Palestine, the world’s powers backed opposite sides. In the Kashmir, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to pressure Pakistan or India for fear of losing political influence with either of these key “neutral” or “middle” powers.

In the absence of securing peaceful settlements, the United Nations engaged in “holding” or “deterrence” actions—hoping to persuade contending parties from resorting to violence (again). But observer forces, by their very nature, could wield only “moral force” which served these purposes for a limited time. As embittered enemies lost faith in diplomatic initiatives, observer forces reported increased tensions, but were unable to prevent the escalation of tensions into inter- or intra-state military conflicts. Comprising no more than one hundred soldiers (in most cases), UN observer missions in Palestine (1956, 1967) and the Kashmir (1965) could only scramble for cover as war machines overran their meager positions. In 1956, following the outbreak of a second Arab-Israeli war, the United Nations decided in favor of supplementing UNTSO observers with a significantly larger multinational UN mission that would provide an increased “physical deterrence” capacity.

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) comprised nearly 6,000 lightly-armed infantry soldiers that were tasked to patrol a boundary between two hostile populations. As a “buffer” or “plate-glass” force, UNEF still performed the same duties that were hallmarks of successful observation missions: investigating and reporting, but UNEF also provided a more significant capability to deter or oppose small-scale military raids. This new, more ambitious type of UN peace operation reinvigorated the United Nations’ role in promoting international peace and established new precedents for subsequent endeavors. The characteristics that defined UNEF were touted by secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld as establishing standard “principles of

peacekeeping.”¹⁰ They included: “consent,” “impartiality,” and the use of “force for self-defense” purposes only. These guidelines were derived from experiences of the organization’s first four observation missions. The principle of “consent” was multifaceted, consisting of several elements. Consent meant that permission was to be obtained from all contending parties: for the type of operations to be conducted, for where these operations were to take place, for rights and privileges that would be granted to the UN peacekeepers (normally incorporated into a formal “status of forces agreement”), and for which national contingents could be employed as “politically acceptable.” Impartiality was to guide all UN national contingents in the conduct of their duties—favoring neither belligerent over the other. This was linked to the notion of host-nation consent in that if a “host” suspected national contingents of acting partially, that contingent-sponsor government would be asked to remove its forces. An example of this rule put into practice was when India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru requested that U.S. military observers (there were approximately two dozen of them) be withdrawn from the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1954. India made this request just days after the U.S. government had concluded a defense agreement with Pakistan. The principle guidance for the “use of force” was that soldiers assigned to UN peace operations were to carry either no weapons or only those required for “self-defense.” UNEF peacekeepers normally carried pistols or rifles and were instructed not to fire unless fired upon first. In later missions, especially the UN operations conducted in the Congo, these guidelines were stretched to justify employment of light artillery and even aircraft against enemy forces—not just for self-defense, but in the interests of preserving established positions or for gaining greater “freedom of movement.”

Other operational guidelines developed from the UNEF experience included: how to define a clear “mandate” for the force, how to integrate battalion-sized units

¹⁰ These are listed repeatedly, even in the past few years as applicable to all UN peace operations, which clearly they are not. See for example, an article by the former “under secretary-general for peacekeeping,” Marrack Goulding, “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” *International Affairs* 69/3 (3 July 1993): 453-55.

(approximately 500 soldiers) contributed by a number of donor states into a cohesive army, and how to sustain such a force over an extended period. These lessons were applicable across the spectrum of UN peace operations—even if they were modified to fit each scenario. What was unique about UNEF (incorrectly assumed to be universal in application), was how the force was employed in a “buffer zone” to separate contending parties. As it turned out, few situations developed over the next decades that replicated similar circumstances (outside of the same Arab-Israeli context). The 1965 India-Pakistan war came the closest, and in that case the United Nations opted to create a very small disengagement and observer force. This response, the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM), performed functions similar to those of UNEF in its initial stages. The differences between these two missions, however, was in both scale and endurance. UNEF was 6,000 soldiers sustained for ten years of operations. UNIPOM was merely 75 to 100 observers that, in effect, temporarily extended UNMOGIP operations south from Kashmir to include the entire border between India and West Pakistan. UNIPOM helped Indian and Pakistani forces to “disengage” and then UN observers reported on each party’s adherence to an agreed-upon cease fire. Once this was completed, UN member-states were not inclined to extend the mission’s mandate and UNIPOM was canceled after six months. The fact that the organization was in the midst of a financial crisis resulting from unpaid peacekeeping costs also contributed to UNIPOM’s modest size and early demise.

The UNEF and UNIPOM experiences established guidelines for conducting UN peacekeeping between two belligerent states, but the majority of disputes brought before the organization after 1956 were not clear interstate disputes. In 1958, the United Nations dispatched an observer mission to Lebanon—a country in the midst of an imminent collapse of internal authority. The next UN peace operation was sent to the Congo, in July 1960—again the situation was that of deteriorating local political authority. In 1963, an observer mission was created in Yemen under conditions reminiscent of Lebanon. In this case, civil war was active and so too was support of opposing factions by two external governments. Finally, in 1964, the United Nations

pursued unique approaches to help defuse Cyprus' civil war. In each of these peace operations, the principle of consent, broadly defined, was not respected by the United Nations. Not every belligerent faction agreed to a "UN presence." In fact some actively attacked UN peacekeepers. Impartiality, too, was disregarded in cases where the international community determined that one faction should be supported over the other. In the Congo and in Cyprus, UN peacekeepers were heavily armed and conducted offensive operations that were justified as "defending a position" or "establishing freedom of movement." This was not "traditional peacekeeping," instead, these missions went beyond UNEF's principles and represented the organization's first attempts to "enforce peace." Accordingly, one should be hesitant to speak of any universal principles that applied to all first-generation UN peace operations. Instead, the record demonstrates that as the spectrum of conflict varied, so too did the types of missions that were created. Regarding objectives and mandates, these too were difficult to define and shifted as circumstances changed.¹¹

As a group, first-generation UN peace operations reflected the organization's attempts to promote peaceful settlement of disputes in regions and by means that the post-war international system and community of nations were willing to allow. First, as outlined above, great-power cooperation needed to effect UN collective-security and to conduct enforcement operations failed to materialize. Second, post-war international forces of change erupted with unexpected volatility across the globe. Europe's colonial powers were nearly exhausted during World War II. As a result, some former colonies were granted independence (such as, Palestine, India, and Indonesia) while others were handed over to the United Nations system as "Trusteeships" (supervised by the United Nations Trusteeship Council). In those states not immediately freed from colonial domination, "nationalism"—movements for national self-determination as enshrined in

¹¹ Ernest Lefever's study of the Congo mission criticized the organization for not developing a clear, unchanging mandate—when in fact, the mission was forced to respond to changing conditions in both the Congo and in support for UN operations by the international community. See Ernest W. Lefever Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

the United Nations Charter, itself¹²—fueled large-scale political protests, terrorism, and wars of revolution. The regions of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia were dramatically altered between the 1940s and 1960s. As a result of these radical forces engendering political change, a large number of international crisis were brought before the United Nations. Eventually, Washington realized that supporting UN attempts to stabilize these dangerous situations served national interests of the United States (and often those of the Soviet Union). But, U.S. foreign policy was slow to endorse the use of UN peace operations in “colonial cases.”

Between 1946 and 1968, Washington staunchly supported the positions of its European allies in cases of colonial wars. The dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesian revolutionaries—first over the issue of Indonesia’s independence, and later regarding the status of West New Guinea—is instructive in this regard. During the initial hostilities between Dutch forces (that were sent to the “Netherlands’ East Indies” after the Second World War to reassert the Hague’s control) and Indonesian “Republicans,” the United States government backed its European ally. It was not until after the “second Dutch police action” (a full-scale military offensive) in December 1948 that the Truman administration contemplated the possible merits of increasing the UN observer mission’s authority and pressuring the Dutch to seek a peaceful settlement. Even so, this determination was made reluctantly and only in response to U.S. Department of State and British Foreign Office assessments that the Dutch could not reassert colonial control without creating long-term instability that would provide local Communists with greater “opportunities” to gain strength. The issue of West New Guinea was left unresolved when Indonesia gained independence in December 1949. The territory’s status remained in dispute for another dozen years. It was not until the General Assembly overwhelmingly supported a resolution (GA 1514, 14 December 1960) that called upon all states to peacefully resolve outstanding “colonial

¹² The document championed the “right to political self-determination” in both its Preamble and in a number of articles, to include: articles 1.2, 55, 73, and 76. See excerpts of the United Nations Charter at Appendix A.

issues" that the United States was willing to pressure the Netherlands to settle the West New Guinea problem. The solution, strangely enough, was not to grant the indigenous Papuans self-determination. Instead, Indonesia secured substantial support from the ever-increasing UN "non-aligned" membership for having the territory handed over to Indonesia. In carrying out this decision, the United Nations played a major role as West New Guinea's "temporary executive authority" (UNTEA). Between October 1962 and May 1963, UN personnel assumed control of the territorial government from the Netherlands while thousands of Dutch administrators were replaced by incoming Indonesian officials. At the same time, UN observers informed guerrilla units that a cease fire was in effect and then, reconstituted as the United Nations Security Force (UNSF), assisted with force disengagements, supervised Dutch military withdrawals, and coordinated prisoner-of-war exchanges. Meanwhile, UNSF civilian police helped to maintain law and order during the six-month transition period. In sum, this was peacekeeping of another kind—"nation building"—with UN officials outright assuming governmental responsibilities.

Between 1946 and 1968, especially during the 1960s when the United Nations was suffering from a financial crisis, UN member-states approved of an increased "peace and security" role for organizations of regional states—defined in the UN Charter as "regional arrangements." In 1961, when the British forces were deployed to prevent an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United Nations (supported by the U.S. delegation) was amenable to an Arab-League proposal for creating an all Arab "peacekeeping force" that would replace British forces (and to deter Iraq's offensive). Four years later, when the Lyndon B. Johnson administration launched an unpopular "unilateral military intervention" into the Dominican Republic, the Organization of American States (OAS) offered an analogous imprimatur to sustain the U.S. operations (under the guise of a "regional peacekeeping" effort). In effect, 20,000 U.S. Marines that landed in Santo Domingo in late April 1965 were supplemented by a few thousand OAS forces (representing five other OAS states). As these pan-American soldiers arrived in the Dominican Republic, the U.S. contingent was reduced by half.

Thereafter, international criticisms of U.S. actions subsided. In these cases, the example of UN “peacekeeping” was adopted and effected by regional organizations.

U.S. Support: Costs, Benefits, and Motivations

On 22 May 1950, President Harry S Truman wrote to Congress:

It will be our plan in the future, as it has been our practice in the past, to do all in our power to strengthen the United Nations as the primary instrument for the maintenance of peace.¹³

Between 1946 and 1968, the United States was the United Nations’ most affluent and generous sponsor. But, the United States did not do “all in [its] power” to support the United Nations. There were clear limitations to the American commitment. As discussed earlier, the U.S. government accepted a specific role for UN peacekeeping—that of defusing and containing potentially explosive “peripheral” disputes. Financially, too, the U.S. government was willing to do no more than its “fair share”—as defined by Washington, not by others. Early on, the U.S. Congress argued that U.S. assessments paid to the United Nations should not exceed a certain percentage of the organization’s total budget. Originally the United States delegation proposed fixing the U.S. “share” at 33.3%. U.S. representatives (in Congress and at the United Nations) espoused the philosophy that a “universal” organization—what the United Nations presumed to be, although there were important hold-outs, including Mainland China—should not rely so heavily upon one member’s contributions. Senator Arthur H.

¹³ Harry S Truman, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 22 May 1950, in Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949 on the Activities of the United Nations and the Participation of the United States Therein, DOS Publication 3765, International and Conference Series III, 48 (Washington D.C.: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, May 1950), vi.

Vandenberg, (Republican from Michigan) was the originator of this line of reasoning.¹⁴ In the First General Assembly's debates of (October - December 1946) Vandenberg, as a member of the U.S. delegation, argued that the UN committee's recommendations to assess the United States at 49.89% should have been set at no more than 33.3%. The committee countered that such high assessments were the United States "fair share" based on national economic indicators. Nonetheless, they compromised and set the initial U.S. "assessment rate" (AR) at 39.89%.¹⁵ This remained in effect until 1950, despite continued U.S. protests. In that year, the U.S. AR was reduced, as a token gesture, by one tenth of one percent to 39.79%. It was not until 1954 that the U.S. AR was dropped to 33.3%—and this was actually in response to the organization being informed that a recent U.S. statute (Public Law 495, DOS Appropriation Act of 1953) had already established a new limit for U.S. assessed payments to any international organization at 33.3%.¹⁶ Of course, Congress was not satisfied with that figure for long. In 1957, the U.S. delegation was directed to argue for a reduction to 30% as "the most any member of a universal organization should contribute."¹⁷ According to U.S. records, the budget committee "agreed in principle" to the U.S. case, but this resulted in only an additional one percentage point drop in the AR. Similar debates continued every year. As of 1968, the U.S. AR was still at 31.57%.¹⁸

¹⁴ Senator Vandenberg was a supporter of the United Nations after having reversed his "isolationist" convictions during the Second World War. He helped to forge the "bipartisan" legislative efforts that determined early U.S. support for the United Nations. See Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator [Arthur H.] Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).

¹⁵ DOS, USPUN 1946, 25-26.

¹⁶ PL 495 cited in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 520.

¹⁷ Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1957, DOS Publication 6654, International Organization and Conference Series III, 128 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 1958), 238-39.

¹⁸ Senator Arthur Vandenberg's "principle" remained in effect twenty years later. In 1968, the U.S. representative to the GA budget committee, Raymond D.

In reality, the United States often contributed over forty percent of the total costs incurred by the United Nations for conducting first-generation peace operations. [See Appendix C, Chart C4: "The Costs of Promoting Peace and the Costs of War/Intervention, 1946 - 1968."] These amounts exceeded "legal limits" because the U.S. government paid all of its assessments (at rates ranging between 39.89% and 31.57%) and, in addition, provided equipment and services that raised the total share of U.S. support.

Personnel and logistical contributions, in many cases were as critical as the political and financial support provided by Washington. David Wainhouse's study, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, meticulously documented the wide range of support provided by all UN member-states to UN first-generation peace operations. He concluded that U.S. manpower contributions included assigning 80 personnel (over the life of the mission) to Northern Greece (UNSCOB); another 24 to the Kashmir (UNMOGIP, until 1954); 21 for Indonesia (GOC/UNCI); and another few hundred in Palestine/Israel (UNTSO). With respect to UNTSO, up to 327 U.S. nationals served at one time during 1949. Still, all of this was significantly less than the 1,000-man limitation established by U.S. Public Law 341 (10 October 1949).¹⁹ Since the mid-

Nasher, recalled, "in 1946, when the first ceiling was fixed, it was recognized that in an organization of states asserting their sovereign equality, no one state should be permitted to exercise an influence which would inevitably attach to a financial contribution to the administrative budget which was too disproportionate to that of other states." He then quoted Senator Vandenberg's statement: "this is, with us, solely a question of what is right and wise and just as between partners in this common enterprise." Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1968, DOS Publication 8482, International Organization and Conference Series 88 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, October 1969), 239.

¹⁹ PL 341 amended the original statutory basis for U.S. participation in the United Nations, PL 264, 20 December 1945. The October 1949 legislation was the first to establish procedures for the United States to gain reimbursement from the United Nations for support of peacekeeping operations. See "UN Participation Act of 1945, as Amended" cited in Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 56-59; and Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., ed., United Nations Peace Operations:

1950s, when Secretary-General Hammarskjöld announced that “great powers” should not participate as field representatives in subsequent UN peace operations, the U.S. role as an “official participant” declined. There were cases, however, when U.S. personnel directly supported UN operations. The role of U.S. airlift and sealift was of great importance. In fact, 50-100 U.S. Air Force personnel were formally assigned to support UNTEA/UNSF operations in West New Guinea/Irian between October 1962 and May 1963.²⁰

As this study has documented, the U.S. military services performed critical support roles in nearly every UN peace operation. In the United Nations’ largest first-generation missions (UNEF, in the Sinai, and ONUC in the Congo), the U.S. Air Force provided the bulk of initial airlift (supported by slower, but ton-for-ton cheaper sealift provided by the U.S. Navy). In fact, Wainhouse concluded that the most critical aspect of all U.S. support provided to UN peace operations was that of airlift and sealift.²¹ In addition, during the four-year Congo operation (July 1960-June 1964), hundreds of U.S. military personnel were assigned roles as “liaison officers” and as air/sea port advisers as required to coordinate continuous contingent rotations and to load and unload supplies. The U.S. government provided, on a purchase-contract basis, tons of foodstuffs, vehicles, communications equipment, and other specialty items—to include the famous “blue helmets” that were improvised from U.S. army-issue helmet liners during the initial stages of UNEF’s deployment in 1957. Accordingly, a combination of U.S. financial and critical logistical support helped make United Nations political resolutions (most of which were supported by the U.S. delegation) a reality.

Although the percentage of U.S. contributions in support of UN peace operations as a single nation was overwhelming, it declined in importance from critical in the earliest days to important in the late 1960s. The participation of U.S. soldiers in UN

A Collection of Primary Documents and Readings Governing the Conduct of Multilateral Peace Operations (New York: American Heritage, 1995), 433-68.

²⁰ Wainhouse and others, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, 535.

²¹ Ibid., 536.

peace operations, especially after 1956, also decreased. Some of these changes reflected newly-conceived roles for Council permanent members, and some were due to dips in enthusiasm from Congress and the U.S. public regarding the utility of the United Nations and its peace operations. This was especially true in the dark days of the organization's financial crisis of 1963 to 1965, and were reinforced by misperceptions that UN peacekeeping had somehow "failed" to prevent the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (which came on the heels of UNEF's ignominious withdrawal). Nonetheless, the record of U.S. political, economic and logistical support for first-generation peace operations proves that—more so than any other UN Member—U.S. contributions were critical.

The magnitude of U.S. support directly related to UN peace operations, totaling some \$350 million in expenditures, was a significant investment. Each year, Congress argued the merits of U.S. support for these operations. As documented in the preceding pages, every first-generation peace operation served U.S. "national interests,"²² despite the fact that, in some cases, critics suggested that unilateral operations would have been more efficient and would have guaranteed U.S. control. The negative political ramifications of unilateral incursions had to be weighed against the inherent inefficiency and indirect-control aspects of multinational peace operations.

A comparison between costs of U.S. "unilateral" interventions in Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965-66) and the amounts spent on UN peacekeeping is revealing. In Lebanon, the U.S. government assessed costs associated with putting ashore 15,000 military forces (into what proved to be a non-combat environment) for three months (15 July to 25 Oct 1958) at \$120 million²³—approximately \$40 million

²² A standard White House letter to U.S. citizens inquiring about U.S. support of the United Nations in 1966 read: "The United Nations actions in Cyprus, the Congo, the Middle East and elsewhere have directly coincided with United States policy." Standard response letter, 12 May 1966, White House Central Files, Box 11, LBJL.

²³ According to a 1963 Congressional Hearing, the "total cost of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon" was approximately \$120 million. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International Affairs, Hearing in Review of United States Participation in the United Nations, 88th Congress, 1st Session,

per month. By comparison, monthly costs for the ambitious UN mission to the Congo, fielding 20,000 soldiers from dozens of different countries, averaged less than \$10 million monthly. In the case of the U.S. "intervention" in the Dominican Republic, April 1965 to September 1966, Washington "invited in" the OAS to provide additional international credibility. This move was a political success. Within a month, U.S. military force levels were reduced by half, from more than 22,500 to fewer than 12,000—reflecting both a stabilization of the situation and the importance of a token (under 2,000) representation by five other American governments. The United States estimated costs for this "operation" at nearly \$180 million. Prorated monthly, this amount exceeded that spent on the UN Congo operation, and it was five times more expensive (per month) than were UN missions to the Sinai (UNEF) and Cyprus (UNFICYP). [See Chart C4.]

In perspective, U.S. fiscal contributions of a few hundred million for all UN peacekeeping missions were meager in comparison to the costs of carrying out unilateral "peacekeeping" efforts. Such expenses were "a bargain" when considering the costs of failed peacekeeping—such as in Korea. The three year Korean war, in 1953 dollars, was estimated to have cost the U.S. government at least \$75 billion.²⁴ In fact, the U.S. relief effort in support of displaced Koreans during that conflict (under United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, or UNCURK) totaled some \$250 million per year.²⁵ Thus, the costs of relief (added to costs of the war effort) were two-and-one-half times that of the most ambitious of all

13 March 1963, p. 31. Other accounts cite figures as high as \$200 million. See for example, Robert Murphy (President Eisenhower's special envoy to Lebanon, officially the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1964), 409; and Caroline Anne Pruden, "Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace" (Ph.D. diss., University of Vanderbilt, Nashville, TN, 1993), 662.

²⁴ See Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute Press, 1996), 22, 37, 181.

²⁵ DOS, USPUN volumes 1950-55. Figures compiled by author.

UN peacekeeping operational costs (ONUC). Over the years, U.S. fiscal contributions for the UN “system”—of which UN peacekeeping is just a small part—averaged one tenth of one percent of U.S. annual budget expenditures.²⁶ Historically, every U.S. dollar contributed to UN peacekeeping missions was matched by \$3 to \$10 in contributions from the rest of the United Nations organization. And as a final consideration for weighing costs and value, U.S. businesses as the single largest supplier of equipment and services in support of UN peace operations secured 48% of all UN contracts—redeeming nearly half of U.S. expenses paid out.²⁷ The price of United Nations peace operations, with these points in mind, was not a great burden for the United States government. U.S. “returns” on these investments were significant. These “cost and benefits” analyses may have convinced U.S. “realists” to acquiesce to a role for the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy. But, there were other dimensions to U.S. support beside such calculations. Ideological motivations also undergirded America’s proclivity to seek international peace and to employ the United Nations as the most appropriate instrument for doing so.

In 1966, President Johnson attempted to explain the intangible reasons why the United States consistently supported first-generation UN peace operations:

Our national interest and the high ideals of our tradition combine in American support of the United Nations. . . . using the process of persuasion, we also seek to foster that wide community of interest among nations which is man’s best hope of establishing peace with honor and progress with justice.²⁸

²⁶ Historically, 80% of UN resources were spent on economic and social programs—not on peacekeeping. Department of State, “U.S. Contributions to the UN System” (Bureau of International Organization Affairs paper, 19 September 1997), 3.

²⁷ “UN Peacekeeping: Some Questions and Answers,” UN Website: <http://www.UN.org/depts/dpko/faq.htm>.

²⁸ President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal to the Congress, 15 November 1967, in Department of State, U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966, DOS Publication 8276, International Organization and Conference Series 77 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, November 1967), v. The president’s last draft on this subject, a year later read, “The UN continues to be man’s best hope for a world of peace and progress, where conflict is replaced by

It is interesting to note that the both United States of America and the United Nations organization, in various contexts, have been characterized as representing “man’s best hope.”²⁹ A common denominator was American idealism. Just as these liberal ideals fueled an American Revolution that confronted colonial tyranny—and as that revolution defined what peoples could gain from an enlightened system of government—so too, the United Nations’ Charter (which reflected American ideals) challenged injustices in the international system, and promoted the creation of a community of nations that would respect peace and justice over “might makes right.”

The Limits of Multinational Peace Operations

There is no doubt, however, that the combination of concessions made at Yalta (which perpetuated systemic *realpolitik*) and the divided post-war international system (manifest as the Cold War) undermined Charter ideals and handicapped the organization’s attempts to create a more enlightened world system. The United Nations was never given a chance as a “collective-security” organization. With respect to its other political objective, that of “promoting international peace,” the United Nations was more successful—but within specific limits. The great powers determined where and when UN initiatives were considered “acceptable.” Calls for UN action in areas aligned with or controlled by East or West were opposed and effectively blocked by these states (regardless of resolutions and voting). For example, the Soviet Union refused to allow UN investigations or diplomatic mediators into Czechoslovakia, East Berlin, and Hungary. Similarly, the UN had no ability to influence mainland China’s

cooperation, and violence by the rule of reason. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Letter of Transmittal to the Congress,” 1 October 1968, White House Central Files #10, LBJL.

²⁹ For a work characterizing the United States as “the last, best hope for humanity,” see H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 320.

control over events in North Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, Laos, and Vietnam. There were even cases when Washington opposed UN initiatives within its own jealously-guarded hemisphere, such as in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Outside these regions, in the middle states or the periphery, UN operations achieved their greatest successes. In retrospect, most of these UN missions advanced the interests of both East and West. Of secondary importance to great power influences, but just as limiting to the success of UN peace operations, was the amount of support—political, economic, and logistical—that the international community was willing to provide the United Nations. These factors, together, determined the extent to which peace operations could be developed and conducted.

Within these parameters, first-generation UN peace operations demonstrated what “peacekeeping” could and could not do. UN peace operations were most successful when contending parties fully supported peacekeeping efforts and viewed UN forces as representative of international good will, not as just another enemy. The experience of UNEF proved that employing a sizable UN multinational force along international boundaries, interposed between enemy (but not hostile) populations was a formula for successful peace operations. In situations involving the breakdown of national governments, the “moral authority” of United Nations representatives commanded less respect in the eyes of non-state actors. In the Congo and Cyprus, UN personnel often were targets of local populations or breakaway factions. Only when central authority was reinstated were peacekeepers subjected to fewer attacks from the local population. In these cases, UN military forces employed significant military might to quell local hostilities. But such operations violated nearly every “principle” of traditional peacekeeping. Neither did these missions lead to long-term settlements. Even the problem of providing the Congo with internal stability could not be solved by the organization’s most ambitious and expensive operation. As soon as the UN forces were withdrawn, the Léopoldville government resorted to hiring outside mercenaries to deal with continuing domestic violence. Cyprus, too, remained divided and the situation on that island was tense for decades to follow.

In sum, UN peace operations proved to be relatively successful when peacekeepers: 1) implemented agreements supported by all contending factions; 2) separated belligerents that were already amenable to disengagement; 3) patrolled clearly defined boundaries; 4) were deployed in sufficient numbers to meet conditions: that is, when force size was determined by the need to supplement moral force with a physical deterrent; and 5) maintained legitimacy in the eyes of local governments and peoples—be that defined as “consent” or “impartiality,” the key was acceptance.

On the other hand, UN peace operations involving “enforcement”—normally, those that were conducted in areas of civil war or where there was a breakdown in central government authority—were dangerous and expensive. These operations did not take advantage of the organization’s “moral authority” and suffered from multinational peacekeeping’s greatest disadvantages, those inherent to fielding a disorganized, military force comprising disparate military contingents. In circumstances where internal political authority had collapsed, UN peacekeepers faced difficulties even conducting simple observer missions (as in Lebanon and Yemen). When engaging in “enforcement operations,” UN peace operations were inefficient, as would be expected of any mixed staff trying to manage incompatible equipment and tactics at the same time facing language and cultural differences and wide margins in proficiency and training. Strategically, however, these missions may have limited the extent of external involvement in peripheral conflicts (especially true of Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus dispute), and possibly may have precluded direct superpower engagements (for example, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when the Moscow-Washington “hot line” was first put to use³⁰). Such benefits should not be discounted, but clearly, these types of peace operations faced “non-traditional” obstacles that were difficult to overcome and should have been considered more carefully.

³⁰ The “hot line” was installed on 30 August 1963. Prior to the call from Moscow at 0800 on 5 June 1967, it had only been tested to exchange “New Year’s greetings.” See Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1971), 287.

APPENDIX A

SELECTIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER¹

Preamble: We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . . to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. . . . and for these ends . . . to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims

Chapter I: Purposes and Principles:

Article 1 The purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

¹ Source: Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World: The U.N.'s Roles in International Relations, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), 499 - 526.

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. . . .

Article 2: The organization and its members, in pursuit of the purposes stated in article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its members.

2. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United Nations.

5. All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Chapter IV: The General Assembly:

Article 10: The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11: 1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a member of the United Nations in accordance with article 35, paragraph 2, and except as provided in article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

Article 12: 1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The secretary-general, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13: 1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

- a) promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
- b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, and functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14: Subject to the provisions of article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 17: 1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the organization.

2. The expenses of the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

Article 19: A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

Article 20 (General Assembly Procedure): The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the secretary-general at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the members of the United Nations.

Chapter V: The Security Council

Article 23 (Security Council Composition): 1. The Security Council shall consist of [eleven until 1965] fifteen members of the United Nations. The Republic of China [Nationalist China from 1945 to 1971], France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [Russian Federation after 1991], the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members [the P-5—each possessing the power of veto over any Security Council Resolution] of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect [six until 1965] ten other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent [voting, but not possessing a power of veto] members of the Security Council. . . .

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. . . . A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

Article 24 (Functions and Powers): 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

Article 25: The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 27 (Voting): 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [7 of 11 until 1965] of nine [of 15] members. [Note, no veto power for procedural matters.]

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [seven] nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members [this established the P-5 power of veto]; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting [which is not considered a veto].

Article 29: The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 31: Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are specially affected.

Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Article 33: 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Article 34: The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35: 1. Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of peaceful settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this article will be subject to the provisions of articles 11 and 12.

Article 36: 1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

Article 37: 1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38: Without prejudice to [other] provisions . . . the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Chapter VII:

Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may . . . call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the member of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.

Article 43: 1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. [. . . and be] subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitution processes.

Article 46: Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47: 1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, and the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

Article 48: 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49: The members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

Article 52: 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangement or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements. . . .

Article 53: 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state [of World War II]

Article 54: The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter XV: The Secretariat

Article 97: The Secretariat shall comprise a secretary-general and such staff as the organization may require. The secretary-general shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the organization.

Article 99: The secretary-general may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter XVI: Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 103: In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104: The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.


Chapter XVII: Transitional Security Arrangements

Article 106: Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall in according with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations² with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”³

² Note: Representatives of fifty nations signed the original Charter in San Francisco on 26 June 1945. By 1998, the number of member states had grown to 185.


³ For commentary on the UN Charter, see Chapter 1 of this study and see Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949).

Map B1: The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, November 1947



Source: Martin Gilbert, *Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 6th edn.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 36.


Map B2: Armistice Boundaries between Israel and its Arab Neighbors, 1949



The Middle East, showing the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt


Source: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. I: The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 4.

Map B3: Jammu and Kashmir: the Karachi Cease-Fire Line (CFL), July 1949




The Cease-Fire Line agreed upon in the Karachi Agreement, July 1949
Based on S/6651, ann. (SCOR, 20th yr, suppl. June-Sept. 1965)

Source: Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*, vol. II: *Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 477.



Map B4: Korea and the Korean War, 1950-1953

Source: Robert Crowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Reader's Companion to Military History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), 247.




Based on map no. 134, GAOR, 3rd sess., Suppl. 8, Annex 5.

Map B5: UNSCOB Observation Zones in Northern Greece, 1947-1954

Source: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary, vol. IV, Europe, 1946-1979 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 2.


UNOGIL deployment as of July 1958



Map B6: Lebanon, UNOGIL's Deployment as of July 1958


Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3d ed. (New York: UNDP, 1996), 117.

UNYOM deployment as of October 1963



Map B7: Yemen, UNYOM Deployment as of October 1963


Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3d ed. (New York: UNDP, 1996), 124.



Map B9: The United States of Indonesia, after December 1949

Source: Central Intelligence Agency Web site, <http://cia/ciamaps/indonesia.gif>

Map B10: West New Guinea/Irian Political Boundaries, January 1963




West Irian (West New Guinea)


Based on UN, *The United Nations in West New Guinea* (1963), pp. 16-17

Source: Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary*, vol. II, *Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 474.

Map B11: Sinai and the Gaza Strip:
UNEF I deployment as of August 1957




Source: UNDP, *The Blue Helmets*, 52.



Areas Occupied by Indian and Pakistani armies as at 3.30 a.m. (IST) on 23 September 1965, and Location of UNIPOM
Based on Indian sources.

Map B12: Border between India and West Pakistan, September 1965


Source: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. II, Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 479.



Deployment of UNEF in May 1967

Map B13: Sinai and Gaza Strip: UNEF Deployment as of May 1967

Source: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967: Documents and Commentary, vol. I, The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 218.



Map B14: Territorial Changes as a result of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War


Source: Martin Gilbert, *Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 6th edn. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 68.

Map B15: The Congo: Provinces, Major Towns, and Rivers, July 1960




Source: Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 234.

Map B16: Deployment of Contingents Assigned to ONUC, July 1960



Based on map no. 1274 REP, SCOR, 15th yr, Suppl. for July-Sept. 1960, p. 238.

Source: Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946 - 1967 Documents and Commentary, vol. III, Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), 464.




Map B17: The Congo: Katanga Province (Major Cities and Infrastructure), 1960

Source: Indarjit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 244.



Map B18: Kuwait: Political Map, 1961


Source: CIA Web Site
<http://cia/ciamaps/kuwait.gif>



Map B19: Cyprus and Deployment of UNFICYP Contingents as of December 1965

Source: The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3d ed. (New York: UNDP, 1996), 155.

Map B20: Hispaniola: Political Map of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1965



Source: Indarjit Rikhye, Michael Harbottle, and Bjorn Egge, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974), between pages 210-11.

Source: U.S. Department of State, USPUN 1949. 231.

The United Nations System

The diagram illustrates the structure of the United Nations System, centered around the United Nations emblem. The main organs of the UN are arranged in a circle around the center:

- General Assembly**
- Security Council**
- Economic and Social Council**
- Secretariat**
- Trusteeship Council**


Surrounding these main organs are various specialized agencies, commissions, and funds, arranged in a larger circle:

- Specialized Agencies:** ILO (International Labour Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), WHO (World Health Organization), UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), ITC (International Trade Centre), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), UN Women, UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), UNWFP (United Nations World Food Programme), UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East).
- Commissions:** Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.
- Funds:** UN Development Fund, UN Trust Fund, UN Voluntary Fund, UN Special Fund.

A dashed line separates the main organs from the specialized agencies and funds. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols used:

- Specialized Agencies:** Represented by a solid black square.
- Commissions:** Represented by a solid black square.
- Funds:** Represented by a solid black square.
- Other:** Represented by a solid black square.

Organization Chart of a United States Delegation to a United Nations General Assembly Session




Source: *United States Mission to the United Nations, Administrative Office, December 1965.*

Chart C2: USUN/General Assembly Overview (typical 1965)

Source: Arnold Beichman, The "Other" State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations—Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 211.

Organization Chart of the Permanent United States Mission to the United Nations



Source: *United States Mission to the United Nations, Administrative Office, August 1967.*

Chart C3: USUN Organizational Chart (typical, 1967)

Source: Arnold Beichman, *The "Other" State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations—Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 210.

C4. The Costs of Promoting Peace and the Costs of War/Intervention, 1946 - 1968

Mission Type/Item	Total UN Assessments (estimates in U.S. millions)	Annual Costs (avg. in U.S. millions)	Other Information (estimates/figures in U.S. millions)
UNTSO	1948-1968: * est. \$12.00	UN: \$0.57	Annual Costs Doubled in 1948 and 1967
UNMOGIP	1949-1968: * est. \$12.40	UN: \$0.62	UNIPOM Costs (1965-1966): \$1.72
UNEF I	1957-1967: \$214.50	UN: \$19.50	U.S. Contributions: \$93.80 (44%)
UNOGIL	June - Dec. 1958: \$3.70	(UN: prorated \$7.40)	U.S. Contributions: \$1.56 (42%)
ONUC	1960-1964: \$408.30	UN: \$102.08	U.S. Contributions: \$179.80 (44%)
UNFICYP	1964-1968: * est. \$95.00	UN: \$23.75	U.S. Contributions: est. \$40.10 (42%)
KOREAN WAR	25 June 1950 - 27 July 1953	U.S.: \$25,000.00	Total Cost to U.S. Government: \$75,000.00
U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON	15 July 1958 - 25 Oct. 1958	(U.S.: pro. \$360.00) (UN: prorated \$7.40)	Operation "Blue Bat." 15,000 U.S. Soldiers Total Cost to U.S. Government: \$120.00
U.S. INTERVENTION IN DOM. REPUBLIC	April 1965 - Sep. 1966 (OAS/IAPF after May 1965)	U.S.: \$135.00 OAS: \$35.00	Initial U.S. Force: 22,500 > May 65: 12,000 Total Cost to U.S. Government: \$180.00
COLD WAR	1947-1968*	USDOD: \$78,000.00	Total U.S. Expenditures est. \$6,500,000.00

*Partial duration. Note: Missions not depicted were either not assessed to the United Nations or costs were insignificant. Sources: DOS, USPUN 1945-1968; David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support—Experience and Prospects (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), passim; Costs of Korean and Cold Wars in Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, D.C.: Cato Press, 1996), 22, 37, 181.

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Lot Files:

Lot 428: Bureau of United Nations Affairs

NSC Files and Action Memoranda

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Records of the Policy Planning Staff

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VITA

Michael Dwight Davis was born in Encino, California on 21 October 1959. He is the second son of John Edward and Patricia Delyte Davis. On 10 November 1969, he accepted Jesus Christ as his personal savior and has attempted to walk close to the Lord since that time. He graduated from Quartz Hill High School in southern California in 1977. Michael was accepted to the Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs, Colorado) in 1979, after having served one year enlisted in the U.S. Air Force. He graduated from the Academy in 1983 with a Bachelor's of Science, majoring in history/area studies and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the USAF. He was the top military graduate in his class (956 total) and was awarded the Academy's "Wolfe" humanities fellowship to continue his education as his next assignment.

Michael earned his Master of Arts degree from the University of Texas at Austin in the summer of 1984. While at school in Austin, he courted and married the former USAF nurse, Karen S. Gould. Together they moved to Arizona where Mike entered pilot training at Williams AFB. Upon completing flight training, he was selected as a "FAIP"—a first assignment instructor pilot. After flying T-37s for 3 years at "Willy," he and his family (with one son, Andrew born in 1985) were transferred to Amman, Jordan where Mike flew the T-37 and the Casa-101 at the King Hussein Air Academy for two years. The family (now with two sons, Roger born in 1989) returned to Ft. Worth, Texas where Mike flew for two years as a B-52 aircraft commander. That bomber assignment was followed by another, this time as a B-1B instructor pilot assigned to Ellsworth AFB, near Rapid City, South Dakota.

Mike began attending graduate school at the University of Maryland, College Park in September 1995. In November 1998 he was assigned to the Pentagon.

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